People Centre Inc v O'Brien and Ors - Judgment No. 3

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  People Centre, INC [D/B/A Rippling] and Anor v O'Brien and Ors [No. 3] (Approved) [2026] IEHC 180 (20 March 2026)

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?THE HIGH COURT

COMMERCIAL

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & TECHNOLOGY

[2026] IEHC 180

[Record No. HP 2025/1289]

BETWEEN

PEOPLE CENTER, INC (D/B/A RIPPLING)

?AND RIPPLING IRELAND LIMITED

PLAINTIFFS

AND

KEITH O'BRIEN, ALEXANDRE BOUAZIZ, ANDREA DAVID MIELI,

DEEL INC AND ASIF MALIK

DEFENDANTS

JUDGMENT No.3 of Mr Justice Mark Sanfey delivered on the 20 th day of March 2026.

Introduction.

1. This judgment concerns an application by the fourth named defendant Deel Inc ('Deel') by notice of motion of 28 July 2025. The motion was one of a number of applications brought by Deel in respect of the conduct of the present proceedings, which motions were heard by the court on 2-5 December 2025.

2. The respective solicitors engaged in relation to the various motions in order to cut down the areas of disagreement. Much of the correspondence concerned the extent to which a motion by which the plaintiffs sought redactions to documents to be produced ('the redactions motion') could be agreed.

3. By the date of the hearing, the redactions motion had been resolved by agreement. Proposals had been made by the plaintiffs' solicitors by letter of 25 November 2025 that materials in three categories ('personal data', 'confidential and/or commercially sensitive information' and 'trade secrets') would be provided subject to certain restrictions on the use of such materials by the fourth named defendant. These proposals were ultimately agreed between the respective solicitors. The third category involved the parties agreeing to materials being restricted to a "confidentiality club" comprised of lawyers from Deel's solicitors and Irish counsel instructed by that firm, and subject to Deel having a right to challenge in court any redactions to the documents.

4. The application the subject of this judgment was initiated by notice of motion on 28 July 2025. The motion ('the inspection motion') sought further and better particulars of the plaintiffs' claim; by the date of the hearing, that issue was resolved. The sole relief sought by Deel at the hearing was at para. 3 of the notice of motion:

"An Order pursuant to Order 31, rule 18 RSC directing the Plaintiffs to produce for inspection by the Fourth-Named Defendant a full and proper copy of the Termination Agreement entered into by the Plaintiffs and the First-Named Defendant dated 27 March 2025 (referred to at ?49, Amended Statement of Claim and at ??21-22, affidavit of Vanessa Wu sworn on 1 April 2025) sought at paragraph 25(vi) of the Notice for Particulars and also at paragraph (a) of the Notice to Produce of the Fourth-Named Defendant dated 8 July 2025;" [Emphasis in original].

5. During the hearing of the various motions, the respective solicitors continued to see if the motions could be resolved. By letter of 1 December 2025, the plaintiffs' solicitors, referring to the third category of documents in the redactions motion, offered the following:

"Our client would...agree to release the Termination Agreement on the same terms as its original category 3 proposal, namely to:

(a) disclose the agreement to a 'confidentiality ring' of lawyers instructed in the Irish proceedings (namely Hayes Solicitors and your Irish counsel team);

(b) on the undertaking that it would not be disclosed to your client or any other parties and could only be used exclusively for the purpose of the Irish proceedings and not for any other purpose; and

(c) subject to an express reservation that you could apply to court (on notice to us) for leave for your client to access the material if you formed the view that it was necessary for you to do so in order to obtain proper instructions."

6. By letter of 3 December 2025, this offer was rejected by Deel's solicitors who set out their reasons for the rejection at length. The motion was heard by the court on 4 December 2025.

Background

7. The present proceedings were issued by way of plenary summons on 12 March 2025. The first named defendant ('Mr O'Brien') was at that time the sole defendant.

8. On 2 April 2025, an order was made by this Court pursuant to O.15, r.13 of the Rules of the Superior Courts ("RSC") joining the second, third, fourth and fifth named defendants (collectively 'the Deel defendants') to the proceedings and granting the plaintiffs liberty to issue and service notice of the proceedings outside the jurisdiction. The second, third and fifth-named defendants ('the individual Deel defendants') have brought applications seeking to set aside their joinder to the proceedings and contending that the Irish courts do not have jurisdiction in respect of the proceedings. These applications are the subject of a separate judgment.

9. On 7 April 2025, a concurrent amended plenary summons issued reflecting the terms of the joinder order. On 16 May 2025, an appearance was entered on behalf of Deel. A statement of claim was delivered on behalf of Rippling on 17 May 2025; this was amended on 19 May 2025 in the form of an amended statement of claim ('ASOC').

10. At para. 10 of the ASOC, the plaintiffs plead that Mr O'Brien was "engaged in a covert course of conduct whereby he spied for Deel and had provided Deel with the Plaintiffs' trade secrets (within the meaning of the European Union (Protection of Trade Secrets) Regulations 2018 SI No. 188/2018)...and proprietary and confidential information". The plaintiffs further claim that Mr O'Brien and Deel entered into a conspiracy, referred to at para. 17 of the ASOC as 'the Scheme', designed to damage Rippling's reputation "by creating a false narrative whereby Mr O'Brien and Deel were portrayed as the victims of unmeritorious and abusive conduct on the part of the Plaintiffs and by causing Mr O'Brien to destroy evidence that would undermine that false narrative" [para. 18 ASOC].

11. From paras. 46 to 52 of the ASOC, under the heading "Mr O'Brien agrees to cooperate with the Plaintiffs", the plaintiffs set out details of the alleged cooperation of Mr O'Brien with the plaintiffs. At para. 49 of the ASOC, it is pleaded that

"On 27 March 2025, the Plaintiffs and Mr O'Brien entered into a Co-Operation Agreement and a Termination Agreement".

12. While para. 50 sets out some detail in relation to the cooperation agreement, the sole reference in the ASOC to the termination agreement is in para. 49 as quoted above. Paragraph 49 of Deel's defence subsequently put the plaintiffs on proof of both agreements, and stated that it "reserves the right to apply for a stay on the proceedings after the delivery of this Defence until the provision to it of the said Agreements".

13. A copy of the two agreements was sought by Deel pursuant to O.31, r.15 of the Rules of the Superior Courts in Deel's notice for particulars of 26 May 2025. The request was refused by the plaintiffs on 2 June 2025 on the basis that "the material provisions of the agreements have been properly disclosed and pleaded", and that the agreements were "confidential and privileged".

14. A notice to produce a number of documents including the termination agreement was served by Deel on the plaintiffs on 8 July 2025.

15. In her affidavit grounding the application to join Deel and the individual Deel defendants to the proceedings, Vanessa Wu, General Counsel of the first named plaintiff, referred to the termination agreement as follows:

"22. The first agreement was an agreement dealing with the termination of Mr O'Brien's employment. In circumstances where the Plaintiffs had on 21 March 2025 terminated Mr O'Brien's employment for cause without the giving of notice or the application of the disciplinary process, the Plaintiffs agreed to pay Mr O'Brien an ex-gratia termination payment in full and final settlement of any employment rights' claims that he might have against the Plaintiffs".

16. Other than in the foregoing paragraph, there is no refence in Ms Wu's affidavit to the termination agreement.

Deel's position

17. Deel's position is that it is entitled to a copy of the termination agreement, subject to the usual undertaking that the document be used solely for the purpose of the present proceedings. Counsel points out that Deel also accepts that it should consent to an order of court if same were necessary in relation to the use in the proceedings of any personal data of Mr O'Brien contained in the agreement.

18. Deel submits that, although the cooperation agreement and the termination agreement were executed on the same day, the former is being provided by the plaintiffs ? notwithstanding their initial refusal to do so ? but the latter is not. The plaintiffs requested Mr O'Brien's consent to release of the cooperation agreement, and that agreement was subsequently provided; Deel says that no adequate rationale has been advanced as to why one agreement has been made available, but not the other.

19. Deel acknowledges that the plaintiffs did state their position in their solicitor's letter of 25 July 2025, under the heading "GDPR and the rights of Mr O'Brien", as follows:

"The Termination Agreement is confidential and contains Mr O'Brien's personal data. Our clients are obliged to ensure that any use (or 'processing') by them of the Termination Agreement (including its disclosure to your clients) protects and preserves such rights.

Considering the conduct of Deel to date (and given that Deel is in the US), we do not believe the Termination Agreement can be lawfully shared with Deel. Unless and until Deel engages with the reality of its conduct, assurances or undertakings from Deel are worthless. Disclosure of the Termination Agreement to Deel would amount to an inappropriate and disproportionate interference with Mr O'Brien's GDPR and Constitutional Rights.

Without prejudice to the foregoing, (and subject to Deel satisfactorily addressing the issue at (1) above), Rippling will consider consenting to an order to [sic ] the disclosure of the Termination Agreement if disclosure is subject to a confidentiality ring where the documents are not shared outside Deel's Irish lawyers."

20. Deel says that this reasoning would have applied equally to the cooperation agreement, which the plaintiffs were ultimately prepared to provide. Deel contends that there is a bare assertion that the termination agreement is confidential and contains Mr O'Brien's personal data, and that the only evidence before the court as to what provisions are in the agreement is para. 22 of Ms Wu's affidavit quoted above.

21. Counsel referred to the decision of Kelly J (as he then was) in Koger Inc v O'Donnell [2009] IEHC 385. In that case, the defendants sought a restriction on disclosure of materials such that they would only been seen by experts or alternatively only by the experts and the legal advisers, but not by officers of the plaintiffs. Kelly J described such a restriction as "unusual", and said that "there must be exceptional circumstances which would justify it" [p.26 of judgment]. The court held that such limited disclosure was "not sufficient to permit of a fair trial", and permitted disclosure to the plaintiff's counsel and solicitor and to "a nominated officer of the plaintiffs under strict conditions", which were set out in the judgment.

22. The law in relation to confidentiality rings was reviewed by Clarke CJ in Word Perfect Translation Services Limited v Minister for Public Expenditure & Reform [2020] IESC 56. It was pointed out that confidentiality rings were used in competition and patent proceedings in Ireland, but not up to that point in procurement proceedings. Counsel for Deel submitted that "all of those types of cases involve inherently confidential information, source codes, pricing information, for example in procurement proceedings...But here, we're dealing simply with a Termination Agreement" [Day 3, p.100, lines 5-13].

23. Counsel also referred to the decision of Mulcahy J in Sandoz AG v Bayer Intellectual Property GmbH [2025] IEHC 500. That case involved a challenge to the validity of an Irish patent. The defendant asked the court to designate certain material provided in discovery and which had been referred to in the course of the proceedings, as confidential. An interim order preserving the confidential nature of the documents was made; the defendant then sought to have the interim order made permanent.

24. The court considered that it was the decision in Gilchrist & Rogers v Sunday Newspapers [2017] 2 IR 284 "which provides the applicable framework". Mulcahy J concluded that

"In light of Gilchrist and [BOC Aviation Limited v Lloyds & Ors. [2024] IEHC 162 ], informed by the caselaw of England and Wales, I accept, as I did when making the interim order, that there may be circumstances in which an order of the type sought in this application are justified. In the absence of any applicable statutory provision, notwithstanding that there are some statutory exceptions for confidential information, it seems to me that the making of such an order must be regarded as exceptional and could only be justified by compelling reasons." [para 83].

25. The cases cited by Deel all emphasise that the making of an order to protect confidentiality of documents is unusual and, in the words of Mulcahy J at para. 89 of his judgment in Sandoz AG, requires an applicant to meet "the very high bar to warrant the making of ...exceptional orders". It is true that all of those cases involve circumstances which could be said to be quite different from the present case; the plaintiffs in the present proceedings say that the termination agreement is both confidential and irrelevant to the present proceedings, and suggest a confidentiality ring involving Deel's lawyers so that Deel can satisfy itself of the termination agreement's lack of relevance.

26. It can also hardly be said by Deel that it objects to the use of a confidentiality ring in principle, given that it has agreed to materials involving "trade secrets" to be restricted to a "confidentiality club" comprised of its lawyers in the context of the redactions motion to which I have referred above.

27. It is perhaps also worth pointing out that O.31, r.18 of the Rules of the Superior Courts does provide that a court may "make an order for inspection in such place and in such manner as it may think fit". There is no apparent restriction on the face of the order itself as to the provisions which might be put in place by a court to facilitate the inspection ordered.

The plaintiffs' position

28. Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that their proposal, set out at para. 5? above, was sufficient for Deel's purposes and did not infringe any entitlement of Deel to conduct the litigation properly. It was further contended that the termination agreement was of its nature inherently confidential - dealing with the terms of Mr O'Brien's termination of employment - but was not in fact relevant to the issues in dispute, and was only being proffered because it is mentioned in the pleadings and in Ms Wu's affidavit.

29. Counsel went on to make seven points as follows:

(1) the document is confidential;

(2) Deel could have led evidence to demonstrate its relevance. However, Deel has steadfastly refused to produce evidence in response to the factual issues raised by Mr O'Brien in his account of his dealings with Deel and the plaintiffs in his affidavit sworn on 01 April 2025, which affidavit was used to ground the application to this Court for joinder of the Deel defendants. Deel seeks to put Mr O'Brien's credibility in issue, while not engaging in any way with the evidence he has given in that affidavit;

(3) the termination agreement is not relevant to the issues in the case;

(4) the court "has good reason not to trust Deel...on the uncontradicted evidence before the court, Deel have demonstrated that they are willing to breach court orders for their own benefit, or at least to collude together with others in a plot to ensure that court orders are breached...So why would the court trust Deel even to abide by an undertaking that it has given to the court in respect of this document?" [Day 3, p.120, lines 1 to 16];

(5) once the document is used in court, "...it can then be used by Deel anywhere and the court would have to be naive to ignore that...";

(6) the document should go into a confidentiality club;

(7) there is no prejudice to Deel from such course of action.

30. Counsel referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Ryan v Dengrove [2022] IECA 155, in which the issues of relevance, confidentiality and discovery were examined. At para. 67 of his judgment, Collins J set out a series of propositions derived from a review of the relevant authorities. He emphasised the primary test of relevance "in the Peruvian Guano sense", and stated that "...Where the document at issue is confidential, its discovery should be directed only where it is ' clear' that the interests of justice in ensuring the fair disposal of the proceedings makes such an order necessary" [para. 67.3].

31. Collins J went on to say as follows:

"6. ...a balance has to be struck between the likely materiality of any given document to the issues likely to arise in the proceedings and the degree of confidentiality attaching to it. A confidential document (and particularly one that is highly confidential) should not be directed to be discovered unless the court is satisfied that there is a real basis on which it is likely to be relevant at the hearing. The more material the document appears to be - the greater the likelihood that the document will have ' some meaningful bearing on the proceedings ' ? the more clearly the balance will be in favour of disclosure. Such an assessment necessarily requires the court to look beyond the threshold test of Peruvian Guano relevance. The ' nature and potential strength of the relevance ', and the degree to which the document is likely to advance the case of the requester, or damage the case of the requested party, are appropriate considerations in this context.

...8. Where, however, it appears that a document ' is really of some significance to the fair determination of proceedings ' and where accordingly refusal of discovery would produce ' a risk of an unfair result', the interests of disclosure will in the ordinary course outweigh any legitimate confidentiality interests (though in such circumstances, a court might still be required to consider whether to adopt measures to mitigate the effects of disclosure)."

32. The plaintiffs also rely on certain dicta in the Supreme Court decision in Word Perfect:

"5.5? In Hartside it is also mentioned that the approach of the Court should be one which seeks to do the least risk of injustice. Injustice can occur if confidential information (and particularly highly confidential information) is disclosed in circumstances where its disclosure may turn out to have no or only a marginal effect on the proceedings. On the other hand, injustice can occur if information which could truly play a material role in the just resolution of the proceedings in accordance with law is not disclosed. As all of the case law makes clear, the disclosure of confidential but non-privileged materials must occur if that disclosure appears to be truly material to the proper resolution of the proceedings. Confidence must yield to the proper administration of justice.

...5.7 It also seems to me appropriate to acknowledge that it may be necessary, in certain cases, to require of a party seeking disclosure of confidential information that it place before the Court some credible basis for believing that it has a cause of action of the type asserted. It may not always be necessary to require the party concerned to put forward prima facie evidence, for it may well be the case that the party concerned requires to use the evidence gathering procedures available to it under the rules to identify evidence. However, mere assertion, without putting forward any credible basis for believing that evidence might be available, may well be insufficient to justify disclosure of significantly confidential information."

33. The plaintiffs rely heavily on the point made at para. 5.7 above. Counsel submitted that Deel's failure to engage with Mr O'Brien's narrative as set out in his affidavit of 1 April 2025 leads to a situation where the plaintiffs "don't even know if Mr O'Brien's credibility is in issue at all...you might expect at least some sort of indication as to why the document will be useful at trial [as] demonstrating that Mr O'Brien's credibility shouldn't be accepted and in demonstrating that there is some reasonable chance that Mr O'Brien's credibility will be impugned, but [Deel say] nothing about any of that..." [Day 3, p.134, lines 12 to 26]".

Discussion

34. It is clear that confidentiality rings have been acknowledged in Irish cases as a means by which confidential information or documentation may be protected from abuse or wider dissemination than is necessary in the interests of justice. Their use has tended to be approved in competition and procurement cases, where the protection of information is often if not usually at the heart of the dispute between the parties. In such cases, it is often clear that the information is confidential; the issue for the court tends to be whether measures should be taken to protect such confidentiality, and if so, what those measures should be.

35. In the present case, the plaintiffs say that it is self-evident that the terms of a termination agreement between an employer and an employee are confidential, and that the agreement has no relevance to the issues between the parties. The termination agreement receives cursory mention in the statement of claim, and its terms are not set out or relied upon by the plaintiffs.

36. Deel's position is that the termination agreement was concluded at the same time as the cooperation agreement, a copy of which Deel was ultimately given, and that it is clearly relevant. In his grounding affidavit for the application, Mr Jeremy Erwin avers at para. 43 that the termination agreement "...appears to form an integral part of the manner in which the Plaintiffs have elected to settle these proceedings in full against Mr O'Brien...". Deel relies on the fact that the plaintiffs have referred to the termination agreement in the ASOC as showing that "the Plaintiffs themselves considered the Termination Agreement to be relevant... [para. 42]".

37. The court has not seen the termination agreement. However, as the evidence suggests that it relates to the terms upon which the plaintiffs and Mr O'Brien agreed that his employment would cease, it seems reasonable to infer that the agreement contains confidential information, and that the information is such as would normally attract the protection of the General Data Protection Regulation ('GDPR').

38. As Collins J pointed out in Ryan v Dengrove, the starting point in relation to the discovery of confidential information or documentation is relevance. I consider the position to be no different where production is sought of a document. The party seeking the document must demonstrate its relevance. Deel seeks the document on the basis that the ASOC refers to it and that it was concluded contemporaneously with the cooperation agreement, which is itself undoubtedly relevant.

39. The plaintiffs do not recite the terms of the termination agreement and do not rely on those terms in the ASOC. It is not clear from the face of the ASOC that the termination agreement has any relevance to the plaintiffs' claim. In those circumstances, it is all the more incumbent on Deel to demonstrate the relevance of the termination agreement to the issues, albeit that Deel is not in a position to address the detail of the agreement, not having seen it.

40. In this regard, the plaintiffs are correct in their contention that Deel has not engaged with the detailed narrative and allegations made by Mr O'Brien in his affidavit of 1 April 2025, which affidavit was proffered in support of the application for joinder of the Deel defendants. This affidavit set out in detail Mr O'Brien's version of events regarding his relationship and dealings with the Deel defendants, and forms the basis for the allegations set out in the ASOC. No affidavit has been forthcoming from the Deel defendants in response to this affidavit, nor does the defence of Deel set out substantive pleas in response to the detailed allegations in the ASOC.

41. Deel is of course entitled to adopt this position and conduct its defence of the proceedings as it sees fit. However, at para. 3.14 of its written submissions in the present application, Deel argues that the termination agreement "also clearly has potential relevance to the credibility of Mr O'Brien's allegations against Deel, and the motive underlying his decision to make those allegations following execution of the Termination Agreement". This argument is made in circumstances where Deel does not proactively contest Mr O'Brien's allegations by adducing evidence of its own which would challenge Mr O Brien's credibility, but merely traverses the plaintiffs' pleadings in relation to those allegations.

42. In these circumstances, there is force in the plaintiffs' argument that Deel cannot advance the existence of issues as to Mr O'Brien's credibility as a reason for the relevance and production of the termination agreement, while declining to advance any evidence or positive pleas which would suggest whether or in what manner Mr O'Brien's credibility is in fact in issue.

43. One can imagine circumstances in which the termination agreement would be relevant to the issues between the parties. However, as Collins J pointed out in Ryan v Dengrove, "...A confidential document (and particularly one that is highly confidential) should not be directed to be discovered unless the court is satisfied that there is a real basis on which it is likely to be relevant at the hearing". In the absence of any actual evidence put forward by Deel impugning the credibility of Mr O'Brien - as opposed to a mere denial of his allegations - one is left with speculation on the part of Deel that the termination agreement may have "potential relevance" to the credibility of Mr O'Brien's allegations.

44. In those circumstances, it is difficult to discern any "real basis" advanced by Deel on which the termination agreement - the terms of which are not relied upon by the plaintiffs in the statement of claim - is likely to be relevant at the hearing. However, the possible relevance of the termination agreement cannot entirely be discounted in circumstances where it was executed contemporaneously with the cooperation agreement. It is certainly possible that the two agreements could be regarded as a "package" which, taken together, secured Mr O'Brien's cooperation, and that the termination agreement might therefore have some relevance together with the cooperation agreement, which itself is undoubtedly relevant.

45. One is struck, on reviewing the caselaw regarding discovery and production of confidential documents, by how varied the circumstances of the cases are. The degree of confidentiality of documents, and the extent to which that confidentiality will require to be protected, will vary from case to case. In matters involving trade secrets or financial information, it may be very clear that the information is highly confidential and requires stringent measures for its protection.

46. The task of the court was summarised by Clarke J (as he then was) in Telefonica O2 Ireland Limited v Commission for Communications Regulation [2011] IEHC 265:

"3. The court is required to exercise some balance between the likely materiality of the documents concerned to the issues which are anticipated as being likely to arise in the proceedings, and the degree of confidentiality attaching to the relevant materials. In that context, the confidence of third parties may be given added weight for it must be accepted that those parties who become embroiled in litigation will necessarily have to disclose information about their confidential affairs when that information is necessary to the fair and just resolution of the relevant litigation..."

47. Clarke J went on to say that

"4. In attempting to balance those rights the court can seek to fashion an appropriate order designed to meet the facts of the individual case so as to protect both the legitimate interests of the party seeking disclosure to ensure that all relevant materials potentially influential on the result of the case are before the court and, to the extent that it may be proportionate, the legitimate interests of confidence asserted...".

48. These dicta were quoted with approval by Collins J in Ryan v Dengrove and incorporated in his summary of propositions to be derived from the cases at para. 67 of his judgment.

Conclusion

49. In my view, the balance between the possible materiality of the termination agreement and the degree of confidentiality attaching to it is best served by the proposal made by the plaintiffs and set out at para. 5 above. The formula provides that the Irish lawyers of Deel have access to the agreement subject to undertakings that it not be disclosed to Deel or any other parties and can be used only for the purpose of the Irish proceedings. The position of Deel is protected by a proviso that an application can be made to court for leave for Deel to have access to the document if it were necessary for Deel's solicitors to do so in order to obtain proper instructions.

50. While I am mindful of the strictures in Koger and Word Perfect in particular in relation to the use of measures to restrict disclosure, I am of the view that the order suggested by the plaintiffs respects the confidentiality of the termination agreement and protects Mr O'Brien's rights, while enabling Deel's lawyers to apprise themselves of the terms of the agreement and apply to court if they perceive a genuine need to obtain instructions from their client in relation to it. If they accept that the agreement is not relevant to the issues, the parties can move on.

51. The order does not prejudice Deel. Both the reported decisions and O.31, r.18 itself envisaged that the court can make an order which fits the particular circumstances of the case and respects the interests of the parties. In my view, the proposed order is balanced and proportionate in all the circumstances.

52. I will hear the parties at 10.30am on Wednesday 15 th April 2026 with a view to making a final order on the application, including in relation to the costs of the matter.

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