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Feb. 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Patrick W. v. Frank J. Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

District Court, N.D. Illinois

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:23-cv-16481

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

PATRICK W.,

                                     Claimant,                       
                               No. 23 C 16481                        
                      v.                                             
                               Magistrate Jeffrey T. Gilbert         

FRANK J. BISIGNANO,

Commissioner of Social Security,

                                     Respondent.                     

          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                               

Patrick W.1 (“Claimant”) appeals the decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security2 (“Commissioner”), denying his application for disability insurance benefits.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court reverses the Commissioner’s decision.3
Background

Claimant applied for disability insurance benefits on October 11, 2016, alleging
a disability onset date of July 12, 2012. (R.126). His application was denied initially
and on reconsideration after which Claimant requested a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Id.). After conducting a hearing at which

1 In accordance with Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 8.1, the Court refers to Claimant
only by his first name and the first initial of his last name.

2 Frank J. Bisignano was confirmed as the Commissioner of Social Security on May 6, 2025.
Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, he is automatically
substituted as the named defendant in this case.

3 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge for all
proceedings, including entry of final judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c). [ECF No. 7].
Claimant and a vocational expert testified, the ALJ issued a decision on June 3, 2021,
denying Claimant’s application for benefits, and concluded he was not disabled under
the Social Security Act. (R.126-40).

Claimant appealed to the Appeals Council, which granted review because the 

ALJ evaluated the medical opinion evidence under the wrong rules.4 (R.143-44). The
Appeal Council vacated the ALJ’s decision and remanded the case back to the ALJ
for further consideration under the correct rules. (Id.). The ALJ held a second hearing
and issued another decision on August 2, 2023, again denying Claimant’s application
for disability benefits. (R.16-33). Claimant appealed to the Appeals Council for a

second time. The Council denied review (R.1-6), leaving the ALJ’s August 2, 2023
decision as the final decision of the Commissioner, which is reviewable by this Court
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). See Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 561-62 (7th Cir.
2009).

Discussion

Under the Social Security Act, disability is defined as the “inability to engage
in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical

or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted

4 Effective March 27, 2017, the Agency promulgated new regulations regarding the way
evidence is to be considered when assessing a disability finding in cases like the one herein.
A core tenet of the new rules is that the evidentiary weight assigned to specific medical
opinions will not be assessed. Rather, the appropriate inquiry will be an assessment of the
persuasiveness of the evidence as it relates to the record support for the findings made and/or
the consistency of that evidence with the record as a whole. The new rules apply to all cases
filed after March 27, 2017. In this case, Claimant filed his application on October 11, 2016
before the new rules were promulgated. Therefore, the opinion evidence should be evaluated
under the old rules using the procedures described in 20 CFR 404.1527.

or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42
U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1)(A). The regulations prescribe a five-part, sequential test for
determining whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a), 416.920(a).

The Commissioner must consider whether: (1) the claimant has performed any
substantial gainful activity during the period for which he claims disability; (2) the
claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) the claimant’s
impairment meets or equals any listed impairment; (4) the claimant retains the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform his past relevant work; and (5) the
claimant is able to perform any other work existing in significant numbers in the

national economy. Id.; see also Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 885 (7th Cir. 2001).
Applying the five-part test in this case, the ALJ found at step one that
Claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 12, 2012. (R.19).
At step two, the ALJ found that Claimant has the severe impairment of obesity,
cervical spondylosis, lumbar degenerative disc disease, and post-traumatic stress
disorder. (R.19). At step three, the ALJ found that Claimant does not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals a listed impairment.

(R.19-20). At step four, the ALJ determined that Claimant has the RFC to perform
medium work with certain limitations but was not able to perform his past relevant
work. (R.21). At step five, the ALJ determined that based on Claimant’s age,
education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs in the national economy that
Claimant could perform, and therefore, he is not disabled. (R.31-32).

The court reviews the ALJ’s decision deferentially and must affirm the decision
if it is supported by “[s]ubstantial evidence,” i.e., ‘“such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). The Seventh Circuit has concluded that an ALJ’s decision is “subject to only
the most minimal of articulation requirements” and “need not address every piece or
category of evidence identified by a claimant, fully summarize the record, or cite
support for every proposition or chain of reasoning.” Warnell v. O’Malley, 97 F.4th
1050, 1053 (7th Cir. 2024). Though the standard of review is deferential, the court

must “conduct a critical review of the evidence” before affirming the Commissioner’s
decision. Eichstadt v. Astrue, 534 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2008). Even if there is
adequate evidence in the record to support an ALJ’s decision, that decision cannot be
upheld if the ALJ does not “build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to
the conclusion.” Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Warnell, 97 F.4th at 1053.

Claimant argues the ALJ failed to comply with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 in

evaluating the medical opinion evidence. An ALJ must provide “good reasons” for the
weight she affords to the opinion of a claimant’s treating physician. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527 (c)(2) (“We will always give good reasons in our notice of determination or
decision for the weight we give your treating source’s medical opinion”); Punzio v.
Astrue, 630 F.3d 704, 710 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that an ALJ must provide a “sound
explanation” for rejecting a treating source’s opinion). Claimant asserts that the ALJ
failed to provide the requisite “good reasons” for discounting the opinions of
Claimant’s treating physicians—Dr. Rubenstein, Dr. Waeltz, Dr. Tresser, and Dr.
Chaumont, who are all specialists in treating musculoskeletal impairments. (R.30).

Claimant also argues the ALJ also failed to provide a sufficient explanation for
assigning “great weight” to the opinion of the State agency consultant, Dr. Smith.
(R.29-30).

The Court agrees with Claimant and focuses on the ALJ’s discussion of Dr.
Smith’s opinion. When addressing Dr. Smith’s opinion, the ALJ stated:

In March 2019, a state agency medical consultant [Dr. Smith] opined

that the claimant is capable of medium work except he could frequently
climb and stoop. He should have avoided concentrated exposure to
pulmonary irritants and hazards (Ex. 16F). This opinion is assigned

great weight as it is supported by the overall record outlined above. The
claimant was treated conservatively during the relevant time period,
with medications and a medial branch block. There are no physical

therapy records provided. He is stable on medications for quite some
time before he exacerbates his pain with activities, which is then when
he has the medial branch blocks. The records supports that he was

capable of a range of medium work during the relevant time period.

(R.29-30). The above-quoted paragraph is the entirety of the ALJ’s discussion of Dr.
Smith’s opinion and the reasons why she give his opinion “great weight.” (R.29). The
Court finds that explanation is woefully deficient and does not comply with the ALJ’s
obligations under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. The ALJ stated that Dr. Smith’s opinion was
“supported by the overall record outlined above,” but the ALJ did not any specific
medical evidence that actually supported Dr. Smith’s opinion. (R.29). The Court is
left in the dark about what medical evidence the ALJ is referring to that purportedly
supports Dr. Smith’s opinion, and the Court cannot, and will not, speculate.

For example, the regulations provide that “[m]edium work involves lifting no
more than 50 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing
up to 25 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567 (c). However, there is nothing in the record

that the ALJ discussed in her decision that addressed Claimant’s ability to lift up to
50 pounds. In fact, the only evidence in the record that the ALJ discussed relating to
how much weight Claimant can lift is opinions from two of Claimant’s treating
physicians. Specifically, the ALJ noted that Dr. Rubenstein included restrictions for
“no repetitive lifting” and “no lifting to waist level more than 10 pounds,” and Dr.
Waeltz limited Claimant to “permanent light-duty restrictions of no lifting over 30

pounds and no repetitive bending.” (R.30). The Court recognizes that the ALJ rejected
those opinions, but those opinions contain the only evidence in the record the ALJ
discussed in her decision that specifically addressed Claimant’s lifting capabilities.

The Court notes that the ALJ also mentioned Claimant’s conservative medical
treatment, lack of physical therapy records, and stability on medications as other
reasons for giving Dr. Smith’s opinion “great weight.” (R.29-30). These additional
reasons, however, do not address Claimant’s specific work-related limitations and, in

particular, the ALJ’s reliance on Dr. Smith’s opinion to conclude that Claimant has
the ability to lift up to 50 pounds and to perform medium work. The ALJ does not cite
to any specific objective evidence to support that conclusion. Because the Court
cannot connect the dots from the evidence to the ALJ’s conclusion as to how Dr.
Smith’s opinion for medium work is supported by the record, remand is required.

The Court also is troubled by the ALJ’s failure to address Dr. Smith’s specialty
as a gastroenterologist as compared to Claimant’s treating physicians who include an
orthopedist and pain management specialist. Also, Dr. Smith checked a box that

stated the file contained no medical source statements regarding Claimant’s physical
capabilities (R.913), which the Commissioner does not dispute and concedes was
erroneous. Commissioner’s Brief [ECF No. 21], at 6-7. Instead, the Commissioner
argues that Dr. Smith’s erroneous checkbox does not undermine his opinion because
he independently reviewed the medical evidence. The Court disagrees.

Social security regulations are clear that an ALJ must consider a State agency

consultant’s familiarity with the opinions of the claimant’s treating physician(s) when
assigning weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (c)(3) (requiring State agency consultants
to “evaluate the degree to which [their medical opinion] consider all of the pertinent
evidence in [the claimant’s] claim, including medical opinions of treating and other
examining sources”). Here, the ALJ did not discuss how Dr. Smith evaluated the
opinions of Claimant’s treating physicians, nor could she. (R.29-30). Taking Dr.
Smith’s Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment at face value (R.908-13),

Dr. Smith checked the box “No” to the question “Is a medical source statement(s)
regarding the claimant’s physical capabilities in the file?” (R.913). This is an
important criterion the ALJ failed to consider in her decision and is another reason
why this case must be remanded. See Kaminski v. Berryhill, 894 F.3d 870, 875 (7th
Cir. 2018) (finding that an ALJ’s failure to consider the relevant regulatory criteria
in weighing medical opinions warranted remand). Because Dr. Smith is the only
opinion evidence on which the ALJ relied when formulating Claimant’s RFC, Dr.
Smith’s failure to consider or discuss the opinions of Claimant’s treating physicians
is not a harmless error nor is the ALJ’s failure to discuss Dr. Smith’s gastroenterology
specialty, which the Court finds particularly egregious in the context of this case. This
case, therefore, must be remanded.
Because the Court has concluded that remand is required, it need not address
Claimant’s remaining arguments. The Court, however, encourages the ALJ to review
her obligations under to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 in connection her evaluation of the
opinion evidence in this record and, in particular, to address all the factors set forth
in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (c) when evaluating Claimant's treating sources. The Court
expresses no opinion about the decision to be made on remand but encourages the
ALJ provide a more fulsome explanation about how she evaluates the all of the
medical opinion evidence in this case and specifically what objective record evidence
supports her conclusions.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants Claimant’s request to reverse
the Commissioner’s decision [ECF No. 16]. In accordance with the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g), the Court remands this case to the Social Security Administration
for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
It is so ordered. )
□□□
effrey T. Gilbert
United States Magistrate Judge
Dated: February 26, 2026