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March 17, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Pitts, D.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 751 EDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Murray

• Opinion

• Authorities (23)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (6K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by Murray

J-S02026-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DECOREY PITTS :
:
Appellant : No. 751 EDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 12, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-23-CR-00002276-2019

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED MARCH 17, 2026

Decorey Pitts (Appellant) appeals from the order dismissing his first

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§§ 9541-9546. Appellant’s court-appointed PCRA counsel, Scott D. Galloway,

Esquire (Counsel), has filed an application to withdraw as counsel and a brief

purportedly pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 249 (Pa. 2009).1 After careful

---

1 Because Appellant appeals from the PCRA court’s dismissal order, Counsel

was required to file a Turner/Finley no-merit letter to accompany his petition
to withdraw. See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
However, “[b]ecause an Anders brief provides greater protection to a
defendant, this Court may accept an Anders brief in lieu of a Turner/Finley
letter.” Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 817 n.2 (Pa. Super.
2011).
J-S02026-26

consideration, we grant Counsel’s application to withdraw and affirm the PCRA

court’s order.

The trial court2 summarized the relevant factual history:

This case arises from an ejectment action that took place on March
25, 2019[,] at … 36 N[orth] Harwood Avenue, Upper Darby
Township, Delaware County, Pennsylvania[ (the residence)]. 3 In
the course of executing the eviction, members of the Delaware
County Sheriff’s Department encountered extremely deplorable
conditions, which posed serious health and safety hazards. The
main water valve [to the residence] was circumvented and there
was no electricity. A series of large vehicle-type batteries in the
residence, along with a gas generator in the garage, were used
for power, while a propane tank in the residence was used for heat
and cooking. Extension cords were run throughout the house.
[The] Upper Darby Township Police Department was contacted
and responded to the residence.

Present on the premises at the time of the eviction was
[Appellant], [] his wife, Sharon Gale[ (Ms. Gale), and their three
minor children].

During the eviction process, a “loaded” and “ready to fire”
firearm was located in the closet of Appellant’s bedroom. N.T.,
1/8/20, at 61-62.

As a result, Appellant was charged with several violations of
the Crimes Code, including … risking a catastrophe (felony 3), …
recklessly endangering another person (misdemeanor 2), …

---

2 The Honorable Richard M. Capelli presided over all proceedings relevant to

this appeal.

3 The residence is situated closely to other dwellings on North Harwood
Avenue.

-2-
J-S02026-26

persons not to possess firearms[, and endangering
the welfare of children (felony 3)].4, 5

Trial Court Opinion, 5/11/21, at 1-2 (one original footnote moved to body;

three footnotes added; punctuation, capitalization, and citation modified). 6

Pertinently, on June 20 and July 31, 2019, Appellant, pro se,7 filed two

substantially similar motions to suppress physical evidence alleging the illegal

search and seizure of evidence in the residence. The matter proceeded to a

suppression hearing on September 11, 2019. The Commonwealth presented

the testimony of Delaware County Sheriff’s Lieutenant Steven Mitchell

---

4 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3302(b), 2705, 6105(a)(1), and 4304.

5 At trial, the Commonwealth introduced evidence that Appellant had
previously been convicted of offenses rendering him ineligible to possess
firearms. N.T., 1/9/20, at 12-13.

6 At CP-23-CR-0002275-2019, the Commonwealth charged Ms. Gale with
substantially similar offenses. On March 16, 2021, Ms. Gale entered no
contest pleas to one count each of risking a catastrophe and endangering the
welfare of children. That same date, the trial court sentenced Ms. Gale to an
aggregate 11½ to 23 months’ incarceration, followed by three years’
probation.

7 The PCRA court explained that Appellant

persisted on proceeding [pro se, despite] the [c]ourt’s many
attempts to offer counsel at all stages of this case. A [hearing
pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa.
1998),] was held on October 28, 2019. [Appellant] was found
competent to represent himself; however, stand-by counsel was
appointed throughout.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/11/21, at 2 n.2 (punctuation modified).

-3-
J-S02026-26

(Lieutenant Mitchell). Appellant presented the testimony of Adrian Moore (Ms.

Moore).

At the commencement of the suppression hearing, Appellant clarified

the basis for his suppression motions. Specifically, Appellant argued that law

enforcement responding to an emergency “are no longer permitted to remain

in one’s house” “once the emergency ends,” “absent a warrant or ex[i]gent

circumstance[s] ….” N.T., 9/11/19, at 3. Appellant further contended that

there were no exigent circumstances justifying law enforcement’s initial entry

to the residence. Id. at 3-4.

Lieutenant Mitchell testified that one of his responsibilities as a

lieutenant with the Delaware County Sheriff’s Department was service of civil

process and eviction notices. Id. at 5. The Commonwealth introduced as

evidence, through Lieutenant Mitchell, the sheriff’s service warrant

(identifying Real Estate Growth Fund, LLC, as the owner of the residence) and

writ of possession for the residence. Id. at 18; see also Johnson v.

Martofel, 797 A.2d 943, 947 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“A writ of possession is

simply the legal means for executing on a judgment of possession.”). 8

---

8 Although admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing, the writ of
possession is not included in the certified record. Appellant objected to the
admission of the writ of possession, based upon allegedly improper service,
but did not contest its authenticity. See N.T., 9/11/2019, at 6; see also
PCRA Petition, 7/2/23, Attachment 1 (Appellant acknowledging its issuance,
but arguing that “Judge [Kathrynann] Du[r]ham of Delaware County Court
merely acted as a ‘rubber stamp’ and gave [Real Estate Growth Fund, LLC,] a
writ of possession ….”).

-4-
J-S02026-26

Lieutenant Mitchell testified that he, along with several sheriff’s

deputies, arrived at the residence to execute Appellant’s eviction on March 25,

1. Id. at 8. Also present on that date were members of the Upper Darby

Township Police and Fire Departments, and “movers” who were “instructed …

to pack everything up, label it, and move it out, put it on their trucks and take

it to storage.” Id. at 8-9; see also id. at 9 (Lieutenant Mitchell testifying that

movers carrying out these tasks is “standard procedure” in evictions, and that

the movers performed their typical function in the instant case). 9

Lieutenant Mitchell testified that members of the Upper Darby Township

Police SWAT team made forcible entry after no one answered the door at the

residence. Id. at 12-13.10 Lieutenant Mitchell testified that indicia of

---

9 At the suppression hearing, Lieutenant Mitchell did not testify as to when

members of the Upper Darby Township Police and Fire Departments, or
movers arrived at the residence.

10 At the suppression hearing, Lieutenant Mitchell did not explain why the
Upper Darby Township Police Department’s SWAT team was present for
Appellant’s eviction. At trial, however, Chief Deputy Sheriff Michael Donohue
(Chief Donohue) testified that, on January 25, 2019, Appellant and Ms. Gale
went to the Sheriff’s Department and advised him that deputies “had no
authority to evict them from” the residence. N.T., 1/8/20, at 77. Chief
Donohue testified that he and members of his staff assisted Appellant and Ms.
Gale in filing a petition for stay of eviction, which, Chief Donohue later learned,
was denied by the trial court. Id. at 78-79. Chief Donohue explained that,
over the weekend prior to the originally scheduled eviction date, he “received
intelligence that [Appellant and Ms. Gale] had actually assembled a large
number of people to [thwart] the eviction.” Id. at 79. Based on safety
concerns, Chief Donohue explained, the Sheriff’s Department postponed the
eviction, and engaged law enforcement to assist in executing the eviction on
March 25, 2019. Id. at 80-81.

-5-
J-S02026-26

Appellant’s unsafe power supply system, and a shotgun, were subsequently

discovered during an inventory of Appellant and his family’s personal property.

Id. at 33; see also id. at 34 (Lieutenant Mitchell testifying that “[e]verything

that comes out of the bedroom, everything that comes out of the kitchen is

marked. There’s an inventory sheet that the movers do of where stuff was.”).

Ms. Moore did not explain her relationship to Appellant or Ms. Gale, but

testified that she had frequented the residence numerous times over the past

five years. Id. at 22. Ms. Moore testified that she never observed a “sign of

sale posted in the yard” of the residence. Id. Ms. Moore further testified that

she obtained a copy of Appellant’s eviction notice, which, she claimed, bore

the signature of “a clerk and not a [j]udge.” Id. at 23.

On January 7, 2020, the trial court denied Appellant’s suppression

motions.11 On the record immediately prior to trial, the trial court briefly set

forth its reasons for denying Appellant’s suppression motion, indicating the

Sheriff’s Department seized Appellant’s personal property during a lawful

eviction. N.T., 1/7/20, at 7. The trial court credited Lieutenant Mitchell’s

testimony that the movers took items “they found to be questionable, [] and

[the movers] determined that they had to turn [those items] over to the

---

11The trial court’s order mistakenly indicated that Appellant’s suppression
hearing occurred on November 12, 2019.

-6-
J-S02026-26

police….” Id. at 8; see also id. at 11 (the trial court finding that the movers

“removed the personal property from [the residence.]”).

The matter proceeded to a bifurcated jury trial 12 on January 7-9, 2020,

at the conclusion of which the jury convicted Appellant of the above-described

charges. On August 25, 2020, the trial court sentenced Appellant to five to

ten years in prison, followed by two years of probation.

On August 26, 2020, Appellant, pro se, filed a timely post-sentence

motion for reconsideration of sentence. On September 15, 2020, the trial

court appointed Mary Elizabeth Welch, Esquire (Attorney Welch), to represent

Appellant.13 On November 29, 2020, Attorney Welch untimely filed an

amended post-sentence motion. On December 11, 2020, the trial court

---

12 In the first portion of Appellant’s jury trial, the Commonwealth presented

evidence relating to Appellant’s non-firearms offenses. After the jury returned
a verdict on those offenses, the Commonwealth presented the same jury with
evidence concerning Appellant’s ineligibility to possess a firearm. See N.T.,
1/8/20, at 66 (the trial court explaining the parties employed this procedure
so as not to prejudice the jury against Appellant).

13 On January 9, 2020, immediately following the jury trial, the trial court
appointed Robert Schwartz, Esquire (Attorney Schwartz), who had previously
served as Appellant’s standby counsel, to represent Appellant on direct
appeal. The record does not contain an order removing Attorney Schwartz as
Appellant’s counsel. However, in its December 11, 2020, order, the trial court
explained that, on September 9, 2020, Attorney Schwartz “advised the [trial]
court … [of] his imminent move to South Carolina[, and] inquired about his
appointment” as Appellant’s counsel. Order, 12/11/20, at 1 n.1. The trial
court thereafter, on September 15, 2020, appointed Attorney Welch to
represent Appellant.

-7-
J-S02026-26

denied both post-sentence motions without a hearing. Appellant timely filed

a counseled notice of appeal.

On direct appeal, Attorney Welch argued that the Commonwealth’s

evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for persons not to possess

firearms, and challenged the verdict for that charge as against the weight of

the evidence. After filing Appellant’s appellate brief, Attorney Welch petitioned

to withdraw as Appellant’s counsel. The trial court granted Attorney Welch’s

petition, and appointed Patrick Scanlon, Esquire (Attorney Scanlon), to

represent Appellant.

On January 26, 2022, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of

sentence. See Commonwealth v. Pitts, 272 A.3d 501, 73 EDA 2021 (Pa.

Super. 2022) (unpublished memorandum). Our Supreme Court denied

allowance of appeal on July 25, 2022. See Commonwealth v. Pitts, 282

A.3d 1122 (Pa. 2022).

On July 3, 2023, Appellant, pro se, filed the instant timely PCRA petition,

his first. The PCRA court appointed Counsel to represent Appellant, and

permitted Counsel to file an amended PCRA petition or no-merit letter by

September 1, 2023. The PCRA court granted Counsel several extensions of

time, after which Counsel timely filed an amended PCRA petition on June 28,

1. Therein, Counsel alleged Attorney Welch rendered ineffective

assistance by failing to challenge, on direct appeal, the denial of Appellant’s

(1) suppression motion, and (2) request for nominal bail pursuant to

-8-
J-S02026-26

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 (speedy trial rule). On October 17, 2024, the

Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss Appellant’s amended PCRA petition.

On January 15, 2025, the PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of

its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing. Appellant did not

file a response. On February 12, 2025, the PCRA court formally dismissed

Appellant’s PCRA petition. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. Appellant

and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On September 15,

2025, Counsel filed in this Court an application to withdraw as Appellant’s

counsel, and a purported Anders brief.

Prior to addressing the instant appeal, we must consider whether

Counsel has satisfied the requirements of Turner/Finley in seeking to

withdraw as Appellant’s counsel. See Commonwealth v. Knecht, 219 A.3d

689, 691 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“When presented with a brief pursuant to

Turner/Finley, we first determine whether the brief meets the procedural

requirements of Turner/Finley.”). The Knecht Court explained:

A Turner/Finley brief must: (1) detail the nature and extent of
counsel’s review of the case; (2) list each issue the petitioner
wishes to have reviewed; and (3) explain counsel’s reasoning for
concluding that the petitioner’s issues are meritless. Counsel
must also send a copy of the brief to the petitioner, along with a
copy of the petition to withdraw, and inform the petitioner of the
right to proceed pro se or to retain new counsel. If the brief meets
these requirements, we then conduct an independent review of
the petitioner’s issues.

Id. at 691 (citations omitted).

-9-
J-S02026-26

Here, the record confirms that Counsel served Appellant with a copy of

his application to withdraw and Anders brief—which, as we noted above,

provides greater protection than a Turner/Finley no-merit letter. See

Widgins, 29 A.3d at 817 n.2. In his application to withdraw, Counsel stated

that he “made a thorough review of Appellant’s case.” Application to

Withdraw, 9/15/25, ¶ 2. Counsel indicated that, after his review, he “found a

complete lack of issues that might be raised on appeal[,] and [] believes this

appeal to be wholly frivolous.” Id. ¶ 3.

Counsel additionally filed an Anders brief, in which he identified the sole

issue Appellant wished to raise, and briefly explained why this issue lacks

merit. See Anders Brief at 10, 12-13; see also id. at 12-13 (Counsel

observing that “[a]ppellate counsel is entitled to forego potentially meritorious

claims on appeal in favor of issues [s]he deems pose a greater likelihood of

success.” (citation omitted)). Counsel also provided to this Court a copy of

the letter he sent to Appellant, advising Appellant of Counsel’s intent to

withdraw, and explaining Appellant’s right to raise additional claims by

proceeding pro se or by retaining private counsel.14 Application to Withdraw,

9/15/25, Exhibit A. Therefore, we conclude that Counsel has substantially

complied with the procedural requirements of Turner/Finley. See

---

14 Appellant did not file a counseled or pro se appellate brief in response to

Counsel’s application to withdraw or Anders brief.

• 10 - J-S02026-26

Commonwealth v. Karanicolas, 836 A.2d 940, 947 (Pa. Super. 2003)

(concluding that substantial compliance with the requirements to withdraw as

counsel will satisfy the Turner/Finley criteria). Accordingly, we proceed to

independently review Appellant’s claim.

Counsel identifies the following issue for our review:

I. Was the [PCRA] court [] in error for dismissing [Appellant’s
PCRA] petition …[,] wherein it raised ineffectiveness of [Attorney
Welch] for failing to include in her [Pa.R.A.P.] 1925(b) [concise]
statement the [trial] court’s denial of the pretrial omnibus motion
…?

Anders Brief at 5 (capitalization modified).15

“Our standard of review for issues arising from the denial of PCRA relief

is well-settled. We must determine whether the PCRA court’s ruling is

supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Hand,

252 A.3d 1159, 1165 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s

findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the

---

15 Counsel did not address in his Anders brief Appellant’s claim that Attorney

Welch rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise on direct appeal the
trial court’s denial of his request for nominal bail pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P.
600. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(B)(1) (providing that “no defendant shall be held
in pretrial incarceration in excess of … 180 days from the date on which the
complaint is filed”). We observe, however, that such a claim on direct appeal,
following his conviction, would have been moot because Appellant was serving
a sentence and no longer entitled to pretrial bail. See Commonwealth v.
Sloan, 907 A.2d 460, 464 (Pa. 2006) (finding claim relating to imposition of
bail conditions following release pursuant to Rule 600 mooted by appellant’s
convictions, but deciding issue because it was “of a recurring nature yet
capable of repeatedly evading review, and involve[d] issues of important
public interest.”). Consequently, any claim concerning this issue on direct
appeal would have entitled Appellant to no relief. See id.

• 11 - J-S02026-26

certified record.” Commonwealth v. Gibson, 318 A.3d 927, 933 (Pa. Super.

2024) (citation omitted). Moreover, a petitioner is not entitled to a PCRA

hearing as a matter of right. Commonwealth v. Williams, 244 A.3d 1281,

1287 (Pa. Super. 2021). Rather, a PCRA court can decline to hold a hearing

if there is no genuine issue concerning any material fact; the petitioner is not

entitled to relief; and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings.

Id.

Here, Appellant contends the evidence obtained from his residence was

the result of an illegal search and seizure. Anders Brief at 5. As stated by

Counsel, Appellant maintains that he retained “an expectation of privacy” in

the residence, notwithstanding the Sheriff’s Department’s execution of

Appellant’s eviction pursuant to the writ of possession granted to Real Estate

Growth Fund, LLC. Id. at 10. According to Appellant, law enforcement’s entry

into the residence constituted an illegal search. Id. As a result, Appellant

claims Attorney Welch rendered ineffective assistance by failing to preserve

and argue this issue on appeal. Id. at 5.

The Commonwealth counters that Appellant’s claim lacks arguable

merit. Commonwealth Brief at 9. The Commonwealth maintains that

[t]he firearm in question 16 was discovered by a private citizen, a
moving company employee, who located the weapon while
lawfully packing Appellant’s belongings during a lawful eviction
and voluntarily turned it over to the sheriff. Because this

---

16 The Commonwealth does not address any other evidence recovered from

the residence.

• 12 - J-S02026-26

discovery was made by a private actor, not the government, the
Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution do not apply. Commonwealth v. Corley, 491 A.2d
829, 831 (Pa. 1985) (exclusionary rule applies only to state
action). The sheriff’s later [procurement] of the firearm did not
transform the private discovery into a governmental search.
Moreover, [] Appellant has not established—either at the
suppression hearing or in his current brief, which cites no
applicable case law to support his position—that he had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a house he was lawfully
evicted from. The denial of suppression was therefore correct.

Id. at 9-10 (footnote added).

As our Supreme Court has explained,

[i]t is well-settled that counsel is presumed to have been effective
and that the petitioner bears the burden of proving counsel’s
alleged ineffectiveness. Commonwealth v. Cooper, 941 A.2d
655, 664 (Pa. 2007). To overcome this presumption, a petitioner
must establish that: (1) the underlying substantive claim has
arguable merit; (2) counsel did not have a reasonable basis for
his or her act or omission; and (3) the petitioner suffered
prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance, “that is,
a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s act or omission, the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. A
PCRA petitioner must address each of these prongs on appeal.
See Commonwealth v. Natividad, 938 A.2d 310, 322 (Pa.
2007) (explaining that “appellants continue to bear the burden of
pleading and proving each of the Pierce elements on appeal to
this Court”). A petitioner’s failure to satisfy any prong of this test
is fatal to the claim. Cooper, 941 A.2d at 664.

Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 177 A.3d 136, 144 (Pa. 2018) (citations

modified).

With respect to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, “the

petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome

of the direct appeal proceeding would have been different but for counsel’s

deficient performance.” Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 750

• 13 - J-S02026-26

(Pa. 2014); see also Commonwealth v. Jones, 210 A.3d 1014, 1019 (Pa.

2019) (“The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just

conceivable.” (emphasis added; citation omitted)). “Counsel cannot be

found ineffective for failing to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.”

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1042 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation

omitted).

Significantly, “[o]ur rules of criminal procedure require that a motion to

suppress ‘state specifically and with particularity … the grounds for

suppression[] and the facts and events in support thereof.’” Commonwealth

v. Hill, 348 A.3d 264, 286 (Pa. Super. 2025) (quoting Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(D)).

“[F]ailure to comply with the specificity requirement of Rule 581(D) will result

in waiver, as those requirements have been held to be mandatory.”

Commonwealth v. Carmenates, 266 A.3d 1117, 1126 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(citation omitted). “[A]ppellate review of an order denying suppression

is limited to examination of the precise basis under which suppression

initially was sought; no new theories of relief may be considered on

appeal.” Commonwealth v. Freeman, 128 A.3d 1231, 1241 (Pa. Super.

2015) (citation omitted; emphasis added).

Importantly, our Supreme Court has observed that, “in exercising one’s

right to self-representation, a defendant relinquishes many benefits, including

the future right to alleged ineffectiveness of counsel[,]” based upon decisions

made in the course of the defendant’s self-representation. Commonwealth

• 14 - J-S02026-26

v. Williams, 196 A.3d 1021, 1029 (Pa. 2018) (brackets, ellipses, and citation

omitted). Relatedly, we observe that “[a]lthough this Court is willing to

construe liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant, a pro se appellant enjoys

no special benefit.” Commonwealth v. Westlake, 295 A.3d 1281, 1286 n.8

(Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted). “To the contrary, any person choosing

to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent,

assume that his lack of expertise and legal training will be his undoing.”

Commonwealth v. Vurimindi, 200 A.3d 1031, 1037 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(citation omitted).

Instantly, in his June 20, 2019, suppression motion, Appellant

generically advanced as his basis for suppression the “illegal search and

seizure” of evidence. Suppression Motion, 6/20/19, ¶ 3. In his July 31, 2019,

suppression motion, without elaboration, Appellant asserted a violation of

Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Suppression Motion,

7/31/19, ¶ 3. As noted above, immediately prior to the suppression hearing,

Appellant clarified that he was challenging law enforcement’s entry into his

residence as unlawful based upon the lack of exigent circumstances. N.T.,

9/11/19, at 3-4.

Here, the record contains no indication that items of evidence were

initially seized by the Upper Darby Township Police Department. Indeed, the

trial court made a specific finding, supported by the record, that private

citizens, i.e., the professional movers, recovered Appellant’s property from the

• 15 - J-S02026-26

residence. See N.T., 1/7/20, at 8, 11; see also Smith, 164 A.3d at 1257

(“Where the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record,

the appellate court is bound by those findings ….” (brackets omitted));

Commonwealth v. Harris, 817 A.2d 103, 1047 (Pa. 2004) (“The

proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment [of the United States Constitution] and

Article I, § 8[ of the Pennsylvania Constitution], do not apply to searches and

seizures conducted by private individuals.” (citation omitted)). Consequently,

Upper Darby Township Police Department’s entry into the residence had no

bearing on the seizure of evidence, as that evidence was obtained by private

citizens assisting in the execution of Appellant’s eviction. Because the

evidence was not obtained as a result of unlawful police action, Appellant’s

underlying claim lacks merit. Attorney Welch cannot be deemed ineffective

for not raising a fruitless or waived claim on direct appeal. See Taylor, 933

A.2d at 1042.

Moreover, Appellant waived any challenge to the lawfulness of his

eviction, or the seizure of evidence by the movers, by failing to present any

such challenge in his suppression motions or at the time of the suppression

hearing. See Freeman, 128 A.3d at 1241. Appellant cannot assert his own

ineffectiveness for failing to preserve additional suppression claims. See

Williams, 196 A.3d at 1029.

• 16 - J-S02026-26

Finally, our independent review discloses no non-frivolous issues

Appellant could raise. Accordingly, we grant Counsel’s application to withdraw

as counsel and affirm the PCRA court’s order dismissing Appellant’s petition.

Application to withdraw granted. Order affirmed.

Date: 3/17/2026

• 17 -