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March 16, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Appeal of: Artisan Construction Group, LLC ~ Appeal of: Artisan Construction Group, LLC

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 963 C.D. 2024

• Judges: Tsai

• Opinion

• Authorities (17)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.7K)

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Lead Opinion

                        by Tsai

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appeal of: Artisan Construction :
Group, LLC from the Portions of the :
Decision Dated January 31, 2024 of :
the Board of Supervisors of East :
Vincent Township, Chester County, :
Pennsylvania :
:
: No. 963 C.D. 2024
Appeal of: Artisan Construction : Argued: February 3, 2026
Group, LLC

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
HONORABLE STELLA M. TSAI, Judge

OPINION
BY JUDGE TSAI FILED: March 16, 2026

Artisan Construction Group, LLC (Artisan), appeals from an order of the
Court of Common Pleas of Chester County (Common Pleas), which affirmed a
decision of the Board of Supervisors of East Vincent Township (Board). The Board
granted conditional use approval for a 53-unit residential development (53-Unit
Plan) and denied conditional use approval for an 86-unit residential development
(86-Unit Plan). We now affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 17, 2022, Artisan filed with the Board an application
(Application) for conditional use approval for the 86-Unit Plan.1 Artisan filed the
Application pursuant to Part 9 of the East Vincent Township Zoning Ordinance

1
The 86-Unit Plan was tailored not only to zoning but also to preliminary plan
requirements under East Vincent Township’s Subdivision and Land Development Ordinance
(SALDO) for a residential development to be known as “Bechtel Farm at Stony Run.”
of 2002, as amended (Zoning Ordinance), pertaining to Open Space Design Option
(OSDO); Part 19 of the Zoning Ordinance, pertaining to Conditional Use Process;
and Part 24 of the Zoning Ordinance, pertaining to Transferable Development Rights
(TDRs).
To meet density requirements, Artisan proposed to develop two adjacent
properties in East Vincent Township (Township) using TDRs. One of the properties,
consisting of approximately 67.9 acres, is located at 446 Stony Run Road
(Development Tract) and is situated in the Low Density Residential (LR) Zoning
District.2 The other property, consisting of approximately 90 acres, is located at
1241 West Bridge Street (Sending Tract) and is situated in the Rural Conservation
(RC) Zoning District. Artisan proposed utilizing the TDRs to increase the density
and number of residences in the LR Zoning District. Under the Zoning Ordinance,
TDRs may be used to allow additional density on a property in exchange for
forfeiting an equivalent number of development rights on a property less suitable for
development that is also owned by an applicant.3 In addition, Artisan proposed to
utilize the OSDO, which is authorized in the LR Zoning District as a conditional use
for residential development under Section 27-902 of the Zoning Ordinance.4

2
The Development Tract is currently improved with a dwelling, a barn, a large shed, and
a spring house, and is considered a Class II Historic Resource. The current use of the Development
Tract is agricultural. Board Decision ¶¶ 17-18.
3
See Sections 24-204 to 24-2407 of the Zoning Ordinance.
4
Section 27-902(1)(B) of the Zoning Ordinance provides:
Conditional Use Approval. Use of the open space design option shall be permitted
in the LR and MR Districts when approved as a conditional use in accordance with
the provisions of Part 19 of this chapter and where the applicant, to the satisfaction
of the Board of Supervisors, can demonstrate compliance with all design standards
and criteria of this Part.

2
The Board conducted eleven hearings over eleven months. Appellee East
Vincent Advocacy (EVA), a group formed for the purpose of advocating on behalf
of its members in favor of responsible development in the Township, and Appellee
William Fields (Fields), a member of EVA who resides directly across the street
from the proposed development, sought to intervene in the proceedings. The Board
granted intervention, and EVA and Fields participated as parties in the hearings.5
Throughout the course of the hearings, Artisan submitted four revisions to the
86-Unit Plan.
At the tenth hearing on October 4, 2023, Artisan presented to the Board an
alternative proposal, the 53-Unit Plan, and agreed to submit the 53-Unit Plan to the
Township Engineer and the Township’s Planning Commission for limited review
given the timing of the further hearings and the lack of fully engineered plans.
According to the Board, Artisan maintained that the 53-Unit Plan did not supplant
the 86-Unit Plan, that Artisan was not withdrawing the 86-Unit Plan, and that
“Artisan took the position that it would accept an approval limited to the [53-Unit
Plan] as a condition.” Board Decision at 2; see also Reproduced Record (R.R.) at
2909a.
The Board orally announced its decision on November 27, 2023, denying
conditional use as to the 86-Unit Plan and granting it as to the 53-Unit Plan. Artisan
agreed to an extension of time for the Board to deliver a written decision, which it
did on January 31, 2024.6 In denying the conditional use for the 86-Unit Plan, the
Board issued extensive factual findings establishing that Artisan failed to meet its

5
When used herein, EVA includes not only EVA but its member William Fields.
6
In that same decision, the Board granted Artisan conditional use approval for the 53-Unit
Plan. Artisan did not appeal that portion of the Board’s decision.

3
initial burden to prove that the 86-Unit Plan satisfied the specific, objective criteria
of the Zoning Ordinance, identifying three bases for its denial. First, the Board
determined that the density and use of TDRs from the Sending Tract did not allow
the 86 proposed lots on the Development Tract. Second, the Board identified
concerns regarding the stormwater management facilities, including the suitability
of stormwater management areas, the efficacy of the facilities, and the accuracy of
calculations. Finally, the Board found that Artisan failed to demonstrate evidence
of adequate available sewage disposal capacity.
As to density, the Board considered the testimony of Patrick J. Stuart, R.L.A.
(Stuart), an expert in landscape architecture and landscape planning, introduced by
Artisan in support of the use of TDRs for the 86-Unit Plan. The Board also
considered the testimony of EVA’s expert in land planning, John Snook, who has 45
years of land planning experience in Chester County and was the principal author of
the current Zoning Ordinance as adopted in 2002. Board Decision at 23, ¶¶ 55-56.
The Board found that Stuart testified that the Development Tract could receive
49 TDRs.7 Id. at 21, ¶ 48. The Board summarized the five-step process that Stuart
then utilized to argue that Artisan was entitled to use the 49 TDRs from the Sending
Tract to develop a total of 86 lots on the Development Tract. Id. at 21, ¶ 49. The
Board summarized Snook’s testimony as agreeing with Stuart to the extent that
Stuart calculated that the Sending Tract had 39 TDRs to send and that those TDRs
converted to 49 TDRs for the Development Tract to receive. Id. at 23, ¶ 58. Snook
also agreed with Stuart that, based on steps one and two, the “adjusted maximum

7
Stuart reached this conclusion by first determining that the Sending Tract had 39 TDRs
available to “send” and by then applying a multiplier of 1.25 to convert the 39 TDRs into the
number of TDRs that could be sent to the Development Tract—i.e., 49 TDRs. Board Decision at
21, ¶ 48.

4
permitted number of lots or dwelling units for the Development Tract [is] 53 lots.”8
Id. at 24, ¶ 59. Snook, however, parted ways with Stuart’s calculations for the
remaining three steps based on his belief that Stuart incorrectly interpreted the
Zoning Ordinance. Id. at 24, ¶ 60.
As to step three, the Board found that Stuart purported to show the “Increased
Density” for the Development Tract under the OSDO pursuant to Section 27-904.1
of the Zoning Ordinance, relating to Minimum Restricted Open Space, which
provides that the Minimum Restricted Open Space for an OSDO development in the
LR Zoning District is 50%. Id. at 22, ¶ 52. According to the Board, “Stuart then
assert[ed] that because the Development Tract ‘has,’ with the receipt of TDRs, 86
lots and the base maximum permissible number of lots or dwelling units for the
Development Tract is 41, that the Development Tract has demonstrated a 100%
increase in permitted density.”9 Id.

8
The first two steps of Stuart’s five-step process, as summarized by the Board, addressed
initial calculations relating to maximum density. In step one, Stuart calculated the “Maximum
Base Lot Density” for the Development Tract under the OSDO pursuant to the Area and Bulk
Regulations set forth in Section 27-904.2 of the Zoning Ordinance; specifically, he multiplied the
net tract area for the Development Tract (58.653 acres) by the multiplier designated for the LR
Zoning District (0.70) to arrive at the maximum permissible number of lots or dwelling units for
the Development Tract—41. Board Decision at 21, ¶ 50. In step two, Stuart calculated the
“Maximum TDR Receiving Lot Density” for the Development Tract under the OSDO where the
TDRs are utilized pursuant to Section 27-2404.1(B)(1) of the Zoning Ordinance, relating to
Conventional Residential TDR Transfer. Id. at 21, ¶ 51. Stuart explained that Section 27-
2404.1(B)(1)(a)(1) increases the multiplier used in step one to calculate the maximum permissible
number of lots of dwelling units from 0.70 to 0.90, resulting in an adjusted maximum permissible
number of lots or dwelling units for the Development Tract of 53. Id. at 21-22, ¶ 51.
9
It appears that the increase in density in this LR District—which we emphasize is a Low
Density Residential Zoning District—is actually 110% under Stuart’s process—not 100%.
Subtracting 41 permissible lots from 86 planned lots yields an increase of 45 lots. Dividing the
additional 45 lots by the original 41 permissible lots for purposes of determining a percentage
increase in density results in a density increase of 110% (45 ÷ 41 = 1.097, rounded up to 1.10 or
110%).
5
As to step four, the Board found that Stuart calculated the “Required Open
Space for the Development Tract” under the OSDO pursuant to
Section 27-2404.1(B)(1)(d), pertaining to Minimum Required Open Space, which
the Board described as providing that “for each 10% increase in gross density over
the base density permitted, the minimum open space requirement under the OSDO
may be reduced by 2.5%; but, not below 25% of the gross tract area.” Id. at 22, ¶ 53.
Stuart, relying on his calculation in step three, asserted that, “because the
Development Tract has demonstrated a 100% increase in permitted density (or, 10
instances of [a] 10% increase in gross density), it can reduce its required minimum
open space (50%) by 25% (10 increases of 10% multiplied by 2.5%).” (Id.) Stuart
then argued that, “because Artisan proposes to reserve 56.89% of the Development
Tract as open space where only 25% is required, . . . Artisan has reserved an excess
of 31.89% of the Development Tract as open space.” Id.
As to Stuart’s final step—step five—the Board found that Stuart purported to
show under Section 27-904.3 of the Zoning Ordinance, pertaining to “Bonus Density
for Open Space Conservation,” that Artisan is entitled to 34 bonus lots, which, when
added to the 53 maximum lots previously calculated in step two, results in a total of
87 lots permitted. Id. at 23, ¶ 54. Section 27-904.3, as explained by the Board,
provides that “where TDRs are received, for each percentage point of open space
reserved in excess of the minimum amount required, the maximum number of units
may be increased by 2%.” Id. Stuart asserted that “because Artisan has reserved an
excess of 31.89% of the Development Tract as open space, when that is multiplied
by 2%, it results in Artisan being entitled to a bonus density of 63.78%, which,
multiplied by 53 as the maximum permissible number of lots for the Development
Tract, results in 34 bonus lots for a total of 87 lots permitted.” Id.

6
When considering Snook’s testimony as to step three, the Board found that
Stuart improperly used the “total number of lots or dwelling units Artisan had
accumulated for the Development Tract after receiving TDRs as a measure of
increased density.” Id. at 24, ¶ 60. Snook opined that no upward “adjustments in
permitted density may be made based upon the number of TDRs a property has
received [over] the base maximum permitted number of lots pursuant to the OSDO.”
Id. The Board focused on Snook’s explanation that “the calculation of TDRs
received refers to ‘a number of available received rights due to TDRs, as opposed to
due to the base density of the land.’” Id. at 24, ¶ 61 (quoting Notes of Testimony
(N.T.), 07/19/2023, at 17-18). Importantly, the Board found that “Stuart
acknowledged that he could not identify where the Zoning Ordinance permitted the
allowed increase in density to be calculated by comparing the number of units
permitted on a property after the receipt of TDRs with the base number of units
permitted on a property pursuant to the OSDO.” Id. at 24, ¶ 62.
As to step four, the Board found that Snook testified that the minimum
restricted open space shall not be less than 50% in the LR Zoning District. Id. at 25,
¶ 64. He further testified that “to be eligible for calculation of bonus density, open
space must comprise open space area(s) fully in addition to the minimum required
in the LR [Zoning] District,” and he opined that Stuart’s methodology was contrary
to the unambiguous language of the Zoning Ordinance and inconsistent with the
ordinance’s purpose of promoting conservation. Id. at 25, ¶¶ 64-65. Stuart’s
analysis, according to Snook, relied on a false assumption in step three that Artisan
qualified for a 100% density increase and improperly allowed a reduction of open
space below 50%. Id. at 24, ¶ 63.

7
Finally, as to Stuart’s step five, the Board found that Snook testified that the
purpose of Part 9 pertaining to the OSDO is to permit applicants who are entitled to
extra density some additional flexibility in placing homes, but it does not reduce the
required 50% open space minimum threshold. Id. at 25, ¶ 67. Snook opined that
correct application of the Zoning Ordinance would require Artisan to calculate
“Bonus Density for Open Space Conservation” by subtracting the minimum open
space required (50%) from the open space preserved (56.89%) to determine the
amount of eligible restricted open space for the calculation of the number of bonus
lots available (6.89%). Id. at 26, ¶ 68. For each of those percentage points, Artisan
would be eligible for a 2% increase in the maximum number of units for a total of
seven bonus lots for a grand total of 60 lots permitted on the Development Tract.
Id.
Ultimately, as to the maximum density and open space calculations, the Board
found that the testimony and opinions of Stuart, Artisan’s expert, were not credible.
Instead, it relied on the testimony of Snook, EVA’s expert, to conclude that Artisan
failed to meet the requirements of the Zoning Ordinance.
As to stormwater management, the Board found that Michelle Adams, P.E.
(Adams), EVA’s expert in civil engineering with specialties in water resources and
stormwater management, testified to deficiencies in the stormwater management
plan. Board Decision at 28, ¶¶ 83-85. Specifically, the Board found that Adams
testified that the type of soils on the southwestern part of the site are hydric soils that
occasionally ponded, making the area not suitable for stormwater management; she
also raised questions as to the efficacy of the stormwater management facilities as
proposed and the accuracy of Artisan’s stormwater calculations. Id. at 28-29, ¶¶ 88-
89, 92.

8
As to the sewage capacity, the Board found that Artisan failed to establish
adequate capacity because the 86-Unit Plan’s provision for public sanitary sewer
was entirely reliant on a proposed expansion of the Veteran’s Center Waste Water
Treatment Plant, which is a condition of the Township’s approval of a wholly
unrelated development known as “Jones Motor.” Id. at 29, ¶ 94. The Jones Motor
development is separate and distinct from this matter; nonetheless, Artisan claimed
its development would have public sewer access by way of the Jones Motor
agreement. Id. at 29, ¶ 95. The Board found no credible evidence of record to
support that claim. Id. at 30, ¶ 96.
Artisan appealed the denial to Common Pleas, which affirmed the Board by
opinion and order, dated July 18, 2024.
II. ISSUES
On appeal,10 Artisan generally argues that the Board erred as a matter of law
or abused its discretion in denying conditional use approval of the 86-Unit Plan. In
support thereof, Artisan maintains that it demonstrated compliance with the
Township’s conditional use requirements relating to density through the use of

10
Where a court has not held a hearing or taken additional evidence, the standard of review
in a land use appeal is limited to a determination of whether the municipal body has committed an
error of law or a manifest abuse of its discretion. Allegheny W. Civic Council Inc. v. Zoning Bd.
of Adjustment of the City of Pittsburgh, 689 A.2d 225, 227 (Pa. 1997). Abuse of discretion is
found if the board’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Valley View Civic Ass’n
v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 462 A.2d 637, 640 (Pa. 1983). Substantial evidence is “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. Where an
error of law is claimed, the standard of review is de novo. Pocono Manor Investors, L.P. v. Pa.
Gaming Control Bd., 927 A.2d 209, 216 (Pa. 2007). Moreover, the trial court cannot substitute its
interpretation of the evidence for that of the board. Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd.,
873 A.2d 807, 811 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 887 A.2d 1243 (Pa. 2005). When the record
contains substantial evidence, the court is bound by a “board’s findings that result from resolutions
of credibility and conflicting evidence rather than a capricious disregard of evidence.” Id. On
review, the board’s interpretation and application of its zoning ordinance is entitled to considerable
deference. Caln Nether Co., L.P, v. Bd. of Supervisors of Thornbury Twp., 840 A.2d 484, 491 (Pa.
Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 856 A.2d 835 (Pa. 2004).
9
TDRs and the OSDO and that the Board erred in failing to read Zoning Ordinance
provisions in pari materia. Artisan contends that it provided evidence of compliance
with stormwater management requirements and that the Township’s testimony on
stormwater was deficient. Artisan also contends that it demonstrated the ability to
comply with requirements for public sewage facilities and that the alleged ability to
comply with requirements for sewer capacity was for factors within the Township’s
control.
The Board and EVA submit counter-statements of these questions presented.
The Board counters that it did not abuse its discretion by denying the conditional use
for the 86-Unit Plan; it disputes that the applicable portion of the Zoning Ordinance
is ambiguous; and it argues that it applied the proper standard of review, such that
the Board’s decision should be affirmed. EVA joins the Board’s brief and further
counters that we should affirm because the Board appropriately exercised its
discretion to deny conditional use for the 86-Unit Plan because Artisan failed to
show that its plan satisfied the specific, objective criteria of the Zoning Ordinance.
Additionally, EVA advances three alternative arguments, all of which depend on its
assertion that Artisan, in a hearing before the Board, entered into a settlement
agreement with EVA through which Artisan agreed to reduce its proposed
subdivision from 86 lots to 53 lots, handle all sewage with on-lot systems, and
address all stormwater issues raised by EVA’s expert. As a result of that settlement
agreement, EVA contends that the Board’s decision should be affirmed or Artisan’s
appeal barred based upon (1) the doctrine of equitable estoppel, (2) the doctrine of
judicial estoppel, or (3) judicial admissions.

10
III. DISCUSSION
“A conditional use is nothing more than a special exception, which falls within
the jurisdiction of the municipal governing body rather than the zoning hearing
board.” Williams Holding Grp., LLC v. Bd. of Supervisors of W. Hanover Twp., 101
A.3d 1202, 1212 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). Despite its name, a conditional use, like a
special exception, is not an exception to the municipality’s zoning ordinance;
instead, it is a right to which an applicant is entitled “unless the governing body
determines that the use does not satisfy the specific, objective criteria in the zoning
ordinance for that conditional use.” In re: Drumore Crossings, L.P., 984 A.2d 589,
595 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009), appeal denied, 4 A.3d 1054 (Pa. 2010). A “conditional
use” is a “use permitted in a particular zoning district pursuant to the provisions in
Article VI” of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC),11 Act of July
31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 10601-10621. See Section 107(a) of the
MPC, 53 P.S. § 10107(a). A governing body has authority to grant a conditional use
“pursuant to express standards and criteria set forth in the zoning ordinance.”
Section 603(c)(2) of the MPC, 53 P.S. § 10603(c)(2).
A conditional use “evidences a legislative decision that the particular type of
use is consistent with the zoning plan and presumptively consistent with health,
safety[,] and welfare of the community.” In re Cutler Grp., Inc., 880 A.2d 39, 42
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2005), appeal denied, 897 A.2d 461 (Pa. 2006). Put another way, it is
a “legislative determination that such use would not have an adverse impact on the
public interests in normal circumstances.” Joseph v. N. Whitehall Twp. Bd. of
Supervisors, 16 A.3d 1209, 1215 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). The applicant bears the
burden of establishing that “the proposed conditional use satisfies the objective

11
The MPC is set forth in its entirety at 53 P.S. §§ 101-11202.
11
standards set forth in the zoning ordinance.” Drumore Crossings, 984 A.2d at 595.
The burden then “shifts to [the] objectors to rebut the presumption by proving that
there is a high degree of probability the proposed use will adversely affect the
welfare of the community in a way not normally expected from the type of use.”
Brookview Solar I, LLC v. Mount Joy Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 305 A.3d 1222, 1233
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2023) (quoting H. E. Rohrer, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Jackson
Twp., 508 A.2d 1014, 1018 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002)). “‘Mere speculation’ of possible
harm is not sufficient, and the objectors’ burden may not be satisfied with personal
opinion or bald assertions.” Brookview Solar I, 305 A.3d at 1233. A “conditional
use application must be granted unless the objectors present sufficient evidence that
the proposed use has a detrimental effect on the public health, safety[,] and welfare.”
In re McGlynn, 974 A.2d 525, 537 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).
The primary objective of interpreting ordinances is to determine the intent of
the enacting body, and the plain language of an ordinance provides the most reliable
indication of that intent. Kohl v. New Sewickley Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 108 A.3d
961, 968 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). “Where the words in an ordinance are free from all
ambiguity, the letter of the ordinance may not be disregarded under the pretext of
pursuing its spirit [and] [a]n ambiguity [can only] exist[] when language is subject
to two or more reasonable interpretations . . . .” Adams Outdoor Advert., LP v.
Zoning Hearing Bd. of Smithfield Twp., 909 A.2d 469, 483 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006)
(citations omitted), appeal denied, 923 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 2007).
A. Settlement Agreement
Before we address whether Artisan met the requirements for conditional use,
we will address EVA’s assertion that Artisan’s appeal is barred by a settlement
between EVA and Artisan. EVA asserts that Artisan entered into a settlement on

12
the record that it would reduce the density of the 86-Unit Plan to 53 units and seek
approval of the 53-Unit Plan which would not use public sewers and would address
all issues raised by EVA’s stormwater expert in exchange for EVA’s agreement to
withdraw its opposition to Artisan’s proposed conditional use application. EVA,
however, also acknowledges that Artisan did not withdraw its 86-Unit Plan, but it
contends that Artisan did so because it wanted to preserve its right to appeal in the
event that the Board denied both plans. EVA maintains that it performed its
obligations under the agreement, withdrew its opposition to the Application as
revised, and supported the 53-Unit Plan, which resulted in Artisan receiving
approval for the conditional use based on the 53-Unit Plan. EVA focuses on a
statement at the hearing by Artisan’s principal, John Benson (Benson), that the
53-Unit Plan is a plan Artisan would “accept as a condition of conditional use
approval if the Board desires to add such condition.” R.R. at 2903a, 2909a. EVA
contends that the agreement was memorialized under oath and on the record.
A review of the record reveals that, in housekeeping matters before testimony
was taken at the October 4, 2023 public hearing before the Board, counsel for EVA
stated that Artisan proposed to “reduce the density down to a maximum of 53 units,”
eliminate public sewers in favor of on-lot sewers for all units, make traffic
improvements, and “satisfy [EVA’s] concerns about the stormwater.” R.R. at 2903a.
EVA’s counsel then noted that the agreement “of course needs to be flushed out a
little bit.” Id. Counsel for the Township’s Planning Commission was quick to point
out that counsel could not agree to anything on the Township’s behalf and that the
developer must present the revised plan through the proper channels. R.R. at 2904a-
2905a. Benson then testified under oath that the submission of the 53-Unit Plan does
not mean that he is withdrawing the 86-Unit Plan, but that this plan was evidence

13
that an alternative exists that could meet the residents’ concerns. R.R. at 2908a-
2909a. When asked, as a hypothetical, if he would accept this 53-Unit Plan as a
condition of conditional use approval if the Board desired to accept it, Benson said
yes. R.R. at 2909a. The record does not reflect any formal Board action with respect
to this potential offer. EVA offered no other evidence of the agreement. Based on
this evidence, we cannot agree with EVA’s characterization that an agreement exists,
let alone that the agreement would serve to bar Artisan’s appeal under any of the
bases asserted by EVA. Thus, we now turn to the merits of Artisan’s appeal.
B. Compliance with Objective Requirements
As discussed above, Artisan argues that the Board erred in denying
conditional use approval based on what the Board found to be deficiencies relating
to density, stormwater management, and sewage capacity. Nevertheless, Artisan
devotes a large portion of its brief to addressing how it demonstrated compliance
with the permissible zoning standards. This argument does not identify errors or
abuses of discretion by the Board; rather, it essentially asks the Court to view the
evidence in a light most favorable to Artisan and find that Artisan met the standards.
“Our role is not to reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses,
but to determine whether, upon consideration of the evidence as a whole, the
[Board’s] findings have the requisite measure of support in the record.” Lodge v.
Robinson Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 283 A.3d 910, 925 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022). As part
of that argument, Artisan, as if in passing, contends that it met the permissible zoning
standards, suggesting that the Township’s standards for conditional use
impermissibly exceed MPC requirements because they required Artisan to attach a
preliminary or final plan and technical standards. Artisan appears to be referencing

14
the requirement of Section 27-1901.4(B) of the Zoning Ordinance12 that an
application for conditional use “be accompanied by a unified overall site plan
covering the entire tract.” Artisan, however, acknowledges that Section
27-1901.4(B) provides, in part, that “such plan need not meet formal submission
requirements under the Subdivision and Land Development Ordinance, but shall be
prepared with sufficient detail to adequately illustrate the proposed development
uses and non-development uses.” Artisan’s Brief at 26. Artisan fails to explain how
such requirement is impermissible, other than to baldly assert that “the requirements
are overly exacting for a zoning approval.” Id. at 27. It also fails to explain how the
Board’s denial relates to Artisan’s complaints about impermissible standards. For
those reasons, we are unpersuaded that Artisan’s attempt to show compliance with
permissible standards demonstrates any error or abuse of discretion on the part of
the Board. With that said, we now turn to Artisan’s actual challenges to the Board’s
decision.

12
Section 27-1901.4(B) of the Zoning Ordinance provides:
Development Plan. Any application for conditional use approval involving
subdivision or land development, ultimately subject to submission and approval in
accordance with the East Vincent Subdivision and Land Development Ordinance
[Chapter 22], shall be accompanied by a unified, overall site plan covering the
entire tract, regardless of any intended phasing of development, prepared at a
graphic scale of at least one inch equals 100 feet. For the purposes of application
for conditional use approval, such plan need not meet formal submission
requirements under the Subdivision and Land Development Ordinance [Chapter
22], but shall be prepared with sufficient detail to adequately illustrate the proposed
development uses and non-development uses of the tract, including (where
appropriate), reserve areas for possible future expansion; coordinated internal and
external vehicular and pedestrian circulation; well related, convenient and efficient
parking and loading areas; agreeable surroundings that provide comfort, safety, and
convenience for prospective residents, customers, and/or workers; and high quality
design in terms of building relationship, facade treatment, signage, lighting,
landscaped and planted buffers and screens, as well as other natural and constructed
amenities in furtherance of the comprehensive planning objectives of East Vincent
Township.

15
C. Density
Artisan, in an attempt to explain why its density calculations are correct
despite the lack of readily identifiable support in the Zoning Ordinance, asserts that
the provisions of Part 9 and Part 24 of the Zoning Ordinance, relating to the OSDO
and TDRs, respectively, must be read in pari materia under Section 1932 of the
Statutory Construction Act of 1972 (Statutory Construction Act), 1 Pa. C.S. § 1932.
Artisan emphasizes that both Parts address the same subject matter and reference
each other, such that they should be read together. Artisan then directs our attention
to Sections 27-904.2 and 27-904.3 of the Zoning Ordinance, which it uses to
calculate bonus density for the OSDO, and Section 27-2404.1(B)(1)(d), which it uses
to calculate the minimum required open space. Artisan appears to contend that the
two sections, read together, support the calculations advanced by Stuart on behalf of
Artisan for the 86-Unit Plan.
The Board represents that it did not commit an error of law or an abuse of
discretion; rather, Artisan did not establish that it met the applicable objective
criteria of the Zoning Ordinance because the testimony of Stuart as to maximum
density was dependent on a misapplication of the Zoning Ordinance. Specifically,
Stuart utilized a “phantom” step—step three—in his calculation of maximum
density, which had no basis in the Zoning Ordinance and undermined steps four and
five of his calculation. In further support of its position, the Board urges the Court
to defer to its interpretation of the Zoning Ordinance as the governing body. The
Board rejects any notion that the Zoning Ordinance is ambiguous and submits that
the rule regarding interpretation of an ordinance in favor of a landowner contained

16
in Section 603.1 of the MPC13 only applies when the words of the ordinance are not
free and clear from ambiguity.
In Williams Holding Group, we explained the interplay between the deference
we afford a governing body’s interpretation of an ordinance and the favorable
interpretation we are to extend to an applicant under Section 603.1 of the MPC. We
wrote:
[T]he common rule [is] that appellate courts reviewing a governing
body’s adjudication of a conditional use application generally should
defer to the interpretation rendered by the governing body. See Smith
v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 734 A.2d 55, 57 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied,
. . . 747 A.2d 904 ([Pa.] 1999). “[A]s the entity charged with
administering a zoning ordinance,” the governing body possesses
knowledge and expertise regarding the ordinance. Id. at 58. This rule
must sometimes bend to the second rule, found in Section 603.1 of the
MPC, which provides:
[i]n interpreting the language of the zoning ordinance to
determine the extent of the restriction upon . . . the use of the
property, the language shall be interpreted, where doubt exists as
to the intended meaning of the language written and enacted by
the governing body, in favor of the property owner and against
any implied extension of the restriction.
We have held that we must “interpret ambiguous language in an
ordinance in favor of the property owner and against any implied
extension of the restriction.” Isaacs v. Wilkes-Barre City Zoning
Hearing Bd., . . . 612 A.2d 559, 561 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1992). Thus, the
general rule contained in Section 603.1 of the MPC applies only when
the words of an ordinance are not free and clear from ambiguity. Id.
Williams Holding Group, 101 A.3d at 1213.
While deference to the governing body and Section 603.1 of the MPC have
potential implications for our analysis, we are also guided by the Statutory

13
Added by the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329, 53 P.S. § 10603.1.
17
Construction Act.14 Section 1932 of the Statutory Construction Act provides that
“[s]tatutes or parts of statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same
persons or things or to the same class of persons or things” and that “[s]tatutes in
pari materia shall be construed together, if possible, as one statute.” 1 Pa. C.S.
§ 1932. Our Supreme Court has explained:
A fundamental principle in statutory construction is that we must read
statutory sections harmoniously. Parts of a statute that are in pari
materia, i.e., statutory sections that relate to the same persons or things
or the same class of persons and things, are to be construed together, if
possible, as one statute. “If they can be made to stand together[,] effect
should be given to both as far as possible.” In ascertaining legislative
intent, statutory language is to be interpreted in context, with every
statutory section read “together and in conjunction” with the remaining
statutory language, “and construed with reference to the entire statute”
as a whole. We must presume that in drafting the statute, the General
Assembly intended the entire statute, including all of its provisions, to
be effective. Importantly, this presumption requires that statutory
sections are not to be construed in such a way that one section operates
to nullify, exclude[,] or cancel another, unless the statute expressly says
so.
Trust Under Agreement of Taylor, 164 A.3d 1147, 1157 (Pa. 2017) (internal citations
omitted). With this in mind, we now turn to the Zoning Ordinance provisions at
issue.
Section 27-904 of the Zoning Ordinance provides, in part:
1. Minimum Restricted Open Space. The minimum restricted open
space shall not be less than the following percentage of the gross
acreage of the tract, as stipulated for the appropriate zoning district . . . .
A. Zoning District Minimum Restricted Open Space.
(1) LR District: 50%.
....

14
1 Pa. C.S. §§ 1501-1991.
18
2. Permitted Density Calculation. Except where bonus density is
permitted in accordance with the provisions of Subsection 3, the
maximum permissible number of lots or dwelling units on any tract
utilizing the open space design option shall be calculated by
multiplying the net tract area (in acres) by the multiplier stipulated for
each zoning district. . . . The product of any such calculation may be
rounded to the nearest whole number[.]
....

Applicant is advised that the maximum number of units calculated
under the provisions herein, including potential bonus density, may not
always be achievable while meeting requirements for minimum
restricted open space and all other standards, criteria, and regulations
herein. . . .
3. Bonus Density for Open Space Resource Conservation. In order to
promote conservation of significant open space resources, the
maximum density or number of lots or dwelling units permitted on any
tract of land proposed for development under the open space design
option may be increased over and above the base maximum calculated
as above or over and above the adjusted maximum in cases where
transferable development rights (TDRs) are received, where open space
is provided meeting the criteria established in Paragraphs A to D,
below, as follows: for each percentage point of eligible open space,
calculated as a percentage of gross tract area, the maximum number of
units may be increased by 2%. This density bonus shall be calculated
as a percentage of the maximum number of units originally calculated
under Subsection 2 or as adjusted in cases of receipt of TDRs.
A. In order to be eligible for calculation of bonus density, open
space must comprise open space area(s) fully in addition to the
minimum required restricted open space area, established in
accordance with Subsection 1 above.
....
C. Open space eligible for calculation of bonus density must
comprise one or more of the following resource categories:
(1) Prime agricultural land, as defined by the
Municipalities Planning Code, and as further listed in
§ 27-401A of this chapter, as Class I, II, and III soils of
East Vincent Township.
19
....
(Emphasis added.)
Section 27-2404.1 of the Zoning Ordinance provides, in part, that owners of
tracts meeting the requirements of the section “may use development rights that are
purchased from sending area landowners,” as follows:
A. Receiving Area Qualifications. The receiving tract of land shall be
located in the LR . . . Zoning District[]. Density and/or intensity of
development on receiving tracts may be increased through the use of
TDRs where approved as a conditional use in accordance with the
provisions of Paragraph B., below, as applicable.
B. Provision for Transfer of Development in Receiving Areas.
(1) Conventional Residential TDR Transfer.
(a) Increase in Permitted Density. Under the open space
design option (OSDO), subject to conditional use
approval, the density multipliers stipulated in § 27-904.2
may be increased through receipt of transferred
development rights as follows:
(1) In the LR District, the multiplier may be
increased to 0.9.
....
(c) Calculation of Received Development Rights. The
incremental increase in density above that provided for in
the base zoning district must be fully accounted for
through proof of purchase and transfer of development
rights in accordance with the provisions of this Part. . . .
....
The ratios for conversion of sending rights to received
rights shall not affect the maximum incremental density
increase through use of TDRs stipulated in Subsection
B.(1)(a), above.
(d) Minimum Required Open Space. For each 10%
increase in gross density over the base density permitted
under the open space design option (OSDO), the
applicable minimum open space requirement under the
OSDO may be reduced 2.5%, measured as a percentage of
20
gross tract area. In no case shall the minimum required
open space be reduced below 25% of gross tract area.
(Emphasis added.)
Here, the parties agree that the applicable standard multiplier for the
Development Tract under Section 27-904.2 of the Zoning Ordinance is 0.7, and,
because Artisan intends to transfer development rights to the Development Tract,
Section 27-2404.1(B)(1)(a)(1) of the Zoning Ordinance increases that multiplier to
0.9. The dispute among the parties has its genesis in Stuart’s application of
Section 27-904.3 of the Zoning Ordinance, which allows an applicant to increase the
maximum number of units by 2% for “each percentage of eligible open space.”15
Artisan, through Stuart’s calculations, ignores the limiting language set forth in
Section 27-904.2, which makes clear that the development must still comply with
all other applicable provisions of the Zoning Ordinance and explicitly cautions that
“the maximum number of residential units calculated . . . , including bonus density,
may not always be achievable while meeting requirements for minimum restricted
open space and all other standards, criteria, and regulations herein.” Zoning
Ordinance § 27-904.2. Applying the plain meaning of that language, it is clear that
the maximum number of units that may be calculated under the Zoning Ordinance
provisions are not guaranteed and may be subject to limitation by another provision
of the Zoning Ordinance. Section 27-2404.1(B)(1)(c) of the Zoning Ordinance
effectuates the potential limitation in this instance, because it restricts the maximum
density by providing that “[t]he ratios for conversion of sending rights to received

15
The “eligible open space” is limited to four categories of open space, including prime
agricultural land. Zoning Ordinance § 27-904.3(C)(1). The parties do not dispute that the Sending
Tract includes prime agricultural land, such that Section 27-904.3 of the Zoning Ordinance may
be utilized to increase the maximum number of units.
21
rights shall not affect the maximum incremental density increase through use of
TDRs.”
Ironically, Artisan’s argument that the relevant provisions of the Zoning
Ordinance must be read in pari materia in the manner championed by Stuart would
result in this Court failing to give effect to the limiting language identified above.
Moreover, it would require us to add language to the Zoning Ordinance that does not
exist, which is evidenced by Stuart’s inability to identify the language of the Zoning
Ordinance that authorizes step three of his five-step calculation. To the contrary,
Snook’s interpretation of the Zoning Ordinance and calculations align with the plain
language of the Zoning Ordinance and would give effect to all provisions of the
Zoning Ordinance, thereby allowing the provisions of the Zoning Ordinance to be
read in pari materia.
Applying the provisions at issue, we agree with the Board that Section
27-2404.1(B)(1)(a)(1) of the Zoning Ordinance explicitly addresses the maximum
number of residential units for the Development Tract by multiplying the net tract
area by 0.9. Section 27-2404.1(B)(1)(d) of the Zoning Ordinance only provides for
the reduction of the minimum required open space. It does not increase or otherwise
adjust the calculation for maximum density. Artisan’s strained interpretation of
Section 27-2404.1(B)(1)(a)(1) to provide a basis to further increase the maximum
density of the Development Tract disregards the explicit text of Section
27-2404.1(B)(1)(a)(1), adds words to Section 27-2404.1(B)(1)(d), and effectively
nullifies Section 27-2404.1(B)(1)(a)(1) and other relevant provisions relating to how
maximum density is calculated. Thus, we conclude that Artisan did not establish
that the Board committed an error of law or abused its discretion when it determined

22
that the 86-Unit Plan did not meet the density requirements of the Zoning
Ordinance.16
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the order of Common Pleas,
affirming the order of the Board.

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STELLA M. TSAI, Judge

16
Because we conclude that the Board did not err or abuse its discretion in denying
Artisan’s conditional use Application based on density, we need not address whether the Board
erred or abused its discretion in denying the Application for reasons relating to stormwater
management and sewage capacity concerns.
23
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appeal of: Artisan Construction :
Group, LLC from the Portions of the :
Decision Dated January 31, 2024 of :
the Board of Supervisors of East :
Vincent Township, Chester County, :
Pennsylvania :
:
Appeal of: Artisan Construction :
Group, LLC : No. 963 C.D. 2024

ORDER

AND NOW, this 16th day of March, 2026, the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Chester County is AFFIRMED.

---

STELLA M. TSAI, Judge