People in Interest of BDR - Juvenile Sexual Contact Appeal

Jump To

Top Caption Combined Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

April 9, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Peo in Int of BDR

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24CA1382

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (5.6K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

24CA1382 Peo in Interest of BDR 04-09-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1382
El Paso County District Court No. 22JD691
Honorable Diana May, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of B.D.R.,

Juvenile-Appellant.

RULING DISAPPROVED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Brown and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 9, 2026

Phillip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jacob R. Lofgren, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Madison R. Whitley, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile-
Appellant
¶1 Juvenile, B.D.R., appeals the district court’s order

disapproving the juvenile magistrate’s judgment of acquittal,

following a bench trial. We perceive no error in the juvenile

magistrate’s judgment and therefore disapprove the district court’s

ruling.

I. Background

¶2 B.D.R. was a resident at the Emily Griffith Center. He and

several other juveniles were in a recreation room that was

monitored by video surveillance. According to video footage, which

does not include audio, I.R. crawled toward B.D.R., who was sitting

on a couch. When I.R. reached the couch, B.D.R. grabbed the back

of I.R.’s head with both hands and began pushing and pulling I.R.’s

head up and down above his crotch area. Both boys were fully

clothed, and other boys were in the room. I.R. then stood up but

remained in the room.

¶3 A staff member who reviewed the video footage contacted the

police. Officer Andrew Marshall responded and interviewed I.R.

¶4 B.D.R. was charged with (1) attempted unlawful sexual

contact; (2) harassment (ethnic intimidation); and (3) unlawful

1
sexual contact. Before trial, the prosecution dismissed counts two

and three, and the case proceeded only on count one.

¶5 At the bench trial, I.R. testified as follows:

[PROSECUTOR]: I want to talk to you about
October of 2022. Do you remember being in
the Emily Griffith Center?

I.R.: Yeah.

[PROSECUTOR]: And do you remember
something happening on October 9th of that
same year?

I.R.: To be honest with you, sir, I don’t
remember.

[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. Do you remember
meeting with an officer named Andrew
Marshall?

I.R.: I remember meeting with one officer, but I
don’t remember his name.

[PROSECUTOR]: That’s okay. Do you
remember talking to him about an incident
that happened with a boy named [B.D.R.]?

I.R.: No, sir, I don’t remember that.

[PROSECUTOR]: That’s okay. Do you
remember telling him about how [B.D.R.] was
sitting on a couch; do you remember that?

I.R.: No, sir, I don’t remember that.

2
[PROSECUTOR]: Do you remember telling him
that [B.D.R.] then asked you to come over to
him?

I.R.: No, sir, I don’t remember that.

[PROSECUTOR]: Do you remember that this
was all in what’s called the common area of
the Rocky Lodge?

I.R.: No, sir, I don’t remember that, to be
honest.

[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. That’s okay. Do you
remember telling that officer that [B.D.R.] then
grabbed your head with both hands and then
forced your head towards his crotch?

I.R.: I don’t remember that, sir.

[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. Do you remember him
then telling you, and I quote, “handle this dick
like a man.”

I.R.: No, sir.

[PROSECUTOR]: Do you remember saying that
this continued for about 20 minutes?

I.R.: I don’t remember that, sir.

[PROSECUTOR]: Do you remember telling that
officer that [B.D.R.] did the same act to you
later that evening as well?

I.R.: No, sir, I don’t remember that.

[PROSECUTOR]: And that second time would
have been between 1800 hours and 1900
hours?

3
I.R.: I don’t remember that, sir.

[PROSECUTOR]: Do you remember telling that
officer that this happened on the same couch
the second time?

I.R.: No, sir, I don’t remember that at all.

[PROSECUTOR]: And do you remember telling
the officer that the second incident lasted for
about 10 minutes?

I.R.: No, sir, I don’t remember that.

[PROSECUTOR]: Do you remember telling the
officer that you felt uncomfortable when
[B.D.R.] was doing that to you?

I.R.: I don’t remember that, sir.

[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. Do you remember
telling the officer that you didn’t know whether
or not [B.D.R.] had an erection?

I.R.: I don’t remember that, sir.

[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. Do you remember
telling the officer that you have not been in a
relationship with a boy named [B.D.R.]?

I.R.: I don’t remember that, sir.

[PROSECUTOR]: Do you remember telling the
officer that you had never had voluntary
sexual acts with a boy named [B.D.R.]?

I.R.: I don’t remember that, sir.

[PROSECUTOR]: And do you remember telling
the officer that you did not want your head to
be down on [B.D.R.]’s crotch?

4
I.R.: I don’t remember that, sir.

[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. Do you – do you
remember a boy named [B.D.R.] at all?

I.R.: Yeah.

¶6 I.R. could not identify B.D.R. in court. The prosecution then

introduced the video footage.

¶7 At the end of the prosecution’s case, B.D.R. moved for a

judgment of acquittal and argued that no evidence was presented

“that the attempt was for any form of sexual contact or that any of

the knowledge requirements were even spoken to.”

¶8 The prosecution responded that B.D.R.’s intent could be

inferred from his actions as well as his knowledge:

I think the Court can infer from everyday
knowledge and understanding that when
somebody grabs somebody else’s head and
then repeatedly throws – thrusts their head in
an up and down motion over the period of 30
seconds over one’s own crotch area, that is a
clear simulation of a sexual act. The only
reason to do that would be for sexual arousal.

¶9 The magistrate found:

The Court does not find that there is enough
evidence to go past half-time. What the Court
is left with is we have [I.R.] who doesn’t
remember. He does remember that he was at
the Emily Griffith Center. He doesn’t
remember any of the events. He doesn’t even –

5
in regards – he remembers being at Emily
Griffith, but in regard to being there in
October, he doesn’t remember, but it’s clear
based on the video, that he was there. The
Court reviewed the video today, but the
District Attorney’s Office has to show that
[B.D.R.] . . . knowingly subjected a person to
sexual contact, knowing a person did not
consent, this is an attempt. This issue is yes, I
can see the video, I can see [B.D.R.] grabbing
the head – the head of [I.R.], but in regards to
subjecting a person . . . to sexual contact, in
regards to the victim having contact with
[B.D.R.], that is difficult for the Court to see.
So, it’s specifically in regards to the attempt of
subjecting a person to any sexual contact.
Therefore, the Court agrees . . . and grants the
half-time judgment of acquittal.

¶ 10 The magistrate advised the parties of their right to appeal the

decision under section 19-1-108(5.5), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 11 The prosecution sought clarification of the magistrate’s ruling,

arguing that B.D.R. was charged with an “attempt” and not a

completed act. B.D.R. responded that an “attempt” charge still

required evidence that B.D.R. intended to have sexual contact with

I.R. and that no such evidence was presented.

¶ 12 The magistrate expanded on the earlier ruling:

And again, what the Court is left with is
looking at the video. I do see force towards the
crotch area of – again, [B.D.R.] taking the head
of [I.R.] towards his crotch area, but again, I

6
can’t find even – you know – forcing someone’s
head towards the crotch area, [the prosecutor]
is asking the Court to speculate that this is the
only reason why [B.D.R.] subjected [I.R.] to
this type of act, and I can’t make that leap
without more. I agree that this is an attempt
to commit sexual contact, but based on the
video alone, I cannot find that there is enough
for the Court to find an attempt to subject [to]
sexual contact. [The prosecutor] is stating that
it can only be this. I can’t make that leap . . .
given that I just have a video to view.

¶ 13 The prosecution filed a timely petition to review contending

that the magistrate erred as a matter of law. Specifically, the

prosecutor argued that the evidence, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to support a conclusion

by a reasonable mind that [B.D.R.]’s actions were done for the

purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse. The prosecution

requested that the district court “disapprove of the juvenile court’s

order dismissing the charges against [B.D.R.].”

¶ 14 B.D.R. responded and argued that the district court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction over the petition because of the “limited

review available pursuant to [C.R.C.P.] 59.” B.D.R. also asserted

that, regardless, the magistrate properly granted the motion for

judgment of acquittal given the lack of sufficient evidence to

7
support a finding that B.D.R. acted for the purpose of sexual

arousal, gratification, or abuse.

¶ 15 The prosecution replied that the district court had jurisdiction,

for three reasons. First, section 19-2.5-1301(2), C.R.S. 2025,

provides that “[t]he prosecution in a delinquency case may appeal

any decision of the trial court as provided in section 16-12-102[,

C.R.S. 2025],” which states that the prosecutor “may appeal any

decision of a court in a criminal case upon any question of law.”

The prosecutor argued that, when read together, the statutes make

clear that the prosecution has the same right to appeal questions of

law in delinquency cases as in criminal cases.

¶ 16 Second, when a juvenile magistrate grants a motion for

judgment of acquittal, section 19-1-108(5.5) requires the

prosecution to file a petition for review of the magistrate’s order in

the district court before an appeal may be filed in the Colorado

Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. Therefore, to preserve the right

to appellate review, the prosecution must first seek review in

district court.

8
¶ 17 Third, section 19-1-108(5.5)’s reference to Rule 59 of the

Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure did not preclude the district court

from reviewing the magistrate’s dismissal order.

¶ 18 The district court found that sections 19-2.5-1301 and

16-12-102, when “[r]ead together,” make it “clear that the District

Attorney has the same right to appeal questions of law in

delinquency cases as in criminal cases.” Further, the district court

found that section 19-1-108(5.5) “does not limit appeals to the

grounds listed in C.R.C.P. 59.” Accordingly, the district court

concluded that it had jurisdiction to consider the prosecution’s

petition for review. The district court then disapproved of the

magistrate’s judgment of acquittal and concluded that, when viewed

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, acquittal should not

have been granted.

¶ 19 On appeal, B.D.R. contends that the district court (1) lacked

jurisdiction to review the juvenile court’s order and (2) erroneously

disapproved of the magistrate’s judgment of acquittal. We conclude

that the district court had jurisdiction to consider the petition for

review, but we agree that there was insufficient evidence to support

a finding that B.D.R.’s actions were for the purpose of sexual

9
arousal, gratification, or abuse and therefore disapprove of the

district court’s ruling.

II. Jurisdiction

¶ 20 B.D.R. contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction to

consider the petition for review, for two reasons. First, he argues

that the prosecution improperly “chose to file its appeal pursuant to

Rule 29 of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure” rather than

under section 19-1-108(5.5). Second, he asserts that even if the

district court had jurisdiction, the petition “did not request one of

the types of relief articulated in C.R.C.P. 59.” We disagree with

both contentions.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 21 Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law that

we review de novo. In re People in Interest of A.T.C., 2023 CO 19,

¶14. Similarly, we interpret rules de novo. Id.; see also Northstar

Project Mgmt., Inc. v. DLR Grp., Inc., 2013 CO 12, ¶ 12 (“We interpret

rules of procedure consistent with principles of statutory

construction and, thus, review procedural rules de novo as well.”).

¶ 22 When construing a statute, our primary task is to effectuate

the legislature’s intent. Colo. Prop. Tax Adm’r v. CO2 Comm., Inc.,

10
2023 CO 8, ¶ 22. In doing so, “we look to the entire statutory

scheme in order to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect

to all of its parts,” and we give “words and phrases . . . their plain

and ordinary meanings.” UMB Bank, N.A. v. Landmark Towers

Ass’n, 2017 CO 107, ¶ 22.

¶ 23 Section 19-1-108 provides, in pertinent part,

(3)(a.5) Magistrates shall conduct hearings in
the manner provided for the hearing of cases
by the court. During the initial advisement of
the rights of any party, the magistrate shall
inform the party that, except as set forth in
this subsection (3), the party has the right to a
hearing before the judge in the first instance
and the party may waive that right but that, by
waiving that right, the party is bound by the
findings and recommendations of the
magistrate, subject to a request for review as
set forth in subsection (5.5) of this section. . . .

....

(5.5) A request for review must be filed within
fourteen days for proceedings under articles
2.5, 4, and 6 of this title or within seven days
for proceedings under article 3 of this title after
the parties have received notice of the
magistrate’s ruling and must clearly set forth
the grounds relied upon. Such review is solely
upon the record of the hearing before the
magistrate and is reviewable upon the grounds
set forth in rule 59 of the Colorado rules of
civil procedure. A petition for review is a
prerequisite before an appeal may be filed with

11
the Colorado court of appeals or Colorado
supreme court. The judge may, on his or her
own motion, remand a case to another
magistrate after action is taken on a petition
for review.

¶ 24 As referenced in that statute, Rule 59 of the Colorado Rules of

Civil Procedure provides a variety of circumstances in which a party

may file a post-trial motion, including for an “[e]rror in [l]aw.”

C.R.C.P. 59(d)(6).

B. Analysis

¶ 25 We begin by rejecting B.D.R.’s argument that the prosecution

improperly filed its appeal under Crim. P. 29 because the petition

clearly asks the district court to “review and reverse the order of the

Juvenile Magistrate . . . dismissing [B.D.R.’s] case under Rule 29.”

Crim. P. 29, “Motion for Acquittal,” abolishes motions for directed

verdicts in criminal cases and provides for motions for judgment of

acquittal following the prosecution’s case and at the end of all the

evidence, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.

Crim. P. 29(a). The prosecution did not file its petition pursuant to

Rule 29, but instead sought review of the magistrate’s Rule 29

ruling. Therefore, the district court did not lack jurisdiction due to

an improperly filed petition for review.

12
¶ 26 Next, we note that the parties agree that section 19-1-108(5.5)

governs the procedural requirements for appealing the juvenile

magistrate’s order in this case. See People in Interest of A.P.H.,

2020 COA 159, ¶ 12. As relevant here, the statute permits review

“solely upon the record of the hearing before the magistrate and is

reviewable upon the grounds set forth in [R]ule 59 of the Colorado

[R]ules of [C]ivil [P]rocedure.” § 19-1-108(5.5); see People v. A.S.M.,

2022 CO 47, ¶ 19. In addressing the interplay between the statute

and Rule 59, the supreme court has explained that “the reference in

section 19-1-108(5.5) to C.R.C.P. 59 (which governs post-trial

motions) presumably is meant to give the district court procedural

guidance when ruling on the request for review.” People v. S.X.G.,

2012 CO 5, ¶ 17.

¶ 27 B.D.R. relies on C.R.C.P. 59(a)(1)–(4) as the “grounds available

for review.” But he is mistaken. Rule 59(a) sets forth the relief

available in a post-trial motion, while Rule 59(d) and (e) set forth

the “grounds” on which the court may grant the requested relief.

See A.T.C., ¶ 23 n.2 (identifying the “grounds” upon which the

district court may review the magistrate’s order under section

19-1-108(5.5) as those included in Rule 59(d) and (e)). And one of

13
those grounds is an error in law. C.R.C.P. 59(d)(6). Because the

prosecution’s petition for review asserted that the juvenile

magistrate erred as a matter of law in granting B.D.R.’s motion for

judgment of acquittal, we conclude the district court had

jurisdiction to consider the petition.1 See A.T.C., ¶ 35 (stating that

Rule 59 “simply lays out the limited types of grounds for relief that

a juvenile court may consider in connection with a petition for

review, such as errors in law and insufficiency of the evidence as a

matter of law” (emphasis added)).

III. Judgment of Acquittal

¶ 28 B.D.R. next contends that the district court erroneously

disapproved of the judgment of acquittal because it failed to

consider the absence of evidence supporting the element requiring

that the charged conduct be for the purposes of sexual arousal,

gratification, or abuse. We agree.

1 Because we conclude the district court had jurisdiction to review

the petition under section 19-1-108(5.5), C.R.S. 2025, we need not
address B.D.R.’s alternate argument that C.R.M. 7 does not provide
a path for review.

14
A. Additional Background Information

¶ 29 In rejecting the magistrate’s order granting the judgment of

acquittal, the district court found:

• I.R. testified that he could not remember the offense.

• Amy Buris authenticated Exhibit 1, the security

recording of the incident.

• Marshall testified that Exhibit 1 “showed [I.R.] laying on

the floor, [B.D.R.] waving over to him, then [I.R.] crawling

over to [B.D.R.], who then grabbed [I.R.]’s head with both

hands and started pushing and pulling his head up and

down over his crotch area.”

¶ 30 The district court concluded that “[s]uch evidence, as a matter

of law, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and

sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable person that the

defendant is guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable

doubt.” The district court noted that “[t]his is not to say as the trier

of the fact, the Magistrate could have found [B.D.R.] not guilty of

the charged offense,” but as a matter of law the judgment of

acquittal should not have been granted.

15
B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 31 We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion for a

judgment of acquittal for insufficient evidence. Montes-Rodriguez v.

People, 241 P.3d 924, 927 (Colo. 2010). Whether a motion for a

judgment of acquittal should be granted is determined by the

substantial evidence test. People v. Gonzales, 666 P.2d 123, 127

(Colo. 1983). “Under this test, we ask whether the evidence, ‘viewed

as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is

substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable

mind that the defendant is guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable

doubt.’” Gorostieta v. People, 2022 CO 41, ¶ 16 (quoting People v.

Harrison, 2020 CO 57, ¶ 32). “[W]e must ‘give the prosecution the

benefit of every reasonable inference which might be fairly drawn

from the evidence.’” Id. at ¶ 17 (quoting Harrison, ¶ 32).

¶ 32 Section 18-3-404(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025, provides that “[a]ny actor

who knowingly subjects a victim to any sexual contact commits

unlawful sexual contact if . . . [t]he actor knows that the victim does

not consent.” As relevant here, sexual contact includes “the

knowing touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the

victim’s or actor’s intimate parts if that sexual contact is for the

16
purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse.”

§ 18-3-401(4)(a), C.R.S. 2025. Whether the defendant acted “for the

purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse” is a separate

element from whether he subjected the victim to any sexual

contact. People in Interest of J.O., 2022 COA 65M, ¶ 17; see also

Page v. People, 2017 CO 88, ¶¶ 18-19 (“The unlawful sexual contact

statute expressly requires that the defendant act with a sexual

purpose . . . .”). Moreover, “[a]lthough the prosecution is entitled to

the benefit of every reasonable inference that may fairly be drawn

from the evidence, ‘there must be a logical and convincing

connection between the facts established and the conclusion

inferred.’” J.O., ¶ 34 (quoting Clark v. People, 232 P.3d 1287, 1292

(Colo. 2010)).

C. Analysis

¶ 33 Relying on J.O., B.D.R. argues that his conduct alone does not

show that he engaged in it for the purpose of sexual arousal,

gratification, or abuse. In J.O., eleven-year-old J.O. was accused of

slapping M.L.’s breast, above her clothing, with the back of his

hand. Id. at ¶ 4. The prosecution presented the following

additional evidence:

17
• A teacher noticed that M.L. and J.O. were chasing each

other and laughing, but then M.O. looked “visibly upset”

and yelled at J.O. to stop and leave her alone. After J.O.

left, M.L. told the teacher that J.O. had “touched her

sexually” and said “sexual things.” Id. at ¶ 5.

• Three days later, during a forensic interview, M.L. said

that J.O. “move[d] his hands” all over her body, that J.O.

touched her genitals with his “butt or something,” that

J.O. touched her genitals with his hand, that his “front

private” touched her butt, and that “his butt touched

[her] butt” as he was “spinning around her.” Id. at ¶ 6.

The juvenile court found that

there was contact, that it was unlawfully and
knowingly done . . . [a]nd . . . that it was for
the purpose of sexual gratification. The Court
notes the touching was not pulling her hair,
touching her head, twisting an arm. It was
contact in sexual parts of [M.L.]’s body. Her
breast, her genital area, and her butt.

Id. at ¶ 9.

¶ 34 A division of this court concluded that the evidence presented

at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

18
J.O. acted with the statutorily required sexual purpose. Id. at ¶ 11.

More specifically, the division noted that

[w]hether a juvenile acted for the purpose of
sexual gratification must be determined on a
case-by-case basis. The trier of fact must
consider all the relevant circumstances,
including the juvenile’s age and maturity,
before it can infer the requisite intent. It may
not — and often will not — be appropriate for a
fact finder to ascribe the same intent to a
juvenile’s act that one could reasonably
ascribe to the same act if performed by an
adult.

Id. at ¶ 28.

¶ 35 The division found that a juvenile’s sexual purpose may not be

inferred solely from the act of touching and that there must be

other evidence of the juvenile’s sexual purpose beyond the sexual

contact itself. Id. at ¶ 18. Further, the division provided a

nonexhaustive list of “other evidence” that might establish that the

juvenile acted for the purpose of sexual gratification, which

included “removing clothing, heavy breathing, placing the victim’s

hand on the accused’s genitals, an erection, other observable signs

of arousal, the relationship of the parties, sexually explicit

comments, coercing or deceiving the victim to obtain cooperation,

19
attempting to avoid detection, or instructing the victim not to

disclose the occurrence.” Id. at ¶ 29.

¶ 36 The People argue that the following evidence, when viewed as a

whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is

substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable

mind that B.D.R. acted with a sexual purpose:

• At fourteen years old, B.D.R. was a teenager and not a

young child.

• B.D.R. “did more than simply touch I.R.’s intimate

parts. . . . [He] forcefully pulled I.R.’s head into his

crotch and then forced I.R. to simulate oral sex.”

¶ 37 Reviewing the record de novo, we are not persuaded that

B.D.R.’s conduct of forcing I.R.’s head up and down over his crotch

alone constitutes the “something more” required to prove it was for

the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse. I.R. testified

that he knew who B.D.R. was, but he could not identify him in

court; did not remember the incident, including anything B.D.R.

said; and did not remember having any sort of relationship with

B.D.R. Further, the video footage did not show any observable

signs of B.D.R.’s arousal, did not show any observable signs of

20
coercion, and showed that the conduct occurred in the presence of

other juveniles, so there was no attempt to avoid detection.

¶ 38 Additionally, to establish sexual abuse, the prosecution must

show that the sexual contact was for the “purpose of causing sexual

humiliation, sexual degradation, or other physical or emotional

discomfort of a sexual nature.” People v. Espinosa, 2020 COA 63,

¶ 21. But the video footage did not show that I.R. left the room

immediately after the contact as if humiliated or degraded by it, nor

did I.R. describe such. Under these circumstances, we conclude

there was no other evidence of B.D.R.’s sexual purpose beyond the

sexual contact itself.

¶ 39 We are not persuaded otherwise by the People’s argument that

J.O. is distinguishable because B.D.R. was fourteen at the time of

the offense. As previously described, J.O. instructs that whether a

juvenile acted for the purpose of sexual gratification must be

determined on a case-by-case basis considering all the relevant

circumstances including the juvenile’s age and maturity. J.O.,

¶ 28. Other than the video footage, the record contains no

information on B.D.R.’s maturity. Therefore, we cannot ascribe the

21
same intent to B.D.R.’s conduct that we could reasonably ascribe to

the same act if it was performed by an adult. See id. at ¶ 35.

¶ 40 Accordingly, even when viewed in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, the evidence is not substantial and sufficient to

support a conclusion by a reasonable fact finder that B.D.R. acted

for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse. We

therefore discern no error in the juvenile magistrate’s judgment of

acquittal.

IV. Disposition

¶ 41 The district court’s ruling is disapproved.

JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

22