Peo v. Webb - Colorado Court of Appeals Affirms Criminal Conviction

Jump To

Top Caption Combined Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

April 23, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Peo v. Webb

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24CA1870

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (7.4K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

24CA1870 Peo v Webb 04-23-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1870
Boulder County District Court No. 23CR2108
Honorable Nancy W. Salomone, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Aaron Oswald Webb,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE TOW
Lipinsky and Berger*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 23, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Caitlin E. Grant, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Ridley, McGreevy & Winocur, P.C., Robert T. Fishman, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Defendant, Aaron Oswald Webb, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of sexual

assault on a child under fifteen years of age by one in a position of

trust as part of a pattern of abuse and an aggravated sex offense

sentence enhancer. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The jury heard evidence that would support the following

findings. Webb sexually assaulted G.B., his stepdaughter,

approximately twenty times when she was between seven and ten

years old.

¶3 G.B. testified at trial. Webb did not. Part of Webb’s defense

centered on attacking the actions of two witnesses. He argued that

David Nichols — G.B.’s therapist and the first person to whom G.B.

disclosed Webb’s sexual abuse — improperly and suggestively

pressured her disclosure while discussing with G.B. a letter she had

written that referred to Webb “touching” her. Webb also argued

that G.B.’s dialogue with Susana Avelar, a forensic interviewer, was

not “neutral.”

¶4 The jury convicted Webb of sexual assault on a child under

fifteen years of age by one in a position of trust as part of a pattern

1
of abuse and an aggravated sex offense sentence enhancer. The

trial court sentenced Webb to an indeterminate term of twelve years

to life in the custody of the Department of Corrections.

II. Cross-Examination

¶5 Webb contends that the trial court violated his right to present

a complete defense by imposing limitations on his

cross-examination of Nichols and Avelar. We discern no error.

A. Additional Background

¶6 The prosecution filed a notice of its intent to introduce

evidence at trial under CRE 404(b) and section 16-10-301, C.R.S.

2025, that Webb repeatedly sexually assaulted his younger sister

decades before, beginning when he was six years old and his sister

was three years old. According to the prosecution, there were

factual similarities between Webb’s sexual conduct involving his

sister and G.B.’s allegations. The prosecution asserted that the

evidence of Webb’s sexual assault of his sister was admissible

because, among other reasons, it (1) went directly to Webb’s intent

when he sexually assaulted G.B.; (2) established that Webb’s

conduct did not result from a mistake or misunderstanding; and

2
(3) rebutted the anticipated defense argument that G.B. was not

credible or made up her story.

¶7 Webb objected, arguing that the prior acts were not relevant,

involved an improper propensity inference, and did not survive a

CRE 403 analysis.

¶8 After additional argument, the trial court granted the People’s

request in part. It explained that it was concerned with the amount

of time that had passed but noted that Webb would open the door

to the evidence at trial if Webb, “on [v]oir [d]ire, [o]pening

[s]tatement[,] or examination of any witness[,] challenges the

credibility of G.B.” The court ruled that, should such a credibility

challenge be asserted, it would admit the evidence as relevant to

Webb’s motive, opportunity, and intent.

¶9 Webb requested that the court reconsider its ruling. In the

meantime, a different district court judge had taken over the case.

At a hearing, the new judge noted with concern that the original

order did not include any CRE 404(b) findings. And the new judge

expressed additional unease with the breadth of the language

warning that a challenge to G.B.’s credibility would open the door.

3
The court then essentially abrogated the original order, saying, “I

regard this as being, essentially, a fresh question for this Court.”

¶ 10 The court conducted a CRE 404(b) analysis and found that

while the first two prongs under People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314,

1318 (Colo. 1990), were met, prongs three and four — the

requirements that the evidence’s logical relevance be independent of

an impermissible propensity inference and the risk of unfair

prejudice not substantially outweigh the evidence’s probative

value — were not. The court also clarified the original ruling,

saying that “attacking the credibility” of G.B. would not mean

simply mounting a defense that the accusation was false or

fabricated. Rather, the court explained, it would mean asserting

that G.B. made up the allegations because of the family dynamic

(which allegedly involved G.B.’s dissatisfaction with Webb during

the dissolution of Webb’s marriage to her mother). The court noted

that it would revisit its ruling depending on whether defense

counsel opened the door to the admission of the prior act evidence

at trial.

¶ 11 At trial, the prosecutor argued that defense counsel opened

the door to the CRE 404(b) evidence during opening statement by

4
arguing that Nichols planted the abuse allegations and that Avelar

pressured G.B. to disclose the abuse; thus, the CRE 404(b) evidence

was admissible to rebut the defense’s implanted memory and

fabrication claims. The court found that while the reasons the

prosecutor gave for admission of this evidence were appropriate, the

evidence did not survive CRE 403 balancing. The court stated,

The Court acknowledges that since the ruling
on Thursday, there has become, in my mind, a
clearer piece of logical relevance, and that I’m
naming as the suggestion that [G.B.] either
purposely fabricated, or the suggestion that
the therapist has implanted a memory that she
now believes is true. That is independent of an
intermediate inference, which is the propensity
one that the Court remains concerned about.

So what is left now is prong four. The Court
feels that at this stage of the evidence, the
weight of prejudice is substantially larger than
the weight of the probative value for the
permissible purpose. But [defense counsel] is
again cautioned that the Court would review
the weight, and that the weight changes the
more the defense affirmatively posits one of
those two things, that is the — that this
evidence would be permissive to rebut.

¶ 12 Later, during a bench conference prior to defense counsel’s

cross-examination of Avelar, defense counsel stated,

So I’ve never intended to argue that a memory
has been implanted. But I understand that

5
there are things I can say that will cause [the
prosecutor] to argue that I’ve done that
anyway. So I just wanted to say, my intent
now, with this witness, is to basically use this
witness to confirm that the original interview,
as described with Nichols, did not follow her
forensic interviewing policies and techniques;
that he did things that she would not have
done. I think that’s a valid area of cross-
examination, but if [the prosecutor] is going to
then argue that I’m inferring, that that’s
implanting a memory, and you’re going to
allow his sister to come testify, I’ll have no
cross.

The parties argued about whether the door was opened in the

following exchange:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And I think that this is
just sufficiency of the evidence, thoroughness
of the process, not following procedures. If
they’re allowed to say these are the procedures
that should be followed by the expert, I feel like
I should be able to say, and they weren’t
followed in the first interview. And I don’t
think that opens the door to implanting a
memory. I’m just saying he didn’t follow the
procedures . . . I just — I want to bring it up
before I do it so I know how to advise my client
and how to move forward.

THE COURT: [W]hile I entirely understand
your intention and bringing the issue to the
Court, I think we’re perilously close to a place
where I’m giving you an advisory opinion . . .
and I’m not going to do that. [The prosecutor]
has already indicated that she thinks that the
door is already open. I’ve indicated that what

6
is remaining for the Court to do in the Spoto
analysis is weigh prejudice versus probative
value, and I don’t think it’s properly my role to
indicate to you what precisely every question
weighs.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I understand that. My
client’s facing 18 to life. If I ask a question
that changes the Court’s ruling, he’s going to
spend years in prison while they appeal my
effectiveness. And so I’m trying to be as
careful and as transparent as I can about what
I’m trying to argue versus what [the
prosecutor] thinks I’m arguing, because I don’t
believe I’ve even got my toes in the door. But
that — that’s where I’m standing. And I guess
I’m understanding the Court to say proceed at
your peril?

The court agreed, noting, again, that it did not want to give an

advisory opinion. Defense counsel did not cross-examine Avelar.

¶ 13 Defense counsel also did not cross-examine Nichols because of

“the pending threat of 404(b) coming in, if [counsel] were to say

anything that [the prosecutor] believe[d] g[ot] [them] through that

door,” among other reasons.

B. Analysis

¶ 14 Throughout his appellate briefing, Webb refers to the court’s

comments as a “ruling.” He argues that this “ruling” forced him to

7
abandon his constitutional rights to cross-examine his accusers

and present a complete defense.

¶ 15 In support of his claim, he cites People v. Johnson, 2021 CO

35. In Johnson, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that an

alternate suspect had tested positive for gunshot residue. The

district court ruled that if the defense offered that evidence, it would

open the door to evidence of Johnson’s positive gunshot residue

test, which the court had previously suppressed as the fruit of an

unlawful search. Johnson, ¶¶ 4, 13. The Colorado Supreme Court

held that the district court’s ruling improperly interfered with the

defendant’s right to present a complete defense. Id. at ¶ 33.

¶ 16 This case differs from Johnson in one significant — and

dispositive — detail. Unlike in that case, the trial court did not

issue a definitive ruling. Indeed, the court expressly disavowed

making any such ruling, saying that it would not issue an advisory

opinion. It simply reiterated that defense counsel’s inquiries on

cross-examination might open the door — a warning that defense

counsel characterized as nothing more than “proceed at your peril.”

¶ 17 Counsel did not press the court for a definitive ruling. See

CRE 103(a)(2) (addressing rulings on evidence and noting that

8
“[o]nce the court makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting or

excluding evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew

an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal”

(emphasis added)). In the absence of a definitive ruling, we have

nothing to review for error. And, perhaps more importantly, it

cannot be said that the trial court prevented Webb from presenting

evidence or asking questions at all — let alone did so to such a

degree as to prevent Webb from putting on a complete defense.

Consequently, we cannot identify any error, let alone reversible

error, related to Webb’s decision not to cross-examine the

prosecution’s witnesses.

III. Rape Shield Statute

¶ 18 Next, Webb contends that the trial court erred by prohibiting

him from introducing evidence of G.B.’s sexual history because the

prosecution opened the door to such evidence. We discern no error.

A. Additional Background

¶ 19 Prior to trial, Webb filed a notice under Colorado’s rape shield

statute, § 18-3-407, C.R.S. 2025, advising the People and the court

that he intended to introduce evidence of G.B.’s prior sexual assault

9
outcry involving her ex-boyfriend, which Webb claimed was a false

report. After a hearing, the court denied Webb’s request.

¶ 20 At trial, Webb challenged the credibility of G.B.’s allegations

against him by having her admit that she had many opportunities

to disclose her allegations against him to her various therapists but

never did. The following exchange between the prosecutor and G.B.

occurred on redirect examination:

Prosecutor: Okay. Fair to say, part of why you
were in both of those [therapeutic] programs
was related to some substance use?

G.B.: Yes.

....

Prosecutor: So that entire time that you were
in treatment, were you working on some of
those sobriety issues and those pieces
initially?

G.B.: Yes.

Prosecutor: Okay. While you were working on
those pieces, did anybody have concerns or
was anybody trying to get you to talk about
trauma or what had happened prior, or were
you just focused on the substance use at first?

G.B.: It was mostly focused on the substance
use. I think two sessions of my, like, 12 or 13
in [my therapeutic programs], we talked more
about like trauma and stuff.

10
Prosecutor: Okay. And you were asked
questions about whether you had talked to
anybody before [Nichols] about [Webb]’s sexual
abuse, and I think you said you did not; is that
right?

G.B.: Correct.

Prosecutor: Okay. Why didn’t you talk to
anybody earlier?

G.B.: I didn’t feel like it was a topic to be spoke
about.

Prosecutor: Okay. Why didn’t you feel like it
was a topic to be spoke about?

G.B.: I preferred talking about other things.

In response to this line of questioning, Webb sought to introduce

evidence that G.B. had reported sexual abuse by her ex-boyfriend to

Nichols. Specifically, defense counsel argued,

[I]n terms of credibility, she just said she didn’t
disclose any trauma in those sessions because
she didn’t want to talk about it. But she did
disclose trauma of the exact same type in
those sessions. So I think it undermines her
credibility, and it’s a crucial area of cross-
examination that I think the door has been
opened to.

The court did not let defense counsel cross-examine G.B. on this

issue.

11
B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 21 We review the trial court’s determination of admissibility of

evidence under the rape shield statute for an abuse of discretion.

People v. Osorio-Bahena, 2013 COA 55, ¶ 21. A trial court abuses

its discretion if its ruling misconstrues or misapplies the law or is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Id.

¶ 22 The rape shield statute generally precludes the admission of

evidence of a victim’s sexual history unless the proponent can show

that the evidence is relevant to a material issue in the case.

§ 18-3-407(2)(e). This prohibition includes evidence of the victim’s

prior sexual assault reports. People v. Weiss, 133 P.3d 1180, 1185

(Colo. 2006). In particular, such evidence is generally inadmissible

for purposes of attacking the credibility of a victim as a witness.

People v. Wallen, 996 P.2d 182, 186 (Colo. App. 1999). But

evidence of a victim’s prior sexual conduct may nevertheless be

admissible “if the prosecution makes the evidence relevant by

12
‘opening the door’ to the evidence.” People v. Murphy, 919 P.2d 191,

195 (Colo. 1996).1

¶ 23 The doctrine of “opening the door” allows a trial court to admit

otherwise inadmissible evidence when such evidence is necessary to

prevent the other party from gaining an unfair advantage through

the presentation of “evidence that, without being placed in context,

creates an incorrect or misleading impression.” People v. Melillo, 25

P.3d 769, 775 (Colo. 2001). It is possible for a victim to open the

door to evidence of that individual’s sexual history that would

otherwise be inadmissible. Id. (“[T]he concept of ‘opening the door’

may provide a proper basis for . . . overcoming the presumption of

irrelevance created by the rape shield statute.”). If the defense

believes the door has been opened, it must make an offer of proof

that meets the requirements of the rape shield statute. Id. (citing

Murphy, 919 P.2d at 195-99).

1 There are additional exceptions to rape shield inadmissibility, but

Webb does not assert that any such exception — other than the
opening-the-door doctrine — applies here.

13
C. Analysis

¶ 24 We are not persuaded that G.B.’s testimony opened any door

or that Webb’s trial counsel made a sufficient offer of proof.

¶ 25 G.B. testified that she talked about trauma during two

sessions of her therapeutic programs. She also testified that she

did not disclose Webb’s sexual abuse at any point in these sessions

because she did not think it was a topic to be spoken about. Trial

defense counsel argued that this latter statement opened the door

to questioning G.B. regarding the other sexual abuse involving her

ex-boyfriend.

¶ 26 G.B. did not broadly assert that she believed sexual assault

was not a subject to be talked about. Rather, she answered the

prosecutor’s question, which specifically asked her why she had not

told anyone “about [Webb]’s sexual abuse” before she disclosed it to

Nichols. When viewed in context, therefore, G.B.’s statement that it

was not a topic to be spoken about is most reasonably understood

as a response to the prosecutor’s questions asking about Webb’s

sexual abuse.

¶ 27 Moreover, as noted, Webb’s trial counsel’s offer of proof was

that G.B. had testified that “she didn’t disclose any trauma in those

14
sessions because she didn’t want to talk about it. But she did

disclose trauma of the exact same type in those sessions.” This

offer of proof was insufficient for two reasons. First, counsel

misstated that G.B. testified that she did not disclose any (sexual)

trauma in her sessions with Nichols. Again, the question to which

she responded asked why she had not disclosed the trauma before

speaking with Nichols. Second, it is inaccurate to say the two

circumstances involved “the exact same type” of abuse; one involved

intrafamilial sexual abuse by a stepfather and the other involved

sexual abuse by a then boyfriend.

¶ 28 In sum, G.B. did not testify that all sexual abuse was a topic

not to be spoken about. Nor did her testimony create an incorrect

or misleading impression that she did not disclose any other sexual

abuse in these therapy sessions. Therefore, her testimony did not

open the door to evidence of her sexual history. See Murphy, 919

P.2d at 192-93 (concluding that the door was not opened to the

proffered evidence about the victim’s sexual history).

¶ 29 Because G.B.’s testimony did not open the door to the

evidence barred by the rape shield statute, the trial court did not

15
abuse its discretion by prohibiting Webb’s inquiry into her other

abuse disclosure.

IV. Child Hearsay — Forensic Interview

¶ 30 Finally, Webb contends that the trial court erred by allowing

Avelar to testify about statements G.B. made during the forensic

interview. We again discern no error.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 31 A trial court may admit a child witness’s out-of-court

statements about sexual assault if it finds that “the time, content,

and circumstances” of the child’s statements provide “sufficient

safeguards of reliability.” § 13-25-129(5)(a), C.R.S. 2025. In People

v. District Court, 776 P.2d 1083, 1089-90 (Colo. 1989), the supreme

court identified a variety of factors that are “helpful” in determining

reliability:

(1) Whether the statement was made
spontaneously;

(2) whether the statement was made while the
child was still upset or in pain from the alleged
abuse;

(3) whether the language of the statement was
likely to have been used by a child the age of
the declarant;

16
(4) whether the allegation was made in
response to a leading question;

(5) whether either the child or the hearsay
witness had any bias against the defendant or
any motive for lying;

(6) whether any other event occurred between
the time of the abuse and the time of the
statement which could account for the
contents of the statement;

(7) whether more than one person heard the
statement; and

(8) the general character of the child.

However, the court specifically noted that these factors are neither

“mandatory standards” nor “an immutable set of standards for the

trial court in determining that the rather amorphous standard of

‘sufficient indicia of reliability’ has been met.” Id. at 1090.

¶ 32 We review a trial court’s decision to admit child hearsay for an

abuse of discretion. People v. Phillips, 2012 COA 176, ¶ 91. “We

will uphold a court’s decision to admit a child hearsay statement, ‘if

the record shows an adequate factual basis to support its decision.’”

People v. Thompson, 2017 COA 56, ¶ 146 (quoting Phillips, ¶ 91).

B. Analysis

¶ 33 The trial court considered the relevant factors when evaluating

the reliability of G.B.’s statements to Avelar. The trial court found

17
that Avelar was trained to conduct the interview without suggesting

responses; G.B. acknowledged at the beginning of the interview that

she understood what telling the truth meant; the interview

technique favored creating reliable statements; G.B. used age-

appropriate language for a sixteen-year-old; G.B.’s demeanor and

nonverbal communication suggested that she made the statements

while still upset or in pain from the abuse; and the interview would

be useful to the jury in determining G.B.’s credibility because Webb

had indicated his intention to assert a fabrication defense. The

court also found that while the statements were not made

spontaneously because G.B. knew the subject of the interview in

advance, they were nevertheless spontaneous versions of the events

as relayed by her.

¶ 34 Webb contends that the court did not consider a number of

factors that weighed in favor of exclusion. But this argument

merely urges us to make different factual findings than the trial

court. That is not our role when reviewing for an abuse of

discretion. The factual record supports the trial court’s findings.

Indeed, the court noted that the factors weighed in both directions.

Thus, notwithstanding the lack of spontaneity of G.B.’s statements

18
to Avelar, there is sufficient factual support for the trial court’s

decision to admit them.

¶ 35 We further reject Webb’s contention that the decisive factor in

the court’s conclusion was Webb’s opportunity to cross-examine

Avelar. The court noted that the defense had the ability to cross-

examine “each of the parts of the statements” but coupled this

observation with a reference to “the nature of the interview.” The

court went on to discuss the likelihood of a claim of recent

fabrication or modification of the allegations and how important it

might be to a jury “to understand the way in which a story has

either maintained or not maintained consistency since the time it

was originally reported.” Thus, we see nothing in the court’s

language suggesting that the ability to cross-examine was the

determining factor. And, as noted, defense counsel chose not to

cross-examine Avelar.2

V. Disposition

¶ 36 The judgment is affirmed.

2 Because Webb has not established that any error occurred, his

cumulative error claim fails. See Howard-Walker v. People, 2019
CO 69, ¶ 25 (cumulative error requires multiple errors).

19
JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE BERGER concur.

20