O'Donnell challenges Cahir District Superintendent in High Court

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O'Donnell v Superintendent For The Cahir District and Anor (Approved) [2026] IEHC 226 (17 April 2026)
URL: https://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2026/2026IEHC226.html
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THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

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[2026] IEHC 226

Record No. 2021/70JR

BETWEEN:

THOMAS O'DONNELL

APPLICANT

-and-

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THE SUPERINTENDENT FOR THE CAHIR DISTRICT

and

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

---

RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Mark Dunne delivered this  17 th day of April 2026

Introduction

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1. In these proceedings, the Applicant seeks to challenge two separate decisions.  The first is the Order and Decision of the District Court made on 15 th December 2020 convicting the Applicant of an offence under section 4A (18) of the Firearms Act, 1925 (as inserted by section 33 of the Criminal Justice Act, 2006) (hereinafter "the Firearms Act" or "the Act").  The second is the decision of the first Respondent Superintendent communicated by a letter of 22 nd December 2020 revoking the Applicant's Firearms Certificates 1274925, 1274924, 1474923 and 1268511 following on from the District Court conviction.  The primary relief sought by the Applicant is certiorari in respect of both decisions, together with various ancillary orders and declarations.

---

Legislative framework

1. The relevant legislation is the Firearms Act, 1925 as amended by the Criminal Justice Act, 2006.    The statutory context is, as Birmingham J. (as he then was) described it in Magee v Murray [2008] IEHC 371, one of control and restriction. The long title of the Act describes it as an Act to place restrictions on the possession of firearms and other weapons and ammunition, and for that and other purposes to amend the law relating to firearms and other weapons and ammunition.

2. Section 2 of the Act makes it unlawful for anyone to possess, use or carry any firearm or ammunition without that person being authorised to do so by a firearm certificate granted under the Act, subject to certain exceptions, including section 2(4)(d) which provides: -

"This section shall not apply to any of the following cases and such cases are accordingly excepted from this section, that is to say: **

... ..... .....

(d) the possession, use or carriage of a firearm or ammunition during a competition or target practice at a club, shooting range or any other place that stands authorised under this section or section 4A of this Act

1. In addition to an individual obtaining a firearm certificate for a firearm, section 2(5) of the Act gives a relevant Garda Superintendent the power to grant an authorisation (with conditions) for the possession, use or carriage of firearms or ammunition in any of the circumstances specified in section 2(4) of the Act, including section 2(4)(d).

2. Section 3 of the Act sets out the process for an individual to apply for a firearm certificate and grants the power to issue firearm certificates (other than a restricted firearm certificate) to the Garda Superintendent for the relevant district.   Section 4 of the Act sets out the conditions for the granting of firearm certificates and importantly section 5 of the Act sets out how a firearm certificate can be revoked.  It is this later section which was relied upon in this case by the first Respondent in revoking the Applicant's own firearm certificates.   The relevant part of section 5 provides as follows: -

(1) An issuing person may at any time revoke a firearm certificate granted by the person if satisfied that the holder of the certificate—

(a) has not a good reason for requiring the firearm to which the certificate relates,

(b) is a person who cannot, without danger to the public safety or security or the peace, be permitted to possess a firearm,

(c) is a person who is declared by this Act to be disentitled to hold a firearm certificate,

1. In terms of section 5(1)(c) above, section 8 of the Act sets out the persons who are declared by the Act to be disentitled from holding a firearm certificate, including at section 8(1)(d):

8.(1) The following persons are hereby declared to be disentitled to hold a firearm certificate, that is to say: —

........

(d) any person who has been sentenced to imprisonment for—

**

(i) an offence under the Firearms Acts 1925 to 2006, the Offences Against the State Acts 1939 to 1998 or the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005, or

(ii) an offence under the law of another state involving the production or use of a firearm,

and the sentence has not expired, or it expired within the previous 5 years.

1. The Firearms Act, 1925 also provides for the regulation of rifle/pistol clubs and shooting ranges, by way of the granting of authorisations pursuant to section 4A of the Act.  Section 4A(1) prohibits a rifle or pistol club or the owner or operator of a shooting range, from allowing the use or storage of any firearm or ammunition in connection with target shooting, on its premises unless an authorisation under that section is in force.  It provides: -

4.A(1) - A rifle or pistol club or the owner or operator of a rifle or pistol shooting range shall not allow any firearm or ammunition to be used or stored on the premises of or at the club or shooting range in connection with target shooting unless an authorisation under this section to do so is in force.

1. It appears that authorisations for clubs are separate and distinct from authorisations for shooting ranges.  Therefore, a pistol/rifle club that also has a shooting range, must apply for both an authorisation for the club and a separate authorisation for the shooting range.

2. Pursuant to section 4A(2), the application for an authorisation is made to the Commissioner of An Garda Síochána, (who has delegated this function to the relevant Superintendents).  Section 4A(6) of the Act sets out the criteria which the Commissioner must be satisfied of, in order to grant such an authorisation. Section 4A(8) allows the Commissioner, to attach to any authorisation, such conditions as he/she thinks necessary "for the purpose of securing that the operation of the club or shooting range and the use and storage of rifles, pistols and ammunition on the premises of, or at the club or range concerned, does not endanger public safety or security or the peace". The Commissioner is also granted the power to vary any of those conditions.

3. Section 4A(9) of the Act mandates that an authorisation granted "shall continue in force for a period of 5 years from the date on which it is granted, unless revoked, and for any further such period or periods for which it may be renewed."

4. Section 4A(11) gives the Commissioner the power to revoke the authorisation of a rifle or pistol club or of a shooting range, if he/she is no longer satisfied in relation to the criteria set out in section 4A(6) of the Act, pursuant to which the authorisation was granted in the first place.  However, this must be done by notice in writing, addressed to the applicant or person or persons responsible for the management of the club or shooting range.

5. Section 4A(13) grants to the Minister for Justice the power in consultation with the Garda Commissioner to make regulations specifying minimum standards to be complied with by a rifle or pistol club or by a shooting range before an authorisation may be granted.  This was done by way of the Firearms (Authorisation of Rifle or Pistol clubs) Regulations 2009 (SI 308 of 2009) in respect of clubs, and by way of the Firearms (Authorisation of Rifle or Pistol Shooting Ranges) Regulations, 2011 (S.I. 622 of 2011), in respect of shooting ranges.

6. Section 4A(18) of the Act creates four separate offences.  The two relevant ones for present purposes are subsection 18(a)(i) which makes it an offence for a club, or the owner or operator of a shooting range to contravene section 4A(1) - that is to "allow any firearm or ammunition to be used or stored on the premises of or at the club or shooting range in connection with target shooting unless an authorisation  under this section is in force" and subsection 18(a)(ii) which makes it an offence for a club, or the owner or operator of a shooting range, "without reasonable excuse, not to comply with the conditions attached to an authorisation".

7. A person found guilty of an offence under section 4A(18) is liable upon summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding €2,500 and/or for a term not exceeding 6 months and on indictment to a fine not exceeding €20,000 and/or for a term not exceeding 7 years.

8. Finally, section 4A(19) sets out a defence to a charge pursuant to section 4A(18)(a)(i) that is of allowing a firearm or ammunition to be used or stored on the premises of or at the club or shooting range in connection with target shooting, without an authorisation being in force.   It provides that it is a defence to prove that the defendant took reasonable precautions and exercised due diligence to avoid committing the offence.

9. In accordance with Section 4A(13) of the Act, the Firearms (Authorisation of Rifle or Pistol Clubs) Regulations 2009 (SI 308 of 2009) were made setting out the minimum standards to be adhered to by clubs.   The Firearms (Authorisation of Rifle or Pistol Shooting Ranges) Regulations, 2011 (S.I. 622 of 2011), were made setting out the minimum standards in relation to the construction of shooting ranges and the storage of rifles and pistols and the minimum duties of the owners and operators of such shooting ranges.

10. The 2009 Regulations required a club to have a written constitution.  They also prohibited a club from running any day or temporary membership schemes and require that a club maintain a register of its members setting out their name, address, date of birth, membership number and details of every firearm certificate held by them, together with a record of their attendance.

11. The 2011 Regulations dealing with shooting ranges, impose upon the owners and operators of the same, an obligation to ensure that the minimum standards specified in the Regulations and all conditions attached to an authorisation are complied with.   Pursuant to the Regulations there is an obligation to maintain a record of the name of, inter alia, every person using a firearm or ammunition on the range together with their club membership number, the number of their firearm certificate and details of any authorisation granted to the person concerned. Anyone proposing to use the range must also confirm in writing that they understand the rules for the operation of the range.

12. Pursuant to Regulation 10 of the 2011 Regulations the owner or operator of the range is required, inter alia, to ensure that no person was present in the shooting area of the range while under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

13. The 2011 Regulations also envisage that persons who do not hold firearms certificates may use a shooting range.  Regulation 11(3) provides that where a person who proposes to use a rifle, pistol or ammunition at a range, does not hold a firearm certificate or authorisation in respect of the firearm concerned, that person must demonstrate to a supervising officer at the range, his/her competence in the use of the firearm concerned.   If the supervising officer is so satisfied, then Regulation 11(4) provides that he/she may permit that person to use the firearm on the range without instruction or supervision.  If he/she is not so satisfied, then that person must receive appropriate instruction from the supervising officer on the safe handling of the firearm and can only use it under the supervision of the supervising officer.

---

Background

1. The Applicant is a farmer and is the owner of farmlands near Clonmel, Co. Tipperary.  He is the owner of a shooting range on his lands.   He is also a member of and the nominated representative of Firearms Sport & Recreation Club which also operate from his premises.

2. On 21 st July 2018 the Club was issued with an authorisation by the relevant Garda Superintendent as a rifle and pistol club for a period of 5 years, until 20 th July 2023 subject to 12 conditions, including inter alia that: -

• members of the Club and persons who are not members but who attend events organised by the Club shall conduct themselves in accordance with the constitution of the Club (condition 4(c)).

• the Club shall not run any day or temporary membership schemes (condition 5).

• the Club shall maintain a register which includes the name, address, date of birth, membership number and details of every firearm certificate held by each member, together with a record of their attendance together with the name, address, date of birth, and firearm certificate number of each person using a firearm at an event organised by the Club (condition 6(4)).

1. A shooting range authorisation was issued on 1 st November 2016 by the relevant Garda Superintendent for the Applicant's shooting range, for a period of 5 years, until 31 st October 2021 subject to 10 conditions, including inter alia: -

• That the requirements of the Firearms (Authorisation of Rifle or Pistol Shooting Ranges) Regulations, 2011 (S.I. 622 of 2011) be complied with. (Condition 1).

• That the Club Rules, Code of Discipline and Procedures of the Woodlands Shooting Range would be strictly complied with at all times. (condition 3)

1. The Authorisation also stated that: -

"The conditions attached to this Authorisation are designed to ensure the safety of all persons using the range and also persons in close proximity to the range.  The conditions shall be strictly adhered to at all times by all persons visiting or using the shooting range to assist in preventing any danger to public safety or security or the peace.

Any breach of the conditions attached to this authorisation may result in the immediate revocation of this authorisation by notice in writing to the person or persons responsible for the management of the range ".

1. The Club Rules are set out in a document entitled "Club Rules, Code of Discipline & Procedures". The aims and objectives of the Club are set out as including, inter alia providing "Authorised Precision Target Shooting Facilities for its Club Members, Visitors and Guests to enable them pursue their chosen Sport of Precision Target Shooting, in a Safe Controlled and Compliant Environment. "

2. For present purposes the relevant rules are as follows:

(i) Club Members "have the privilege of inviting guests to visit the range e.g. on a one-to-one basis, for a maximum of three visits and at the discretion of" the Club management team.  After three visits these visitors must apply for membership if they wish to commence using the Club range shooting facilities. (Rule 12 (8))

(ii) Club members "must obtain prior approval from a member of the [management team] before any visit by a non-member is permitted". (Rule 12(9))

(iii) Club members without exception must sign in and out when attending the range. (Rule 17)

1. On 14 th June 2019, the Applicant's Shooting Range was the subject of an inspection by An Garda Síochána.  They found what was described as a fully stocked bar in the Clubhouse, operating without a liquor licence.  On the 20 th June 2019 a cautioned statement was taken from the Applicant.  He admitted that members of the public would come to the shooting range as parties or groups to partake in shooting about once a month.  He stated that after a safety briefing, they would shoot using the firearms belonging to 3 Club members, who also supplied ammunition.  Alcohol could only be purchased in the Clubhouse by way of tokens after the shooting.

2. As a consequence of this inspection, the range authorisation which was scheduled to run until 31 st October 2021 was revoked by the first Respondent by letter dated 20 th June 2019.  The grounds for the revocation of the authorisation were as follows:

1. " The unlawful supply of alcohol at the Firearms Range. A fully stocked bar operating without a liquor licence was present.

**

2. The possession, use and carriage by unlicensed persons of firearms licensed to members of the club, contrary to the Firearms Act, 1925, as amended.

**

3. The possession, use and carriage by unlicensed persons of ammunition licensed to members of the club contrary to the Firearms Act, 1925, as amended.

**

4. Unsatisfactory running of the shooting range."

1. Although the Applicant has not challenged the revocation of the shooting range authorisation as and from 20 th June 2019, he maintains that An Garda Síochána were in error in relation to grounds 2 and 3, since there was a valid shooting range authorisation in place at the date of the inspection.

2. The revocation of the shooting range authorisation was followed by the issue of two District Court summonses on 18 th December 2019. The first alleging a breach of section 7 of the Intoxicating Liquor (General) Act, 1924 and the second alleging that "on the dates, unknown, between 01-Jan-2019 and the 13-Jan-2019" the Applicant "did as operator of a shooting range allow the use of unauthorised firearms and ammunition on the premises of the shooting range in connection with target shooting. Contrary to Section 4A (18) of the Firearms Act 1925, as inserted by Section 33 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006"

**

1. While section 4A(18) of the Firearms Act creates four separate offences, the District Court Summons is no more specific than set out above.   However, the wording used suggests and this was confirmed in oral argument before me, that the offence being prosecuted was in fact an offence contrary to section 4A(18)(a)(i) of the Act.  Despite this the wording of the Summons does not equate with the actual offence created by sections 4A(18)(a)(i) and 4A which is allowing "any firearm or ammunition to be used ...... on the premises of or at the ... shooting range ... in connection with target shooting unless an authorisation under this section to do so is in force." The section does not make any reference to the " use of unauthorised firearms and ammunition" as set out in the District Court Summons - no such offence was created by section 4A(18)(a)(i) of the Act.  Pursuant to section 4A, it is the club or shooting range that must be authorised, not the firearm and ammunition.  No issue was made about the generality of the wording of the Summons during the District Court proceedings, nor did the Applicant challenge the inclusion of the phrase "unauthorised firearms and ammunition".

2. When the matter came on for hearing before the District Court on 9 th March 2020, the Applicant pleaded guilty to the offence pursuant to section 7 of the Intoxicating Liquor (General) Act, 1924, and was subsequently fined €500.

3. In relation to the charge under section 4A(18), the evidence put forward on behalf of the prosecution was primarily focused on alleged breaches of conditions attaching to the club authorisation and the shooting range authorisation, despite the fact that the Applicant was not charged with the separate and distinct offence of not complying with conditions attaching to an authorisation under section 4A(18)(a)(ii).

4. Part of the unchallenged evidence of the first Respondent was that there was alcohol available in the clubhouse, that members of the public would come to the shooting range as parties or groups to partake in shooting about once a month, using the firearms belonging to three club members, who also supplied ammunition and that that under the Firearms (Authorisation of Rifle or Pistol Clubs) Regulations 2009 (SI 308 of 2009) the Club was not entitled to run any day or temporary membership schemes, which it was submitted, was what the Applicant was doing.  The evidence was that the documentation and information that was supposed to be kept on people using the shooting range was inadequate, incomplete and not in accordance with the Regulations.    The first Respondent also referred to the club rules on the signing in process and gave evidence as to the inadequacy of the documentation provided.   Referring to the fact that there was alcohol on the premises, he stated that alcohol and firearms did not belong on the same premises and that he found it " quite frightening. "      Throughout his evidence the first Respondent appeared to accept that a valid authorisation for the shooting range was in existence on the date of his inspection on 14 th June 2019 and beforehand.   He gave evidence about the range authorisation being granted by his predecessor and stated at one point "we were more concerned with the next range, [sic] ...... which were covered under the authorisation in existence, Judge." This is despite the fact that the actual charge preferred on the Applicant was one of allowing firearms to be used on a shooting range where an authorisation was not in force.

5. At the end of the prosecution case, a direction of no case to answer, was sought on the grounds that as there had been a valid shooting range authorisation in place, on the date of the alleged offences.  The submission should have been straight forward - the Applicant was charged with allowing the use of "unauthorised" firearms and ammunition on a shoot range that did not have an authorisation in force contrary to section 4A(18) of the Act, but since there was, as a matter of fact, a shooting range authorisation under section 4A in force for the shooting range at the relevant time, applying the Galbraith principles, (R v. Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039) taken at its highest, the prosecution evidence was such that the Court could not properly convict. Unfortunately, the submission made to the District Court Judge was somewhat more complex and confused and appeared to conflate the power of a Garda Superintendent to authorise the firearms and ammunition of a club or shooting range under section 2(5) of the Act with the provisions of section 4A of the Act and with the general prohibition on an individual possessing or using a firearm and ammunition, without a firearm certificate contrary to section 2(1) of the Act.  Thus, reference was made to section 2(4)(d) of the Firearms Act, which provides an individual with an exemption from the requirement to have a firearm certificate, where they are engaged in target practice on an authorised shooting range.  It was submitted that arising from the fact that there was a valid authorisation in place in respect of the shoot range, at the time of the alleged offence, coupled with the exemption provide by section 2(d) of the Act meant that the use of the firearms and ammunition by members of the public during the target shooting was lawful and there was no unauthorised firearms being used at the time.

6. This submission appeared to interweave two separate and distinct legal points -namely the exemption provided to persons who did not have firearm certificates when using firearms and ammunition on an authorised shooting range on the one hand, and the lawfulness of owners/operators of shooting ranges allowing a firearm and ammunition to be used on their range for target shooting, once an authorisation was in place, on the other.   This is perhaps understandable given the erroneous wording of the Summons by the use of the phrase " unauthorised firearms and ammunition. "

7. In its submission, the prosecution also appears to have succumbed to the same confusion, also referring to the prohibition in section 2 of the Act in relation to the possession, use and carriage of a firearm by an individual, in the absence of a firearms certificate.  It was accepted that under section 2(4)(d), a firearms certificate was not required for possession or use of a firearm or ammunition where they were being used for target practice on a shooting range that stood authorised.   The submission strayed into section 2(5) of the Act which gives a relevant Garda Superintendent the power inter alia to authorise the possession, use or carriage of firearms or ammunition for the circumstances specified in section 2(4)(d).  It was submitted that a person who held a firearms certificate was not authorised to supply their firearm to anybody else and that the question for the court was whether the operator allowed the use of unauthorised firearms.  It was submitted that the firearms used were not authorised under any provisions of the Act or the Regulations and that that was the offence committed under Section 4A (18).  Again, this appears to conflate the authorisation that is required for a firearm under section 2 of the Act and the offence committed under section 2 in the absence of the same, with the authorisation that a shooting range must have under section 4A.

8. The District Court Judge adjourned the matter for consideration and on 21 st September 2020, delivered his ruling on the direction application as follows: -

"So the first thing I'd have to say is that the Court accepts that under Section 2(4)(d) the restrictions on possession, use and carriage of firearms do not apply during competitions or target practice at a club, a shooting range or any other place that is then authorised under Section 4(A) of the Act.  The Court notes that under Section 4(A)(2), the procedure and requirements applicable to applications for authorisations are set out and that section 4A (2)(8) allows authorisations to be issued or varied subject to conditions.  It's noted that in the current case, a shooting range authorisation was issued and subsequently varied.  It was granted subject to two conditions. Amongst others, [sic] 1) full compliance at all times with statutory instrument number 622/2011.  Condition 3, subject to compliance with the rules, code of discipline and proceedings of the Woodlands Shooting Range.  And similarly, a pistol club authorisation was issued to the accused as nominated representative of the Woodlands Range Sports and Recreation Club subject to conditions among others, at condition 2) that the accused perform the functions set out in regulation five and ensure compliance with the said regulations at condition 4) the club having written a constitution.  Condition 5) the club not running any day or temporary membership schemes.  Condition 6(2) maintain a register with certain information.  Condition 6.5(a) retain records for a period of six years.

**

The Court is satisfied that as the authorisation in this case issued subject to conditions, if at any stage they were being operated in breach of a condition the authorisation was null and void and ceased to have any effect so that no authorisation would have existed at the material time of the breach.  It is noted that the rules, code of discipline and procedure of the ... Woodlands Range Sports & Recreation Club make no provision for day membership, only annual membership subject to a six month probationary period and does not allow associate membership under the conditions contained in rule 13.  It's further noted that under statutory instrument 622 [of] 2001 regulation nine it is specified what records must be kept by the owner or operator of the range and for what period of time.  Regulation 4 subsection 1 of statutory instrument number 308 of 2009 prohibits any day or temporary membership schemes which are also expressly prohibited under condition five of the club authorisation.  Regulation 5.2 sets out the duties of the nominated representative which include compliance with the conditions of the authorisations and the statutory instruments, and regulation 5.4 sets out the record requirements.  They are also reproduced in condition 6 of the club authorisation.

**

In the accused's caution statement and going no further than that the accused has admitted allowing shoots for a day at €80 per head that groups would go to the range about once a month and that on one occasion, a stag party came to the range and he did not keep forms for each group.  Further, if you look at the forms that have been furnished, some of them have first names and an address that comprises one word that has been signed and that's the full extent of the information.  He's admitted he hasn't kept proper records himself.  He has admitted allowing day shoots in breach of the regulations.  There have been a number of clear breaches of the conditions of the authorisation and in that context, no valid authorisation would have existed at those material times and therefore the exemption as to the requirement of having a firearms licence would not have applied at those material times.  So, I have to find against your submission in the circumstances.  Anything further?  Are you going into evidence?"

1. Following that ruling the defence went into evidence and thereafter, the Judge convicted the Applicant as follows: -

"While I accept that if there was an appropriate authorisation in place at material times, the use of firearms would have been exempt, but I am quite satisfied that there was no .....because there were breaches of so many of the conditions of the authorisation, there was no valid authorisation at the time, that these events took place and accordingly, I am entitled to convict.

**

So the charge is as operator of a shooting range allowed the use of unauthorised firearms and ammunition on the premises which he did, plain and simple.  So, I convict him on that and I know he has entered a plea of guilty on the licensing matter".

1. Having established that the level of penalty was up to €2,500 or 6 months imprisonment, the Judge stated that the Applicant was: -

"....... the operator of a firearm range and that carries with it a great deal of responsibility.  He may well have invested a substantial sum of money for the construction of the range to ensure that it met all the safety requirements, but that's of little benefit unless it's operated in accordance with the law.  I would deem his behaviour to be reckless.  It was a flouting of his own responsibilities and it would warrant in normal course of events a custodial sentence.  Now, he has no previous convictions and I note that, so in that context, I wonder would a custodial sentence be of benefit to anybody.  What I would be inclined to consider is community service in lieu of a custodial sentence.  Would he be willing to do community service".

1. On 15 th December 2020 the Applicant was sentenced to 180 hours community service, in lieu of 10 weeks imprisonment, the District Court Order noting:

"... the said offence being an offence for which, in the opinion of the court, the appropriate sentence would be one of imprisonment for the period of 10 weeks and THE COURT BEING satisfied having considered the offending circumstances and a report about him/her by a Probation and Welfare Officer, that he/she is a suitable person to perform work under a community Service Order and that arrangements can be made for him/her to perform such work in the said district in which he/she resides while performing such work."

1. Following the making of the District Order the Applicant instructed his solicitors to appeal the conviction to the Circuit Court and although it appears that there was some difficulty in lodging the appeal, a Circuit Court appeal was ultimately lodged.

2. By letter of 22 nd December 2020 the first Respondent wrote to the Applicant informing him that he was revoking the Applicant's own firearms certificates numbered 1274925, 1274924, 1474923, 1268 511.  The reason given in the letter was as follows:

" I....am satisfied that you the said Mr Thomas O'Donnell, ...... is a person who is declared by this Act to be disentitled to hold a firearms certificate.

Accordingly, under powers granted to me by Section 5 Firearms Act, 1925 and in light of recent convictions at Clonmel Court on 15 th December 2020 for an offence under section 4A (18) of the Firearms Act 1925 as inserted by section 33 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006, I hereby revoke your certificates of the following firearms".

1. The letter went on to notify the Applicant of his right to appeal the revocation to the District Court under section 15A of the Firearms Act 1925 (as inserted by section 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006), within 30 days of receipt of the notice.

2. The Applicant's solicitors wrote to the first Respondent complaining about the insufficiency of the reasons provided and this ultimately led to the first Respondent's letter of 14 th January 2021 setting out the following reasons for the revocation decision.

" In relation to your request to elaborate on the reasons for the revocation of the firearm certificates, it is quite straightforward.   It is mentioned in the revocation letter as well as being well known to Mr O'Donnell.  He has been convicted by the District Court for an offence under Section 4A (1) Firearms Act, 1925 as inserted by Section 33 (18) (A) (1) Criminal Justice Act 2006 in relation to his running of the firearms range. This together with all aspects of the criminal case and the evidence which was submitted to the court and of which Mr O'Donnell is aware of was more than sufficient to warrant the revocation of the certificates.  In further elaboration of these reasons, during the court case, there were evidence [sic] of the unsafe and dangerous practices at the firing range under the management of Mr O'Donnell."

The challenge to the District Court Conviction

Summary of Applicant's arguments

1. The Applicant challenges his District Court conviction on two principal grounds. Firstly, that the District Judge erred in law in convicting him of allowing the use of unauthorised firearms and ammunition on the premises of the shooting range for which there was not an authorisation on force, contrary to section 4A (18) of the Firearms Act, in circumstances whereby an authorisation was in force at the relevant time.  In that regard, the Applicant argued that the conviction was based on a fundamentally incorrect interpretation of the statutory provisions and that in holding that the shooting range authorisation was "null and void and ceased to have any effect " at the material time, because of breaches of conditions of the authorisation, the Judge had fallen into fundamental error in his interpretation and understanding of the statutory provisions.  It was submitted that an authorisation granted under section 4A of the Act remained valid until lawfully revoked in accordance with the provisions of section 4A (11) of the Act and thus under the Act, a breach of a condition of the authorisation was not " self-executing" in revoking the authorisation.  It was argued that this misinterpretation and misunderstanding of the relevant statutory provisions, was such that the conviction occurred in excess of jurisdiction.

2. The second argument was that there was a breach of fair procedures in the manner in which the District Court Judge came to his decision because the legal basis relied upon by the Judge, to find that there was no authorisation in force at the material time, had not been submitted  as a point of law by the prosecution nor raised by the Judge before his ruling.  Fair procedures required, it was argued, that the Judge should have informed the Applicant of his view that a breach of a condition of the authorisation meant that the authorisation itself was void and of no effect and should have given the Applicant an opportunity to be heard, on the correct interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Act.  Failing to do so, it was submitted, was a breach of fair procedures and reliance was placed on the decision of the Court of Appeal in DPP v. James Flynn. [2025] IECA 104.

Summary of Second Respondent's arguments

1. The second Respondent, who was the legitimus contradictor to the challenge to the District Court conviction, argued that the Judge had been correct in his interpretation of the relevant provisions and that a breach of a condition of the authorisation, unless de minimus, meant that the authorisation was null and void at the material time - that is while the condition was being breached.  The Judge was entitled to convict the Applicant and entitled to arrive at the conclusion that the authorisation did not permit the particular activities on the day, due to the failure to abide by the conditions of the authorisation.   It was argued that in order to be able to rely upon an authorisation the owner of a shooting range had to comply with its conditions and that the authorisation only authorised activities which fell within the terms of its conditionality.  By way of example, it was submitted that the fact that one of the conditions of the shooting range authorisation was that no person under 14 years of age "shall be permitted" to handle or use any firearm or enter the confines of the shooting area" of the range, pointed to the fact that allowing a person under 14 years to engage in target practice at the shooting range would not be authorised under the authorisation.

2. It was submitted that if, on the other hand, the Applicant's interpretation was correct, then the bare fact of an authorisation in and of itself, could excuse any target shooting no matter how wildly the shooting departed from the express conditions of the authorisation.   Therefore, it was submitted, the Judge was entitled to hold that the failure of the Applicant to comply with some of the conditions of the authorisation meant that he, the Applicant, could not rely upon the authorisation, for the target shooting taking place under a breach of conditions - in other words he could not rely upon an authorisation that he was disobeying.

3. It was submitted that not every failure to comply with a condition would expose an owner/operator of a shooting range to criminal conviction as section 4A(19) provided a defence where it could be p roved "that the defendant took reasonable precautions and exercised due diligence to avoid committing the offence." ** Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Heather Hill Management Company CLG and Others v. An Bord Pleanála and Others [2024] 2 IR 222, it was argued that applying the correct principles of statutory interpretation, it was intended that a failure to comply with conditions of an authorisation resulted in the authorisation being invalid because otherwise section 4A(19) which provides a defence to a failure to have an authorisation in being would be meaningless.  Therefore if, it was argued, a failure to comply with the conditions of an authorisation, did not affect the validity of the authorisation, there would be no need for the protection afforded by section 4A(19) which, it was argued implied that ongoing compliance with the conditions of shooting range authorisation was critical to availing of the shooting  range authorisation.  The question was posed, as to what the point was of including the "due diligence" defence by way of subsection 19, if ongoing compliance with the conditions of an authorisation was not a condition precedent to its validity?

4. It was further submitted, in the alternative, that even if the District Court Judge had been in error in his interpretation, it was an error within jurisdiction and that in every prosecution there is a legal provision to be construed and that it is the business of the District Court, to do so.  It was accepted that in this case the facts were peripheral in that the issue on the direction was whether there was an authorisation in place.

5. As to the fair procedures point, it was argued that there had been no breach of fair procedures and that the issue of compliance with the conditions of the authorisation had been raised in the evidence and addressed by the prosecution in submissions.  The Applicant could have sought to make further submissions on the point, at the close of the entire case after all the evidence had been heard.

6. Finally, it was argued that even if the District Court Judge was incorrect and fell into error, the Applicant should be refused relief because of his failure to exhaust his alternative remedy by way of a de novo appeal to the Circuit Court.  A de novo appeal to the Circuit Court had been provided by statute, as the appropriate remedy for a disputed conviction.  The Circuit Court was not bound by any rulings made in the District Court and that no serious grounds had been advanced regarding the fairness of the hearing or the conduct of the Judge.   The Applicant had invoked his Circuit Court appeal and therefore this was the appropriate avenue for him to take. Instead, he was seeking " two bites of the cherry."

Discussion

1. I propose dealing with the fair procedures point first.  T he Applicant says that there was a breach of fair procedures because the Judge failed to inform him of his view that a breach of a condition of the authorisation meant that the authorisation itself was void and of no effect and failed to give him an opportunity to be heard, on the correct interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions.  I find no merit in this argument.  In DPP v James Flynn [2025] IECA 104 the Court of Appeal had to consider inter alia, on an appeal against conviction by the Special Criminal Court, whether the principle of audi alteram partem had been infringed when in the course of delivering its verdict the trial court amended a count on the indictment to reflect a narrower offence before finding the Appellant guilty on the amended count.    It was argued on behalf of the appellant in that case that his right to natural and constitutional justice had been breached by the trial court, by not indicating that it was going to adopt that course before doing so and inviting submissions from the parties.  By not affording him this opportunity, he was not in a position to avail of particular procedural steps which could have been to his benefit, namely to make an application for a direction in respect of the offence, which was in fact subsequently considered by the court, or plead guilty to the amended (less serious) offence.  Burns J delivering the decision of the Court, stated that the trial court in taking the course of action it did had breached the appellant's right to fair procedures, offending the principle of audi alteram partem.  She noted:

"[31] However, the appellant had no input into the decision to amend the indictment and was given no opportunity to make any legal argument which might arise, such as the arguments which have been aired before this Court. Indeed, as an appeal court, we are unusually being invited to determine legal issues which were never argued before the lower court. This arises, not because of fault on the side of the parties but rather because the trial court did not provide anyone with an opportunity to make any submissions on the proposed amendment. In addition, the appellant was not given the opportunity to make a direction application on the amended count, or indeed decide whether to plead guilty, both of which, in the normal course, are important procedural features in a criminal trial which an accused is entitled to avail of."

1. What is required in terms of fair procedures and complying with the principle of audi alteram partem will vary from case to case.   In DPP v Flynn the trial court had, at the time of sentence, amended the indictment, without notice to the accused and without giving him an opportunity to be heard or invoke his entitlement to make a direction or change his plea.   The Court of Appeal in coming to the conclusion it did, referred to Walsh on Criminal Procedure 2 nd Ed which states at paragraph 18-112, that where a significant amendment is made to an indictment the interests of justice normally dictate that there is an adjournment so that the defence has an opportunity to assess how their position has been affected, that the accused is re-arraigned on the amended indictment and that in the appropriate case consideration be given to postponing the trial.

2. Thus, amending the indictment in the course of delivering the verdict, without notice to the accused, let alone without giving him an opportunity to make any submissions on the proposed amendment, offended against one the basic tenets of the audi alteram partem principle, that the accused be on notice of the case he has to meet and be given an proper opportunity to address it.    This cannot be equated with the situation in the present case.  Here the Applicant sought a direction, he was legally represented, he knew the charge he had to meet (and while it might be said that the charge was poorly drafted no objection was taken to it by the Applicant's legal representatives),  he was given an opportunity to be heard, to challenge evidence by way of cross examination, (if he so wished), and to make a legal submission on the law, the correct interpretation of the material statutory provisions and their applicability to the issue, as part of the application for a direction.  This in my view was all that was required and the audi alteram partem principle did not, in my view, require the trial judge to reconvene the hearing so as to give the Applicant a further opportunity to make further legal submissions on the interpretation of the statutory provisions upon which he already had an opportunity to be heard.   Therefore, I am satisfied that there was no breach of fair procedures or the audi alterm partem principle.

3. As to the Applicant's argument that the District Court Judge fell into significant error such that the conviction should be quashed, I must consider whether the Judge was correct in his interpretation of section 4A of the Act.  I am guided by the decision of the Supreme Court in Heather Hill Management Company CLG and Others v. An Bord Pleanála and Others [2024] 2 IR 222.  In that case, in his judgment for the Court, Murray J. cited with approval the judgment of McKechnie J. in The People (DPP) v. Brown [2019] 2 IR 1, and summarised the essential points which McKechnie J. had made as follows:

"(i) The first and most important port of call is the words of the statute itself, those words being given their ordinary and natural meaning...

(ii) However, those words must be viewed in context; what this means will depend on the statute and the circumstances, but may include "the immediate context of the sentence within which the words are used; the other subsections of the provision in question; other sections within the relevant part of the Act; the Act as a whole; any legislative antecedents to the statute/the legislative history of the Act, including...Law Reform Commission or other reports; and perhaps...the mischief which the Act sought to remedy"...

(iii) In construing those words in that context, the court will be guided by the various canons, maxims, principles and rules of interpretation all of which will assist in elucidating the meaning to be attributed to the language...

(iv) If that exercise in interpreting the words (and this includes interpreting them in the light of that context) yields ambiguity, then the court will seek to discern the intended object of the Act and the reasons the statute was enacted..." (para.110)

1. He also noted that what "the modern authorities now make clear is that ....... .., in no case can the process of ascertaining the "legislative intent" or the "will of the Oireachtas" be reduced to the reflexive rehearsal of the literal meaning of words, or the determination of the plain meaning of an individual section viewed in isolation from either the text of a statute as a whole or the context in which, and purpose for which, it was enacted. " (para 113)

2. In the case of A,B and C v The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade [2023] 1 I.L.R.M. 335 Murray J. said that the cases on statutory interpretation including Heather Hill Management Company CLG v An Bord Pleanála:

"have put beyond doubt that language, context and purpose are potentially in play in every exercise in statutory interpretation, none ever operating to the complete exclusion of the other. The starting point in the construction of a statute is the language used in the provision under consideration, but the words used in that section must still be construed having regard to the relationship of the provision in question to the statute as a whole, the location of the statute in the legal context in which it was enacted, and the connection between those words, the whole Act, that context, and the discernible objective of the statute. The court must thus ascertain the meaning of the section by reference to its language, place, function and context, the plain and ordinary meaning of the language being the predominant factor in identifying the effect of the provision but the others always being potentially relevant to elucidating, expanding, contracting or contextualising the apparent meaning of those words."(para 73)

1. It is with these principles, together with the principle that in a penal statute should be construed strictly, in mind, that I must consider whether the District Court Judge was correct in his interpretation of the material statutory provisions, and in concluding that because the Applicant had breached conditions of the authorisation, the same was void at the material time, thus leading to the Applicant's conviction.

2. In his ruling, the Judge held that the shooting range authorisation was " null and void and ceased to have any effect so that no authorisation would have existed at the material time of the breach" because of the fact that the shooting range was being operated in breach of conditions of the authorisation. Having decided that that the authorisation was void and of no effect at the material time he concluded " therefore the exemption as to the requirement of having a firearms licence would not have applied at those material times." This appears to have been a reference to the exemption provided by section 2(4)(d) of the Act, although the Applicant was not charged with an offence under section 2.

3. I am satisfied that in finding that a breach of the conditions of the shooting range authorisation resulted in the authorisation being "null and void " and ceasing to have any effect at the material time, the District Court Judge fell into error, in his interpretation and understanding of the relevant provisions.     Section 4A(9) makes it clear that an authorisation "shall continue in force .... unless revoked" and section 4A(11) sets out the circumstances in which an authorisation can be revoked and mandates that this must be done in writing.  If it was intended that the breach of an authorisation condition would somehow suspend or nullify its effect, then that would have been provided for in the section.  Furthermore, it is significant that the Oireachtas chose, by virtue of section 4A(18)(a)(ii) to make a failure, without reasonable excuse, to comply with a condition of an authorisation, a separate offence which carries with it the same potential penalties, upon conviction, as a contravention of section 4A(1).  If it had been intended that a failure to comply with a condition would have the effect of making the authorisation void, then such a separate offence, would have been unnecessary.

4. I do not accept the argument that the defence provided by section 4A(19) would be rendered meaningless if a failure to comply with the conditions of an authorisation, did not affect the validity of the authorisation.  Given that, in addition to the imposition of conditions, the Commissioner has the power pursuant to section 4A(6) of the Act to grant an authorisation in respect of a club or shooting range "or on a specified part of those premises," one might see how, if there was confusion as to the exact demarcation of the specified part of the premises so authorised, an owner might unwittingly fall foul of section 4A(18)(a)(i) and need to rely upon the reasonable precautions and due diligence defence.  Furthermore, the wording of subsection 19 is instructive.  It provides a defence where the defendant took reasonable precautions and exercised due diligence "to avoid committing the offence," that is the offence under section 4A(18)(a)(i).    If, as was contended, it had been intended to speak to a situation where a breach of a condition of an authorisation resulted in the authorisation being void, then one might have expected that it would have made reference to the defendant taking reasonable precautions and exercising due diligence "to avoid breaching the condition," but, it does not do so.

5. I must say that I have some sympathy for the District Court Judge in this matter.  Confusion appears to have permeated the matter from the outset.  It is clear that the first Respondent believed, on foot of his inspection of the Applicant's premises, that the Applicant was breaching the conditions of the authorisation attached to his shooting range.  It then should have and could have been a simple matter of charging the Applicant with an offence pursuant to section 4A(18)(a)(ii) that is, failing as the owner of the shooting range, without reasonable excuse, to comply with any of the conditions attached to the authorisation.  Instead, it appears that the decision was taken to charge the Applicant with the offence provided for by section 4A(18)(a)(i) of the Act, that is allowing firearms and ammunition to be used on the premises of the shooting range in connection with target shooting, without an authorisation under section 4A to do so, being in force.   However, by the time the Summons issued, this charge appears to have been cross pollinated by an offence created by section 2 of the Act and the power granted by section 2(5) of the Act to a Garda Superintendent to " authorise " the possession, use or carriage of firearms and ammunition in certain specified circumstances, thus resulting in the Summons specifying the charge as "allow the use of unauthorised firearms and ammunition on the premises of the shooting range in connection with target shooting contrary to Section 4A(18) of the Firearms Act 1925 ......".

6. This confusion appears to have continued into the prosecution case where the evidence proffered, focused primarily on alleged breaches by the Applicant of the conditions of both his shooting range authorisation and the conditions of the club's authorisation.  This was followed through in the submissions made by both parties to the District Court Judge, where the power of a Garda Superintendent to authorise the firearms and ammunition of a club or shooting range under section 2(5) of the Act and the provisions of section 4A of the Act, were conflated with submissions being made on section 2(4) (d) of the Act, (which provides an individual with an exemption from the requirement to have a firearm certificate on an authorised shooting range), when the charge against the Applicant was for an offence under section 4(A)(18)(a)(i) and thus the central issue being, the existence or nonexistence of a shooting range authorisation granted under section 4A. As such, two separate and distinct statutory concepts became entangled.  In these circumstances, one might be forgiven for concluding that it was almost inevitable that the District Court Judge would fall into the same legal quagmire.

7. As a consequence of his misinterpretation of the relevant statutory provisions and in concluding that because the Applicant had breached conditions of the authorisation, it was null and void, the Applicant says that the conviction must be quashed.  The second Respondent, however, argues that if the Judge fell into error, it was an error within jurisdiction and should not be quashed.

8. I agree with the observation of McKechnie J in Stephens v Connellan [2002] 4 IR 321 that there is a wide divergence of judicial views as to what correctly should be described as an error made within jurisdiction as distinct from an error made in excess of jurisdiction.   Both the Applicant and the second Respondent have relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Sweeney v. Fahy [2014] IESC 50, where it considered some of the applicable principles in the context of a drug driving case. The issue that arose related to evidence of incapacity, which was required in a drug driving case.

9. Clarke J. (as he then was) in considering whether judicial review was the appropriate remedy and having discussed the framing of errors as being within jurisdiction or exceeding jurisdiction, opined that:

[3.4 ] In the light of that observation, it seems to me that it may be more helpful to describe the overall role of the High Court in judicial review (and the role of this Court, and indeed the Court of Appeal, when it comes into existence, as appellate courts exercising constitutional jurisdiction on appeal from the High Court's judicial review jurisdiction) as concerned with whether a decision of a person, body or statutory court which affects legal rights (arising from the law conferring on that person, body or court the legal power to make a decision of a particular type) is lawful. On that basis, various categories of grounds on which judicial review can be granted can be seen to be examples of a finding that the ultimate decision made affecting legal rights is not lawful.

1. He was of the view that such an analysis "[3.5] ... obviously leads to the next question as to just what it is that renders a determination affecting legal rights to be regarded as unlawful or, in the words of Henchy J., not 'in accordance with law'".

2. He noted that some errors will be such, as to render the ultimate decision unlawful and thus capable of being quashed by way of judicial review, whereas other errors do not render the decision unlawful and are only capable of being corrected, if at all by way of appeal.   He emphasised that judicial review is fundamentally concerned with the lawfulness of decisions taken affecting legal rights and is not concerned with the correctness of those decisions.  Thus, the distinction, (which Clarke J described as " fundamental ") was between a decision which was unlawful and could be quashed on a judicial review, as opposed to one that was simply incorrect and could not be so quashed.    Clarke J noted that "[3.8] .... save in an extreme case, absence of sufficient evidence as to the merits would only render the decision incorrect and, thus, not amenable to judicial review" whereas "[3.8] .... Absence of a lawful power to make the decision would render the decision unlawful."

3. He also referred to the further matter for consideration, which was the availability of an appeal.  A matter which I will return to below.  He then summarised the position [at paragraph 3.16] as follows:

"It seems to me that while there may not be complete consistency between all of the authorities, the balance of the case law suggests that the following principles apply. First, judicial review is concerned with the lawfulness rather than the correctness of the decision sought to be challenged. Second, where the jurisdiction of the relevant decision maker to embark on the process of making the relevant decision is either not challenged or is established, an error by the decision maker in reaching the necessary conclusions to determine the appropriate decision to be made does not, of itself, necessarily render the decision unlawful. *** At a minimum, it requires a fundamental error to raise the prospect that the decision is not merely incorrect but also unlawful. It is unnecessary, for the purposes of this case, to attempt any exhaustive examination of what might be said to be the type of error which is sufficiently fundamental to render a decision unlawful in all types of cases. ........... Third, even if judicial review might otherwise lie, a court will not exercise its jurisdiction where the law allows for an appeal and where an appeal would be an appropriate remedy to deal with the complaint made. Thus, there may be circumstances where judicial review will not lie against a first instance or initial decision but where it might lie against a similar decision of a body from which no appeal or no further appeal lay."*

1. The concept of a fundamental error giving rise to the quashing of a decision is considered in the cases referenced by Clarke J in his judgement.  He referred to the judgment of Hederman J. in Sweeney v. Brophy [1993] 2 I.R. 202 where at p. 211 that judge observed:

"In my judgment certiorari is an appropriate remedy to quash not only a conviction bad on its face or where a court or tribunal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction but also where it acts apparently within jurisdiction but where the proceedings are so fundamentally flawed as to deprive an accused of a trial in due course of law. I take this opportunity of emphasising that certiorari is not appropriate to a routine mishap which may befall any trial; the correct remedy in that circumstance is by way of appeal. "

1. I have also been referred by the parties to the judgment of Phelan (Sara) J. in Ratinskis v DPP [2025] IEHC 428. There when considering whether judicial review was an appropriate remedy, she carried out a review of the caselaw including Cork County Council v Shakleton [2011] 1 IR 443.  In Shackleton the applicant sought to set aside the determinations of a property arbitrator appointed to conduct an arbitration under s. 96 of the Planning and Development Act 2000. Pursuant to that section the arbitrator was concerned to determine the social and affordable housing obligations of the notice party to the proceedings arising out of a housing project of which it was the developer. The proceedings presented important and difficult issues of statutory construction arising from the relevant provisions of the 2000 Act and, specifically, the method of calculation to be brought to bear on the obligations imposed upon developers by those provisions.   Clarke J in quashing the decision of the arbitrator and having referred to the decision of Keane J in the Supreme Court in Radio Limerick One Ltd. v. Independent Radio and Television [1997] 2 I.R. 291,  stated:

"[109] It seems to me to follow that, where there has been a significant error in the interpretation of a material statutory provision leading to a decision of the property arbitrator being wrong in law, any such decision should, prima facie, be quashed.

.....

[112] It should also be noted that the overall approach mandated by s. 96 is, in my view, a fundamental legal question. An error, if an understandable one, in adopting an inaccurate construction of the section is, therefore, in my view a sufficiently fundamental matter which should lead to the quashing of the arbitrator's determination."

1. In the present case, I am satisfied that what occurred was a significant error on the part of the District Court Judge in the interpretation of the material statutory provisions leading to the conviction being wrong in law and therefore, in my view, the Applicant has a prima facie entitlement to have the conviction quashed.

2. But what of his alternative statutory remedy and his failure to exhaust the same? Counsel for the second Respondent, argued that this is sufficient to deny the Applicant relief by way of judicial review.

3. In LA v The Chief Appeals Officer & Ors [2025] IECA 54 , Collins (Anthony) J. on behalf of the Court of Appeal noted at para. 13 that "[T]here is well-established case-law to the effect that the availability of alternative remedies will constitute what is sometimes described as "a discretionary bar" to relief by way of judicial review." He quoted the dicta of Clarke J. (as he then was) in EMI Records (Ireland) Ltd. V Data Protection Commuissioner [2013] 2 IR 669 , where Clarke J stated:

**

"[41] Thus the overall approach is clear. The default position is that a party should pursue a statutory appeal rather than initiate judicial review proceedings. The reason for this approach is, as pointed out by Hogan J. in Koczan v. Financial Services Ombudsman [2010] IEHC 407 , (Unreported, High Court, Hogan J., 1st November, 2010), that it must be presumed that the Oireachtas, in establishing a form of statutory appeal, intended that such an appeal was to be the means by which, ordinarily, those dissatisfied with an initial decision might be entitled to have the initial decision questioned.

[42] However, there will be cases, exceptional to the general rule, where the justice of the case will not be met by confining a person to the statutory appeal and excluding judicial review. The set of such circumstances is not necessarily closed. However, the principal areas of exception have been identified. In some cases an appeal will not permit the person aggrieved to adequately ventilate the basis of their complaint against the initial decision. As pointed out by Hogan J. in Koczan v. Financial Services Ombudsman [2010] IEHC 407 , (Unreported, High Court, Hogan J., 1st November, 2010), that may be so because of constitutional difficulties or other circumstances where the body to whom the statutory appeal lies would not have jurisdiction to deal with all the issues. Likewise, there may be cases where, in all the circumstances, the allegation of the aggrieved party is that they were deprived of the reality of a proper consideration of the issues such that confining them to an appeal would be in truth depriving them of their entitlement to two hearings.

[43] However these and any other examples must be seen as exceptions to the general rule."

1. Collins J conclude that: -

"[15] It follows from the foregoing that a court, asked to adjudicate upon a plea that the availability of a statutory appeal or review bars access to the High Court's judicial review jurisdiction, must consider the nature and scope of that statutory remedy with a view to determining if, by reference to all relevant circumstances, it can afford the person who seeks to challenge the correctness of a decision an effective remedy in order to address his or her complaint."

1. Where the line falls in relation to the "exceptions to the general rule" as identified by Clarke J in EMI was further considered by him in Sweeney v. Fahy [2014] IESC 50 ** where, as outlined above,  the Judge distinguished between decisions that were unlawful and thus prima facie amenable to judicial review and decisions that were simply incorrect or in error, that were not.   Clarke J. noted that the default position on the invocation of judicial review as opposed to an appeal as a method of challenge in criminal proceedings was set out in the judgement of Hederman J. in Sweeney v Brophy [1993] 2 I.R. 202 ** quoted earlier in this judgment.

2. Clarke J. noted that there may be cases where the nature of the allegation made is such that, if it be true, the person concerned will have, in substance, been deprived of any real first instance hearing or at least one which broadly complies with the constitutional requirements of fairness and that "[t]o say that someone, who has been deprived of a proper first instance hearing at all, has, as their remedy, an appeal is to miss the point. In such circumstances what the law allows is a first hearing and an appeal. If there has, in truth, been no proper first hearing at all, then the person will be deprived of what the law confers on them by being confined, as a remedy, to an appeal. In such a case, judicial review lies to ensure that the person at least gets a first instance hearing which is constitutionally proper and against which they can, if they wish, appeal on the merits in due course". (para. 3.14)

3. McKechnie J. delivering a concurring judgment noted that judicial review was not an appropriate remedy to address a claim that the trial judge had erred in his assessment of the evidence, as the High Court, exercising its judicial review jurisdiction was not a court of appeal and should not second guess the adequacy or sufficiency of the evidence given at trial.  However, he added the observation that "in rare cases, it may be possible to mount a judicial review challenge, even where an appeal may be an option, where the proceedings have been so fundamentally flawed as to breach an important tenant of natural or constitution al justice." (para.70)

4. I am satisfied that, for the reasons outlined above,  this case, presents one of those rare occasions, where the proceedings were tainted with such a fundamental error in the interpretation of the material statutory provisions that they deprived the Applicant of the reality of a proper consideration of the issues at first instance, such that confining him to an appeal would be to deprive him of his entitlement to two hearings.

5. In these circumstances, I will grant the order of certiorari sought in relation to the conviction.

The Revocation decision

Summary of Applicant's arguments

1. The Applicant challenges the revocation of the firearms certificate effectively on three grounds. Firstly, in so far as the revocation decision was based upon the conviction of the Applicant for an offence under section 4A(18) of the Firearms Act, if the conviction is quashed then the revocation must fall.  In other words, if the District Court conviction is unlawful, it cannot provide a lawful basis for the revocation of the firearms certificates.

2. Secondly, it was argued that even if the Applicant's conviction under section 4A(18) is not unlawful, the first Respondent fell into error in deciding that the Applicant was a person declared disentitled under the Firearms Act from holding a firearm certificate within the meaning of section 8 thereof, by virtue of being convicted and sentenced to 180 hours community service.  It was argued that while section 8(1)(d) of the Act declared a person sentenced to imprisonment for an offence under the Firearms Act to be a person disentitled to hold a firearm certificate, the Applicant had not in fact been sentenced to imprisonment and therefore was not a person so disentitled, as the first Respondent had decided.  The Applicant relied on the relevant provisions of the Criminal Justice (Community Service) Act 1983 and argued that since a community service order under the Act was an alternative to the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment, the Applicant was not in fact a person who had been sentenced to imprisonment for an offence under the Firearms Act and therefore was not declared by the Act to be disentitled to hold a firearms certificate within the meaning of section 5(1)(c). The Applicant relied upon a passage from O' Malley, Sentencing Law and Practice, 3 rd edition 2016 at paragraph 24-06, to the effect that a community service order is an alternative to the term of imprisonment that would otherwise be deemed appropriate.

3. It was also argued by the Applicant that the first Respondent fell into error because of his failure to provide adequate reasons for his decision to revoke the firearm certificates.  The Applicant submitted that section 5 of the Firearms Act sets out the grounds upon which a firearm certificate can be revoked and that in this case, the only possible relevant grounds were sections 5(1)(a), (b), or (c).    It was submitted that while it was clear as to why the first Respondent was relying on section 5(1)(c) - that is that he believed that the Applicant was declared by the Act to be disentitled to hold a firearm certificate, in so far as the first Respondent was relying upon either section 5(1)(a) or section 5(1)(b), it was unclear from the letter of the 14 th January 2021 how the basis for revocation came within either subsection or how the connection between the manner in which the Applicant ran the shooting range on the one hand, and him coming within either subsection (1)(a) or (1)(b), on the other, was made.  The Applicant relied upon the decision of Clarke J in Connolly v An Bord Pleanála [2021] 2 IR 752 and argued that there was a lack of adequate reasons for the decision.

Summary of first Respondent's arguments

1. The first Respondent, who was the legitimus contradictor to the challenge to the revocation of the firearm certificates, argued that he was entitled to revoke the firearm certificates relying on section 5(1)(c) of the Firearms Act - that is being a person who is declared by the Act to be disentitled to hold a firearms certificate.    The Applicant had been sentenced to 10 weeks imprisonment with 180 hours of community service in lieu and therefore he was, in accordance with the provisions of section 8(1)(d), a person who had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment (10 weeks) for an offence under the Firearms Act 1925.    Reliance was placed on Foley v. Murphy [2005] 3 IR 574 as to the effect of a Community Service Order in lieu of a prison sentence.

2. The first Respondent, also argued that even if the conviction fell, the revocation was valid, because he had, and was entitled to, rely upon section 5(1)(b) of the Act, namely that he was satisfied that the Applicant was a person who "cannot, without danger to the public safety or security or the peace be permitted to possess a firearm." He relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in McCarron v Superintendent Kearney & Ors [2010] 3 IR 302 ** as to the broad discretion granted to Garda Superintendents under the Firearms Act. **

3. As to the reasons argument, it was submitted that on any reading of the letters, sent by the first Respondent of 22 nd December 2020 and 14 th January 2021 the reasons for the revocation of the firearm certificates were clear, sufficient and intelligible.  In so far as the first Respondent had relied upon "all aspects of the criminal case and evidence which was submitted to the court," as the basis of the revocation, since the Applicant was in court for all of the criminal case and evidence, he was well aware of what had been said about his failure to comply with the conditions and regulations.  It was submitted that any person reasonably familiar with the District Court case could readily understand how the first Respondent had come to the conclusion that the Applicant's firearm certificates should be revoked, namely because of what was submitted was his blatant disregard for compliance with the rules and regulations whose primary function was public safety.   Reference was also made to the evidence given by the first Respondent to the District Court about alcohol being on the premises which the first Respondent had said in evidence he had found " quite frightening."  Reliance was placed on the passage from Clarke C.J. in Connelly v An Bord Pleanála [2021] 2 IR 752 where at paragraph 48 speaking about challenges to environmental decisions which are subject to European law he stated:

"Where a person has participated in a process it might potentially be open to a decision-maker to point to information which would be obvious to someone who had so participated for the purposes of explaining a decision and this information might help to satisfy the requirement to give reasons."

Discussion

1. The question of whether the Applicant was "sentenced to imprisonment for" an offence under the Firearms Act, within the meaning of section 8(1)(d), so as to be a person disentitled to hold a firearm certificate pursuant to section 5(1)(c) of the Act, is an interesting one.   The argument that since the making of a community service order is an alternative to imprisonment, it cannot amount to a sentence of imprisonment within the meaning of section 8(1)(d) of the Act, has a certain logic.  Yet as Dunne J. held in Foley v. Murphy [2005] 3 IR 574 a court cannot impose a community service order on a defendant convicted of an offence, where the court has decided not to impose a sentence of imprisonment, because it is not a standalone penalty - the offence must merit a term of imprisonment, before a community service order can be made in lieu.  Therefore, the argument that it was the intention of section 8(1)(d) that persons who were convicted of offences under the Firearms Act, of such seriousness as merited the imposition of a term of imprisonment should be disentitled from possessing a firearm or holding a firearm certificate, is also on the face of it, an argument of substance.    However, I do not need to decide this question, to dispose of the challenge to the firearm certificates revocation decision, since I have found that the decision is vitiated by a failure to provide adequate reasons, as outlined below.   Furthermore, given the potential significance of a determination on this issue, I would prefer to hold it over to the appropriate case, for determination.

2. The first Respondent of course says that the conviction was not the only basis upon which the revocation decision was made, and that the decision was also lawfully made under section 5(1)(b) of the Firearms Act.  The Applicant for his part says that the decision is so devoid of any proper reasons, as to be invalid.

3. In Meadows v. Minister for Justice ** [2010] 2 IR 701 ** Murray C.J. stated: -

"[93] An administrative decision affecting the rights and obligations of persons should at least disclose the essential rationale on foot of which the decision is taken. That rationale should be patent from the terms of the decision or capable of being inferred from its terms and its context.

[94] Unless that is so then the constitutional right of access to the Courts to have the legality of an administrative decision judicially reviewed could be rendered either pointless or so circumscribed as to be unacceptably ineffective."

1. In Connolly v. An Bord Pleanála [2021] 2 IR 752 the Supreme Court pointed out that satisfying the obligation to give reasons will vary in different types of situations and that the legal requirements that go into different types of decisions may vary significantly from case to case.   Where the decision maker was required to determine whether precise criteria were met, the reasons required to be given would have to address why it was said that the criteria were or were not met and the basis upon which it was decided that the criteria were or were not met. (para. 28)    The Court took the view that it was possible to identify from the caselaw two separate, but closely related requirements regarding the adequacy of any reasons given by a decision-maker. First, any person affected by a decision should at least be entitled to know, in general terms, why the decision was made. Second, a person was entitled to have enough information to consider whether they can or should seek to avail of any appeal, or to bring a judicial review of a decision. The Court held that the reasons provided must be such as to allow a court hearing an appeal, or reviewing a decision, to actually engage properly in such an appeal or review. The Court went on to explain that it may be possible that the reasons for a decision might be derived in a variety of ways, either from a range of documents, or from the context of the decision, or some other fashion. But this was subject to the overall concern that the reasons must actually be ascertainable and capable of being determined (paras. 46 to 49).  As Clarke CJ pointed, out the reasons provided, "must enlighten any interested party as to why the decision went the way it did. " (para 30).

2. Applying those principles in the present case, I am satisfied that the reasons given by the first Respondent, for revoking the Applicant's own firearm certificates were wholly inadequate.     Leaving aside the reasons based upon the conviction, which conviction I have decided should be quashed, the letter of 14 th January 2021 sets out the other reasons relied upon for the revocation decision, which the Court was informed, in oral argument was in reliance upon section 5(1)(b) of the Act, that is that the Applicant "is a person who cannot without danger to the public safety or security or the peace, be permitted to possess a firearm".

3. In this regard the precise reason given was, the conviction pursuant to section 4A(1) of the Act and "[t] his together with all aspects of the criminal case and the evidence which was submitted to the court and of which Mr O'Donnell is aware of was more than sufficient to warrant the revocation of the certificates.  In further elaboration of these reasons, during the court case, there were evidence [sic] of the unsafe and dangerous practices at the firing range under the management of Mr O'Donnell."

4. It is entirely unclear from this, precisely what the first Respondent was relying upon to ground his decision.  Was it the evidence that led to the findings of the District Court Judge of breaches of conditions, or was it the entirety of the evidence proffered including all other allegations made?   Did it include the fact that the Applicant had been serving alcohol without a licence in the club house, albeit that the Judge had found that " the relevant level of culpability wasn't too high on the basis of evidence that nobody consumed alcohol prior to shooting.  It was only thereafter."?  Was it public safety, security or the peace or a combination of all three, which the first Respondent believed would be endangered, by the Applicant being permitted to possess his own firearms?  Was the conviction the main reason for the revocation decision and if so, were the other reasons on their own, sufficient in the mind of the first Respondent to justify the revocation of the Applicant's firearm certificates?    It is impossible to know the answers to these questions from the reasons given.

5. Furthermore, it is not possible to know from the decision how the Applicant's failures in terms of managing and operating the shooting range translated into him being a danger to the public safety or security or the peace, if he was allowed to have his own personal firearms.  It may well be, as counsel for the first Respondent argued before the Court, that the first Respondent took the view that the Applicant had shown such a clear and blatant disregard for the regulations, whose primary function was public safety, in the operation of his shooting range, that he could not without danger to public safety be permitted to possess his own firearms.   However, the difficulty is that such a reason is not to be found in the letter of 14 th January 2021.

6. The first Respondent swore an affidavit in these proceedings wherein he stated that the reasons given for the revocation were, the conviction, all aspects of the criminal case and evidence submitted, the evidence of unsafe and dangerous practices at the firing range and the illegal running of a shebeen.  He then goes on in his affidavit to say that "by 14 th January 2021 ", he was not " satisfied that the use and storage of rifles, pistols and ammunition will not endanger the public safety or security or the peace and that the club is responsibly managed." That seems to suggest that on 22 nd December 2020 when the letter revoking the firearm certificate was written and the decision made, these reasons were not, as yet, in the mind of the first Respondent, as reasons to revoke the certificates, yet the letter of 14 th January 2021 suggests otherwise.  Furthermore, that averment did not make its way into the letter of 14 th January as a basis for revoking the firearm certificates.  Furthermore, even if it had, it still does not explain how the use and storage of the club's rifles, pistols and ammunition translates into the Applicant being a danger to the public safety or security or the peace, if he was allowed to have his own personal firearms.

7. Therefore, I am satisfied that the first Respondent, as the decision maker, failed to explain how and why the criteria in section 5(1)(b) were met and failed to explain the essential rationale for deciding that the Applicant's failures in terms of managing and operating the shooting range translated into him being a danger to the public safety or security or the peace, if he was allowed to have his own personal firearms. Accordingly, the Applicant has a prima facie entitlement to have the decision quashed on the grounds that the first Respondent failed to comply with the obligation to provide adequate reasons.

8. The issue here is not about the discretion of the first Respondent in exercising his power, as was the case in McCarron v Superintendent Kearney & Ors. [2010] 3 IR 302.  In that case, Mr. McCarron had challenged the Superintendent's decision to refuse his application for a firearms certificate for a .40 Glock pistol on the narrow ground that the reasons given by him related entirely to the nature of the firearm.  The difference of opinion between the applicant and the Superintendent in that case concerned the type of weapon.   It was held in the High Court that an individual garda superintendent retains authority over his own discretion and that authority must be respected unless there is evidence of improper conduct, or the superintendent had fettered his discretion as to the issue of firearms certificates. This decision was upheld by the Supreme Court where Fennelly J. noted that the challenge was based on the proposition that the Superintendent had no power to make the decision which he made, not that it was unreasonable or discriminatory.

9. Having found that the Applicant has a prima facie entitlement to have the decision to revoke his firearm certificates quashed, it is necessary to consider whether an order of certiorari should be refused because of the Applicant's failure to exhaust his right of appeal to the District Court.    It was argued on behalf of the first Respondent that since the Applicant had failed to avail of his right to a de novo appeal to the District Court pursuant to section 15A of the Act, even if the decision was wrong, the correct approach was an appeal, as this was what the Oireachtas had determined was the appropriate way to challenge a revocation of a firearm certificate.  Because the Applicant did not do this, he was not entitled to relief by way of judicial review.

10. Section 15A(1)(d) of the Act provides for an appeal from a decision to revoke a firearm certificate under section 5 of the Act, to the District Court.  Section 15A(3) sets how the jurisdiction of the District Court on such an appeal.  It may:

(a) Confirm the decision.

(b) Adjourn the proceedings and direct the issuing person to reconsider the decision in the light of the appeal proceedings, or

(c) Allow the appeal.

1. Section 15A(4) mandates that where the appeal is allowed the issuing person shall give effect to the court's decision.

2. Counsel on behalf of the first Respondent urged that I should follow the recent decision of Bolger J. in Tracey v. Garda Commissioner [2025] IEHC 234, involving a challenge to a refusal of a firearms licence.    There, in a telescoped hearing, leave was refused on the basis that the Applicant's concerns could more appropriately be dealt with by way of the appeal pursuant to section 15A.    However, in that case, the Applicant claimed that he did not bring a statutory appeal because he would not receive fairness in the District Court, that the decision of the Superintendent was irrational and that accordingly judicial review was appropriate.    Bolger J. was satisfied that there was no evidence that the Applicant would not receive a proper hearing in the District Court and that it was in reality a challenge to the decision on its merits. She took the view that an appeal to the District Court pursuant to section 15A was thus more appropriate as it would be more extensive, with a right to cross examine, which in the circumstances she described as far more suitable and appropriate.  She described the substantial judicial review challenge as " neither strong nor compelling."

3. In coming to that conclusion, she referred to the decision of Donnelly J. in FD v Chief Appeals Officer & Ors. [2023] IECA 123.   In that case, the appellant challenged the decision of the chief appeals officer, who had determined the appellant's social welfare appeal on a summary basis, upholding the decision of the deciding officer, concerning her entitlement to carer's allowance.  On behalf of the respondent, it had been argued that since the appellant had failed to exhaust the alternative remedy of seeking a revision under the scheme of appeals/revision set out in the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 2005, she should be refused relief.    This was accepted by the Court of Appeal.  Donnelly J. for the Court, noted that the breadth of the revision provisions in the Act was, possibly, unique in the field of the administration of public law and that applicants for social benefits/allowances ought to use those very wide provisions which were intended to ensure that potentially qualifying applicants would not be excluded on narrow or technical grounds. She noted that the power of revision under the Act was as broad as it could possibly be and would in an appropriate case, permit a decision not to provide for an oral hearing to be reversed and it could accommodate an oral hearing itself. All matters that could be raised on appeal could be dealt with there.   She also noted that it was not the same as a loss of the possibility of first instance fair procedures, as under the Act it was a continuation of the entire process which was designed to be fair to applicants.  However, Donnelly J. cautioned

"[50] That said however, a court must have some regard to the underlying grounds upon which the substantive claim for relief is made. That may be the only way the court can assess whether the issue is one which would bring it within the exception to the rule of exhausting alternative remedies. For example, the court would have to assess whether the claim amounted to a fundamental denial of fair procedures or is one that is based on a lack of jurisdiction. *** If that were the case, then the discretion to refuse jurisdiction may not be exercised by the court hearing the application."*

1. While it is undoubtedly the case, that that the Oireachtas has decided that in normal course, a person unhappy with a firearm certificate revocation decision under the Firearms Act, should appeal to the District Court, as the most effective and convenient procedure, nonetheless there are those exceptional cases, where there has been a fundamental denial of fair procedures or where the decision was made in excess of jurisdiction, that merits relief by way of judicial review.  In such exceptional cases, the Court should not refuse relief by way of judicial review, where the applicant has a prima facie entitlement to the same.

2. In the present case, given the wholly inadequate reasoning provided for the decision to revoke the Applicant's own firearm certificates, I am satisfied that this is such a case. This very significant inadequacy in the reasoning provided, undermines the effectiveness of the statutory right to appeal and means that the Applicant would be forced to embark upon an appeal without knowing whether it was it was public safety, security or peace or a combination of all three that the first Respondent believed was endangered by him having his own firearms  and without knowing how his failure to properly operate the shooting range translated into such a danger, in terms of him having his own firearms.  The Applicant should not have to wait until the hearing of an appeal to find out the precise reasons why the first Respondent revoked his firearm certificates.  While the deficiency in the reasons provided in this case, justified the Applicant seeking judicial review, as was pointed out by Simons J. in Brennan v The Chief Superintendent of the Cork West Division [2023] IEHC 45 ** the fact that a statement of reasons by the first instance decision maker is deficient will not necessarily justify a party foregoing their statutory right of appeal under section 15A of the Act for a judicial review.  It is only in exceptional circumstances, that an applicant will be so justified.

Proposed Orders

1. Therefore, I will make an order of certiorari quashing the Order of the District Court made the 15 th December 2020 convicting the Applicant of an offence under section 4A (18) of the Firearms Act, 1925 (as inserted by section 33 of the Criminal Justice Act, 2006.  I will also make an order quashing the decision of the first Respondent Superintendent to revoke the Applicant's firearm certificates 1274925, 1274924, 1474923 and 1268511 communicated by letters of 22 nd December 2020 and 14 th January 2021.

2. While other related ancillary reliefs were also sought in the Statement of Grounds, they were not addressed in oral argument, although not formally withdrawn.   In these circumstances, I do not propose to grant any such reliefs.

3. As this judgment has been delivered electronically, the matter will be listed for mention at 10.30 am on 19 th May 2026 for the purpose of making final orders and dealing with costs.

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