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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Aguilera CA4/3

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: G064382

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (3.4K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/18/26 P. v. Aguilera CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G064382

v. (Super. Ct. No. 22CF3758)

SEAN ANTHONY AGUILERA, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Robert A. Knox, Judge. Affirmed.
Russell S. Babcock, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A.
Natasha Cortina, Kelley Johnson and Arlyn Escalante, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

---

Defendant Sean Anthony Aguilera appeals his convictions on
three counts arising from a single night when he assaulted three different
women. He was convicted of attempted second degree robbery (count one;
Pen. Code,1 §§ 664, 211, 212.5, subd. (c)); assault with force likely to produce
great bodily injury (count two; § 245, subd. (a)(4)); battery (count three; §
242); and sexual battery (count four; § 243.4, subd. (e)(1)). He was sentenced
to state prison for three years. On appeal, Aguilera contends there was
insufficient evidence to support the sexual battery count and that his
attorney improperly conceded guilt as to one of the counts during closing
argument. We conclude these arguments lack merit and affirm the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We focus on the facts pertinent to this appeal.
I.
COUNT ONE—ATTEMPTED SECOND DEGREE ROBBERY
In brief, as to count one, on October 21, 2022, L.K. went for a
walk from her Tustin home between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. As she was walking, a
man on a skateboard suddenly grabbed her wrist and attempted to take her
watch. After she screamed, the man released her. L.K. identified Aguilera in
court as the man who tried to take her watch.
II.
COUNT FOUR—SEXUAL BATTERY
On the same evening, at approximately 6:30 p.m., P.A. was
walking to a pharmacy in Tustin. As P.A. passed by an empty building, she
felt an arm touch her. She turned around quickly to push the person away. A

1Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise indicated.

2
man she had never seen before started saying something about “Jason” and
tried to grab her. He said, “‘Let’s go with Jason,’” and she responded that she
did not know Jason. He had a skateboard with him. P.A. described the man’s
demeanor as aggressive and scary. He stood very close to her, and he looked
angry.
In response to her attempts to move away, the man grabbed her
again and repeated statements about going with Jason. He touched her inner
thigh or groin, and also grabbed her buttocks. P.A. ran away and eventually
called 911. She identified Aguilera in police custody later that night, and also
identified him in court.
III.
COUNTS TWO AND THREE—ASSAULT WITH FORCE LIKELY TO PRODUCE GREAT
BODILY INJURY AND BATTERY
At approximately 8:15 p.m., the same night, M.G., who was eight
months pregnant, was walking through the parking lot of her Tustin
apartment complex with her mother. She saw a man standing on the roof or
the top of the carports, holding a piece of wood. Once the man saw M.G. and
her mother, he jumped off the carport and walked towards them. She asked
what he was doing, and he approached her and struck her in the stomach
with his hand or fist. The man said, “‘I just hit your baby, bitch.’” She asked
him why he did that, and he replied with “‘Ask your mom. Ask your mom.’”
Neighbors began to arrive in the area, and the man ran away.
The blow caused M.G. pain and contractions, and she felt
dizziness, cramps, and hot flashes. M.G. identified defendant the night of the
assault and in court.
After this incident, based on reports to the police, a Tustin Police
Department patrol officer located Aguilera, who matched the description of

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the suspect. The officer detailed Aguilera, who was ultimately arrested, and
later identified him at trial.
Aguilera was charged with the four counts identified above. He
was convicted on all four counts following a jury trial. Aguilera was sentenced
to a total of three years. He now appeals.
DISCUSSION
I.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE ON SEXUAL BATTERY
Aguilera’s first contention on appeal is that there was no
evidence he “had a sexual intent when he made brief contact with [P.A.]’s
groin and buttocks.”
A. Standard of Review
“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we determine ‘“whether from the evidence, including all
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, there is any substantial
evidence of the existence of each element of the offense charged.”’ [Citations.]
Under such standard, we review the facts adduced at trial in the light most
favorable to the judgment, drawing all inferences in support of the judgment
to determine whether there is substantial direct or circumstantial evidence
the defendant committed the charged crime. [Citation.] The test is not
whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether
substantial evidence, of credible and solid value, supports the jury’s
conclusions. [Citation.] [¶] In considering the sufficiency of the evidence, we
cannot reweigh the evidence, as the credibility of witnesses and the weight to
be accorded to the evidence are matters exclusively within the province of the
trier of fact. [Citation.] Rather, we simply consider whether any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offenses beyond

4
a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] Unless it is clearly shown that ‘on no
hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the
verdict,’ the conviction will not be reversed.” (People v. Misa (2006) 140
Cal.App.4th 837, 842.)
The standard of review is the same even when the case relies on
circumstantial evidence. (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567,
1572.) We accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from such
evidence. (Id. at p. 1573.)

B. Relevant Law
“(1) Any person who touches an intimate part of another person,
if the touching is against the will of the person touched, and is for the specific
purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse, . . . is guilty
of misdemeanor sexual battery . . . . ¶ As used in this subdivision,
‘touches’ means physical contact with another person, whether accomplished
directly, through the clothing of the person committing the offense, or
through the clothing of the victim.” (§ 243.4, subd. (e).) “Intimate part”
includes the “sexual organ . . . or buttocks.” (§ 243.4, subd. (g)(1).)
This offense is a specific intent crime, and must be committed for
the sexual purpose set forth in the statute. (People v. Chavez (2000) 84
Cal.App.4th 25, 29.)
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Aguilera contends the area of P.A.’s body where Aguilera grabbed
her was on the same side of her body where she was wearing her purse, and
any contact was incidental while he reached toward her purse. He argues
there was nothing to indicate a sexual intent because the contact was not
prolonged and he did not stroke or fondle her. He further contends the lack of

5
admissions and “corroborating evidence,” and the brevity of the touches
indicates a lack of substantial evidence.

We disagree. In a case where direct evidence of intent can only
come in the form of an inculpatory admission, the defendant’s intent may “be
inferred from the act itself together with its surrounding circumstances.” (In
re Shannon T. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 618, 622.) There was evidence that
Aguilera first touched P.A.’s groin, then her buttocks. The jury could have
reasonably found, based on the sequence of events, that Aguilera had the
requisite sexual intent.
Further, the statute does not only include sexual gratification
within its ambit. It also includes sexual abuse, which “encompasses a purpose
of insulting, humiliating, intimidating, or physically harming a person
sexually by touching an ‘intimate part’ of the person.” (In re Shannon T.,
supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 621.) Aguilera’s argument admits he grabbed
P.A. as part and parcel of a robbery attempt, “when he reached toward her
purse.” Accordingly, the jury could have found his intent was sexual abuse in
furtherance of the robbery. Grabbing a person’s groin and buttocks is
insulting, humiliating, and intimidating, and the jury could reasonably find it
to have been sexual abuse in an effort to facilitate the theft of P.A.’s purse.
Under either theory, there was sufficient evidence to support the
sexual battery conviction.
II.
MISDEMEANOR CONCESSION
During closing argument, defense counsel stated: “I will tell you
this now. On Count 3, you can find Mr. Aguilera guilty of that. He touched
her, and he should not have. And this goes to [M.G.], the woman who was at
the time pregnant. You can find him guilty of simple battery on Count 3. He

6
is not guilty of Count 2; that’s the assault with force likely to commit great
bodily injury.” Counsel went on to argue the facts relating to great bodily
injury, concluding: “So from the surrounding instance and from what [M.G.]
told us and from what you heard, yes, [Aguilera] committed a simple battery
on [M.G.], but he did not commit an assault with force likely to incur great
bodily injury. There’s just not enough here. There’s just not enough.”
Aguilera contends this was an involuntary waiver of his right to
have the charges proved by the prosecution. He relies on McCoy v. Louisiana
(2018) 584 U.S. 414 (McCoy), for the proposition that his fundamental right
to decide whether to plead guilty and/or persist in a plea of not guilty was
violated by counsel’s statement, which was offered with no waiver.
McCoy was a death penalty case. (McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at
p. 418.) After the defendant was convicted of three counts of murder, his
counsel, in the penalty phase, decided that given the state of the
evidence, “absent a concession at the guilt stage that [the defendant] was the
killer, a death sentence would be impossible to avoid at the penalty
phase.” (Ibid.) During his penalty phase opening statement, he told the jury
that “the evidence is ‘unambiguous,’ [that] ‘my client committed three
murders.’” (Id. at pp. 419–420.) Outside the jury’s presence, the defendant
objected. (Id. at p. 419.) He testified during the penalty phase, maintaining
his innocence and raising an alibi defense. (Id. at p. 420.) The Louisiana
Supreme Court affirmed, concluding admitting guilt was within counsel’s
purview.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding “that a
defendant has the right to insist that counsel refrain from admitting guilt,
even when counsel’s experienced-based view is that confessing guilt offers the
defendant the best chance to avoid the death penalty.” (McCoy, supra, 584

7
U.S. at p. 417.) The Court reasoned, “With individual liberty—and, in capital
cases, life—at stake, it is the defendant’s prerogative, not counsel’s, to decide
on the objective of his defense: to admit guilt in the hope of gaining mercy at
the sentencing stage, or to maintain his innocence, leaving it to the State to
prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at pp. 417–418.)
This rule, however, did not change the essential balance between
counsel and the client. Counsel maintained a “trial management role” which
included the role of deciding, for example, “‘what arguments to pursue, what
evidentiary objections to raise, and what agreements to conclude regarding
the admission of evidence.’” (McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at pp. 422–423.)
Aguilera admits that McCoy’s holding “relied upon the
defendant’s protestations of innocence in reaching its decision.” He argues we
should extend it to require an express waiver, but in doing so he asks us to
disregard settled California law on the question. In People v. Burns (2019) 38
Cal.App.5th 776, which was decided after McCoy and discussed that case at
length, the court held that defense counsel’s express concession of two of the
charged offenses was not tantamount to a guilty plea requiring the
defendant’s consent. (Id. at p. 782.) Further, “The trial court has no duty to
inquire whether the defendant agrees with his attorney’s concession strategy,
at least where there is no explicit indication he disagrees with the approach.”
(Id. at pp. 782–783.)
Multiple California cases agree that defense counsel’s statements
during argument are not tantamount to guilty pleas and do not require
consent or waiver. (See, e.g., People v. Villa (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1042;
People v. Lopez (2019) 31 Cal.App5th 55.) Aguilera does not cite any cases
that adopt his proposed approach. We find no violation of the key principles
set forth in McCoy in the instant case. “[F]or a Sixth Amendment violation to

8
lie, a defendant must make his intention to maintain innocence clear to his
counsel, and counsel must override that objective by conceding guilt.” (People
v. Franks (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 883, 891; see McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at p.
23.) There are no facts to support such the contention that Aguilera was set
on maintaining his innocence at all costs.2 If such facts exist outside the
record, Aguilera is, of course, free to pursue a habeas petition.
Aguilera also argues that for essentially the same reasons, we
should find ineffective assistance of counsel. He identifies the deficient
performance as “being unfamiliar with the rule of McCoy.” As we have
concluded that McCoy does not apply under these facts, we find no ineffective
assistance of counsel.

2 In this appeal, Aguilera appears to concede he committed the
attempted robbery alleged in count one and contends he attempted a similar
robbery in his argument on the sexual battery count. “The conduct toward
[P.A., the victim in the sexual battery count] was similar to the conduct
towards [L.]K. in count [one], when [Aguilera] tugged at her fitness watch.”
While not conclusive, it does not support the contention that Aguilera was or
is dead set on maintaining his innocence.

9
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

MOORE, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.

DELANEY, J.

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