Ogbedo, G and V v Taiga - Family Law Financial Provision

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  Ogbedo, G and V v Taiga [2026] EWHC 411 (Fam) (24 February 2026)

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[2026] EWHC 411 (Fam) | | |
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| | | Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 411 (Fam) |
| | | Case No: FD25F00035 |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION

| | | Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
| | | 24/02/2026 |
B e f o r e :

SIR JONATHAN COHEN

Between:
| | Nneka Mercy Ogbedo, G and V | Applicant |
| | - and - | |
| | Moses Oghenerume Taiga | Respondent |

**Mr Nicholas Wilkinson (instructed by HCR Law) for the Applicants
Mr Femi Osibanjo (solicitor partner in K&S @ Law) for the Respondent

Hearing dates: 2-5 February 2026**

HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT ____________________

Crown Copyright ©

1. This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.
3. Sir Jonathan Cohen :
4. Introduction
5. This case concerns what financial provision, if any, should be made for twin girls G & V born in 2001. Their parents have been found not to have been married and therefore the application is made under Section 15 and Schedule 1 Children Act 1989.
7. The girls are now aged 24 years. They have been maintained throughout their lives, normally to a greater but sometimes to a lesser extent by their father. Until these proceedings, they had never seen their father.
9. This case is to the best of my knowledge unique in its intensity and duration. By my calculations, there have been about 75 orders made on different dates by the High Court. Most of the substantial hearings were conducted by Mr Justice Charles. I came into this case in 2018 and have conducted most of the hearings since then. There have been in addition about 7 orders each from the Court of Appeal in England and Wales and from the High Court and above in Nigeria, including the Supreme Court. That means that over 22 years of litigation, there have been over 90 days on which court orders have been made, sometimes multiple orders and sometimes after lengthy hearings. It is plainly my duty to make an order that is both fair and, so far as is possible, final so far as this litigation is concerned.
11. The applications before the court are those by the children's mother and by the children themselves for an extension and variation of the order made by me on 24 May 2018. The father denies that the court has jurisdiction to entertain either application in the light of the terms of previous orders which he says expired at the end of the girl's first degree of tertiary education and in the light of their age at the time that the applications were taken out. The applicants deny that there is any jurisdictional bar.
13. I shall call the parties M (the mother), F (the father) and G and V (the children).
15. The relevant orders
16. On 11 July 2007 Charles J provided that upon completion of the children's secondary education F shall pay periodical payments to them "from the date of the commencement of any tertiary education the sum of ?15,000 pa, directly to each of the twins for each year of their tertiary education (first degree only) ?"
18. The order also provided for F to pay for G additional funds to cover the cost of a classroom assistant and the cost of speech and language therapy provided for the benefit of G. In addition he was to pay in respect of annual medical checkups for G. It is clear therefore that G's health difficulties were before the court at that time.
19. Other provisions covered the purchasing of a property for the occupation of the twins "with a minimum of 3 double bedrooms or 2 double bedrooms and 2 single bedrooms". This was to be made available for the occupation by the mother and the twins during the period of the twins dependence, defined as the period when the twins or one of them undertook tertiary education to a first-degree level. This led to the purchase of the property in North London ("the property") which still is the home of M and the children.
20. The matter came before me in 2018. At that stage the girls were coming to the end of their schooling. The mother was seeking additional funds, including funding for a bigger property. I made provision for various payments by way of variation of the 2007 order including payment until completion of tertiary education to a first-degree level (i.e. consistent with the order of Charles J).
22. The mother's application for variation is dated 15 July 2024 and came before me substantively on 11 October 2024. At the door of the court the father offered to pay a lump sum of ?40k to be used to meet V's tuition fees at the university she was attending and "the children's living and accommodation costs at their respective universities. This shall be the sum payable for the children's benefit in respect of their tertiary education unless otherwise supplemented by further order of the court or agreement between the parties". By that time, M had issued nullity proceedings having failed in the litigation to prove that she was ever validly married. In order to avoid an even greater multiplicity of litigation I determined that the nullity proceedings should be dealt with first. These were in due course struck out by me.
24. On 22 May 2025 the twins issued their own application for a lump sum order, a property adjustment order, a settlement or a transfer of property order and a periodical payments order. They did not expressly apply to vary the existing order. That application came before me on 16 July 2025 when I made various directions which included it being recorded that due to the application having been made by the girls, no orders were currently pursued by their mother. Subsequently, I directed that her application if pursued should be heard with the girls' application and all three applicants have been represented by the same solicitors throughout and at this hearing by the same counsel.
26. I further provided that there should be two independent single joint experts, a psychiatrist and an occupational therapist ("OT") respectively, experienced in attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and autism spectrum disorder (ASD) to provide reports addressing the diagnosis and prognosis of any medical condition suffered by G, a proposed treatment plan, details of the state benefits to which she may be entitled by reason of her condition and the cost of implementing any such treatment plan.
28. There have been a series of other directions hearings before me, the details of which no longer matter. To a significant extent they were necessitated by F's non-compliance with legal services payment orders. I have made cost orders against him and very belatedly he has now complied both with those orders and the substantive orders.
30. Jurisdiction
31. There has been a live debate between the parties as to the ability of both M and the children to apply for the extension of the 2018 order. The relevant paragraphs of schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989 read as follows:
33. 1(1) On an application made by a parent, guardian or special guardian of a child, or by any person who is named in a child arrangements order as a person with whom a child is to live, the court may make one or more of the orders mentioned in sub-paragraph (2).
34. (2) The orders referred to in sub-paragraph (1) are
35. (a)an order requiring either or both parents of a child
36. > (i)to make to the applicant for the benefit of the child; or
37. > (ii)to make to the child himself, such periodical payments, for such term, as may be specified in the order;
38. (b)an order requiring either or both parents of a child
39. > (i)to secure to the applicant for the benefit of the child; or
40. > (ii)to secure to the child himself, such periodical payments, for such term, as may be so specified;
41. (c)an order requiring either or both parents of a child
42. > (i)to pay to the applicant for the benefit of the child; or
43. > (ii)to pay to the child himself, such lump sum as may be so specified;
44. (d)an order requiring a settlement to be made for the benefit of the child, and to the satisfaction of the court, of property
45. > (i)to which either parent is entitled (either in possession or in reversion); and
46. > (ii)which is specified in the order;
47. (e)an order requiring either or both parents of a child
48. > (i)to transfer to the applicant, for the benefit of the child; or
49. > (ii)to transfer to the child himself, such property to which the parent is, or the parents are, entitled (either in possession or in reversion) as may be specified in the order.
50. (3) The powers conferred by this paragraph may be exercised at any time.
51. (4) An order under sub-paragraph (2)(a) or (b) may be varied or discharged by a subsequent order made on the application of any person by or to whom payments were required to be made under the previous order.
52. (5) Where a court makes an order under this paragraph
53. (a) it may at any time make a further such order under sub-paragraph (2)(a), b) or (c) with respect to the child concerned if he has not reached the age of eighteen;
54. (b)it may not make more than one order under sub-paragraph (2)(d) or (e) against the same person in respect of the same child.
55. ?
56. 2(1) If, on an application by a person who has reached the age of eighteen, it appears to the court
57. (a)that the applicant is, will be or (if an order were made under this paragraph) would be receiving instruction at an educational establishment or undergoing training for a trade, profession or vocation, whether or not while in gainful employment; or
58. (b)that there are special circumstances which justify the making of an order under this paragraph, the court may make one or both of the orders mentioned in sub-paragraph (2).
59. (2) The orders are
60. (a)an order requiring either or both of the applicant's parents to pay to the applicant such periodical payments, for such term, as may be specified in the order;
61. (b)an order requiring either or both of the applicant's parents to pay to the applicant such lump sum as may be so specified.
62. (3) An application may not be made under this paragraph by any person if, immediately before he reached the age of sixteen, a periodical payments order was in force with respect to him.
63. (4) No order shall be made under this paragraph at a time when the parents of the applicant are living with each other in the same household.
64. (5) An order under sub-paragraph (2)(a) may be varied or discharged by a subsequent order made on the application of any person by or to whom payments were required to be made under the previous order.
65. It is F's case that paragraph 2(3) is conclusive of the children's applications and fatal to them. Mr Osibanjo points out that immediately before the girls reached the age of 16 the periodical payments order was in force with respect to them. So far as M is concerned, he says that she cannot make an application under paragraph 1 for the girls as at the time she made it they were aged over 18 and thus no longer children within the meaning of the statute. Her opportunity, in his word, evaporated when they reached 18.
67. In this context it is important also to look at paragraph 6 which reads:
69. 6(1) In exercising its powers under paragraph 1 or 2 to vary or discharge an order for the making or securing of periodical payments the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case, including any change in any of the matters to which the court was required to have regard when making the order.
70. (2) The power of the court under paragraph 1 or 2 to vary an order for the making or securing of periodical payments shall include power to suspend any provision of the order temporarily and to revive any provision so suspended.
71. (3) Where on an application under paragraph 1 or 2 for the variation or discharge of an order for the making or securing of periodical payments the court varies the payments required to be made under that order, the court may provide that the payments as so varied shall be made from such date as the court may specify, except that, subject to sub-paragraph (9), the date shall not be earlier than the date of the making of the application.
72. (4) An application for the variation of an order made under paragraph 1 for the making or securing of periodical payments to or for the benefit of a child may, if the child has reached the age of sixteen, be made by the child himself.
73. (5) Where an order for the making or securing of periodical payments made under paragraph 1 ceases to have effect on the date on which the child reaches the age of sixteen, or at any time after that date but before or on the date on which he reaches the age of eighteen, the child may apply to the court which made the order for an order for its revival.
74. (6) If on such an application it appears to the court that
75. (a)the child is, will be or (if an order were made under this sub-paragraph) would be receiving instruction at an educational establishment or undergoing training for a trade, profession or vocation, whether or not while in gainful employment; or
76. (b)there are special circumstances which justify the making of an order under this paragraph, the court shall have power by order to revive the order from such date as the court may specify, not being earlier than the date of the making of the application.
77. It is also helpful to set out the note that appears at 2.364 [7] of the Family Court Practice at the foot of paragraph 6 which reads as follows:
79. Scope-Subject to CSA 1991, this paragraph contains the court's powers to vary orders made either under para 1(order for financial relief for a child against parents) or para 2 (order for financial relief against parents where the child is applying for the first time when the child is over18).
80. Whilst the editor's commentary in a note is not authority, it is helpful.
81. Mr Wilkinson relies heavily on the fact that these applications are not for any of the orders set out at paragraph 1(2) but are for an extension or variation of the previous order. He is plainly correct that paragraph 1(2) does not mention variation and so, he says, the fact that the children are over 18 does not matter. By the same analogy, he argues that paragraph 2(3) does not apply to a variation.
83. Paragraph 2(3) has caused difficulties on previous occasions. It is hard to see the rationale underlying it. In particular, if special circumstances were to arise when a young person is aged 18, for example a devastating illness or accident, why should an application be barred simply because a periodical payments order is in force in relation to that young person when he reached the age of 16? Why should he be in a worse position than someone who was not in receipt of periodical payments?
85. In addition, if F is correct, it would lead to the undesirable situation whereby children of married parents would be able to apply for an extension condition (either for education or special circumstances) but those children of unmarried parents who were in receipt of a maintenance order prior to reaching the age of 16 would not.
87. The issue was considered by His Honour Judge Hess in J v K v L (FD01P01372 & ZC18P04077) in a judgment handed down on 30 December 2021. I refer in particular to the following paragraph:
89. 34. It is not easy to understand why those drafting Schedule 1 did not simply allow a co-existence of parental and child remedies for children older than 18 (or perhaps 16), but they appear to have deliberately chosen a more complicated 'baton-passing' scheme. As well as the general points I have made above, the scheme certainly has some potentially curious and complicated effects when applied on a close analysis to the unusual facts of the present case, and I want to make the following points:-
90. ?
91. > (vi) First, in my view a variation order does not fall within the meaning of "further order" in paragraph 1(5)(a). In my view paragraphs 1(3) and 1(4) make it clear that a variation application (as opposed to a fresh application, for example after the expiry of an earlier order) can be pursued at any time. In my view that includes the period from the child attaining the age of 18 to the child ceasing to satisfy one of the extension conditions. To decide otherwise produces an absurd result as is illustrated by the facts of this case. Mr Thorpe's construction of the paragraph 1(5)(a) prohibition would, it seems to me, apply just as much to an application made by an adult child of over 18 under paragraph 6(4) (because paragraph 6(4) confers on the child the right to make a paragraph 1 order) as it does to the mother's application. In such a scenario nobody would have a right to make a variation application and the order would continue even if everybody thought it should not. My preferred statutory construction, which is in my view consistent with making sense of the statute, but also taking a purposive approach to secure (as far as it is consistent with the clear wording of the Act) similar rights to children of unmarried parents as those held by children of married parents.
92. > (vii) Secondly, it seems to me wrong in principle (and also inconsistent with a purposive approach to the statute) to exclude the mother's right to seek orders which she had at the time of the application on the basis of effluxion of time. This seems particularly unfair where the effluxion of time is no fault of hers. Had HHJ O'Dwyer dealt with the application, as expected, within a few weeks of the November 2020 hearing he would (without argument) have been able to vary the order of DJ Simmonds, if he so chose, right back to the date of the application (see paragraph 6(3)) and right forward to the end of the period when K ceases to satisfy the extension conditions. Further, he would have been able to make such lump sum orders as he thought fit. In my view it would be wrong to deprive the court of those powers, just because of the effluxion of time. In reaching this conclusion I want to express agreement with the views of Williams J in DN v UD (supra), in particular the following passages:- "The effect of Sch 1, para 3 which permits the court to backdate a periodical payments order to the date of the application and to extend it beyond the child's 18th birthday would support the construction that an order for periodical payments can be made for the first time after the child reaches the age of 18 provided that the application was made prior to the child's 18th birthday. The use of the word 'is' in paragraph 3(2)(a) would also support the construction that an order can be made at a time when the child is 18. It seems to me that if the court has the power to make a periodical payments order in respect of a 'child' who has reached the age of 18 where the application was made prior to the 18th birthday that the court would also retain the jurisdiction to make other species of order under para 1. Para 3 is looking at the duration of orders in terms of commencement and end date rather than the jurisdiction of the court to make any order at all. As a matter of logic if educational or special circumstances apply so as to justify the court making periodical payments orders which extend beyond the child's 18th birthday those special circumstance would as a matter of fact (albeit not of law) be just as relevant to the issue of whether they provided the factual foundation for a capital order. If Parliament had intended that the court should lose the ability to make an order when the child reached the age of 18 in the course of pending proceedings it surely would have addressed the issue. If the court lost the power to make the order it would require the court to then join the child to the proceedings or at least to ascertain whether they wished to then make their own application. I do not think it can be right that procedural delay the fault for which might lie entirely at the door of either the court or of the respondent should have the potential to 'knockout' an application which was legally permissible and which was evidentially sustainable at the time of determination. Such an interpretation would potentially breach both the article 6 ECHR and article 8 ECHR rights of the applicant and the children and would be contrary to their welfare, whether as a primary consideration or simply as a consideration. It could in any event be partially remedied by joining the adult child as a party and deeming an application to have been made by them pursuant to Sch 1, para 2 albeit there would be a more limited range of orders available."
93. In terms of the outcome of the case, it matters not whether I find jurisdiction on the application of M or the children or both, as long as I find it on one of them.
95. I am entitled to adopt a purposive construction of the statute. It would in my judgment be unfair if I were to find that a child, even if aged more than 18, is subject to special circumstances which justify the making of an order (almost invariably by reason of a disability) but that because of the fact of an order for his maintenance having been made before he reached the age of 16, he is debarred from pursuing an application for support. It would be illogical to arrive at such a conclusion so as to leave his needs unmet when they would have been met if his parents were married or if he had not been in receipt of such an order. I am fortified in this conclusion by the words of the commentator to which I have referred in respect of paragraph 6.
97. Whilst paragraph 2 makes provision for an application by a person who has reached the age of 18, there is nothing in the statute which debars the parent of such a child from making an application on behalf of the child.
99. I also draw attention to 1(iv) which provides for the application to vary being made by any person by or to whom payments were (emphasis added) required to be made under the previous order. Whilst the order has, in my view, lapsed by reason of the conclusion of a first degree of tertiary education, that does not prohibit an application for a variation, including extension, or discharge. The test is not whether the order is still in effect at the time of the application but whether payments were required to be made under the previous order, as they plainly were.
101. Education
102. When the matter was before me in 2018 the girls were studying for their A levels. Their progress since then has been as follows:
104. G
105. i) She left her A level college in June 2019
106. ii) She did a first degree at University A between October 2019 ? July 2023, where she achieved a 2.1 degree
107. iii) She attended the University B between September 2024 ? October 2025. She submitted a dissertation in October 2025 and will get her results in March 2026. She hopes to graduate with an MSc.
108. V
109. i) She took her A levels, completing that part of her education in January 2019 and then until August 2019 undertook a preparation for university entry foundation course
110. ii) From January 2020 ? September 2021, she attended University C seeking to obtain a BSc in medical sciences. She then left that course before completion
111. iii) Between September 2021 ? Summer 2024 she studied at the University D achieving a BSc in computer science with AI. She received a 2:2 degree
112. iv) In October 2024 she commenced a course for a MSc in AI at the University E. She left the course in September 2025 and is resitting some papers with the results due in March.
113. Both girls have been living at home since September or October 2025, albeit that V travels to her university one day per week.
115. I do not see how the girls could still properly be classified as having remained in tertiary education to a first degree beyond July 2023 (for G) and July 2024 (for V). I agree with Mr Osibanjo that at the time they made their own applications they had ceased tertiary education to a first-degree level.
117. It is not necessary to enter into the debate about what F was told about the girls' further education and whether he consented or not. The fact that he provided some support during the period after their first degree on a voluntary basis does not amount to a variation of the court order.
119. In any event, since both girls have in effect finished their university education, the provision at paragraph at 6 (a) does not apply and on the facts of this case, after each child has been in tertiary education for over 6 years it is inconceivable that an order would be made under that provision.
121. This case is and always has been about whether G's medical condition amounts to special circumstances which justify the making of an order.
123. G's condition and needs
124. I take G's educational history from a report prepared by Professor Craig in February 2025. He assessed G and provided a long and detailed report. Because of the many communications that had taken place between him and M, I acceded to the request of F that there should be an independent SJE to report on G, but nevertheless Professor Craig's material remains useful.
126. Professor Craig describes the close relationship that G has with M and with V and that G relies heavily on V, in particular, to provide her with daily support. He notes that the continuous court proceedings have become a source of significant emotional strain for G, "exacerbating her anxiety and feelings of uncertainty about the future".
128. He says this: "G's educational journey has been characterised by consistent academic struggles despite her average - above average intellectual ability". She went to a boarding school between the ages of 12-16 and despite her difficulties achieved 8 GCSE results including 4 A's.
130. She then transferred to a college in E London where she was again a boarder but did less well. Whilst there, M would visit her most days to check upon her and support her in the mornings. G needs help with some aspects of bathing and dressing. She lived in a hall of residence with about 5 other students.
132. She subsequently attended the University A where she did well academically and completed a BSc in Business management achieving a 2:1 degree. She started in 2019 living in a flat with 5 others. There were about 24 students in all in the building. That only endured for 1 year because of covid and when students were allowed back on campus she spent her last year in a student hall of residence.
134. She then moved to the University B and in September 2023 commenced doing an MBA before being advised that she would be better off doing a degree in project management, which she did for the second year of her course (2024-2025). In both years she lived on campus in flats with other students.
136. Throughout her academic studies she has had learning support including mentoring and assistive technology.
138. Professor Craig diagnosed G as suffering from a complex neurodevelopmental profile including autism spectrum disorder, dyslexia, dyspraxia and severe anxiety. He said "her difficulties are longstanding, pervasive, and impact her academic, social, and occupational functioning". He advised that "ongoing struggles are compounded by significant life stressors, including her parents continuous court proceedings and the transition to post graduate study. Despite her cognitive strengths and academic achievements, her social, organisational, and emotional challenges place her at high risk of underemployment and social isolation without targeted intervention". He then set out various interventions which he recommended, in particular CBT and group therapy options. He also recommended a referral to a vocational counsellor and support for her in building independence skills to reduce her over-reliance on her twin sister.
140. It is unfortunate that these recommendations have largely not been acted upon, in significant part because of the backlog in the medical sector and because these proceedings have overtaken them.
142. She suffers from a range of other issues including asthma and has difficulty in standing for other than short periods. She says that she also suffers from claustrophobia although I cannot see reference in the reports to this condition.
144. For these proceedings G was seen by Dr Tahseen, consultant psychiatrist. Her diagnosis is not in any significant way different from that of Professor Craig. In respect of employment prospects and reasonable adjustments Dr Tahseen advised as follows:
146. Employment prospects and reasonable adjustments.
147. 10.6. Employability is good where the job?environment fit is appropriate. For G this means: a quiet or low-stimulus workspace; written briefs and instructions; predictable scheduling; staged deadlines with brief interim check-ins; permission for noise-reduction strategies; concise agendas circulated in advance; and short, planned processing/sensory breaks. Where meetings are unavoidable, limited numbers and a clear structure are preferable; where feasible, asynchronous or video participation may be more effective than impromptu group discussions. These are barrier-removal measures intended to neutralise substantial disadvantage, not to confer advantage. Without them there is a material risk of task failure, avoidance and secondary low mood. Workplace assessment and provision can be pursued through the employer's duty to make reasonable adjustments and the government's Access to Work scheme.
148. She concluded at 10.16 that:
149. 10.16. Prognosis is guardedly favourable, contingent on the above measures. Over approximately six months, anxiety should reduce and executive reliability improve with CBT and initial ADHD interventions/coaching. Over twelve months, sustained gains are expected in attendance, task completion and tolerance of routine change. Over twenty-four months, with consistent supports, stable independent living and sustained employment in a suitably designed role are likely. In the absence of treatment and adjustments, recurrent overload with functional slippage and social withdrawal is likely.
150. A report was commissioned from an occupational therapist (OT) and I set out here the most material passages ?
152. 2.1.1.3 G reports that she currently depends on her mother and sister for many aspects of her self-care and daily life activities. Her difficulty engaging in self-care tasks and new motor tasks during the Occupational Therapy assessment demonstrates that she will still require support until she reaches higher levels of independence. Her functional performance in familiar activities was significantly better than in unfamiliar ones, which is common among people with coordination difficulties, suggesting that, with appropriate support, she can reach higher levels of independence.
153. 2.1.1.5 In my opinion, G is likely to require ongoing support into adulthood. While the level of support required may reduce over time, it is, on the balance of probabilities, more likely than not that she will continue to require some degree of assistance on an ongoing basis, rather than this being a short-term or time-limited need.
154. 2.1.1.6 In addition, it is my opinion that G will require reasonable adjustments within the workplace, which may include extended time to meet deadlines, clear and specific guidance regarding tasks, flexible working arrangements, more frequent rest breaks, and an inclusive working environment that is responsive to neurodiversity-related needs.
155. The OT helpfully set out the degrees of assistance that G required. She says that G can dress and undress herself but requires support with complex fastenings that require fine motor movements. She struggles with zips and with shoelaces.
157. She needs help with washing her hair and her back and sits down on a stool in the shower because she cannot stand for a long time due to foot and ankle pain. Cooking is done for her by her mother or sister and she struggles to cut large or hard pieces of food.
159. She has lived in student halls of residence but they provide little by way of support for the argument that they show that she can live independently. She hated student accommodation which she found dirty and noisy. Her mother stayed with her some days; she ate food that her mother brought her; she had no social life outside that provided by her sister.
161. G does not use public transport as she finds it overwhelming and she travels either by being driven by M or V or she will use an Uber. Outside the home her favourite activities are going to the gym or shopping centres and watching films or tv which she does, when outside the home, with her sister. She is adept at typing on her laptop or texting on her phone.
163. The report concludes that her difficulties are lifelong conditions that cannot be cured and will have an impact on her daily functioning. The recommendations were very similar to those of Professor Craig but also included 12 sessions of OT. She helpfully signposted the various forms of employment support and independent living support to which G might access and these complement the list of potential resources available to help G which had been set out by Professor Craig.
165. G gave evidence in court, using a screen so as not to be able to see her father. The process that was adopted was that the question would be asked; G would listen to it and then type it so that she could see the question on her screen; she would then give an answer. She needs to be able to see the question, normally but not invariably, to be able to answer it. Her answers were coherent and fluent. She plainly is intelligent.
167. It is clear that although she has employment potential, she will find it much easier if her employment was able to be undertaken remotely. Interviews will be very challenging. She would like to obtain a job in management or administration. She says that she has applied for many jobs although the list shows that a large number of them would not have been suitable as they involved shop work or reception work. Plainly, interface with the public would not suit her. I have no difficulty in accepting that she has tried hard to find work. The jobs market even for graduates without disability is difficult at the moment and it must be dispiriting for her to receive rejections or no response. She will be more likely to be successful when she has undertaken the various courses that have been recommended.
169. She has applied for a PIP but has not yet received a response beyond an acknowledgement upon receipt of her claim. It seems to me that relatively little effort has been made to access the various support networks that are available, mostly provided by the local authority. I am not in a position to know whether helpful assistance can be provided by schemes such as access to work. The quicker that G can get into therapy, the better.
171. V
172. V came across as a thoroughly impressive young woman. She spends a large amount of time helping G. When they were at different academic institutions, as has been the case for most of the last 6 years, V would spend significant amounts of time, measured in hours, on a daily basis speaking to her sister, to the detriment of her own academic performance. She would see her most weekends but not midweek for obvious geographical reasons. V has also had difficulties finding employment. She is desperate to obtain a job and I am sure that she will achieve that end.
174. M
175. M is a qualified lawyer in Nigeria and was called to the bar there. She has not practised as a lawyer for very many years as she has dedicated herself to looking after the children. She has now almost concluded a law degree and hopes to find employment as a caseworker. She is 57 years old and struck me as energetic and capable.
177. Quite how she manages the household finances was not clear. In October 2024 F volunteered to pay ?40k which I am told did not arrive until February 2025. Apart from that she has received nothing that I am aware of other than the intermittent payment of the child maintenance that I ordered of ?1,200pm per child. It is very much to F's discredit that payment has been so haphazard. The arrears were agreed to be ?7,200 at the end of the hearing.
179. M says that she has borrowed money from friends and family; she has at times lodged her jewellery as security for monies lent to her; she has done a small amount of trading. Despite the challenge to her veracity, I have no reason to find that she has any significant undisclosed income or assets.
181. In my 2018 judgment I stated that M had no current earning capacity. At that time G was attending the college in E London and M was going there every day. Both children are now back at home and since 2021 M has undertaken her degree course and is on the cusp of concluding it. I find it probable that within a relatively short period M will obtain employment as a caseworker, as she plans, but I doubt that it will be hugely remunerative, bearing in mind the commitment that she will still have to running the home and the fact that her age and length of time out of the employment market will count against her.
183. None of the three applicants receive any state benefits.
185. F
186. F is 78 and spends most of his time in Lagos, Nigeria in a very substantial property. He also maintains a valuable flat in Westminster. He employs a large number of domestic staff in Nigeria. He leads a very comfortable lifestyle. Although he says that it has now become too expensive, most of his travel from Lagos to London has been first class.
188. In 2017 he disclosed his net worth to be ?40m (in one document) and ?34m (in another document), both exclusive of the property. It matters not which is correct. The wealth was to be found broadly equally between property assets held in England and property in Nigeria. The fact that the assets held in England are within a trust is immaterial in this case.
190. The assets in England have to a significant extent been sold and they have realised sums approximating to the value given in the 2017 disclosure. I know little about the Nigerian assets save for his Lagos property which he valued then at ?6.45m. I have no difficulty in accepting that the current value of his assets in Nigeria is much less in sterling terms. The Nigerian Naira is now worth about one quarter of the 2017 value. I regard the fact that he has put some of his assets into the joint names of himself and his wife as also immaterial for these purposes. The court can have no idea of what his actual worth is as his disclosure has been lamentable. His off the cuff suggestion of ?5m is plainly a significant undervalue.
192. He accepts that it is no part of his case that he cannot afford without compromising his lifestyle to be unable to access the value of the N London property. All that said, the fact that he is much more wealthy than M and the children does not provide a reason for a new home for G to be removed from his ownership. G's disability provides the special circumstances which enables the court to continue with provision to meet her needs but those circumstances do not justify the transfer of ownership.
194. The parties' positions
195. The applicants seek:
197. i) Secured capital fund. ?215,000 for educational, medical and living costs. ?55,000 for educational and medical costs to be administered by M and ?160,000 to provide support for G for 4 years at ?40,000 pa, to be paid to G.
198. ii) Housing. The home to be sold and a replacement property to be purchased with a housing fund of up to ?950,000 and held in a Disabled Person's Trust. This fund shall include costs of sale, purchase, removals and insurance for the first 12 months (estimated to be ?636 on a property worth ?850,000). The purpose of the trust will be to provide G with housing for life, with provisions for a review in the event of any significant change in circumstances. The balance to F after the following has been met:
199. iii) Car. ?30,901 for a car and insurance for 2 years.
200. iv) V. ?24,000 to provide her with support for 12 months.
201. v) Legal fees. ?200,000 to clear all sums owed to HCR (?197,508.58 + solicitor travel and accommodation for the hearing).
202. F's offer is as follows:
204. i) Sell the property.
205. ii) F to pay for all of the treatments and therapies suggested by the Psychiatrist and the OT for a maximum of 2 years in respect of G.
206. iii) ?1,200 pm / ?14,400 pa maintenance for G for 2 years or until she starts work, whichever is earlier.
207. iv) No payments for V.
208. v) Before completion of the sale, rent free accommodation for G in a decent 2-bed flat for her alone, within the N London area, until June 2027 or whenever the Local Authority provides her with accommodation whichever is earlier (?1,600 - ?1,898 pm).
209. vi) V may live with G, but F will not be responsible for her upkeep or any additional expense.
210. The family home
211. One of the surprises of this case is that the family still occupy the original London property. In 2018 M sought permission to relocate. She said that of the 4 bedrooms in the house only 2 were occupiable; she said that the girls were both around 6ft tall and their shared room was too small and too low for them and that neither she nor the twins had ever liked the property. She sought funds to rehouse which I granted, but she never did rehouse.
213. She still complains about the property and would like to move. She seeks to rehouse at around ?850-900k and asks that this housing fund should be placed in a Disabled Persons Trust. The purpose of the trust would be to provide G with housing for life.
215. If the property were sold, and the bracket for value seems to be ?1.4-?1.2m, she asks, in effect, for the entirety of the surplus to be paid for a variety of forms of support set out in her proposal.
217. F does not oppose the sale of the property, which is in his name, but he strongly disagrees with the provision of a replacement property extending beyond two years' worth of rent for a 2 bedroomed property.
219. I have thought long and hard about the provision of housing. Orders vesting a property in the name of children are extremely rare. It must be a requirement of their disability that such a course is taken.
221. I am not attracted by the notion of a Disabled Person's Trust (otherwise known as a Vulnerable People Trust). It is not clear on the evidence provided that G is even eligible for such a trust as she is not currently in receipt of any of the benefits which would open that door. But even if it was available, there is no need to deprive F of his capital in order to meet the needs of G.
223. I am satisfied that a 3 bedroom property is required. Only 2 bedrooms in the existing property are used as such and a 4 bedroom property would not be justified. On the other hand, it would not be right to remove from G's support network in the house either M or V. The household should be able to continue with its existing personnel. Their absence would undoubtedly rebound adversely on G.
225. That brings me to the issue of whether or not the property should be rented or owned and the duration of the provision. I bear in mind the part of M's statement dated September 2024 where she stated that she sought an extension of the ability to live in the property until August 2027 to let G find work and get used to it and to let V become financially independent. She says that only after filing this statement did she realise how uncertain was the possibility of G obtaining employment. Whilst it is true that neither the reports of Professor Craig or the SJEs had come in by that time, I find it difficult to accept that M was unaware of the potential employment difficulties. Her case has now changed.
227. The advantage of a property owned by F and made available for the use of G as her home without a time limit upon her occupancy is that she will have the security of a long-term home without the anxiety of knowing that she must move in a few years' time unless she successfully applies for an extension. It avoids the inevitability of another hearing. G suffers from a lifelong condition and I think that there is a very real risk that she will not achieve the employment and independence which is postulated. It seems to me much better that I allow F the ability to apply to terminate the provision in the event of significantly changed circumstances than I pitch the parties into the prospect of further litigation in a few years' time by limiting the occupancy as M suggested in her statement.
229. As so often happens in these cases the parties retreated to the most extreme positions. The applicants put forward particulars at the top end of the bracket and F put before the court rental flats with 2 bedrooms. I required the parties to produce particulars of 3 bedroom properties for sale and for rent.
231. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the parties struggled to provide particulars for 3 bedroom flats. There appear to be few on the market. In addition, it is the applicants' case that G simply cannot cope in a dwelling which is shared in the sense that there are other occupants going up and down the stairs to other dwellings within the premises and she needs her own space including a small garden. The presence of strangers upsets her greatly. Her social anxiety is pronounced.
233. I accept this argument and so have turned to look at 3 bedroom houses. F provided a number of particulars which can only be described as very unattractive both in appearance, the smallness of their size and their location on busy roads. They covered a range up to ?500,000. M produced 3 particulars in the range of ?750k-?815k. The properties are modest in size and appropriate. The property market is extremely slow at the moment and it is apparent from the particulars that reductions in price have occurred.
235. I fix the sum to be made available at ?780k inclusive of the costs of purchase. I allow the further sum of ?20k to cover the costs of redecoration and essential works and equipping. At F's suggestion, I add this to the housing fund rather than placing it in a restricted fund. The total is to be used to provide accommodation for G and, to the extent that they wish to avail themselves of it, V and M who share the support of G. It will be available to her until, upon F's application or agreement, such time as it exceeds her needs or the special circumstances cease to be present.
236. Other items
237. Upon moving the applicants will be entitled to take all the contents of the home. They must provide vacant possession upon the property being sold.
239. I intend to provide a secured capital fund to cover the following items:
241. i) The cost of medical and therapeutic services for G. The figures that have been given in the reports are very modest, totalling about ?5k. I consider it eminently foreseeable that more might be required. I intend to allow the sum of ?10k to cover courses of all sorts to help G along the road to semi independence and to employment.
242. ii) Ongoing provision for G. I allow 3 years' worth of payments to cover the time from now. I choose that period to cover the 24 month period recommended by Dr Tahseen and the OT and to cover the inevitable gap before the treatment/courses commence and to allow for a period of job-searching at the end. I allow the figure of ?30k pa for 3 years. It will be paid monthly until the sale of the property and then capitalised. The repeated defaults by F mean that all the payments set out in this paragraph will be capitalised out of the sale proceeds.
243. iii) It is important to note that apart from the provision of medical and therapeutic care, G's condition does not lead to much of an increased income need for her. She leads a very quiet life and does not incur significant expenditure.
244. iv) I need to allow something in addition for the cost of running the property. It is reasonable to expect M and V to make a contribution to the expenses of the home. Both have or will soon have an earning capacity or entitlement to benefits. I assess G's element in respect of this at an additional ?5k for each of the 3 years, which I have included in the payment to her.
245. v) I see no basis for making the order requested for the provision of a car and insurance. Both V and M transport G when she needs it in M's car. It would be reasonable to ascribe to G some of the costs of running the car and the cost of an Uber when it is used. I have taken that into account in the sum that I have allowed for her annual support.
246. vi) G seeks the sum of ?24k for V to provide additional support. The additional services that M and V provide for G come at minimal expense to them but will undoubtedly be to a limited extent time consuming. I propose between them for the 1 year to allow an additional figure of ?12k.
247. There are arrears of maintenance of ?7,200. They have only been made up in the gap between the conclusion of the hearing and the handdown of judgment.
249. I have at this handdown hearing been asked to consider the duration of housing provision in the event that F dies while G is still dependent and special circumstances remain. The argument is as follows:
251. i) As F is domiciled in Nigeria, no claim can be brought against his estate pursuant to the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975.
252. ii) Thus, say the Applicants, there must be a charge registered and a deed of trust to secure G's right of occupation following F's death. To do otherwise would leave her without protection.
253. iii) F replies that if G has no claim open to her upon his death, that is a matter of law. To try to get round the territorial limit imposed by the 1975 Act would be "judicial activism".
254. I do not agree with F's position. Having assessed G's need, to leave her exposed to the risk of being made homeless upon F's death even if special circumstances remain would be wrong.
256. I do not propose to reduce the sums that I have awarded by the benefits if any that are achieved by G. If she receives a PIP, then that will be hers to use as she wishes. Likewise if she receives other benefits or an earned income. It will only be recipe for further litigation and expense if some form of accounting has to take place between the parties.
258. Costs
259. I made an LSPO in the sum of ?120k which was very belatedly paid by F. In addition he, eventually, has satisfied 3 other orders for costs that I have made totalling between them ?27,300.
261. I am told that M's solicitors have incurred costs and disbursements in the sum of ?197k. I am asked to order that F should pay that balance. The sum that I awarded in July 2025 by way of LSPO was what I regarded at the time as a proper amount to bring this litigation to a conclusion. As this hearing has extended for 1 day longer than estimated in July 2025, I have in effect increased the allowance by a little under ?9.5k by making a costs order in respect of what I regard the reasonable costs of today to have been.
263. I accept that F's approach to this litigation where he has been in breach of many orders has increased the costs albeit they have to a significant extent been met by the provision of costs orders. I shall allow the further sum of ?20,000 to cover part of the shortfall and reflecting the additional work that F's presentation has entailed. I do not accept that simply because (at least in theory) the solicitors might be able to recoup from the girls the shortfall, I should write what would in effect be a blank cheque, in the sense that it will cover the shortfall whatever it might be.

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