Velazquez-Olais v. Blanche - Immigration Removal Review

7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Filed April 6th, 2026

Detected April 7th, 2026

Summary

The Seventh Circuit dismissed petition No. 25-1244 filed by Asucena Velazquez-Olais challenging a 2018 Final Administrative Removal Order. The court held that an email from a Chicago Field Office Deportation Officer declining to reopen the removal order does not constitute a final agency action subject to judicial review. The petitioner must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking appellate review.

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What changed

Petitioner Asucena Velazquez-Olais, who was removed to Mexico in August 2018 under a Final Administrative Removal Order (FARO) pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1228(b), sought judicial review of an email from a Department of Homeland Security Deportation Officer stating the Chicago Office would not revisit her 2018 removal order. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the petition, holding that the email does not constitute a final agency action subject to appellate review. The court distinguished Riley v. Bondi (2025), which held that final removal orders are reviewable, from this situation where no final order was issued—just a non-binding email from an officer without authority to issue final orders.

Immigration detainees and their counsel should understand that requests to reopen removal orders must go through proper administrative channels before seeking judicial review. An email declining to reopen does not create appellate jurisdiction. Petitioners should exhaust administrative remedies and await a formal final agency decision before filing petitions for review in the circuit courts.

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April 6, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Asucena Velazquez Olais v. Todd Blanche

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Citations: None known
Docket Number: 25-1244
Judges: Easterbrook
Opinion
Authorities (5)
Cited By (0)
Summaries (0)
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Combined Opinion

                        by [Frank Hoover Easterbrook](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/960/frank-hoover-easterbrook/)

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit

No. 25-1244
ASUCENA VELAZQUEZ-OLAIS,
Petitioner,
v.

TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General of the United States,
Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Administrative Decision
Declining to Reopen a Removal Order

ARGUED FEBRUARY 19, 2026 — DECIDED APRIL 6, 2026

Before EASTERBROOK, PRYOR, and KOLAR, Circuit Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Asucena Velazquez-Olais en-
tered the United States illegally (avoiding inspection at the
border) some time before 2018. When a state conviction for
possessing cocaine with intent to deliver, see 720 ILCS
570/401(d), brought her to the attention of federal oﬃcials, the
Department of Homeland Security entered a “Final Adminis-
trative Removal Order” (FARO) against her. See 8 U.S.C.
§1228 (b). Such an order is judicially reviewable, see Riley v.
Bondi, 606 U.S. 259 (2025), but Velazquez-Olais did not ﬁle a
2 No. 25-1244
petition for review. She was removed to Mexico on August 10,
2018.
She is back in the United States. Again we do not know
when and how she entered, but she does not contend that the
entry was authorized or lawful. She asked a state court to
amend her conviction from “possession with intent to de-
liver” to simple possession, contending that the quantity
seized on her arrest (28.1 grams) is consistent with personal
use. The state judiciary obliged.
Counsel for Velazquez-Olais then asked an immigration
oﬃcial in Chicago to reopen and cancel the removal order. Af-
ter an exchange of emails, a Deportation Oﬃcer in the Chi-
cago Field Oﬃce of the Department of Homeland Security
stated that the “Chicago Oﬃce” would not revisit the 2018 or-
der. Velazquez-Olais now invokes 8 U.S.C. §1252 (a), asking
the court of appeals to review that email message.
It is one thing to say, as the Justices did in Riley, that a ﬁnal
order of removal is reviewable even when entered through an
expedited process. It is quite another to suppose that an email
declining to do anything about an order executed years ago is
the same as an order of removal. Riley carefully identiﬁed the
characteristics that make something an order of removal. 606
U.S. at 267. The email that Velazquez-Olais received possesses
none of these. With some exceptions, §1252(a)(1) authorizes a
court of appeals to review a “ﬁnal order of removal”, so we
could have reviewed the 2018 order. But that order has been
carried out. All questions about timing to one side
(§1252(b)(1) allows only 30 days to seek judicial review), it is
not possible to see an email from a ﬁeld oﬃce as the agency’s
ﬁnal decision, let alone as a “ﬁnal order of removal.”
There is just nothing to review. The 2018 order has been
executed. Once an order has been executed, it cannot be re-
No. 25-1244 3
executed. Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 487 (9th
Cir. 2007). An order of removal may be reinstated under 8
U.S.C. §1231 (a)(5), and the act of reinstatement is reviewable
under some circumstances. See Villa v. Barr, 924 F.3d 370, 372–
73 (7th Cir. 2019). But the 2018 order has not been reinstated.
Instead the Department of Homeland Security restarted the
removal process last July by issuing a Notice to Appear. A
new decisional process is under way. Velazquez-Olais can ar-
gue there that a conviction for simple possession of cocaine
does not foreclose avenues of discretionary relief.
If the ongoing process leads to a new order of removal,
Velazquez-Olais will be free to seek judicial review. If she is
criminally prosecuted for her reentry, that too would facilitate
review, subject to the limitations in 8 U.S.C. §1326 (d). See
United States v. Palomar-Santiago, 593 U.S. 321 (2021); United
States v. Manriquez-Alvarado, 953 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2020). But
she is not now subject to an order of removal, so we lack ju-
risdiction under §1252(a).
The petition for review is dismissed.