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                  by Judge Fred Gore](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10810319/in-re-mcb/#o1)

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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re: M.C.B.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-34

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (10.8K)

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Syllabus

termination of parental rights; willful abandonment; incarcerated parent; clear, cogent, and convincing evidence; best interests of the child.

Combined Opinion

                        by Judge Fred Gore

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA25-34

Filed 18 March 2026

Gaston County, No. 22JT000317-350

IN RE:

M.C.B.

Minor Juvenile.

Appeal by respondent-father from order entered 24 September 2024 by Judge

Pennie M. Thrower in Gaston County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals

23 September 2025.

J. Thomas Diepenbrock for respondent-appellant-father.

J. Edward Yeager, Jr. for petitioner-appellee Gaston County Department of
Health and Human Services.

Battle, Winslow, Scott & Wiley, PA, by M. Greg Crumpler, for appellee
Guardian Ad Litem.

GORE, Judge.

This appeal arises from an order of the District Court, Gaston County,

terminating respondent-father’s parental rights to his minor son, Maxwell,1 on

1 A pseudonym.
IN RE: M.C.B.

Opinion of the Court

multiple statutory grounds under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a), including willful

abandonment. The trial court further determined that termination was in Maxwell’s

best interests. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-27(b)(2) and

7B-1001(a)(7). After careful review, we conclude that the trial court’s findings are

supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and sustain its conclusion that

respondent-father willfully abandoned the juvenile during the relevant six-month

period. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.

I.

Maxwell was born in November 2022. Both Maxwell and his mother tested

positive for controlled substances at the time of his birth. The mother, who is not a

party to this appeal, informed the Gaston County Department of Social Services

(“DSS”) that she no longer wished to care for Maxwell and identified respondent-

father as the possible father, later confirmed through DNA testing.

Respondent-father was incarcerated in the Cleveland County Jail from

February 2023 until March 2024, when he was transferred to prison following

convictions for possession of a firearm by a felon and possession with intent to sell

and deliver methamphetamine. He had previously served time in federal prison from

2017 to 2020 on gang and racketeering charges, violated parole, and was incarcerated

for 18 months before being released in February 2022.

Shortly after Maxwell’s birth, DSS contacted respondent-father, who stated

that if he was Maxwell’s father, he wanted to be in his life, but also indicated he was

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IN RE: M.C.B.

Opinion of the Court

“not in a good place” to have Maxwell in his care. On 17 November 2022, Child

Protective Services social worker Miya Beauford met with respondent-father, who

acknowledged he could be Maxwell’s father, stated he had been released from jail

nine months earlier, had another child, and was “working on stability.” He inquired

about “seeing the baby” but took no further action to arrange visitation.

On 22 November 2022, DSS filed a juvenile petition alleging neglect and

dependency, and obtained nonsecure custody of Maxwell. Maxwell was placed in

foster care, where he has remained. Following a hearing on 27 February 2023, the

district court adjudicated Maxwell neglected and dependent and ordered respondent-

father to comply with a case plan.

The case plan required respondent-father to: (a) participate in parenting

classes; (b) abstain from illegal activity; (c) complete a substance abuse assessment

and any recommended treatment; (d) complete a mental health assessment if

necessary and follow recommendations; (e) avoid domestic violence; (f) submit to

random drug screening; (g) obtain and maintain employment; (h) provide proof of

income; and (i) establish and maintain safe, independent housing. DSS sent case

plans to respondent-father in April 2023 and July 2023 while he was in the Cleveland

County Jail.

Adoption supervisor Jessica Clark-Rice testified that DSS corresponded with

respondent-father by mail and phone and visited his residence, but he did not request

visitation, send letters, cards, gifts, or other items to Maxwell, or inquire about

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IN RE: M.C.B.

Opinion of the Court

Maxwell’s well-being during the relevant six-month period. Respondent-father never

offered his mother as a placement option during this period. Paternal grandmother

testified she first learned of Maxwell’s existence in April or May 2024.

On 25 April 2024, DSS filed a petition to terminate respondent-father’s

parental rights (“TPR”) alleging grounds under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), (6), and

(7). Respondent-father was served while incarcerated. His first communication to

DSS during the relevant period was a letter written after service objecting to

termination and proposing that his mother assume custody.

On 24 September 2024, the district court entered an order terminating

respondent-father’s parental rights, concluding that grounds existed under § 7B-

1111(a)(1), (2), (6), and (7) and that termination was in Maxwell’s best interests.

Respondent-father gave notice of appeal.

II.

Our Juvenile Code provides a two-stage process for terminating parental

rights: an adjudicatory stage followed by a dispositional stage. See N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-

1109, -1110 (2023). During the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of

proving the existence of any ground for termination alleged under N.C.G.S. § 7B-

1111(a) by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e)–(f) (2023).

“A trial court’s finding of fact that is supported by clear, cogent, and convincing

evidence is deemed conclusive even if the record contains evidence that would support

a contrary finding.” In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 379 (2019) (citation omitted).

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IN RE: M.C.B.

Opinion of the Court

“Unchallenged findings are deemed to be supported by the evidence and are

‘binding on appeal.’” In re K.N.K., 374 N.C. 50, 53 (2020) (citation omitted). On

appeal, we review only those findings necessary to support the trial court’s

determination that a ground for termination exists. In re Z.O.G.-I., 375 N.C. 858, 861

(2020) (citation omitted). “[W]hether a trial court’s findings of fact support its

conclusions of law is reviewed de novo.” In re J.S., 374 N.C. 811, 814 (2020) (citation

omitted).

Applying these principles, we consider whether the trial court’s findings

support its conclusion that respondent-father willfully abandoned the juvenile within

the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7).

III.

A trial court may terminate parental rights upon finding that “the parent has

willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six consecutive months immediately

preceding the filing” of the termination petition. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) (2023).

“Abandonment implies conduct on the part of the parent which manifests a willful

determination to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the

child.” In re Adoption of Searle, 82 N.C. App. 273, 275 (1986) (citation omitted).

Willful abandonment may occur “where a parent withholds his presence, his love, his

care, [and] the opportunity to display filial affection,” and willfully fails to provide

“support and maintenance.” In re D.J.D., 171 N.C. App. 230, 241 (2005) (cleaned up).

Our Supreme Court has made clear that “incarceration, standing alone, is

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IN RE: M.C.B.

Opinion of the Court

neither a sword nor a shield” in termination of parental rights proceedings. In re

M.A.W., 370 N.C. 149, 153 (2017) (cleaned up). Although “a parent’s options for

showing affection while incarcerated are greatly limited, a parent will not be excused

from showing interest in the child’s welfare by whatever means available.” In re

C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 19–20 (2019) (cleaned up). Accordingly, our appellate decisions

require courts to recognize the constraints incarceration imposes on expressions of

love and concern, while also requiring parents to make whatever efforts are possible

to demonstrate care for their children. In re A.G.D., 374 N.C. 317, 320 (2020). “The

trial court may consider a parent’s conduct outside the six-month window in

evaluating a parent’s credibility and intentions” during “the relevant period.” In re

A.J.P., 375 N.C. 516, 532 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The relevant

period here is 26 October 2023 to 26 April 2024, the six months immediately

preceding the filing of the TPR petition.

Respondent-father challenges two findings relevant to willful abandonment.

He disputes the finding that he “failed to attend any visitation with the juvenile since

the juvenile’s birth” (Finding 40), claiming it is unsupported because a social worker

told him hospital visitation required proof of paternity and because he was

incarcerated and barred from visits until he made himself available to the court. He

also disputes the finding that, before service of the TPR petition, he failed to attend

hearings, send letters, call the Department or his counsel, or engage in case plan

programs (Finding 53), arguing it is misleading given no evidence of the Department’s

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IN RE: M.C.B.

Opinion of the Court

efforts to locate him before finding him in jail on 5 June 2023—four months after last

contact—and no evidence of attempts to meet with him or secure his attendance at

hearings.

The record contains clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supporting both

findings. The social worker testified that no visits ever occurred, respondent made

no effort to attend hearings or communicate with the Department or counsel despite

having the ability to send letters or make calls from prison, and he sent no letters,

cards, or gifts, made no inquiries, and requested no photographs, updates, or

visitation before the petition was filed. The first time he contacted the Department

was in a letter written after service of the petition, objecting to termination and

proposing that his mother assume custody. Respondent admitted that before service

of the petition he “hadn’t had any contact with anybody” at DSS. It is undisputed he

never visited the child, and the paternal grandmother testified she did not learn of

Maxwell’s existence until April or May 2024, undermining any claim that she had

been arranged as a caregiver.

Respondent also cites Findings 41, 42, and 43 to argue the trial court

overlooked his inability to work toward reunification while incarcerated and did not

explicitly find willfulness. He does not challenge their accuracy, and they remain

binding. See Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97 (1991). These findings—that he

failed to meet the juvenile’s basic needs, failed to demonstrate the ability to parent

and protect, and failed to acknowledge the juvenile on holidays and birthdays—

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IN RE: M.C.B.

Opinion of the Court

further support willful abandonment.

His claim that incarceration and the Department’s alleged failure to provide a

case plan excused his lack of contact is unpersuasive. Incarceration does not preclude

a finding of abandonment when a parent could have communicated by letters, calls,

or other available means. See In re D.E.M., 257 N.C. App. 618, 621 (2018) (citation

omitted) (stating that although incarceration limits a parent’s options for showing

affection, the parent “will not be excused from showing interest in his child’s welfare

by whatever means available.”). Even accepting that he did not receive a case plan

until April 2023, he was represented by counsel and knew of the proceedings before

the six-month period began. The record contains no evidence he attempted to

communicate with the Department, his counsel, or the court to express interest in

Maxwell or request updates.

The trial court’s findings—that respondent had no contact, provided no

support, and made no inquiries in the six months before the petition—are supported

by competent evidence and sustain the conclusion that he willfully abandoned the

child under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). Because proof of any one ground under

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) is sufficient to support termination, we do not address

respondent’s other arguments. See In re N.T.U., 234 N.C. App. 722, 733 (2014).

IV.

The unchallenged and supported findings of fact demonstrate that respondent-

father failed to have any contact with his son, provide any support, or make any

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IN RE: M.C.B.

Opinion of the Court

inquiries into his well-being during the six months immediately preceding the filing

of the termination petition. These findings support the trial court’s conclusion that

respondent-father willfully abandoned the juvenile within the meaning of N.C.G.S. §

7B-1111(a)(7). Because the existence of a single statutory ground is sufficient to

support termination, and termination is in the child’s best interests, we affirm the

order terminating respondent-father’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED.

Judges FLOOD and FREEMAN concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

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