Jackman-Bey v. Bullard - Next Friend Standing Denied

Jump To

Top Caption Trial Court Document The text of this document was obtained by analyzing a scanned document and may have typos.

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

April 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Jeremy Raphael Jackman-Bey v. Jamie Bullard, Warden, Tabor Correctional Institution

District Court, W.D. North Carolina

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 3:26-cv-00002

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (30.6K)

• PDF

Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 3:26-cv-00002-MR

JEREMY RAPHAEL JACKMAN-BEY, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
MICHELLE JACKMAN-BEY, )
)
As Next Friend, ) MEMORANDUM OF
) DECISION AND ORDER
vs. )
)
JAMIE BULLARD, Warden, )
Tabor Correctional Institution, )
)
Respondent. )
________________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, on behalf of
Jeremy Raphael Jackman-Bey (herein “Petitioner”), by Michelle Jackman-
Bey, as his “next friend” (herein “Ms. Jackman-Bey”). [Doc. 1].
I. BACKGROUND
According to the North Carolina Department of Adult Correction
Database,1 the Petitioner is a prisoner of the State of North Carolina pursuant

1 See https://webapps.doc.state.nc.us/opi/viewoffender.do?method=view&offenderID=
1082643&searchOffenderId=1082643&searchDOBRange=0&listurl=pagelistoffendersea
rchresults&listpage=1 (herein “NCDAC Database”); Fed. R. Evid. 201.
to a state court judgment. The Petitioner was convicted in the Mecklenburg
County Superior Court, file number 11CR23384, of Second-Degree Murder

on April 26, 2012. [NCDAC Database]. The state trial court imposed on the
Petitioner an active sentence of 200 to 249 months imprisonment. [Id.]. The
Petitioner’s conviction and sentence imposed in this judgment is projected to

expire November 12, 2029. [Id.].
Ms. Jackman-Bey has filed the petition herein purportedly on behalf of
the Petitioner asserting that she is the “Attorney-in-Fact and Authorized Next
Friend” of the Petitioner. [Doc. 1]. Ms. Jackman-Bey is not an attorney

licensed by the North Carolina State Bar2 to practice law. Further, Ms.
Jackman-Bey neither alleges any facts to show why the Petitioner is
incapable of filing his own petition through licensed counsel or pro se, nor

why this Court should grant her “next friend” status.
II. DISCUSSION
Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is available to a person who is “in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he

is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” While Ms. Jackman-Bey broadly asserts that the Petitioner is being

2 A search of the North Carolina State Bar membership directory using the surname
“Jackman” or “Jackman-Bey” located no licensed attorney with the full name “Michelle
Jackman-Bey.” https://portal.ncbar.gov/Verification/results.aspx. Fed.R.Evid. 201.
held by the state in violation of the Constitution, her very capacity to assert
these claims for and on behalf of the Petitioner is governed by a separate

part of the Constitution. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution limits the
power of federal courts to actual cases and controversies. Though “several
doctrines ... have grown up to elaborate that requirement,” the one “that

requires a litigant to have ‘standing’ to invoke the power of a federal court is
perhaps the most important.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). A
person who does not satisfy Article III's standing requirements may still
proceed in federal court if she meets the criteria to serve as “next friend” of

someone who does.
In Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 162 (1990), the Supreme
Court noted that next friend standing “has long been an accepted basis for

jurisdiction in certain circumstances,” expressly permitted in habeas actions,3
and has most often been invoked “on behalf of detained prisoners who are
unable, usually because of mental incompetence or inaccessibility, to seek
relief themselves.” The Court clarified that “[a] ‘next friend’ does not himself

become a party to the habeas corpus action in which he participates, but

3 “Application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the
person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf.” 28 U.S. Code
§ 2242 (emphasis added).
simply pursues the cause on behalf of the detained person, who remains the
real party in interest.” Id. at 163.

The availability of next friend standing in federal court is not a right and
is strictly limited:
Most important for present purposes, “next friend” standing is by
no means granted automatically to whomever seeks to pursue
an action on behalf of another. Decisions applying the habeas
corpus statute have adhered to at least two firmly rooted
prerequisites for “next friend” standing. First, a “next friend” must
provide an adequate explanation – such as inaccessibility,
mental incompetence, or other disability – why the real party in
interest cannot appear on his own behalf to prosecute the action.
Second, the “next friend” must be truly dedicated to the best
interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate, and
it has been further suggested that a “next friend” must have some
significant relationship with the real party in interest. The burden
is on the “next friend” clearly to establish the propriety of his
status and thereby justify the jurisdiction of the court.

Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163-64 (internal citations omitted). As the Court
emphasized, “[t]hese limitations on the ‘next friend’ doctrine are driven by the
recognition that it was not intended that the writ of habeas corpus should be
availed of, as matter of course, by intruders or uninvited meddlers, styling
themselves next friends.” Id. at 164.
This Court now turns to the issue of whether Ms. Jackman-Bey
qualifies for next friend status. First, the Court finds that Ms. Jackman-Bey
has no significant relationship with the real party in interest, the Petitioner, or
that she appears truly dedicated to his best interests. This is so simply
because Ms. Jackman-Bey has alleged no such facts leading to either
conclusion. Second, the Court likewise cannot find that the real party in

interest, the Petitioner, is incapable of appearing on his own behalf to
prosecute the action. Ms. Jackman-Bey has alleged no facts setting forth any
basis as to why the Petitioner cannot complete a standard habeas form

himself and sign it under penalty of perjury.
The Court has before it the all-too-common scenario of a concerned
individual, possibly a spouse or family member, wanting only the best for the
named Petitioner who is in state custody. In the absence of any factual

showing of mental incompetence or other disability plaguing the Petitioner,
as well as the absence of any facts showing her significant relationship with
the Petitioner, Ms. Jackman-Bey’s claim to next friend status is unfounded.

As noted by the Fifth Circuit,
[I]ndividuals not licensed to practice law by the state may not use
the “next friend” device as an artifice for the unauthorized
practice of law. The “next friend” expedient, which on occasion
may be essential to the efficacy of the “Great Writ,” may not be
so abused as to unleash on the courts a quasi-professional group
of lay writ writers who would seek to right all wrongs, both real
and imagined.

Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 1978). As mandated by the
Supreme Court, “[t]he burden is on the ‘next friend’ clearly to establish the
propriety of [her] status and thereby justify the jurisdiction of the court.”
Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164. Ms. Jackman-Bey has not carried this burden.
Accordingly, Ms. Jackman-Bey fails to qualify for the status of next friend
and, therefore, this Court is without jurisdiction to proceed.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Ms. Jackman-Bey’s next friend
status is DENIED and this action is DISMISSED for want of subject matter
jurisdiction.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases, the Court DECLINES to issue a certificate
of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c)(2); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,
338 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: April 20, 2026

Martifi Reidinger ee
Chief United States District Judge AS