Petrov v. Blanche - Cancellation of Removal Denied

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                    by Scudder](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10843319/bato-petrov-v-todd-w-blanche/#o1)

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April 15, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Bato Petrov v. Todd W. Blanche

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 22-3114

• Judges: Scudder

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (176)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by [Michael Yale Scudder Jr.](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8633/michael-yale-scudder-jr/)

In the

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 20-3517 & 22-3114
BATO PETROV,
Petitioner,

v.

TODD W. BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General of the United
States,
Respondent.

Petitions for Review of an
Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A020-987-580.

ARGUED JANUARY 27, 2026 — DECIDED APRIL 14, 2026

Before RIPPLE, SCUDDER, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.
SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Bato Petrov is a stateless native of
Germany who sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(1), contending that his removal will cause excep-
tional and extremely unusual hardship to his United States
citizen relatives. An immigration judge concluded that Pe-
trov’s evidence fell short of this demanding standard and de-
nied his application. The Board of Immigration Appeals
2 Nos. 20-3517 & 22-3114

affirmed and then denied Petrov’s subsequent motion to reo-
pen the removal proceedings. Petrov now seeks relief in our
court. Seeing no errors, we deny his petitions for review.
I
Petrov was born in Germany but identifies as a stateless
gypsy. In 1974, at about the age of one, he illegally entered the
United States and has lived here ever since. Petrov has been
with Helen Owens, a United States citizen, since the 1990s,
and the couple married in 2013. They live in Chicago with
their three children, all United States citizens. Petrov’s parents
also live in Chicago, and his father is a United States citizen.
In January 2014, Petrov filed an application for asylum,
which the United States Citizenship and Immigration Ser-
vices denied. Later in 2014, the Department of Homeland Se-
curity served Petrov with a Notice to Appear and initiated re-
moval proceedings against him under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182 (a)(6)(A)(i) for having entered the United States with-
out admission or parole. Petrov conceded removability, and
the agency designated Germany as his county of removal.
Petrov then sought cancellation of removal under
§ 1229b(b). A hearing followed before an immigration judge,
and Petrov and his wife both testified. They explained that
Petrov was the sole breadwinner for his household, that his
family was particularly close, and that he feared European
racism against gypsies. The immigration judge denied Pe-
trov’s application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals
agreed, largely adopting the immigration judge’s decision.
In March 2021, Petrov asked the Board to reopen his ap-
plication, supplemented by additional evidence. For the first
time, he introduced evidence that his wife suffers from
Nos. 20-3517 & 22-3114 3

anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder. He
also informed the Board that she endured a miscarriage in
June 2018. Petrov submitted further evidence that two of his
children and his father have medical conditions. Finally, he
included articles reporting the lack of economic opportunity
in Germany and ongoing bias there against gypsies.
The Board denied Petrov’s motion to reopen. It concluded
that some of his additional evidence existed and was available
prior to the immigration judge’s initial hardship decision.
Further, the Board found that the additional evidence,
whether considered individually or cumulatively with the ex-
isting record evidence, did not demonstrate prima facie eligi-
bility for cancellation of removal under the hardship stand-
ard.
Petrov now petitions for our review.
II
A
To qualify for cancellation of removal, a non-citizen bears
the burden to show that his removal would result in “excep-
tional and extremely unusual hardship to [his] spouse, par-
ent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(1)(D).
We have jurisdiction to review the agency’s exceptional-
and-extremely-unusual-hardship determination because it is
a mixed question of law and fact. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)(2)(D);
Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 217 (2024) (clarifying that
this question falls within the scope of federal court review un-
der § 1252). Our court has not yet specified the precise stand-
ard of review applicable to the agency’s hardship determina-
tion. See Santos Mendoza v. Bondi, 151 F.4th 900, 905 (7th Cir.
4 Nos. 20-3517 & 22-3114

2025). Other circuits suggest the standard is either substantial
evidence or clear error review. See id. (surveying case law and
ruling out de novo review). We need not resolve this question
here. Whether we review the hardship determination for clear
error or substantial evidence, we see no ground for relief.
“Because the Board adopted the immigration judge’s de-
cision but provided [minimal] additional reasoning, we re-
view the judge’s decision as supplemented by the Board.” Pe-
rez-Perez v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 371, 374 (7th Cir. 2021). To be
eligible for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(1), Pe-
trov “had to show that his removal would cause hardship that
is substantially different from, or beyond, that which would
be normally expected from the deportation of an alien with
close family members in the United States.” Santos Mendoza,
151 F.4th at 906 (cleaned up). The inquiry considers “the ages,
health, and circumstances” of Petrov’s qualifying relatives. Id.
(cleaned up).
The agency’s conclusion that Petrov’s family’s hardship
was not exceptional and extremely unusual passes muster.
On Petrov’s initial motion, the record before the immigration
judge and the Board primarily established that his family was
financially dependent on him. But losing the family’s main in-
come earner is insufficient alone to establish exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship. See id.; see also In re Andazola-
Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319, 323 (BIA 2002) (explaining that “eco-
nomic detriment alone is insufficient to support even a find-
ing of extreme hardship,” which is less demanding than “ex-
ceptional and extremely unusual hardship”).
At the time of his initial motion, Petrov had not submitted
evidence of circumstances, like his family’s medical condi-
tions, that might have compounded that financial harm.
Nos. 20-3517 & 22-3114 5

Indeed, the immigration judge expressly acknowledged the
good health of Petrov’s family and his daughters’ lack of spe-
cial educational needs. Put simply, on the record before the
Board and the immigration judge, Petrov failed to provide ev-
idence that his family would endure harm beyond the normal
pain associated with removal cases.
B
This brings us to the Board’s denial of Petrov’s motion to
reopen removal proceedings. We review this decision for
abuse of discretion. See Cruz-Velasco v. Garland, 58 F.4th 900,
903 (7th Cir. 2023). In this context, our touch is especially light.
We grant relief only if the Board’s decision “was made with-
out a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from estab-
lished policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as in-
vidious discrimination against a particular race or group.” Id.
(quoting Victor v. Holder, 616 F.3d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 2010)). The
Board “has discretion to reopen a removal proceeding when
the alien presents material evidence that ‘was not available
and could not have been discovered or presented at the for-
mer hearing.’” Victor, 616 F.3d at 710 (quoting 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2 (c)(1)).
The Board did not abuse its discretion by concluding that
Petrov could have discovered much of his motion evidence
prior to the immigration judge’s initial hardship determina-
tion. The records documenting his wife’s mental health chal-
lenges date to 2011, well before removal proceedings started
against Petrov. Although Petrov asserted that his wife’s sense
of secrecy and shame precluded him from presenting this ev-
idence, he points to no evidentiary support for this explana-
tion. See Barragan-Ojeda v. Sessions, 853 F.3d 374, 383 (7th Cir.
2017) (rejecting attorney’s otherwise unsupported
6 Nos. 20-3517 & 22-3114

explanation that a non-citizen had not previously revealed his
sexual orientation before the immigration judge due, in part,
to fear). Additionally, Petrov’s briefing before us does not ex-
plain why he failed to present evidence of his daughter’s heart
condition to the immigration judge despite the medical rec-
ords indicating she had the condition as early as 2014.
As to the remaining evidence, the Board did not abuse its
discretion by concluding Petrov failed to make out a prima
facie case for cancellation of removal. We understand Petrov’s
important role in supporting his family. And we have deep
sympathy for Ms. Owens and recognize how the sorrow of
miscarriage may have added to her struggles. The Board,
however, considered Petrov’s evidence about each of his fam-
ily members and explained why this evidence, considered in-
dividually and as a whole, did not demonstrate unusual hard-
ship. Our standard of review demands no more.
Finally, to the degree that the Board committed error by
failing to engage with Petrov’s articles about racism and eco-
nomic conditions in Germany, any error was harmless. See Ig-
lesias v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 528, 530–32 (7th Cir. 2008) (applying
harmless error standard). Hardship to Petrov is only relevant
insofar as it may affect his qualifying relatives. See In re Mon-
real-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 64 (BIA 2001). While adverse
treatment of Petrov in Europe may cause his family dismay
or hamper his ability to contribute financially, these general
articles do not establish that the situation facing his family
would rise to the high standard of exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship.
For these reasons, we DENY the petitions for review.