Peo v. Stidham - Criminal Jurisdiction Appeal
Summary
The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a postconviction motion filed by Afrow Spade Stidham. Stidham argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction due to the prosecutor's alleged failure to file an oath of office and bond. The court found this argument did not implicate subject matter jurisdiction and was successive.
What changed
The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Afrow Spade Stidham's postconviction motion, which argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the prosecutor allegedly failed to file an oath of office and bond with the Colorado Secretary of State. The appellate court determined that this argument did not affect the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and that the issue was successive, having been raised in prior postconviction motions.
This ruling means that Stidham's convictions and sentence remain valid. For legal professionals and compliance officers involved in criminal justice, this case reinforces the principles of res judicata and successive postconviction motions, highlighting the importance of timely and comprehensive appeals. It also clarifies that procedural omissions regarding prosecutor oaths, as alleged here, do not automatically void a court's jurisdiction.
Archived snapshot
Mar 27, 2026GovPing captured this document from the original source. If the source has since changed or been removed, this is the text as it existed at that time.
Jump To
Support FLP
CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.
Please become a member today.
March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note
Peo v. Stidham
Colorado Court of Appeals
- Citations: None known
- Docket Number: 25CA0363
Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
Combined Opinion
25CA0363 Peo v Stidham 03-26-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0363
El Paso County District Court No. 08CR1501
Honorable Samuel Evig, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Afrow Spade Stidham,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I
Opinion by JUDGE LUM
J. Jones and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 26, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brittany Limes Zehner, Senior Assistant
Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for
Plaintiff-Appellee
Afrow Spade Stidham, Pro Se
¶1 Defendant, Afrow Spade Stidham, appeals the postconviction
court’s denial of his Crim. P. 35(c) motion asserting that the trial
court didn’t have jurisdiction over his criminal case. We affirm.
I. Procedural History
¶2 In 2009, Stidham was convicted of child sexual assault,
adjudicated a habitual criminal, and sentenced to forty-eight years
to life in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Stidham
directly appealed his convictions and sentence, and after two
remands, a division of this court ultimately affirmed. People v.
Stidham, (Colo. App. No. 15CA0618, Feb. 8, 2018) (not published
pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Stidham I). The final mandate from
Stidham’s direct appeals was issued in 2018. Other divisions of
this court affirmed the denials of two postconviction motions in
2020 and 2022. See People v. Stidham, (Colo. App. No. 19CA1407,
June 11, 2020) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Stidham
II); People v. Stidham, (Colo. App. No. 22CA0780, Nov. 30, 2023)
(not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Stidham III).
¶3 In 2024, Stidham filed his third postconviction motion, the
denial of which underlies this appeal. In the motion, Stidham
argued that his convictions are void and his sentence is illegal
1
because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction based on the
prosecutor’s failure to file an oath of office and bond with the
Colorado Secretary of State prior to filing the complaints.
¶4 Stidham had raised the oath-of-office issue in his first
postconviction motion. A division of this court affirmed the
postconviction court’s denial and held, as relevant here, that
Stidham’s argument (1) didn’t implicate the trial court’s subject
matter jurisdiction and (2) was successive because it could have
been raised on direct appeal. Stidham II, slip op. at ¶ 30. Then, in
Stidham’s second postconviction motion, he reraised the issue of
noncompliance with the oath and bond filing requirements by
arguing that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by
failing to raise it. See Stidham III, slip op. at ¶ 49. On appeal, a
division of this court declined to address the oath-of-office issue
because it was argued in a conclusory fashion. Id. at ¶ 50.
¶5 In the order underlying this appeal, the postconviction court
denied Stidham’s motion for the following reasons:
• The oath-of-office claim was successive because it was
previously raised and resolved in his first postconviction
proceeding.
2
• The motion was time barred because Stidham filed it
more than three years after the statutory deadline in
section 16-5-402(1), C.R.S. 2025.
• The motion failed on the merits because sections 20-1-
101 and 24-12-101, C.R.S. 2025, required only an
elected district attorney to file an oath and bond.
II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶6 We review a postconviction court’s summary denial of a
motion for postconviction relief de novo. People v. Nozolino, 2023
COA 39, ¶ 7. A postconviction motion may be denied without an
evidentiary hearing when the motion, files, and record clearly
establish that the defendant’s allegations are without merit and
don’t warrant postconviction relief. Ardolino v. People, 69 P.3d 73,
77 (Colo. 2003).
¶7 Subject to exceptions not relevant here, “claims for
postconviction relief are subject to a three-year time limitation,
which runs from the date a conviction is final. A conviction is final
on the date the defendant’s direct appeal has been exhausted if an
appeal is pursued . . . .” People v. Shepard, 151 P.3d 580, 582
(Colo. App. 2006) (citations omitted); see § 16-5-402(1).
3
¶8 Additionally, a court must deny any postconviction claim that
was “raised and resolved in a prior appeal or postconviction
proceeding on behalf of the same defendant” unless the claim is
based on newly discovered evidence or on a new rule of
constitutional law. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI).
III. Oath of Office
¶9 Stidham argues that his motion isn’t successive under Crim.
P. 35(c) and isn’t time barred under section 16-5-402 because it
raises subject matter jurisdiction, which, he asserts, excepts him
from these procedural barriers. We disagree.
¶ 10 Stidham filed his postconviction motion in 2024 —
approximately three years late. See Hunsaker v. People, 2021 CO
83, ¶ 36. It’s true that a postconviction claim asserting that the
trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction may be raised outside
the three-year time limit. § 16-5-402(2)(a). However, Stidham’s
argument that the prosecutor hadn’t appropriately filed his oath of
4
office doesn’t implicate the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
See People v. Scott, 116 P.3d 1231, 1232-33 (Colo. App. 2004).1
¶ 11 Furthermore, even if Stidham’s claim did implicate the court’s
subject matter jurisdiction, the claim was previously raised and
resolved in Stidham’s first postconviction proceeding. Thus, the
only way the court could address his claim is if it was based on
newly discovered evidence or on a new rule of constitutional law.
See Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI). Stidham doesn’t raise any argument that
his claim falls under either of those exceptions.2
IV. Habitual Criminal Convictions
¶ 12 Stidham also challenges his designation as a habitual criminal
as unconstitutional under Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821
(2024). However, we decline to address this issue because it isn’t
1 To the extent that Stidham argues that the three-year deadline to
challenge a conviction does not apply to him because the
postconviction court lacked personal jurisdiction, see § 16-5-
402(2)(b), C.R.S. 2025, we decline to address the argument. See
People v. Gingles, 2014 COA 163, ¶ 29 (appellate courts will decline
to address issues presented in a “cursory[] and undeveloped
manner”).
2 To the extent Stidham contends that his motion is cognizable
under Crim. P. 35(a), we disagree. See Johnson v. Gunter, 852 P.2d
1263, 1265 n.5 (Colo. 1993) (“An allegation that a trial court was
without . . . subject-matter jurisdiction is properly raised in a Crim.
P. 35(c)” motion.).
5
preserved.3 See DePineda v. Price, 915 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Colo.
1996) (“Issues not raised before the district court in a motion for
postconviction relief will not be considered on appeal of the denial of
that motion.”); People v. Huggins, 2019 COA 116, ¶ 18 (noting that
the preservation rule “applies to both constitutional and
nonconstitutional arguments presented for the first time in an
appeal of a ruling on a Crim. P. 35(c) motion”).
V. Disposition
¶ 13 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.
3 We note that Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), was
decided on June 21, 2024 — approximately two weeks before
Stidham filed the postconviction motion at issue in this appeal.
6
Named provisions
Related changes
Get daily alerts for CO Court of Appeals Opinions
Daily digest delivered to your inbox.
Free. Unsubscribe anytime.
About this page
Every important government, regulator, and court update from around the world. One place. Real-time. Free. Our mission
Source document text, dates, docket IDs, and authority are extracted directly from CO Court of Appeals.
The summary, classification, recommended actions, deadlines, and penalty information are AI-generated from the original text and may contain errors. Always verify against the source document.
Classification
Who this affects
Taxonomy
Browse Categories
Get alerts for this source
We'll email you when CO Court of Appeals Opinions publishes new changes.
Subscribed!
Optional. Filters your digest to exactly the updates that matter to you.