Claypoole v. Altoona-Logan Twp. Mobile Medical Emergency Dept. Authority – Governmental Immunity Affirmed

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April 23, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

K. Claypoole and M. Knepp as Co-Administrators of the Estate of G.M. Noel v. Altoona-Logan Twp. Mobile Medical Emergency Dept. Authority d/b/a AMED

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 196 C.D. 2025

• Judges: McCullough

• Opinion

• Authorities (18)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.1K)

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Lead Opinion

by Patricia A. McCullough

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Kristin Claypoole and Melissa :
Knepp as Co-Administrators of the :
Estate of Glenn M. Noel, :
Appellants :
:
v. : No. 196 C.D. 2025
:
Altoona-Logan Township Mobile : Argued: March 3, 2026
Medical Emergency Department :
Authority d/b/a AMED :

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE STELLA M. TSAI, Judge
HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION
BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: April 23, 2026
Kristin Claypoole and Melissa Knepp as Co-Administrators of the Estate
of Glenn M. Noel (Decedent) (Estate) appeal from the February 3, 2025 order of the
Court of Common Pleas of Blair County (trial court), which sustained preliminary
objections filed by Altoona-Logan Township Mobile Medical Emergency Department
Authority d/b/a AMED (AMED) and dismissed the Estate’s complaint (Complaint)
with prejudice. In the Complaint, the Estate asserted negligence, gross negligence, and
wrongful death claims against AMED related to emergency medical services (EMS) it
rendered to Decedent on October 25, 2022.
In sustaining AMED’s preliminary objections, the trial court concluded
that the Estate’s claims were barred by the governmental immunity provisions of the
Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541, 8542(b) (PSTCA). In this
Court, the Estate argues that, notwithstanding the applicability of the PSTCA, Section
8151(2) of the Emergency Medical Services System Act (EMSSA), 35 Pa.C.S. §
8151(2), provides an independent exception to immunity where the claims brought
against a local agency relate to the provision of EMS care and assert grossly negligent
conduct.
Upon review, we affirm.
I. Background and Procedural History
A. Statutory Framework
Because the issues in this case require us to interpret and consider the
interplay between the PSTCA and the EMSSA, we begin by reviewing the purpose and
structure of both.
Generally speaking, “the Commonwealth, and its officials and employees
acting within the scope of their duties, shall continue to enjoy sovereign immunity and
official immunity and remain immune from suit except as the General Assembly shall
specifically waive the immunity.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310 (citing Pa. Const. art. I, § 11); see
also id. (“When the General Assembly specifically waives sovereign immunity, a claim
against the Commonwealth and its officials and employees shall be brought only in
such manner and in such courts and in such cases as directed by the provisions of Title
42 . . . or 62 . . .[,] unless otherwise specifically authorized by statute.”) In this vein,
the PSTCA was enacted in 1980 with an “overall purpose . . . to limit governmental
exposure to tort liability for its acts.” Sphere Drake Insurance Co. v. Philadelphia Gas
Works, 782 A.2d 510, 515 (Pa. 2001). See also Dixon v. Cameron County School
District, 802 A.2d 696, 700 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (the PSTCA was enacted to restore,
with certain exceptions, the doctrine of sovereign immunity to the Commonwealth and
its political subdivisions by way of “sovereign, governmental, and official immunity,
and by defining the exceptions to that immunity in strict and narrow terms”).

2
As to local agencies, the PSTCA provides a comprehensive immunity
scheme and establishes an absolute and non-waivable immunity defense, subject to
nine strictly construed exceptions. McShea v. City of Philadelphia, 995 A.2d 334, 341
(Pa. 2010); Lockwood v. City of Pittsburgh, 751 A.2d 1136, 1139 (Pa. 2000). Section
8541 of the PSTCA provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subchapter,
no local agency[1] shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person
or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other
person.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541. Section 8542(a) of the PSTCA then sets forth the
prerequisites that must be established before a local agency may be liable for damages
in tort, providing as follows:
(a) Liability imposed.--A local agency shall be liable for
damages on account of an injury to a person or property
within the limits set forth in this subchapter if both of the
following conditions are satisfied and the injury occurs as
a result of one of the acts set forth in subsection (b):
(1) The damages would be recoverable under common
law or a statute creating a cause of action if the injury
were caused by a person not having available a defense
under [S]ection 8541 (relating to governmental immunity
generally) or [S]ection 8546 (relating to defense of
official immunity); and
(2) The injury was caused by the negligent acts of the
local agency or an employee thereof acting within the
scope of his office or duties with respect to one of the
categories listed in subsection (b). As used in this
paragraph, “negligent acts” shall not include acts or
conduct which constitutes a crime, actual fraud,
actual malice or willful misconduct.

1
“Local agency” is defined in Section 8501 of the Judicial Code as “[a] government unit other
than the Commonwealth government.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8501.

3
42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(a) (emphasis provided). Subsection 8542(b)(1)-(9) sets forth nine
categories of circumstances in which a local agency may be liable for damages, which
include (1) vehicle liability; (2) the care, custody, or control of personal property; (3)
real property; (4) trees, traffic controls, and street lighting; (5) utility service facilities;
(6) streets; (7) sidewalks; (8) the care, custody, or control of animals; and (9) sexual
abuse. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(1)-(9). Thus, pursuant to the express language of Sections
8541 and 8542 of the PSTCA, a local agency may be held liable for damages resulting
from an injury to person or property only if (1) the damages are otherwise recoverable
pursuant to common law or statute creating a cause of action; (2) the injury is caused
by negligent acts of the local agency or its employees acting within the scope of their
employment; and (3) one of the nine enumerated exceptions in Section 8542(b) applies.
The EMSSA, enacted in 2009,2 is a comprehensive statute that regulates
the provision of EMS in Pennsylvania. See 35 Pa.C.S. § 8102 (“Declaration of
Policy”). It designates EMS as an essential public service, establishes the public
interest of assuring “that there are high quality and coordinated emergency and urgent
medical services readily available to the residents of this Commonwealth to prevent
premature death and reduce suffering and disability which arise from severe illness and
injury,” and declares that this public interest “is best achieved through a regulated and
coordinated emergency medical services program.” Id. § 8102(1)-(3). Among other

2
The EMSSA repealed and replaced the former Emergency Medical Services Act (EMSA),
which likewise prohibited civil liability against EMS providers arising out of the provision of EMS
care except in instances of “gross or willful negligence.” See former Section 11(j)(2)a of the EMSA,
Act of July 3, 1985, P.L. 164, former 35 P.S. § 6931(j)(2).

4
things, the EMSSA establishes reporting requirements for EMS agencies3 (§ 8106),
establishes an EMS state advisory board (§ 8108), provides for the creation of regional
EMS councils (§ 8109), directs the Department of Health to prepare and implement a
statewide EMS system plan (§ 8111), establishes the requirements for EMS agency
licensing (§ 8129), and requires the Department of Health to promulgate regulations
governing the operation of EMS agencies (§ 8129). As to its interpretation, the
EMSSA mandates that it “shall be liberally construed to establish and maintain an
effective and efficient emergency medical services system which is accessible on a
uniform basis to residents of this Commonwealth and visitors to this Commonwealth.”
35 Pa.C.S. § 8102(8).
Pertinent here, Section 8151 of Subchapter C of the EMSSA
(“Miscellaneous Provisions”) provides for certain “[l]imitations on liability.” It states,
in relevant part, as follows:

....
(2) No EMS agency, EMS agency medical director or EMS
provider[4] who in good faith attempts to render or facilitate
emergency medical care authorized by this chapter shall be
liable for civil damages as a result of an act or omission,
absent a showing of gross negligence or willful
misconduct. This paragraph shall also apply to students
enrolled in approved courses of instruction and supervised
pursuant to rules and regulations.
....

3
“EMS agency” is defined, in pertinent part, as “[a]n entity that engages in the business or
service of providing emergency medical services to patients within this Commonwealth by operating”
. . . “[a]n ambulance.” 35 Pa.C.S. § 8103.

4
“EMS provider” includes an emergency medical responder, a paramedic, a prehospital nurse
or physician, and similar individuals. 35 Pa.C.S. § 8103.

5
42 Pa.C.S. § 8151(2).
B. Proceedings Below
The Estate filed the Complaint on October 15, 2024, alleging as follows.
On October 25, 2022, while riding a motorcycle, Decedent collided with another
vehicle. (Complaint, ¶¶ 16-18.) AMED5 was notified of the accident at 6:20 a.m., was
dispatched at 6:23 a.m., and arrived on scene at 6:29 a.m. Id. ¶¶ 19-22. At 6:49 a.m.,
AMED transported Decedent to Conemaugh Nason Medical Center Emergency Room
(Conemaugh Nason), located approximately seven minutes from the accident scene.
Conemaugh Nason is not a designated trauma center. Id. ¶¶ 39, 41-42. Another
hospital, UPMC Altoona, was located approximately 19 minutes from the accident
scene. UPMC Altoona is a Level II trauma center. Id. ¶¶ 43-44.
After approximately 45 minutes, Conemaugh Nason staff contacted air
ambulance to arrange for Decedent’s transfer to the nearest trauma center. The air
ambulance was unavailable due to weather conditions. Id. ¶¶ 49-50. Decedent waited
at Conemaugh Nason for a total of approximately 3 1/2 hours before being transferred
by ground transport to UPMC Altoona. Id. ¶ 53. Care administered at UPMC Altoona
was unsuccessful, and Decedent died at 2:04 p.m. on October 26, 2022, from traumatic
brain injury. Id. ¶¶ 56-59.
The Complaint asserts claims for negligence/gross negligence (survival)
(Count I) and wrongful death (Count II) against AMED, chiefly alleging that AMED’s
failure to immediately transport Decedent to a Level I or II trauma center was
“negligent, grossly negligent, and reckless.” Id. ¶¶ 63-65, 68-70.

5
The Estate alleges that AMED is an EMS agency that provides EMS as defined in Section
8103 of the EMSSA and that “this action arises pursuant to the EMSSA.” (Complaint, ¶ 14.) The
Estate further alleges that AMED is a “municipal authority.” Id. ¶ 10.

6
AMED filed a preliminary objection on January 10, 2025, demurring to
both Counts of the Complaint on the ground that it is immune from suit pursuant to
Sections 8541 and 8542(a) and (b) of the PSTCA. The trial court sustained the
preliminary objection and dismissed the Complaint with prejudice. The trial court
acknowledged that the parties did not dispute that (1) AMED was a “local agency”
afforded immunity under the PSTCA; and (2) that none of the exceptions to immunity
in Section 8542(b) applied. The trial court concluded that the language of Section
8151(2) of the EMSSA permitting claims for gross negligence against EMS providers
was limited and qualified by Sections 8541 and 8542 of the PSTCA where claims are
asserted against a local agency EMS provider. In that circumstance, the trial court
concluded, a pertinent exception to immunity must apply for any claim against the local
agency EMS provider to remain viable. (Trial Ct. Op., 2/3/2025, at 7-8.)
The Estate now appeals to this Court.
II. Issues
The Estate presents two questions for our review, which in essence are
two parts of one overarching question: whether the trial court erred in concluding that
the Estate’s gross negligence claims are barred by Sections 8541 and 8542 of the
PSTCA.6

6
The affirmative defense of immunity from suit ordinarily must be pled as new matter.
Pa.R.Civ.P. 1030. Nevertheless, immunity is an unwaivable defense and may be addressed via
preliminary objection if its applicability is clear from the face of the complaint and the plaintiff has
not objected. Mazur v. Cuthbert, 186 A.3d 490, 497-98 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018); Williams v. Philadelphia
Housing Authority, 873 A.2d 81, 84 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). Here, the Estate did not object to the
trial court’s consideration of the immunity defense via preliminary objection, and the material facts
governing whether immunity applies are undisputed and clear on the face of the Complaint. The trial
court therefore properly considered it.
Further, where a trial court dismisses a complaint by sustaining preliminary objections, our
review is limited to determining whether the trial court committed legal error or abused its discretion.
(Footnote continued on next page…)

7
III. Discussion
A. The Parties’ Arguments
The Estate does not dispute that the PSTCA applies to AMED and renders
it generally immune from suit for damages to persons or property. The Estate further
acknowledges that none of the exceptions to immunity in Section 8542(b) of the
PSTCA apply in these circumstances. The Estate nevertheless argues that Section
8151(2) of the EMSSA provides an additional, independent exception to immunity that
allows for liability against local agencies where, as here, a plaintiff asserts that the local
agency was grossly negligent in providing EMS care. (Estate Br. at 4, 10-18.) More
specifically, the Estate argues that Sections 8541 and 8542 of the PSTCA and Section
8151(2) of the EMSSA must be read in pari materia pursuant to Section 1932(a) and
(b) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 (Statutory Construction Act), 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 1932(a), (b),7 to permit gross negligence claims against local agencies providing EMS
care. (Estate Br. at 11-12.)
The Estate also argues, somewhat paradoxically, that the PSTCA and
EMSSA are “irreconcilable” here because application of Sections 8541 and 8542 of

Minor v. Kraynak, 155 A.3d 114, 121 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). Further, where preliminary objections
present questions of law, including questions as to whether claims are barred by immunity and
questions involving statutory interpretation, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review
is plenary. Russo v. Allegheny County, 125 A.3d 113, 116 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (citing Feldman
v. Hoffman, 107 A.3d 821, 826 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014), and Bender v. Pennsylvania Insurance
Department, 893 A.2d 161, 162 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006)).

7
Section 1932(a) and (b) of the Statutory Construction Act provides:
(a) Statutes or parts of statutes are in pari materia when they relate to
the same persons or things or to the same class of persons or things.
(b) Statutes in pari materia shall be construed together, if possible, as
one statute.
1 Pa.C.S. § 1932(a), (b).

8
the PSTCA would preclude the Estate’s gross negligence claims, and Section 8151(2)
of the EMSSA would permit them. (Estate Br. at 13.) Thus, the Estate contends that,
pursuant to Section 1936 of the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. 1936,8 Section
8151(2) of the EMSSA should apply as the later-enacted provision. Id. at 13-14. The
Estate maintains that its interpretations of the PSTCA and EMSSA are supported by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Sherk v. County of Dauphin, 614 A.2d
226 (Pa. 1992), this Court’s decision in Zuppo v. Department of Transportation, 739
A.2d 1148 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999), and the Supreme Court of Michigan’s decision in
Malcolm v. City of East Detroit, 468 N.W.2d 479 (Mich. 1991).
AMED argues in response that the PSTCA applies to shield local agencies
from liability in all circumstances, including where gross negligence or willful
misconduct is asserted, unless one of the exceptions enumerated in Section 8542(b)
applies. AMED contends that Section 8151(2) of the EMSSA does not apply where
the EMS agency is a local agency, which interpretation it contends is supported by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Christy v. Cranberry Volunteer Ambulance Corps, Inc.,
856 A.2d 43 (Pa. 2004), and this Court’s decision in Flood v. Silfies, 933 A.2d 1072
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). AMED asserts that the Estate’s reading of the PSTCA and
EMSSA results in an end-run around the PSTCA’s clear language precluding all
liability, including that for gross negligence and willful misconduct, against all local
agencies unless one of the enumerated exceptions applies. (AMED Br. at 16-17.)
AMED argues that the two statutes cannot be read in pari materia because they do not

8
Section 1936 of the Statutory Construction Act provides that, “whenever the provisions of
two or more statutes enacted finally by different General Assemblies are irreconcilable, the statute
latest in date of final enactment shall prevail.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1936.

9
necessarily relate to the same, or same class of, persons or things. (AMED Br. at 18);
see also 1 Pa.C.S. § 1932(a).
Rather, AMED argues that the two statutes should be read separately and
consistently with each other. AMED points out that the EMSSA is part of a much
larger, general statute regulating all aspects of the provision of EMS care by any
provider, including various types of non-agency entities and individuals. Its liability
limitation likewise is general and applies to all EMS providers. By contrast, the
PSTCA is aimed at limiting liability of local agencies and applies only to them. Thus,
according to AMED, reading the two statutes according to their own terms results in a
general limitation of liability against all EMS providers except in cases of gross
negligence or willful misconduct, unless the EMS provider is a local agency. In that
case, all liability, including that resulting from gross negligence or willful misconduct,
is precluded unless one of the enumerated exceptions in Section 8542(b) applies.
(AMED Br. at 25-26.)
B. Analysis
Because the questions before us require statutory interpretation, we begin
by reviewing the following principles that guide our analysis:
As in all matters of statutory interpretation, the [Statutory
Construction Act] guides our analysis. The Statutory
Construction Act provides that the object of
all statutory interpretation “is to ascertain and effectuate the
intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(a).
Generally, the best expression of
the General Assembly’s intent “is found in the statute’s
plain language.” Commonwealth v. Howard, [668] Pa. [142],
257 A.3d 1217, 1222 (2021). “When the words of a statute
are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to
be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.
C.S. § 1921(b). Moreover, “we should not insert words into
a statute that are plainly not there.” Frazier v. Workers’
Comp. Appeal Bd. (Bayada Nurses, Inc.), 616 Pa. 592, 52

10
A.3d 241, 245 (2012). Only in instances of ambiguous
statutory language “may courts consider statutory factors to
discern legislative intent.” Howard, 257 A.3d at 1222.
Additionally, “[w]ords and phrases shall be construed
according to rules of grammar and according to their
common and approved usage,” though “technical words and
phrases and such others as have acquired a peculiar and
appropriate meaning or are defined in [the Statutory
Construction Act] shall be construed according to such
peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.” 1 Pa. C.S. §
1903(a). “We also presume that ‘the General Assembly does
not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or
unreasonable,’ and that ‘the General Assembly intends the
entire statute to be effective and certain.’ ” Berner v.
Montour Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 655 Pa. 137, 217 A.3d
238, 245 (2019) (quoting 1 Pa. C.S. § 1922(1)-(2)).

Commonwealth v. Coleman, 285 A.3d 599, 605 (Pa. 2022) (some editing omitted).
Further, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court consistently has held that “where the General
Assembly intends to provide exceptions to immunity, such exceptions must be
specifically and explicitly expressed.” U.S. Venture, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 255 A.3d
321, 337 (Pa. 2021) (citations and quotations omitted). Any exceptions to immunity
are to be “narrowly construed,” and “the General Assembly can correct any
misinterpretation of the immunity provisions by amending the statute so as to explicitly
waive immunity.” Id. (citation and quotations omitted).
Here, it is undisputed that AMED is a local agency9 to which the PSTCA
applies. Thus, pursuant to Sections 8541 and 8542 of the PSTCA, AMED is absolutely

9
Even if AMED’s status as a local agency were disputed, it appears to satisfy the test set forth
by our Supreme Court in Christy. Under Christy, to be a “local agency” for purposes of the PSTCA,
an ambulance service must be a non-profit corporation created by a political subdivision for the
purpose of carrying out a civic or political function of the municipality. 856 A.2d at 52-53. In its
preliminary objections, AMED alleged, with supporting public documentation, that AMED is a
municipal authority created by the City of Altoona and the Township of Logan “to provide ambulance
equipment and facilities and to furnish ambulance service to the inhabitants of the City of Altoona
(Footnote continued on next page…)

11
immune from liability for damages resulting from injury to persons or property unless
all of the prerequisites for liability set forth in the PSTCA are satisfied, including that
at least one of Section 8542(b)’s nine exceptions applies. Because it also is undisputed
that none of those exceptions apply here, we must determine whether, as the Estate
argues, the General Assembly specifically intended to abrogate immunity for local
agencies via Section 8151(2) of the EMSSA and permit claims for gross negligence or
willful misconduct arising out of the provision of EMS care. See Doe v. Franklin
County, 174 A.3d 593, 605 (Pa. 2017). We conclude that it did not.
Section 8541 of the PSTCA provides that, “except as otherwise provided
in this subchapter, no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of
any injury to a person or property . . . .” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541 (emphasis provided).
Thus, Section 8541 is a categorical immunity provision applicable specifically and
only to local agencies, and it prohibits all liability for damages caused by injury to
persons or property unless otherwise authorized in Title 42, Part VII, Chapter 85,
Subchapter C of the Judicial Code.10 Section 8542(a) permits such liability only if three
prerequisites are established: (1) absent immunity, the damages would be recoverable
under common law or statute; (2) the injury was caused by the negligent acts (but not
criminal conduct, fraud, malicious acts, or willful misconduct), of the local agency or
its employee; and (3) one of the exceptions in Subsection 8542(b) applies. 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 8542(a)(1)-(2), (b). These prerequisites for recovering damages for injury to persons

and Township of Logan, and to the inhabitants of such adjoining political subdivisions or areas as
may desire such service.” (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 0022-23, 36, 38.)

10
Subchapter C of Chapter 85 contains other immunity-related provisions that govern official
immunity and its contours, see 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8545, 8546, limitations on damages, see 42 Pa.C.S. §§
8549, 8553, and exceptions for willful misconduct (which do not apply to governmental immunity
under Section 8541), see 42 Pa.C.S. § 8550.

12
or property apply to all such claims against local agencies, and there are no exceptions
for EMS care.
The EMSSA, by contrast, is a comprehensive statute governing all aspects
of EMS care rendered by all EMS agencies and providers in the Commonwealth. Its
explicit purpose is to ensure that there are “high quality and coordinated emergency
and urgent medical services readily available to the residents of this Commonwealth,”
and it must “be liberally construed to establish and maintain an effective and efficient
emergency medical services system which is accessible on a uniform basis to residents
of this Commonwealth and visitors to this Commonwealth.” 35 Pa.C.S. § 8102(2), (8).
The EMSSA was not enacted to address liability, and it plainly does not contain an
express and comprehensive scheme to authorize local agency liability for damages in
derogation of Sections 8541 and 8542 of the PSTCA. Cf. Hidden Creek L.P. v. Lower
Salford Township Authority, 129 A.3d 602, 612 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (the General
Assembly, via Section 5607 of the Municipal Authorities Act, 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607,
clearly intended to create “a targeted form of accountability resting outside the scope
of governmental immunity”; Section 5607 explicitly authorizes suit against a
municipal authority in the court of common pleas).
Instead, and pertinent here, a single miscellaneous provision of the
EMSSA, Section 8151(2), prohibits the liability of EMS agencies related to the good
faith rendering of EMS care unless gross negligence or willful misconduct is
established. 35 Pa.C.S. § 8151(2). Section 8151(2), by its plain language, is not a
claim-creating provision; it is a liability-prohibiting provision with two narrow
exceptions. Nowhere does it state that it is intended to add a tenth exception to
immunity outside of the PSTCA, and it does not eliminate, replace, or even mention
the other prerequisites for liability contained in Section 8542(a).

13
Moreover, although the EMSSA’s definition of “EMS agency” would on
its face include local agencies providing EMS care, the EMSSA does not anywhere
expressly address liability of local agencies, and it contains no express language
indicating that it authorizes liability against local agencies notwithstanding any other
provision of law, including the PSTCA.11 We simply cannot conclude that the mere
failure of the EMSSA to exclude local agencies from the definition of “EMS agency”
evidences a clear intent of the General Assembly to abrogate local agency immunity in
Section 8151(2) of the EMSSA. See Doe, 174 A.3d at 608 (the General Assembly did
not intend to abrogate high official immunity for sheriffs via “general, undefined”
terms of “person” or “local governmental agency” included in Section 6111(i) of the
Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6111(i), which authorizes suit for
civil damages arising out of disclosure of confidential information).
In sum, we cannot conclude that the General Assembly intended Section
8151(2) to override the clear language in Sections 8541 and 8542 of the PSTCA, which
provide blanket and absolute immunity for local agencies save in nine specifically-
delineated circumstances found only in the PSTCA. There simply is no evidence in
the language of Section 8151(2) or elsewhere in the EMSSA indicating that the General
Assembly intended to “otherwise specifically authorize” claims against local agencies
for gross negligence and willful misconduct notwithstanding the PSTCA’s immunity
provisions barring those claims. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310.12

11
The EMSSA does preclude, however, without exception, all claims for damages “arising
out of an EMS provider” against (1) the Department of Health and its officials and employees, (2)
any regional EMS council and its officials and employees, and (3) the Commonwealth EMS Director.
35 Pa.C.S. § 8151(6).

12
In creating new exceptions to local agency immunity, the General Assembly historically
has treated as exclusive those contained in Section 8542(b). For example, in 2019, the General
(Footnote continued on next page…)

14
Further, and as AMED has argued, prior decisions of both this Court and
our Supreme Court have assumed, if not compelled, the above interpretation. In
Christy, the plaintiff heart attack patient was transported to a hospital by the defendant
ambulance service. The plaintiff later filed suit against the ambulance service alleging
gross negligence in failing to administer nitroglycerine during the trip to the hospital.
856 A.2d at 44-45. Although the ambulance service argued that the claims were barred
by Section 6931(j)(2) of the now-repealed EMSA, the case proceeded to trial with a
jury finding the ambulance service grossly negligent. Id. at 45. After a retrial on
unrelated grounds, the ambulance service again was found by a jury to be grossly
negligent. Id. On appeal to this Court, the ambulance service argued that it was
immune from suit pursuant to the PSTCA. This Court disagreed, concluding without
factual development that the ambulance service was not a local agency and,
accordingly, that the EMSA, not the PSTCA, controlled. Id. at 46, 50.
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for a factual determination of
whether the defendant ambulance service was a local agency, i.e., whether it was a
municipal authority created by Cranberry Township and over which the Township
exercised control for the purpose of carrying out a civic or political function of the
Township. Id. at 53-54. The Court in Christy specified that remand was necessary so
that the trial court could assess whether the ambulance service was “a local agency for
purposes of the [PSTCA], . . . and, hence, immune from tort liability.” Id. at 53.
Although the Supreme Court in Christy did not specifically rule that the PSTCA
applied, its remand to the trial court would be futile if the “local agency” designation

Assembly amended Section 8542(b) to add a ninth exception for “sexual abuse.” See the Act of
November 26, 2019, P.L. 641; 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(9). The General Assembly generally has not
created exceptions to local agency immunity outside of the PSTCA, and we discern no indication that
it intended to do so via Section 8151(2) of the EMSSA.

15
was not controlling. Essential to the Christy Court’s ruling was the principle that an
ambulance service’s status as a local agency is determinative on the question of
whether it is immune from liability under the PSTCA or, conversely, not immune under
the EMSA; in other words, the pleading of gross negligence, where a local agency is
sued, is irrelevant to whether it is immune.
This Court assumed the same principle in Flood v. Silfies, where the
plaintiffs sued a volunteer fire company and two of its emergency medical technicians
(EMTs) for allegedly negligent medical care. 933 A.2d at 1073. The defendants
ultimately moved for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) they were immune
from liability under the PSTCA, and (2) the EMTs also were immune under the EMSA
because the plaintiffs did not plead gross negligence. Id.13 The trial court granted
summary judgment on the sole ground that all of the defendants were immune under
the PSTCA. Id.
We affirmed, concluding that no genuine issues of fact existed as to
whether the defendant volunteer fire company was a local agency protected from
immunity by the PSTCA. As a result, we also concluded that all of the defendants
were immune from liability and that the trial court properly granted summary judgment
in their favor. Id. at 1077-78. As in Christy, essential to our decision in Flood was the
principle that an entity’s status as a local agency under the PSTCA is controlling as to
whether it is liable for damages arising out of the provision of EMS care. Although
we did not address whether the EMTs also were entitled to immunity under the EMSA,

13
The EMTs also argued that they were immune under Section 8332(a) of the Judicial Code,
42 Pa.C.S. § 8332(a), which affords immunity to emergency response providers and bystander “Good
Samaritans” from claims arising from their provision of emergency care unless intentional or grossly
negligent conduct is established.

16
the question ultimately was irrelevant to our decision because, even if we had,
immunity under the PSTCA still would apply. Id. at 1078.
In arguing that the PSTCA and EMSSA must be read in pari materia to
create a new gross negligence exception to immunity, the Estate relies on several
distinguishable cases. It first cites to Sherk, 614 A.2d 226, in which the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania interpreted a specific “medical-professional liability” exception to
sovereign immunity, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(2),14 in pari materia with Section 114 of the
Mental Health Procedures Act,15 50 P.S. § 7114, which provides immunity to certain
mental healthcare providers absent a showing of willful misconduct or gross
negligence. The Court in Sherk, relying on its prior decision in Goryeb v. Department
of Public Welfare, 614 A.2d 226 (Pa. 1990), ruled that the two provisions must be read
in pari materia pursuant to Section 1932 of the Statutory Construction Act to except
from sovereign immunity claims for damages arising out of mental health treatment
where gross negligence or willful misconduct is established. 614 A.2d. at 231-33. The
Court concluded that the two provisions were not inconsistent, related to the same class
of persons or things, and functioned to waive sovereign immunity in those limited
circumstances. Id.
Sherk does not require a contrary result for one obvious reason: Section
8522(b)(2) of the Judicial Code specifically creates a “medical-professional liability”
exception to immunity through which Section 114 of the Mental Health Procedures

14
Section 8522(b)(2) waives sovereign immunity for “acts of health care employees of
Commonwealth agency medical facilities or institutions or by a Commonwealth party who is a doctor,
dentist, nurse or related health care personnel.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(2).

15
Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 817, as amended.

17
Act could be applied to allow claims for gross negligence or willful misconduct. Such
is not the case here.
The Estate also relies on Zuppo, 739 A.2d 1148, in which this Court
applied Section 1933 of the Statutory Construction Act to conclude that Section
7704(a) of the Emergency Management Services Code (Emergency Code), 35 Pa.C.S.
§ 7704(a),16 created an exception to sovereign immunity for willful misconduct during
declared disaster emergencies in addition to the nine exceptions to immunity listed in
Section 8522(b) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b). We noted that, because
the General Assembly specifically retained sovereign immunity for Commonwealth
parties unless otherwise waived by statute, it must have intended for Section 7704(a)
of the Emergency Code to operate as a limited, independent waiver of immunity
notwithstanding the fact that Section 8522(b) did not contain such an exception.
Zuppo, 739 A.2d at 1151 -52 (citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310). We reasoned:
Here, Section 7704(a) of the Emergency Code very
specifically applies to situations where Commonwealth
employees are engaged in emergency services activities. 35
Pa.C.S. § 7704(a). . . . In comparison, the nine narrow
exceptions set forth in Section 8522(b) of the Judicial Code,
though subject to strict construction, are somewhat more
general and are not limited to a period during which the
Governor issues a proclamation. They include 1) vehicle
liability; 2) medical-professional liability; 3) the care,
custody or control of personal property; 4) Commonwealth
real estate, highways and sidewalks; 5) potholes and other
dangerous conditions; 6) the care, custody or control of

16
At the time of the incident in Zuppo, Section 7704(a) provided immunity for
Commonwealth parties while engaged in emergency services activities, except for cases of willful
misconduct. See Zuppo, 739 A.2d at 1153 (citing former Section 7704(a)). Section 7704(a) was
amended in 2020 to add additional exceptions for gross negligence, recklessness, and bad faith. 42
Pa.C.S. § 7704(a).

18
animals; 7) liquor store sales; 8) natural guard activities; and
9) toxoids and vaccines.
Section 7704(a) of the Emergency Code is highly specific. It
provides that neither the Commonwealth nor any of its
employees shall be liable when engaged in emergency
services activities, except in cases of willful misconduct. In
addition, a proclamation of the Governor activates the
immunity-waiver provision for only a limited duration of
time. Therefore, we conclude that we can give effect to both
Section 8522(b) of the Judicial Code and the Emergency
Code and that the specific immunity provision found in the
latter applies in this instance.
Id. at 1152-53 (footnotes omitted).
Zuppo is distinguishable because, quite plainly, the waiver of immunity
for willful misconduct in Section 7704 is express and limited in both scope and
duration, and by its language it manifests the intent of the General Assembly to waive
immunity where there is willful misconduct in the performance of emergency services.
It therefore is not inconsistent with Section 8522(b) of the Judicial Code and operates
as an additional exception to immunity. Here, by contrast, Sections 8541 and 8542 of
the PSTCA do not contemplate exceptions to damages immunity found outside of
Section 8542(b), and Section 8151(2) of the EMSSA contains no express waiver of
immunity or other language evidencing the General Assembly’s clear intent to subject
local agencies to damages liability.17

17
The Estate also relies on the decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan in Malcolm, 468
N.W.2d 479. We are not bound by the decisions of other state courts, and, in any event, the decision
in Malcolm is distinguishable. The emergency medical services statute at issue in Malcolm defined
the “persons” covered by the statute to include government entities. Accordingly, the court in
Malcolm concluded that the legislature “clearly meant to single out certain governmental employees
and their governmental employers for standards of immunity different from those extant in the more
comprehensive [governmental tort liability act]. 468 N.W.2d at 482. By contrast, the EMSSA does
not expressly include local agencies in its definition of “EMS agency” and contains no language
(Footnote continued on next page…)

19
IV. Conclusion
For these reasons, we conclude that Sections 8541 and 8542 of the
PSTCA, and not Section 8151(2) of the EMSSA, governs whether a local agency
ambulance service is immune from suit for damages arising out of its provision of EMS
care. Given the lack of any dispute that AMED is a local agency under the PSTCA
and that none of the exceptions to immunity in Section 8542(b) apply, the trial court
did not err in sustaining AMED’s preliminary objections and dismissing the Complaint
with prejudice. We accordingly affirm its order.

---

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

Judge Wolf did not participate in the decision of this case.

suggesting that the General Assembly intended Section 8151(2) to “single out” local agency EMS
providers to be subject to gross negligence liability.
The Estate lastly relies on a one-sentence order entered by the Court of Common Pleas of
Allegheny County overruling preliminary objections without further explanation or comment. (R.R.
at 0086.) We cannot discern any rationale from that order, and a court of common pleas decision is
not binding in any event.

20
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Kristin Claypoole and Melissa :
Knepp as Co-Administrators of the :
Estate of Glenn M. Noel, :
Appellants :
:
v. : No. 196 C.D. 2025
:
Altoona-Logan Township Mobile :
Medical Emergency Department :
Authority d/b/a AMED :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 23rd day of April, 2026, the February 3, 2025 order of
the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County is hereby AFFIRMED.

---

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge