Peo v. Redwine - Restitution Order Affirmed in Murder Case

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April 9, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Peo v. Redwine

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 22CA0596

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (3)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2.5K)

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Combined Opinion

22CA0596 Peo v Redwine 04-09-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA0596
La Plata County District Court No. 17CR343
Honorable Jeffrey R. Wilson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Mark Allen Redwine,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE FOX
Kuhn and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 9, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, William G. Kozeliski, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Jason C. Middleton, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 A jury found Mark Allen Redwine guilty of second degree

murder and child abuse resulting in death for the murder of his

child. One hundred thirty-eight days after sentencing, the trial

court ordered $900 in restitution for the cost of the child’s burial

plot.

¶2 In this appeal, Redwine challenges the restitution order,

arguing that (1) the trial court and prosecution failed in their

statutory obligations at the time of sentencing regarding restitution;

(2) the court erred by finding that good cause existed to extend the

statutory ninety-one-day deadline to determine restitution; and

(3) the court erred by finding good cause to further continue the

restitution hearing based on the prosecution witness’s surgery.1

¶3 We discern no reversible error and therefore affirm the order.

I. The Restitution Statute and Weeks

¶4 Under Colorado’s restitution statute, every order of conviction

must include one of four types of restitution orders. § 18-1.3-

603(1), C.R.S. 2023. As relevant here, one of those options is an

order “that the defendant is obligated to pay restitution, but that

1 Redwine has separately appealed the judgment of conviction in

Colorado Court of Appeals Case No. 21CA1859.

1
the specific amount of restitution shall be determined within the

ninety-one days immediately following the order of conviction,

unless good cause is shown for extending the time period by which

the restitution amount shall be determined.” § 18-1.3-603(1)(b).

¶5 The statute also requires the prosecution to file information

supporting a specific amount of restitution “prior to the order of

conviction or within ninety-one days, if it is not available prior to

the order of conviction.” § 18-1.3-603(2)(a).

¶6 In People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75 (Weeks II)2, the supreme court

interpreted these provisions of the restitution statute as follows.

First, the prosecution must file its information supporting a specific

amount of restitution “before the judgment of conviction or, if it

isn’t yet available, within ninety-one days of the judgment of

conviction.” Id. at ¶ 31. Second, if the court proceeds under

section 18-1.3-603(1)(b), the judgment of conviction must include

an order that the defendant is obligated to pay restitution but that

2 We use the shorthand “Weeks II” because later in this opinion we

also cite the opinion from a division of this court that preceded the
supreme court’s opinion in Weeks II, namely, People v. Weeks, 2020
COA 44, aff’d, 2021 CO 75, for which we will use the shorthand
“Weeks I.”

2
the specific amount will be determined later. Weeks II, ¶ 4. And

third, if the court determines that an extension of its ninety-one-

day deadline to order an amount of restitution is warranted, it must

make an express finding of good cause, before the ninety-one-day

deadline expires, to extend the deadline. Id. at ¶ 5.

II. Background

A. The Sentencing Hearing and Mittimus

¶7 The sentencing hearing took place on October 8, 2021, one

month before the supreme court issued its opinion in Weeks II.

¶8 At the hearing, the prosecutor said that he did not have a

victim impact statement on file and requested that restitution

“remain open” for ninety-one days. Defense counsel objected,

arguing that a victim impact statement should have been completed

before sentencing. The court asked defense counsel when he

noticed the absence of a victim impact statement, and defense

counsel responded that he noticed the day before. The court then

found that both parties had been dilatory on the issue and said,

“[W]e’re gonna go forward.” Restitution was not discussed further

at the hearing. The court sentenced Redwine to forty-eight years in

the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC).

3
¶9 On the same day, the court issued a mittimus that read, in

pertinent part, “DEF TO PAY ALL COSTS, FEES AND ANY

RESTITUTION, WHICH SHALL BE FILED WITHIN 45 DAYS.” So,

the court’s forty-five-day deadline for the prosecution to file its

motion for restitution and costs was November 22, 2021, and the

statutory ninety-one-day deadline for the court to order a specific

amount of restitution was January 7, 2022.

B. The Proceedings During the First Ninety-One Days
After Sentencing

¶ 10 On November 29, 2021, one week after the expiration of the

court-imposed deadline, the prosecution filed a motion for the costs

of prosecution, detailing a multitude of expenses incurred during

the four-year history of the case totaling more than $100,000.

However, the motion did not include any request for restitution.

The next day, the prosecution filed an amended motion for its

prosecution costs but again did not mention restitution.

¶ 11 On December 13, 2021, the defense filed an “objection to

untimely filing,” arguing that the court “lack[ed] jurisdiction” to rule

on the motion because the prosecution filed it past the

court-imposed deadline of November 22, 2021.

4
¶ 12 Then, on December 21, 2021 — seventy-four days after

sentencing — the prosecution amended its motion to include a

request for $900 in restitution for the cost of the victim’s burial

plot. It also filed a response to the defense’s objection, in which it

explained its reasons for not meeting the court’s forty-five-day

deadline:

The People have been in regular consultation
with the victim’s family throughout the long
history of this case, including on the issue of
restitution, and neither have been dilatory nor
negligent on the topic. Instead, the victims
have contemplated carefully whether to seek
restitution in this case, and for what
categories, if at all. Their specific financial
expenses due to the defendant’s criminal acts
are beyond reasonable calculation; they are
dispersed over a[] 9-year time period [since the
murder] among many different potential
categories, and would require the victim’s
family to search through years of financial
records to locate all of the pecuniary losses
associated with this case. After deliberation,
and for a host of reasons, the victim’s family
has chosen to forgo most restitution, instead
focusing on the most recent cost, securing a
final resting place for the victim. Their
decision, and the associated costs of the burial
plot, were determined by the family recently,
thus explaining the delay in the People’s $900
restitution request being filed on December 21,
2021.

5
The prosecution also argued that, despite its failure to request

restitution by the forty-five-day deadline, the court still had ample

time to order restitution within the statutory ninety-one-day

deadline for what was “a simple request, comprised of single

expense, documented with a valid receipt, for a clearly authorized

expense.”3

¶ 13 On December 28, 2021, the court set a hearing on the

prosecution’s motion for restitution and the costs of prosecution for

January 4, 2022 (three days before the expiration of the statutory

ninety-one-day deadline). In doing so, the court noted that it still

had jurisdiction to rule on the motion despite the prosecution

missing the court-imposed forty-five-day deadline.

¶ 14 The next day, the defense filed a motion for a writ of habeas

corpus to transport Redwine from the DOC to the courthouse for

the hearing on January 4.

¶ 15 However, on January 2 — two days before the scheduled

hearing, and five days before the ninety-one-day deadline — the

court issued an order finding good cause to continue the restitution

3 The motion also included a multitude of costs incurred by the

prosecution in litigating the four-year case.

6
hearing beyond the ninety-one-day deadline. Specifically, the court

found as follows:

• It had excused the prosecution’s failure to file the motion

for restitution and costs within the court-imposed

forty-five-day deadline.

• The defense had not filed an “appropriate” motion for a

writ of habeas corpus for Redwine to appear at the

January 4 restitution hearing.

• The sheriff’s office had informed the court clerk’s office

that even if it was provided with a proper writ of habeas

corpus, it did not believe it could transport Redwine to

the January 4 restitution hearing because of DOC

requirements, the New Year’s Day holiday, its staffing

levels, and other transports it was obligated to complete.

• Although the defense had objected to the original motion

for the costs of prosecution, it hadn’t objected to the

amended motion containing the prosecution’s restitution

request.

• Despite the lack of objection, the court found that “it

needs a hearing upon this matter prior to determining

7
the amount of restitution to be ordered” because of “the

extremely contentious history of this case and defense

counsel’s attempt to procure [Redwine’s] presence at the

hearing.”

• Under those circumstances, the court found “that good

cause exists for [it] to hold the hearing and determine the

amount of restitution owed outside of the 91-day time

limit” because of “the need for a hearing . . . coupled with

the late, but statutorily timely, filing of the restitution

request and the difficulties in obtaining [Redwine’s]

presence at the hearing.”

The court set a January 4 Webex hearing to reschedule the hearing

on restitution and the costs of prosecution.

¶ 16 One day after the court issued this order, and one day before

the January 4 scheduling hearing, the defense filed an objection to

the continuance, arguing that the prosecution should have moved

for a specific amount of restitution at sentencing or, at the very

least, by the court-ordered forty-five-day deadline.

¶ 17 At the scheduling hearing, Redwine appeared via video, and

the court expressed surprise that he was appearing without a video

8
writ. Redwine’s counsel again objected to the continuance beyond

the ninety-one-day deadline and asserted that he and his client

were ready to proceed that day via Webex with the hearing on

restitution and the costs of prosecution. However, given that the

court had continued the hearing on the motion and was holding the

Webex hearing only to reschedule the hearing on the motion, the

prosecutor represented that he was not prepared to proceed that

day via Webex. And when the court remained firm about

rescheduling the substantive hearing and asked defense counsel

how long would be required for the hearing, defense counsel

responded “half a day” at a “minimum” given complexities

surrounding the prosecution’s motion for the prosecution costs.

The court then proposed a rescheduled hearing date of February 4,

2022, and, although the defense initially requested a date later in

February, both parties ultimately agreed to the February 4 hearing

date.

C. The Remaining Proceedings

¶ 18 On January 26, 2022, the prosecution moved to continue the

February 4 hearing. In the motion, the prosecution relayed that its

witness for the restitution hearing — the victim’s mother — was

9
having surgery on January 26 and would be continuing to

convalesce on February 4. Given that it was unclear how long the

witness’s recovery period would be, the prosecution requested a

five-week continuance in the event that she would be required to

appear in person, and a three-week continuance if she could appear

remotely.

¶ 19 The court ordered the defense to file any response by noon on

January 31, 2022. After the court didn’t receive a response by that

deadline, it granted the prosecution’s request to continue the

restitution hearing and ordered counsel to appear via Webex on

February 4 to reschedule the hearing. Later that same day, the

defense filed an objection arguing, among other things, that the

prosecution had not shown due diligence by waiting until January

26 to request the continuance.

¶ 20 At the February 4 Webex hearing, the prosecutor said that the

victim’s surgery made it difficult for her to sit for extended periods

of time. The court rescheduled the hearing on restitution and the

costs of prosecution for February 24, 2022.

¶ 21 After further briefing, the court issued an order denying the

prosecution’s request for the costs of prosecution on the ground

10
that Redwine did not have the ability to pay the extensive costs.

That left outstanding only the prosecution’s request for $900 in

restitution for the cost of the victim’s burial plot.

¶ 22 Then, on February 23, 2022 (the day before the scheduled

restitution hearing), the court issued an order vacating the hearing.

In the order, the court noted that after it denied the prosecution’s

request for the costs of prosecution, the court received an email

from the defense that read,

Mr. Redwine . . . has requested that the costs
hearing be vacated based on the prosecution’s
pleading and the court’s order. He is not
contesting the amount of restitution requested
($900). As identified in the order, he has
preserved timing and jurisdiction objections [to
restitution] for which the court will not take
further evidence or argument. There is no
objection as to [the] amount [of restitution] so
based on [the court’s order denying the costs
of prosecution] there is no longer any
contested issue necessitating the [restitution]
hearing.

Based on that representation from the defense, the court vacated

the restitution hearing and ordered $900 in restitution.

III. Standard of Review

¶ 23 The proper interpretation of the restitution statute is a

question of law that we review de novo. Weeks II, ¶ 13.

11
¶ 24 “However, the issue of whether good cause exists to extend the

ninety-one-day deadline to determine restitution under section 18-

1.3-603(1)(b) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” People v.

Weeks, 2020 COA 44, ¶ 11 (Weeks I), aff’d, 2021 CO 75; cf. People

v. Hines, 2021 COA 45, ¶ 17 (“[W]e review for an abuse of discretion

the district court’s decision to grant a continuance for good

cause.”). A court abuses its discretion when its decision is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it

misconstrues or misapplies the law. Weeks I, ¶ 11.

IV. Analysis

A. The Sentencing Hearing and Mittimus

¶ 25 Redwine first contends that both the prosecution and the trial

court failed to comply with their statutory obligations regarding

restitution at sentencing.

1. Error

¶ 26 The record indicates that Redwine is correct as to the

prosecution. In Weeks II, ¶ 46, the supreme court “infer[red] from

the restitution statute that the legislature expects litigants . . . to be

prepared to address the issue of restitution at sentencing hearings.”

Specifically, “by the time of the sentencing hearing, the prosecution

12
should know whether it is seeking restitution, even if the

information related to the proposed amount isn’t yet available.” Id.

at ¶ 44 n.14.

¶ 27 Here, the record suggests that the prosecutor was unprepared

to address the issue of restitution at sentencing because he did not

have a victim impact statement on file. See § 18-1.3-603(2)(a) (The

prosecution shall present information in support of restitution

“through victim impact statements or other means.”). Instead, the

prosecutor simply requested that restitution “remain open for 91

days.”

¶ 28 And, because the prosecutor did not explain why he did not

have restitution information ready at the time of sentencing, the

trial court erred by extending the prosecution’s deadline to request

a specific amount of restitution. See People v. Martinez Rubier,

2024 COA 67, ¶¶ 35-41; People v. Brassill, 2024 COA 19, ¶¶ 30-45

(cert. granted Aug. 4, 2025).

¶ 29 However, we conclude that the trial court did not lose the

statutory authority to impose restitution after sentencing. See

Martinez Rubier, ¶¶ 42-54; Brassill, ¶¶ 56-64. On the mittimus, the

court specifically ordered, “DEF TO PAY ALL COSTS, FEES AND

13
ANY RESTITUTION.” And the trial court gave the prosecution forty-

five days to determine the amount of restitution it intended to

request. We conclude that this was sufficient to constitute a

restitution order under section 18-1.3-603(1)(b). See § 18-1.3-

603(1)(b) (authorizing “[a]n order that the defendant is obligated to

pay restitution, but that the specific amount of restitution shall be

determined” later); cf. Tennyson v. People, 2025 CO 31, ¶¶ 10, 45

(concluding that the trial court implicitly found at sentencing that

the defendant was liable for restitution but that the amount of

restitution would be determined later); People v. Tennyson, 2023

COA 2, ¶ 37 (clarifying that the mittimus in Tennyson did not

include any notation regarding restitution), aff’d, 2025 CO 31; see

also Weeks II, ¶ 7 n.4 (“In requiring an express finding of

extenuating circumstances to extend the prosecution’s deadline and

an express finding of good cause to extend the court’s deadline, we

don’t mean to suggest that talismanic incantations are necessary.

In both instances, substance controls over form.”).

¶ 30 And because the defense had an opportunity to be heard at

the sentencing hearing, we are unpersuaded by Redwine’s

14
argument that the court erred by entering that notation on the

mittimus without giving the defense an opportunity to be heard.

1. The Error Does Not Warrant Reversal

¶ 31 We conclude that reversal is not warranted. In Brassill, a

division of this court considered what the proper remedy was for the

prosecution’s failure to exercise reasonable diligence to determine

the amount of restitution before sentencing, and for a trial court’s

decision to excuse the prosecution’s error in that regard. See

Brassill, ¶¶ 46-49, 56-63. The division, in effect, held that the

prosecution’s and trial court’s error was harmless because the court

never lost the authority to order restitution under section

18-1.3-603(1)(b). See Brassill, ¶¶ 56-63. Another division of this

court reached the same conclusion in Martinez Rubier, ¶¶ 42-54.

¶ 32 Because we ultimately conclude below that the trial court

never lost the authority to order restitution under section

18-1.3-603(1)(b), and because Redwine has not shown that he

suffered actual prejudice by any delay (such as faded memories of

witnesses or the loss of material evidence), the prosecution’s failure

to be prepared at sentencing to address restitution does not

warrant reversal. See Martinez Rubier, ¶¶ 42-54; Brassill, ¶¶ 56-63.

15
B. The Extension of the Statutory Ninety-One-Day Deadline

¶ 33 Redwine also contends that the trial court lost the authority to

order restitution when it continued the restitution hearing beyond

the statutory ninety-one-day deadline. But again, section

18-1.3-603(1)(b) requires that “the specific amount of restitution

shall be determined within the ninety-one days immediately

following the order of conviction, unless good cause is shown for

extending the time period by which the restitution amount shall be

determined.” (Emphasis added.) If a trial court determines that an

extension of the ninety-one-day deadline is warranted, it must

make an express finding of good cause, before the ninety-one-day

deadline expires, to extend the deadline. Weeks II, ¶ 5.

¶ 34 The trial court did that. In the court’s January 2, 2022,

written order — issued five days before the ninety-one-day

deadline — it expressly found good cause to extend the deadline

based on a combination of several reasons. First, although the

prosecution had not met its court-imposed forty-five-day deadline to

move for a specific amount of restitution, it did file its restitution

motion before the ninety-one-day deadline under section

18-1.3-603(2), which led the court to believe that it could resolve

16
the restitution issue within the ninety-one-day deadline. And the

court scheduled the restitution hearing for January 4, 2022, within

the ninety-one-day deadline.

¶ 35 Second, the court pointed out that the defense had not filed

any objection to the prosecution’s restitution motion between

December 21, 2021, and January 2, 2022. However, the defense

did file an apparently deficient motion for a writ of habeas corpus

for Redwine to appear in person at the January 4 restitution

hearing. So, the court reasonably concluded that the prosecution’s

restitution motion was contested and that a hearing was necessary.

¶ 36 And third, the court ultimately learned that Redwine could not

be transported from the DOC to the courthouse on January 4.

Under these circumstances, we discern no error in the court’s

finding that good cause existed to continue the combined hearing

on restitution and the costs of prosecution beyond the

ninety-one-day deadline. See People v. Hernandez, 2019 COA 111,

¶ 19 (“[A] restitution hearing is a proceeding at which a defendant

has a right to be present.”).

¶ 37 Also, we have found nothing in the record showing that either

party suggested, leading up to the January 4 hearing, that the

17
combined hearing on restitution and the costs of prosecution

should be held remotely via Webex. On appeal, Redwine argues

that he “could have waived his appearance or arranged to appear

electronically (as ultimately happened), once timely informed of

difficulties in securing his physical presence” at the January 4

hearing. But he did not make that argument in his objection filed

the day before the hearing. Instead, he argued in that filing — filed

four days before the expiration of the ninety-one-day deadline —

that the court would be unable to meet the ninety-one-day deadline.

And once the court had already ruled that the January 4 Webex

hearing was being held solely to reschedule the combined hearing

on restitution and the costs of prosecution, Redwine’s surprise

appearance at the hearing did not affect the court’s justification for

continuing the hearing.

¶ 38 Further, we have found nothing in the record showing that

either party requested that the restitution proceedings be bifurcated

from the proceedings related to the prosecution’s extensive request

for the costs of prosecution. Although the defense ultimately

objected in February 2022 filings on the ground that Redwine was

financially unable to pay such extensive costs of prosecution, it did

18
not lodge that objection in its filing on December 13, 2021 — filed

nearly a month before the ninety-one-day deadline — in which it

focused on the prosecution’s failure to meet the court-imposed

forty-five-day deadline.

C. The Second Continuation of the Restitution Hearing

¶ 39 We also discern no reversible error in the trial court’s decision

to continue the restitution hearing a second time based on the

victim’s mother’s surgery. The court issued its ruling after the

defense failed to timely object to the prosecution’s request for the

extension based on the surgery. We recognize that the defense’s

lateness in objecting to the prosecution’s motion for a continuance

was trivial compared to, for example, the much more substantial

delay by the prosecution in filing its motion for restitution.

However, we discern no basis for reversal on this issue.

V. Disposition

¶ 40 The restitution order is affirmed.

JUDGE KUHN and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.

19