People v. Bontemps - Affirmation of Judgment

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March 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Bontemps CA4/1

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: D084635

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (15)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/27/26 P. v. Bontemps CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084635

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCS326700)

DONALD PAUL BONTEMPS III,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Timothy R. Walsh, Judge. Affirmed.

Russell S. Babcock, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier, Supervising Deputy Attorney
General, Emily Reeves, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
A jury convicted Donald Paul Bontemps III of seven counts of corporal

injury on a dating partner (Pen. Code,1 § 273.5, subd. (a); counts 2-4, 6-9) and
three counts of assault with great bodily injury. (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); counts 5,
11, and 12.) The court found true allegations that the offenses involved a
high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness and the victim was
particularly vulnerable. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.421(a)(1) and (a)(3).)
The court sentenced Bontemps to an aggregate term of 10 years in state
prison.
Bontemps appeals, contending his conviction must be reversed because:
(1) the trial court abused its discretion in allowing an expert witness to

testify about intimate partner battering and its effects2; (2) the trial court
erred in failing to sua sponte give CALCRIM No. 850, the limiting instruction
on the use of such expert testimony; (3) his attorney was ineffective for failing
to object to the expert testimony or request CALCRIM No. 850; and (4) the
cumulative effect of these errors denied his right to due process.
We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Bontemps and V.G. began dating on and off starting in June 2021. In
June 2022, when V.G. was about five months pregnant with their child, she

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Different terminology has been used to refer to this set of effects.
Bontemps uses “intimate partner battering syndrome,” while “battered
women’s syndrome” continues to appear in many opinions. (See, e.g., People
v. Morgan (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1212.) But “ ‘intimate partner
battering and its effects’ is the more accurate and now preferred term.” (In re
Walker (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 533, 536, fn. 1.) (See, e.g., Evid. Code, § 1107
[governing admissibility of expert testimony regarding “intimate partner
battering and its effects”].)
2
moved in with Bontemps. In September V.G. returned to Michigan, where
her family lived, to have the baby. Bontemps joined them in Michigan just
before the baby was born. Their daughter was born in Michigan in October.
V.G. and the baby moved back in with Bontemps in January 2023. Her
relationship with Bontemps was bad at the time. There was infidelity and
yelling, and V.G. had thought about leaving. But she loved Bontemps and
she wanted a household with two parents for their baby.
After she moved back in with Bontemps, things got “really tense
quickly.” Bontemps told V.G. he was not getting enough sleep due to the
baby’s crying, and he began getting frustrated with her. Bontemps would
“flick” V.G.’s forehead and belittle her verbally, telling her that she was a
“bad mom.” He would ram his head against her head, and squeeze her
cheeks hard. The violence escalated over the next several months. Bontemps
pushed her to the ground, kicked her in the legs and stomach, hit her on her
head with a shoe, punched her in the back of the head, grabbed her neck,
twisted her fingers and hands, and strangled, choked, and slapped her.
She did not leave him because she hoped the “old Donnie” that she
knew and fell in love with would come back. She wanted him to “be the dad
[she] thought he could be.” Bontemps never hurt their baby and was good
with her.
V.G. took audio and video recordings of her injuries to show herself that
she was not going crazy, since the way Bontemps acted “behind closed doors”
was completely different from when they went to church or the laundromat
together. She never reported him to the police because she did not want
Bontemps to get in trouble, and she thought they could work through their
issues. They still had good times together, but things could change from good
to bad within a matter of seconds. Just before his arrest Bontemps was

3
assaulting her daily. Several times he strangled her to the point that she
could not breathe, which scared her.
By March 2023, V.G. was making plans to leave. She applied for
apartments in Michigan and attempted to save money until she could finish
school in May 2023. She kept her plan a secret because Bontemps had
previously told her she would never see their child again if she left.
For a while she did not tell anyone what was happening because it was
embarrassing, but she eventually told two friends in April or May 2023.
V.G. continued to go to school and attempted to hide the bruising by
wearing a hat with her hair down, wearing long sleeves, and tightening her
hood around her face. She asked a classmate for makeup to cover up her
injuries but did not tell her what was going on. Eventually one of her
classmates learned about the reason for the bruising on her face and reported
it to law enforcement.
When police first interviewed her in May 2023, V.G. still wanted to
protect Bontemps so she told them things were fine and asked them to leave.
Bontemps was arrested that same day.
At trial V.G. testified about physical attacks by Bontemps in February,
March, April, and May 2023. She authenticated photos and videos she took
of the resulting injuries, a video she recorded of one of the interactions with
Bontemps, and multiple audio files of Bontemps berating and threatening her
with violence.
Detective Federico Dominguez testified as an expert in domestic
violence relationships. He received extensive training on investigating
domestic violence and worked on over 6,400 domestic violence cases in his 10
years as a patrol officer and three years as a detective with the with the
Chula Vista Police Department’s family protection unit. Detective

4
Dominguez was not the assigned detective on Bontemps’s case. He had not
interviewed V.G. and he was not provided any information about the case.
Based on his training and experience, Detective Dominguez described
different emotional responses exhibited by victims of domestic violence, which
can include anger, confusion, and embarrassment. Some victims minimize
what happened because they are in shock or do not want to admit that they
allowed things to get as bad as they did. He said, by the time law
enforcement gets involved, which, statistics show, is typically after there are
least seven unreported domestic violence incidents, victims can direct their
anger at law enforcement out of fear of what will happen to the children or to
deflect attention away from the abuser. He stated that he was using
statistics only for generalizations.
Detective Dominguez explained various myths and misconceptions of
domestic violence, including that it is not always apparent that an individual
is a perpetrator or victim of domestic violence. Domestic violence can impact
individuals from a wide range of socioeconomic, cultural, religious,
educational, or relationship backgrounds. It is not always the case that the
perpetrator is male and the victim is female. Another myth is that the victim
in a domestic violence relationship must have done something to deserve the
abuse. This leads victims to underreport the violence, because a victim might
believe that had they not acted in a certain way, they would not be a victim,
and they need to get out of the situation themselves. A victim may stay in an
abusive relationship due to finances, their living situation, children, their
religious beliefs, their world views, or their familial beliefs.
Detective Dominguez described a diagram referred to as a “power and
control wheel” used by law enforcement and victim advocates to understand
and talk to victims about the dynamics that affect abusive relationships.

5
Power and control may be exercised through physical and sexual violence,
intimidation, harm to property or pets, emotional abuse, isolating the victim,
using children as bargaining pieces, an assumption that male privilege
permits men to beat women, and economic abuse. In particular, emotional
abuse could involve, for a female, name calling and degrading her about
appearance or children, and for a male, belittling him for loss of a job or
financial difficulties. Detective Dominguez testified that violence can
escalate over time, with good days and bad days. He also described the cycle
of abuse in an abusive relationship. He described two “prototypes” for the
abuser: the “bulldog,” who is domineering and always ready to attack, and a
“viper”, who is calm and quiet but can snap. In the cycle of abuse, tension
between the individuals can escalate towards a violent outburst: then
“[t]here’s the bite from the bulldog; there’s the bite from the viper.” The
outburst is followed by a “honeymoon phase,” after which escalation resumes.
The cycles often get faster and more violent.
Detective Dominguez discussed the ways in which victims may adapt to
the cycle of violence by covering injuries with makeup, clothes or hairstyles,
or taking up martial arts or other intense activities to have an explanation
for bruising. He also noted that some victims attempt to collect evidence of
their abuse or come up with plans to flee. It is common for victims to be
unable to remember details of every incident of abuse.
The jury also heard from a friend of V.G.’s who received text messages
from her about the abuse, and two classmates, one of whom made the report
to law enforcement, who saw bruises on V.G. A forensic nurse testified as an
expert in the mechanics of strangulation.
Bontemps testified in his defense at trial. He explained that V.G.
frequently belittled him, accused him of cheating, and demanded to look at

6
his phone. V.G. would get physically aggressive with him. When she charged
at him, Bontemps would grab her wrists, turn her around and hug her from
behind to restrain her arms, and ask her to stop.
As to the specific charges, Bontemps recalled having an argument but
not a physical altercation with V.G. on February 27, 2023. On March 23,
Bontemps said V.G. struck him in the face and in response Bontemps
grabbed her arms to restrain her. He got bruised on his eye, but he did not
take any photos. He did not call the police because he did not want her to be
separated from her child, and they were trying to deal with it themselves.
On all of the other charged occasions, V.G. initiated the encounters by
throwing objects at him or trying to strike or kick him. To restrain her
Bontemps grabbed her wrists or arms and held her. He asked her not to hit
him. He never intentionally put his hands or arms around her neck. The
encounter on May 13, 2023, was similar; she got physical with him and he
restrained her in the same manner.
V.G. showed him pictures she had taken of her injuries and said she
could “bury [him],” which he took to mean he would be sent to jail and lose
his daughter. He took extra 12-hour shifts at work to avoid being at home.
He asked her to leave and offered to pay for her travel to the home of a friend,
family member, or wherever she wanted to move.
The trial court instructed the jury regarding expert testimony with
CALCRIM No. 332, which explained that “[t]he meaning and importance of
any opinion” was for the jury to decide. The parties agreed to the set of jury
instructions given. Neither the parties nor the court proposed CALCRIM No.
850, regarding intimate partner battering and its effects.
The jury returned verdicts of guilty on seven counts of corporal injury
and three counts of assault; returned a not guilty verdict on one count of

7
corporal injury (count 1, dated February 27, 2023), and deadlocked on one
count each of corporal injury and assault (counts 10 and 13, both dated May
13, 2023).
DISCUSSION
I. Failure to Object Forfeited Bontemps’s Challenge to Admission of
Intimate Partner Battering Evidence
Bontemps contends the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
the expert testimony because the expert improperly relied on statistical
probabilities and covered irrelevant and prejudicial topics. The Attorney
General contends that we should not consider this argument on appeal
because Bontemps failed to object to the expert testimony at trial. Bontemps
concedes that he failed to object. This claim was therefore forfeited.
Evidence Code section 353, subdivision (a) allows a judgment to be
reversed because of erroneous admission of evidence only if an objection to
the evidence or a motion to strike it was “timely made and so stated as to
make clear the specific ground of the objection.” (Evid. Code § 353, subd. (a).)
Accordingly, a defendant’s failure “ ‘to make a timely and specific objection’
on the ground asserted on appeal makes that ground not cognizable,” and the
defendant forfeits his claim on appeal that the trial court erroneously
admitted the evidence. (People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 20-21.)
This principle applies equally to the admission of expert witness testimony.
(People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 448; People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th
186, 211.)
Since “ ‘ “ ‘ “[t]he law casts upon the party the duty of looking after
his legal rights and of calling the judge’s attention to any infringement of
them,” ’ ” ’ ” Bontemps’s failure to object forfeited this claim on appeal.
(People v. Aguirre (2025) 18 Cal.5th 629, 706 n. 41.)

8
We consider, ante, Bontemps’s claim that the failure to object
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.
II. No Sua Sponte Duty by Court to Instruct
Bontemps contends the court was obligated to instruct the jury sua
sponte with CALCRIM No. 850, which limits the use of expert testimony on
the effects of intimate partner battering. We disagree that the court was
required to give a limiting instruction absent a request.
A. Legal Principles
A claim of instructional error is reviewed de novo. (People v. Thomas
(2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 924, 948.)
“ ‘ “Absent a request, a trial court generally has no duty to instruct as
to the limited purpose for which evidence has been admitted.” ’ ” (People v.
Mateo (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1071-1074 (Mateo).) The Legislature
imposes only one mandatory instruction on expert testimony, which is

captured by CALCRIM No. 332. (§ 1127b.)3 “No further instruction on the
subject of opinion evidence need be given.” (Ibid.)
B. Analysis
The trial court complied with section 1127b by providing the jury with
the pattern instruction on expert testimony found in CALCRIM No. 332.

3 “When, in any criminal trial or proceeding, the opinion of any expert
witness is received in evidence, the court shall instruct the jury substantially
as follows: [¶] Duly qualified experts may give their opinions on questions in
controversy at a trial. To assist the jury in deciding such questions, the jury
may consider the opinion with the reasons stated therefor, if any, by the
expert who gives the opinion. The jury is not bound to accept the opinion of
any expert as conclusive, but should give to it the weight to which they shall
find it to be entitled. The jury may, however, disregard any such opinion, if it
shall be found by them to be unreasonable. [¶] No further instruction on the
subject of opinion evidence need be given.” (§ 1127b.)
9
Under the plain language of the final sentence of section 1127b, no further
limiting instruction on the use of the expert testimony was required.
While People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 959 imposed a sua
sponte duty to give a limiting instruction “in all cases” where an expert
testifies about an analogous psychological syndrome, we agree with Mateo,
supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at pages 1071-1074, that statutory and decisional law
require the instruction be given only if requested. Mateo explained that
Housley is “at odds with our Supreme Court’s decision in [People v. Humphrey
(1996)] 13 Cal.4th 1073,” which held that the trial court had a duty to give a
limiting instruction on intimate partner battering and its effects on request,
and suggested that, even on request, “an instruction would be discretionary.”
(Mateo, at p. 1073; see Humphrey, at p. 1088, fn. 5 [an additional limiting
instruction might be appropriate on request].)
We agree with Mateo’s analysis and conclude that a trial court does not
have a sua sponte duty to give CALCRIM No. 850 when testimony on
intimate partner battering and its effects is presented. Here, the trial court
properly instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 332, which complies with
section 1127b’s requirements. In the absence of a request from Bontemps, no
further instruction on expert testimony was required, and the trial court did
not err.
III. Counsel Was Not Ineffective
Bontemps contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to Detective Dominguez’s testimony or request CALCRIM No. 850. Since
Bontemps failed to demonstrate prejudice, we conclude his counsel was not
ineffective.

10
A. Legal Principles
To establish ineffective assistance, an appellant must show (1)
“counsel’s performance was deficient” and (2) “the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687
(Strickland).)
A reviewing court will indulge the presumption that counsel’s
performance fell within the wide range of professional competence and that
counsel’s actions and inactions can be explained as a matter of sound trial
strategy. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687.)
On appeal, if the record “ ‘ “sheds no light on why counsel acted or
failed to act in the manner challenged,” ’ ” we must reject the claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel “ ‘ “unless counsel was asked for an
explanation and failed to provide one, or there simply could be no satisfactory
explanation.” ’ ” (People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 488.)
“ ‘The choice of when to object is inherently a matter of trial tactics not
ordinarily reviewable on appeal’ ” (People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153,
1197), and the “ ‘[f]ailure to object rarely constitutes constitutionally
ineffective legal representation.’ ” (People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168,
207.)
B. Analysis
The record does not indicate why trial counsel did not object to the
expert testimony or request CALCRIM No. 850. Consequently, Bontemps
cannot prevail “ ‘unless there could be no conceivable reason for counsel’s acts
or omissions.’ ” (People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1165.)
Conceivable tactical reasons exist for counsel’s decision not to object to
the testimony. Defense counsel knew he intended to attempt to neutralize
Detective Dominguez’s expert testimony with a very brief cross-examination.

11
Under defense counsel’s questioning, the detective confirmed that he had
closed investigations in the past after determining domestic violence
accusations were unfounded. He testified that a victim’s brain may block
memories of events leading up to the alleged assault, which supported the
defense’s argument that V.G. failed to describe what she had done to initiate
the fights with Bontemps. Defense counsel also elicited that Detective
Dominquez knew nothing about the relationship between Bontemps and V.G.
Counsel urged the jury to rely on the credible and factual testimony of
Bontemps, instead of the biased, speculative, and incomplete testimony of
prosecution witnesses. Counsel argued in closing that the jury had heard few
facts, except from Bontemps. He said Detective Dominguez “came in with a
script” and “had statistics for everything that benefitted his position as a
domestic violence expert, but couldn’t seem to answer any challenges to it,”
such as statistics on the number of times the detective had found accusations
unsupported or that a victim had lied. V.G. could not remember much; she
would show a bruise and say it must have been Bontemps. In contrast,
Bontemps “finally got to tell his side of the story.” He was “largely
consistent” with “fairly clear memories.”
Moreover, despite the detective’s bias, the expert testimony actually
supported Bontemp’s testimony, his counsel argued. If the jury reviewed the
prosecutor’s “domestic violence wheel,” the jury would see Bontemps was a
victim who was belittled and controlled by V.G. “By all means, please, take a
look at that wheel and think about his testimony,” counsel urged. (Cf. People
v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1165 [defense counsel was not ineffective
where, instead of registering a contemporaneous objection, he made a tactical
choice to undermine the prosecutor in his own closing remarks].)

12
As to the expert’s use of the animal imagery, objecting to “bulldog” and
“viper” may have only served to draw the jury’s attention to these terms (see
People v. Planchard (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 157, 176 [defense counsel may
make a tactical decision that “objection or other responses would serve only to
highlight the undesirable testimony”]). Or, such an objection may have
undermined counsel’s plan to urge the jury to believe V.G. was the predatory
abuser, not Bontemps, and that, by implication, those terms described her.
Similarly, a conceivable reason exists for the choice not to request
CALCRIM No. 850: “competent counsel could rationally conclude that it
would be counterproductive to request an instruction highlighting expert
testimony supporting the victim’s credibility.” (Mateo, supra, 243
Cal.App.4th at p. 1076.) Counsel chose instead to emphasize Bontemps’s
credibility, upon which his defense relied.
Because conceivable reasons exist, we do not find Bontemps’s counsel
ineffective for opting not to object to the expert testimony or request
CALCRIM No. 850.

Even if his counsel should have objected to the testimony,4 Bontemps
cannot meet his burden to prove he would have obtained a more favorable
result had objections been made or CALCRIM No. 850 been given.

4 We find aspects of the testimony troubling, particularly the expert’s
characterization of abusers as either a “bulldog” or a “viper.” Use of such
animal imagery is problematic and potentially prejudicial, whatever the
circumstance or purpose. (See, e.g., People v. Quintero (2024) 107
Cal.App.5th 1060, 1077 [noting that the Racial Justice Act defines
“ ‘ “[r]acially discriminatory language” ’ to include ‘racially charged or
racially coded language’ and ‘language that compares the defendant to an
animal . . . .’ ” (§ 745, subd. (h)(4)]).

13
Bontemps contends that the expert recited statistics and probabilities,
which “would have encouraged the jury to speculate that [Bontemps] had
battered [V.G.] at least seven times before [he] was arrested by police.” We
do not view such speculation as likely to have occurred in this case.
First, the case Bontemps relies upon is inapposite. In People v. Julian
(2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 878, 883, the expert testified that false allegations by a
child of sexual abuse were rare, occurring between 1 and 8 percent of the
time. Because the testimony conveyed that child victims were truthful up to
99 percent of the time, this probability evidence “invited jurors to presume
[defendant] was guilty based on statistical probabilities, and not decide the
evidence properly introduced in the case.” (Id. at p. 886.) Expert testimony
on the likelihood that a prosecution witness was telling the truth invaded the
province of the jury and deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial.
(Ibid.)
The expert in Bontemps’s case offered no such statistical evidence

about the likelihood of false allegations in domestic violence cases.5 Instead,
Detective Dominguez cited the statistic about seven prior unreported
domestic violence incidents to explain why victims can react with anger and
resist the involvement of law enforcement.
In any case, there was little risk that Bontemps’s jury would speculate
about whether unreported acts of domestic violence occurred, or convict on
the charged counts based on suspicion that Bontemps had committed seven
other unknown acts before his arrest. The entire trial concerned violent
incidents prior to Bontemps’s arrest that V.G. had never reported. V.G.

5 Bontemps’s counsel recognized this. In closing, counsel urged the jury
not to believe Detective Dominguez’s testimony in part because he could not
answer questions about the number of times an abuse victim lies.
14
testified, and authenticated audio and video recordings, about charged
offenses dated in February, March, April, and May 2023, all unreported acts
occurring before Bontemps’s arrest in May. In addition, the court permitted
the prosecution to introduce evidence about a prior uncharged act of domestic
violence under rule Evidence Code section 1109, subd. (a)(1). Thus, the
expert testimony would not cause the jury to speculate about unreported acts
of domestic violence; the jury knew Bontemps was charged with such events,
it received evidence regarding those incidents, and it was tasked with
evaluating whether those events had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Bontemps further contends that while some expert testimony was
permissible to explain V.G.’s failure to report, the broad scope of the expert
testimony rendered it irrelevant since the case against him did not involve all
topics the expert covered, such as recanting by the witness, allegations of
sexual violence, use of pets and finances to control the victim, the preserving
of evidence by a victim who was afraid she was going to be killed, and brain
damage caused by domestic abuse. The prosecution offered Detective
Dominguez’s testimony as broad and generalized information about the set of
observations and patterns associated with intimate partner battering and its
effects. The prosecution did not offer it as testimony that exactly fit the
allegations in Bontemps’s case, and there was no suggestion by Detective
Dominguez or in the prosecution’s arguments that everything Detective
Dominguez described was true for Bontemps’s relationship with V.G. To the
contrary, Detective Dominguez testified that he was not assigned to
Bontemps’s case, had not interviewed V.G., and had no information about
V.G.’s case.
We also note that while Detective Dominguez’s testimony described
behavior by victims that the jury could conclude was consistent with V.G.’s

15
conduct, the expert testimony also supported Bontemps’s defense in some
regards. Bontemps introduced in his opening statement his defense that V.G
and Bontemps were mutual aggressors. The expert testified that the woman
is not always the victim, the man is not always the abuser, and that men can
be the victims of domestic violence. Detective Dominguez explained that
emotional abuse could be committed against men, which corroborated
Bontemps’s testimony that V.G. constantly belittled and demeaned him. The
jury could also view the testimony of the escalation and cycle of violence in a
domestic violence relationship as consistent with Bontemps’s testimony that
V.G. frequently verbally provoked and physically attacked him. Bontemps’s
effort to take more shifts at work and his offer to pay for V.G. to move away
could be seen as consistent with Detective Dominguez’s testimony that
victims try to get out of an abusive relationship.
The use of the animal imagery did not necessarily prejudice Bontemps,
due to defense counsel’s effort to adopt the expert testimony and argue it
showed Bontemps was the victim. This would mean the terms “bulldog” and
“viper” characterized a role occupied not by Bontemps, but by V.G., the real
aggressor in the relationship.
The mixed verdict revealed that the jurors neither entirely believed
V.G.’s testimony that all of her injuries stemmed from abuse by Bontemps,
nor wholly credited Bontemps’s defense casting himself as the victim and
V.G. as the abuser. In addition to guilty verdicts on several counts of
corporal injury and assault, the jury found Bontemps not guilty of the
corporal injury charge from February (count 1). As to that encounter,
Bontemps admitted he and V.G. had an argument that day, but testified
there was no physical altercation, while V.G. testified that Bontemps grabbed
her fingers and painfully bent and twisted them, and the prosecution

16
introduced a photograph of her swollen finger. The jury deadlocked on the
corporal injury and assault charges from May 13. Bontemps testified that
V.G. initiated physical aggression against him on that occasion. He tried to
restrain her by hugging her from the back or grabbing her arms, not with the
intent to harm or choke her but to end the altercation. V.G. testified about
photographs and a video showing bruises to her face, neck, cheeks, chin, and
chest inflicted by Bontemps that day.
On this record, we cannot say the expert testimony so inflamed the jury
against Bontemps that there was a reasonable probability the result would
have been different absent the testimony. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p.
694.)
CALCRIM No. 850 would have informed the jury that, while the
expert’s testimony about the effects of intimate partner battering relate to a
pattern of behavior that may be present in domestic abuse cases, such
testimony (1) “is not evidence that the defendant committed any of the crimes
charged” and (2) may be considered “only in deciding” if the victim’s conduct
“was consistent with someone who has been abused and in evaluating the
believability of her testimony.” (CALCRIM No. 850.) The court’s other
instructions conveyed substantially the same information. The jurors were
instructed that “[i]t is up to all of you, and you alone, to decide what
happened.” (CALCRIM No. 200.) The jurors could not abdicate that
responsibility to the expert. The jurors “alone”—not the expert—“must judge
the credibility or believability of the witnesses.” (CALCRIM No. 226.) The
court instructed the jurors they could believe “all, part, or none of any
witness’s testimony.” (CALCRIM No. 226.) Specific to expert testimony, the
jurors were instructed that they were “not required to accept” the expert’s
opinions “as true or correct,” and instead jurors could “disregard any opinion

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that [they] find unbelievable, unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence.”
(CALCRIM No. 332.)
“We presume that jurors understand and follow the court’s
instructions.” (People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 414.) Though not
tailored to testimony on intimate partner battering, the given instructions
provided the same guidance for how the jury could consider evidence. The
jury’s mixed verdict showed it followed CALCRIM No. 226 and credited
Bontemps’s testimony in part and V.G.’s testimony in part, which compels
our conclusion that Bontemps was not prejudiced by the absence of
CALCRIM No. 850.
IV. No Cumulative Error
Having rejected Bontemps’s individual claims of error, we find no
cumulative error that violated his right to due process and a fair trial.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DO, J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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