Jump To

Top Caption [Combined Opinion

                  by Wojcik. Wallace](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10810034/ma-dillow-v-lawrence-county-board-of-elections/#o1)

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 16, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

M.A. Dillow v. Lawrence County Board of Elections

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 20 C.D. 2026
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Wojcik. Wallace

• Opinion

• Authorities (16)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (37.4K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by Wojcik. Wallace

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Michael A. Dillow, :
:
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 20 C.D. 2026
: Submitted: January 26, 2026
Lawrence County Board of :
Elections, Hickory Township, :
Jason A. Medure, in his capacities :
as County Solicitor and Township :
Solicitor, and Randy Brown :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
HONORABLE STELLA M. TSAI, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: March 16, 2026

Michael A. Dillow appeals from the December 29, 2025 order of the
Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas (trial court) which denied Dillow’s
Application for Emergency/Expedited Relief (Application) in its entirety.1 Dillow
sought therein to enjoin the Lawrence County Board of Elections (Board) from
certifying Randy Brown2 as the winner of the November 4, 2025 election for Hickory

1
This election-related appeal, at least at first blush, seems unorthodox yet otherwise
uncomplicated. Indeed, we are not usually tasked with resolving election disputes filed by the
candidate who received the greatest number of votes in an election. But our review of the matter
sub judice indicates that this case is more complicated than the parties initially believed. In fact,
what has unfolded since the November 4, 2025 Election can only be described as a series of
unfortunate events.

2
Brown joined this action as an intervenor in the trial court below.
Township (the same or Township) Supervisor because Brown received fewer write-
in votes than Dillow himself. We reverse.
If nothing else, at least the facts underlying this appeal are
straightforward. On November 4, 2025, Dillow received 57 write-in votes for the
office of Hickory Township Supervisor – receiving the greatest number of votes in
the election. Trial Court Order, 12/29/25, ¶1. Brown received 55 write-in votes. Id.
Nevertheless, the Board indicated its intention to declare Brown as the winner of the
election because it determined that Dillow was registered as a voter in Scott
Township on Election Day and was therefore ineligible to serve as Hickory
Township Supervisor under Section 401 of The Second Class Township Code,3 53
P.S. §65401. Id. ¶¶2, 8. More particularly, the Board’s solicitor, also serving as the
Hickory Township solicitor, related the following in an email to the Hickory
Township Board of Supervisors:

Dillow is not registered to vote in Hickory Township. As
such, [] Dillow is not qualified to hold office in Hickory
Township until he changes his voter registration. The
County will not declare [] Dillow as the write-in winner of
the Supervisor’s race. Randy Brown will be declared
winner and given the opportunity to accept his election
victory.
Original Record (O.R.) at Item No. 7.
Upon learning of the Board’s intention, and prior to the Board’s
scheduled certification of the Election on November 21, 2025, Dillow filed the
Application in the trial court. In pertinent part, relying on Section 1407(a) of the

3
Act of May 1, 1933, P.L. 103, as amended, 53 P.S. §65401 (“No person is eligible for the
office of supervisor, auditor or tax collector in any township unless that person is an elector of the
township.”).
2
Election Code,4 Dillow requested that the trial court enjoin the Board from certifying
the Election and that it hold a hearing on the matter. See O.R. at Item No. 1. The
trial court stayed certification of the Election pending resolution of the Application
in an order dated November 20, 2025, while also directing the Board and Hickory
Township to file an answer thereto. Id. at Item Nos. 2-3.
Notably, in the Board’s Answer to the Application, the Board explained
that it
reviews the voter[] registration for all individuals who
received the highest amount of write-in votes as a matter
of administrative policy and practicality. If said individual
is not registered to vote in the municipality (or precinct in
the case of party committee representatives), said
individual’s votes are invalidated. Similar administrative
functions occur when an individual attempts to provide the
Elections office with a Petition for candidacy in a
municipality he/she is not registered or said Petition is
unsigned or unnotarized.
O.R. at Item No. 7.
At the hearing, the parties stipulated that Dillow was not registered to
vote in Hickory Township on Election Day – although he changed his registration
on November 5, 2025. See Trial Court’s Hearing, Notes of Testimony (N.T.) at 5-

4
Section 1407(a) of the Election Code provides in pertinent part:

(a) Any person aggrieved by any order or decision of any county
board regarding the computation or canvassing of the returns of any
primary or election, or regarding any recount or recanvass thereof
under sections 1701, 1702, and 1703 of this act, may appeal
therefrom within two days after such order or decision shall have
been made, whether then reduced to writing or not, to the court
specified in this subsection, setting forth why he feels that an
injustice has been done, and praying for such order as will give him
relief.

Act of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, as amended, 25 P.S. §3157(a) (emphasis added).
3
10, 15. But the Board and the Township did not contest Dillow’s residency.
Although the Board and Brown focused on Dillow’s failure to register as an elector
in Hickory Township at the time of the Election, neither contested that Dillow was
a longtime resident of the Township. Id., N.T. at 9-11. Still, the Board and Brown
viewed this as inconsequential. In their view, because Section 401 of The Second
Class Township Code mandates that a Supervisor must be “an elector of the
township,” his failure to register as an elector of Hickory Township by Election Day
barred him from holding the office. Id., N.T. at 14-22.
As indicated, the trial court largely accepted these arguments and
denied Dillow’s Application in its entirety in an order dated December 29, 2025.
The trial court believed that the single issue presented by this appeal was whether
Dillow was “qualified for the position of Supervisor in Hickory Township, a second
class township, as he was registered to vote in Scott Township.” Trial Court’s Order
¶7. Thus, relying on Sections 401 and 403(c)5 of The Second Class Township Code,
53 P.S. §§65401, 65403(c), the trial court determined that because Dillow was not a
registered elector of Hickory Township on Election Day, he was unqualified for
office. Id. ¶¶8-10 (“When he won the election, [Dillow] still was registered to vote
in Scott Township which demonstrates he was not an elector of Hickory Township.
Resultantly, [Dillow] was not qualified to assume the office of Supervisor under The
Second Class Township Code.”). The trial court likewise terminated its earlier stay
of the Board’s certification. Id. ¶12. According to the Board, it certified Brown as
the winner of the election for Hickory Township supervisor on January 5, 2026.

5
Section 403(c) of The Second Class Township Code provides: “Supervisors shall reside
in the township from which elected and shall have resided in that township continuously for at
least one year before their election.” 53 P.S. §65403(c). The trial court therefore construed The
Second Class Township Code as having elector and residency requirements. Trial Court’s Order
¶10.
4
Board’s Brief at 4. Dillow, however, filed a Notice of Appeal in this Court on
January 2, 2026.6
Before this Court, Dillow asserts a litany of issues,7 but each issue
raised and his subsequent argument can be distilled into the following: the Board
exceeded its authority by disqualifying Dillow as the victorious write-in candidate
in favor of the runner-up. Dillow’s Brief passim. Dillow therefore requests that this
Court reverse the trial court’s decision and order that Dillow be sworn in as
Township Supervisor.
For its part, the Board largely advances the arguments it raised before
the trial court. It also argues, however, that in invalidating the write-in votes cast
for Dillow and disqualifying him from the election, the Board was simply acting
within the authority conferred upon it by the Election Code to administer elections.
Board’s Brief at 4 (citing 25 P.S. §§2641, 2642). So too, the Board reiterates that
the actions it took are similar to those it might take when a candidate attempts to file
a nominating petition. Id. at 5. To the extent Brown’s own arguments depart from
the Board, he argues that Dillow’s disqualification means that he is the duly elected
supervisor of Hickory Township pursuant to Section 1417 of the Election Code, 25
P.S. §3167.
As we see it, and as discussed infra, the Board plainly exceeded its
authority under the Election Code to disqualify Dillow from holding public office
and the trial court then compounded this error by denying the Application in its

6
The trial court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on January 21, 2026, largely reiterating
its December 29, 2025 order.

7
To the extent our restatement of the issues does not encompass every issue raised by
Dillow, we need not reach them given our disposition. See Dillow’s Brief at 6-8.

5
entirety and terminating its stay of the Board’s certification. For his part, Dillow
then failed to seek a stay of the certification pending his appeal in this Court, thereby
enabling the Board to wrongfully certify the election in Brown’s favor. The parties’
arguments, then, miss the greatest difficulty in now resolving this appeal: the Board
has already certified Brown as Hickory Township Supervisor thereby mooting this
dispute.
It is well settled that an actual case or controversy – one that is real
rather than hypothetical – must be extant at all stages of litigation, not merely at the
time of filing. Harris v. Rendell, 982 A.2d 1030, 1035 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).
However, a once extant case or controversy may become moot if a ‘change in
circumstances has eliminated the controversy so that the court lacks the ability to
issue a meaningful order, that is, an order that can have any practical effect.’” In re
General Election (2024), 328 A.3d 606, 611 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024) (quoting Burke ex.
rel. Burke v. Independent Blue Cross, 103 A.3d 1267, 1271 (Pa. 2014)).
While an extant controversy exists here, namely, whether Dillow was
unduly disqualified from the election for Hickory Township Supervisor, we are
unaware of any authority which would permit this Court or the trial court to order
the Board to decertify the results of the Election. See, e.g., Ioannidis v. Wolf (Pa.
Cmwlth., No. 635 M.D. 2020, filed July 8, 2021), slip op. at 8-9 (discussing effect
of certification on continued viability of election challenges).8 This Court therefore
must determine what order we could issue that would have any practical effect, and,
upon review, we must deem this matter technically moot. Mistich v. Pennsylvania

8
See Pa. R.A.P. 126(b)(1)-(2) (“As used in this rule, ‘non-precedential decision’ refers to
. . . an unreported memorandum opinion of the Commonwealth Court filed after January 15, 2008.
[] Non-precedential decisions . . . may be cited for their persuasive value.”).
6
Board of Probation and Parole, 863 A.2d 116, 119 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (“[C]ourts
will not enter judgments or decrees to which no effect can be given.”).
Still, even where a dispute is technically moot, we may nevertheless
reach the merits under certain circumstances, such as where a dispute involves an
issue of great public importance. Rendell v. Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission,
983 A.2d 708, 719 (Pa. 2009). We are inclined to apply that exception here. To wit,
this matter implicates the proper mechanisms, if any, for challenging the
qualifications of a victorious write-in candidate. See also In re Petitions to Open
Ballot Box Pursuant to 25 P.S. §3261(A), 295 A.3d 325, 332-33 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023).
However, given that Dillow filed the Application pursuant to Section 1407 of the
Election Code, we will confine our review accordingly. That is, we will limit our
review in this election contest “to [an] examination of the record to determine
whether the trial court committed errors of law and whether the court’s findings were
supported by adequate evidence.” Dayhoff v. Weaver, 808 A.2d 1002, 1005 n.4 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2002).
In the proceedings below, the Board and the trial court undertook an
unfamiliar and little-explored legal question when they inquired upon Dillow’s
qualifications for office. Indeed, notwithstanding the Board’s comparison to the
provisions of the Election Code relating to fatally defective nominating petitions or
papers, see, e.g., 25 P.S. §§2861-2960, the Election Code is silent on the matter as it
concerns write-in candidates.
Nevertheless, by way of a footnote, our Supreme Court has explained:

Unlike candidates who pursue general elections ballot
access by nomination petitions or papers, the Election
Code does not require write-in candidates to file anything
attesting to or substantiating their qualifications or
eligibility for office . . . . Nor does it provide a

7
mechanism for challenging the qualifications of
victorious write-in candidates after their nomination or
election. Except perhaps in the rare case in which quo
warranto might lie, a circumstance that we have no
occasion to explore today, once a write-in candidate is
certified as the winner the courts are effectively
powerless to interfere.
In re Jordan, 277 A.3d 519, 532 n. 18 (Pa. 2022) (emphasis added). Thus, the
dispositive error in the proceedings below lies not with the trial court’s or the
Board’s interpretation of The Second Class Township Code or even Dillow’s
qualifications for office – and we offer no opinion on those issues now. Rather, the
dispositive error lies with the Board’s authority to invalidate lawfully cast votes for
the purpose of denying a write-in candidate’s putative victory.
If that were not enough to underscore the Board’s error in this matter,
we note Section 1404(g)(3) of the Election Code, 25 P.S. §3154(g)(3) (emphasis
added), provides: “If any error or fraud is discovered, the county board shall
compute and certify the votes justly regardless of any fraudulent or erroneous
returns presented to it, and shall report the facts to the district attorney of the
proper county for action.” This principle is not novel with respect to our election
law jurisprudence – in fact, this principle predates the Election Code itself.
For example, in 1867, our Supreme Court observed: “The votes cast at
an election for a person who is disqualified from holding office are not nullities.
They cannot be rejected by the inspectors, or thrown out of the count by return
judges. The disqualified person is a person still, and every vote thrown for him is
formal.” Commonwealth v. Cluley, 56 Pa. 270, 273 (1867) (emphasis added). So
too, in Commonwealth ex. rel. Parker v. Emminger, 74 Pa. 479, 483 (1871), the
Supreme Court determined that an election return judge’s sole duty and
responsibility was to faithfully tabulate and report the returns. Therein, the return

8
judges refused to certify a senator-elect’s victory on suspicion of fraud and bribery.
Id. The Supreme Court opined:

So far from this being the certificate required by law, it
was a refusal to certify. The returns were plain and
intelligible, at least nothing to the contrary is alleged, and
the only duty of the return judges was to cast them up
and certify for whom the majority has been given. The
county returns were, as to them in the performance of this
duty, conclusive. They could not be disregarded in the
least, excepting perhaps for plain clerical errors, and could
not be set aside. They were to be the evidence upon which
the return judges alone should act.
Id. at 483 (emphasis).
Thus, while this principle has since been codified at Section 1404(g)(3)
of the Election Code, it has long been the law of this Commonwealth that a county
board of elections may not sua sponte invalidate the votes that it deems to have been
cast for an unqualified candidate – especially, so that it might certify the runner-up
as victorious.9 Rather, the county boards have a duty “to compute and certify the
votes justly regardless of any fraudulent or erroneous returns presented to it . . . .”
See 25 P.S. §3154(g)(3). Here, to the extent the Board had concerns regarding
Dillow’s qualifications to hold the office of Township Supervisor, the Board’s
recourse was limited to reporting those findings to the Lawrence County District

9
Indeed, while it is beyond the scope of this proceeding, we nevertheless find Brown’s
argument that he is the duly elected Township Supervisor under Section 1417 of the Election Code
perplexing. That provision provides: “Except as otherwise provided by law, the persons receiving
the highest number of votes for any office at any election shall be declared elected to such office,
up to the number required by law to be elected thereto.” 25 P.S. §3167. By Brown’s very own
stipulation, he did not receive the highest number of votes for the office of Township Supervisor.
See, e.g., Brown’s Brief at 2-3; Cluley, 56 Pa. at 273 (“But surely it cannot be maintained that in
any possible contingency the office can be given to [the runner-up] . . . . Under institutions such
as ours, there is even greater reason for holding that a minority candidate is not entitled to the
office if he who received the largest number of votes is disqualified.”).
9
Attorney’s Office under Section 1404(g)(3) of the Election Code, rather than
invalidating lawfully cast votes by fiat.10 Id. It would then be incumbent upon the
District Attorney’s Office to seek further relief, including an action in quo warranto
as suggested in In re Jordan. However, because appellate jurisdiction over a matter
involving the right to public office is vested exclusively in the Supreme Court, see
42 Pa. C.S. §722(2), we will end our analysis here.11

10
We also observe that the Board’s vague reliance on the provisions of the Election Code
which provide for the county boards of elections membership and jurisdiction, see 25 P.S. §2641,
and its powers and duties, see id. §2642, must also fail. Neither provision empowers the Board to
disqualify victorious candidates – write-in or otherwise. In fact, Section 302(i) of the Election
Code, id. §2642(i) (emphasis added), empowers the county boards of elections “[t]o investigate
election frauds, irregularities, and violations of this act, and to report all suspicious circumstances
to the district attorney.” But it confers no greater authority, such as adjudicating the fraud,
irregularity, violation, or suspicious act, upon the county boards.

11
We suppose, then, that the only viable avenue for continued judicial relief in this matter
would be a fresh action in quo warranto filed in the trial court. See In re Jordan, 277 A.3d at 532
n. 18. We caution, however, that

[o]nce a person has been duly elected, the right to exercise
the authority of office is not to be lightly disturbed. A complaint in
quo warranto is aimed at the right to exercise the powers of the
office, which is a public injury, rather than an attack upon the
propriety of the actions performed while in office, which would be
a private injury. Accordingly, standing to pursue quo warranto is
generally within a public entity such as, the Attorney General, or the
local district attorney. Spykerman v. Levy, 421 A.2d 641, 648 (Pa.
1980); Lehman v. Tucker, [368 A.2d 670, 672 (Pa.] 1977). A private
individual or entity is generally barred from bringing a quo warranto
action; but a private petitioner will be deemed to have standing
where that petitioner can show that it has been specially damaged or
has some special right or interest. Spykerman, 421 A.2d at 649; see
also In re One Hundred or More Qualified Electors of Clairton,
[683 A.2d 283, 286-87 (Pa.] 1996) (finding qualified electors lacked
standing to bring an action in quo warranto for failure to show an
interest beyond that shared in common by all citizens of
municipality).
(Footnote continued on next page…)
10
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order.

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

Commonwealth ex rel. Judicial Conduct Board v. Griffin, 918 A.2d 87, 93 (Pa. 2007) (footnotes
omitted); see also Spykerman, 421 A.2d at 648 (“Historically, Pennsylvania courts have held that
the quo warranto action is the sole and exclusive method to try title or right to public office.”).
11
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Michael A. Dillow, :
:
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 20 C.D. 2026
:
Lawrence County Board of :
Elections, Hickory Township, :
Jason A. Medure, in his capacities :
as County Solicitor and Township :
Solicitor, and Randy Brown :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 16th day of March, 2026, the December 29, 2025 order
of the Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas is REVERSED.

---

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Michael A. Dillow, :
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 20 C.D. 2026
: Submitted: January 26, 2026
Lawrence County Board of Elections, :
Hickory Township, Jason A. Medure, in :
his capacities as County Solicitor and :
Township Solicitor, and Randy Brown :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
HONORABLE STELLA M. TSAI, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
BY JUDGE WALLACE FILED: March 16, 2026

I agree with the conclusion reached by the Learned Majority. The Court of
Common Pleas of Lawrence County’s (trial court) decision in this matter should be
reversed because the Lawrence County Board of Elections (Board) lacked the
authority to refuse certification of elections. However, I write separately to note I
would have transferred this appeal, at least in part, to the Supreme Court, because
the central issue on appeal implicates a person’s right to hold public office.
Before addressing my disagreement, I want to emphasize the issue of private
standing in quo warranto actions. Although the Majority cautions a duly elected
person’s right to exercise the authority of office is not to be lightly disturbed, it
importantly and correctly notes a quo warranto action may be available to oust a
person from public office and to prevent continued exercise of authority unlawfully
asserted. In re Prospect Crozer LLC, 328 A.3d 37, 68 (Pa. 2024). Private persons
may have standing to bring a quo warranto action when they can demonstrate special
damage or some special right or interest. See Reed v. Harrisburg City Council, 995
A.2d 1137, 1140-41 (Pa. 2010) (holding “a private party with a special interest in
the matter[, such as Mayor Reed,] may institute a quo warranto action without first
notifying the Attorney General or the local district attorney.”).
Now, turning to my point of disagreement, the Majority frames the issue on
appeal as simply one involving the Board’s authority to refuse to certify the election
results for the office of supervisor of Hickory Township in favor of Michael A.
Dillow, the election winner. The issue, however, is more nuanced and mixed. The
rationale for the Board’s refusal rests on its interpretation of Section 401 of The
Second Class Township Code, 53 P.S. § 65401. Specifically, whether the term
“elector” means that a candidate is required to have registered as an elector of a
township by election day to qualify for the position of township supervisor.1 Maj.
Op. at 4. This issue undoubtedly involves a person’s right to hold public office.
Due to jurisdictional constraints, I refrain from offering an opinion on the
meaning of “elector.” This restraint is especially challenging because the Board and

1
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines “elector” as “a person qualified to vote in an
election.” Elector, Merriam Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/elector (last
visited Mar. 12, 2026) (emphasis added). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “elector” as “[a] voter”
or “qualified voter,” “a person who meets the voting requirements for age, residency, and
registration and who has the present right to vote in an election.” Black’s Law Dictionary (12th
ed. 2024) (emphasis added). The term “registered elector” denotes a person needs to be registered
to vote, whereas, as stated, the term “elector” holds no such meaning. See 25 Pa.C.S. § 1102
(defining “registered elector” as “[a] qualified elector who is registered to vote”).

SW - 2
the trial court did address the meaning of elector. In concluding that an elector of a
township must reside in and be registered to vote in that township, the trial court
principally relied on Aukamp v. Diehm, 8 A.2d 400 (Pa. 1939). Aukamp involved
who may sign petitions for local option referendums pursuant to the Liquor Control
Act and the Beverage License Act. Evaluating the issue under the voter qualification
provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and applying the Election Code’s
definition of “qualified elector,” our Supreme Court concluded “the legislature used
the word ‘elector’ . . . in the sense of one qualified to vote at the election and
therefore one who, at the time of signing the petition for referendum, was registered
to vote.” Id. at 401.
Aukamp, however, appears to be in tension with In re Sullivan, 160 A. 853
(Pa. 1932),2 where the Supreme Court explained:

We cannot agree with the contention which was earnestly advocated
before us, and which was also the opinion of the court below, that
registration is an essential qualification of an elector. The reference
which is made to registration in the first paragraph of the section of the
Constitution just quoted [i.e., the former Article 8, Section 1] does not
require such a narrow construction of the phrase ‘qualified elector.’
Registration may be and usually is prerequisite to voting; but it is not a
qualification for the exercise of the franchise. No attorney is permitted
to argue before the bar of this court without being formally admitted;
yet no one would contend that the mere motion for admission
constitutes a qualification for practice. The same reasoning applies to
registration for voting.

Id. at 854 (emphasis added). As indicated, this apparent conflict on the meaning of
the terms “elector” and “registered elector” is for our Supreme Court to resolve,

2
In re Nomination of Nader, 860 A.2d 1, 7 (Pa. 2004) (Saylor, J., dissenting statement) (noting
that Aukamp and Sullivan “are in tension” and that “[a]s between the two decisions, however,
Sullivan is . . . the better reasoned.”). Aukamp does not cite or overrule Sullivan.

SW - 3
because it implicates a question involving a right to public office. See
42 Pa.C.S. § 722(2).
Thus, this Court should have at least transferred the portion of the appeal
pertaining to Dillow’s qualification for public office to the Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Spano, 701 A.2d 566 (Pa. 1997) (The Superior Court affirmed the
conviction, but transferred the portion of the appeal concerning defendant’s removal
from office to the Supreme Court).
If, in the future, after this Court reverses the trial court in this action, Dillow
were to file a new, separate, quo warranto action to seek Randy Brown’s removal
as Hickory Township Supervisor, the basis for relief may be identical to what is
presently before us. That is, whether the Board misapplied the meaning of the term
elector, as used in Section 401, to refuse to certify the election for Dillow.3 If that is
the case, Dillow would file a direct appeal with the Supreme Court. See Reed, 995
A.2d at 1139 (The Commonwealth Court, via a single-judge order, transferred the
quo warranto case to the Supreme Court under Section 722(2)). Because of this, we
would be dismissive of judicial resources and the parties’ and public interest in
resolving this dispute expeditiously, as one quarter of the year has already elapsed
since Brown took office.
Accordingly, I disagree with the Majority’s decision not to transfer this appeal
to the Supreme Court.

---

STACY WALLACE, Judge
3
Because the trial court has already determined the meaning of the term “elector” in this case, it
is conceivable it may reapply that same meaning in subsequent cases. See Appeal of Coatesville
Area Sch. Dist., 244 A.3d 373, 378 (Pa. 2021) (res judicata “bars actions on a claim, or any part
of a claim, which was the subject of a prior action, or could have been raised in that action.”).

SW - 4