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March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State of New Jersey v. Deshawn F. Banks

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-1871-23

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (13)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2.8K)

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Combined Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1871-23

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DESHAWN F. BANKS,

Defendant-Appellant.

---

Submitted January 14, 2026 – Decided March 26, 2026

Before Judges Paganelli and Vanek.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 22-03-
0704.

Ronald B. Thompson, PC, attorney for appellant
(Amanda DeVault, of counsel and on the brief; Ronald
B. Thompson, on the brief).

Grace C. MacAulay, Camden County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Rachel M. Lamb, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
Defendant Deshawn F. Banks appeals from the July 7, 2022 order

denying his motion to suppress evidence after an evidentiary hearing. We

affirm, substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge David M. Ragonese in

his written statement of reasons.

I.

We discern the salient facts from the record established at the June 21,

2022 suppression hearing. The State called Camden County Police Officer

Matthew Napoli to testify and moved footage of Officer Napoli's body-worn

camera (BWC) into evidence, along with photographs of the location of

defendant's arrest and the weapon recovered.1 Defendant testified on his own

behalf.

At 12:40 a.m. on March 15, 2021, Officer Napoli was dispatched to "El

Recodo," a bar in Camden, in response to a 9-1-1 report that one of "four or

five individuals . . . wearing all black" possessed a firearm. Officer Napoli

and others arrested one individual at El Recodo but they did not recover a

weapon. Following that arrest, the investigation stemming from the 9-1-1

report was closed.

1
We have reviewed the BWC footage and photographs in evidence before the
trial court, after providing counsel additional time to comply with our sua
sponte orders requiring their submission.

A-1871-23
2
Officer Napoli was then directed to conduct "bar and park checks,"

which are hourly surveillance checks for "certain bars and parks throughout

the [C]ity [of Camden] due to the[] known crime that happens in those areas."

When conducting these checks, officers are to "[l]ook for anything that might

be out of the ordinary."

At around 1:40 a.m., Officer Napoli—in uniform and inside a marked

police vehicle—entered "Utah Park"2 (the Park) which he described as "a small

park, dark, [and in] a high-crime area known for shootings and narcotic-related

offenses." There is an entrance to the Park across the street from El Recodo.

Upon driving into the Park, Officer Napoli turned on the police vehicle's

"takedown lights"—bright illuminating lights used to "light up a dark area."

Officer Napoli observed a "male wearing all dark clothing"—later identified as

defendant—who "started running away." Officer Napoli followed defendant in

his vehicle.

As defendant ran, Officer Napoli observed defendant grab his waistband

and then, after running out of the Park, duck behind a white vehicle parked in a

driveway. Officer Napoli made the decision to stop defendant because, in his

experience, when someone grabs their waistband, that action indicates

possession of a "firearm."

2
The record refers to the park as both "Utah Park" and "Eutaw Park."

A-1871-23
3
Upon instructing defendant to show his hands, Officer Napoli observed

defendant "shaking down at his waistband and looking down." Defendant then

came out from behind the white vehicle and surrendered with his hands up.

Officer Napoli approached defendant and saw a black handgun on the ground

near defendant's feet. Crime scene investigators later recovered the firearm, a

Walther PK380 loaded with ammunition.

On March 15, 2022, a Camden County grand jury charged defendant

with second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1).

Defendant moved to suppress the handgun recovered at the scene of his arrest.

At the suppression hearing, defendant did not dispute that he was in the

Park during those early morning hours but asserted he had left his friend 's

house and was on his way to meet a girl. Defendant stated while he was

walking through the Park he saw lights, and because he did not know who was

driving, he ran until he was "out of breath," crouching behind the white

vehicle. Defendant testified Officer Napoli then got out of the police car with

his firearm drawn, told him to stand up with his hands raised, and arrested him.

After hearing oral argument, the judge denied defendant's suppression

motion, setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law in a written

statement of reasons. The judge found Officer Napoli's BWC footage

corroborated his testimony. The judge found defendant's testimony was not

A-1871-23
4
credible "because he immediately became defensive on cross[-]examination

and did not want to answer the questions posed by the State" and "was unable

to provide specific answers[] and took long pauses between answering the

questions."

The judge concluded that "the investigatory stop of defendant occurred

when Officer Napoli stepped out of his vehicle with his firearm drawn." The

judge found under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Napoli had a

"particularized suspicion" sufficient to lawfully stop defendant because

defendant was "grabbing at his waistband" while running and Officer Napoli

observed defendant matched the description of the individual possessing a

firearm at El Recodo, which is across the street from the Park.

The judge also concluded that the seizure of the firearm comported with

prevailing law because it was in Officer Napoli's plain view on the ground by

defendant's feet, and there were no facts to suggest that defendant was in

lawful possession of the firearm. He found Officer Napoli was lawfully on the

driveway where the weapon was recovered due to his "hot pursuit" of

defendant. The judge also reasoned that the exigent circumstances exception

to the warrant requirement justified seizure of the firearm.

A-1871-23
5
Defendant pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to three years'

incarceration with one year of parole ineligibility pursuant to the Graves Act,

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c).

Defendant raises the following points for our consideration:

I. THE SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD HAVE
BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE THE STATE LACKED
PARTICULARIZED SUSPICION TO JUSTIFY THE
INVESTIGATORY STOP.

II. THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE DOES NOT
JUSTIFY THE SEIZURE BECAUSE THE INITIAL
ENCOUNTER WAS UNLAWFUL.

II.

A.

The Supreme Court recently reiterated the well-settled law governing

our review of a trial court order deciding a motion to suppress evidence,

stating:

When appellate courts review the grant or denial
of a motion to suppress, they "must defer to the factual
findings of the trial court so long as those findings are
supported by sufficient evidence in the record." State
v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015). Only when
factual findings "are clearly mistaken" can they be set
aside. Ibid. "We accord no deference, however, to a
trial court's interpretation of law, which we review de
novo." State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521, 538 (2017).

[State v. Caneiro, 262 N.J. 288, 300 (2025) (citations
reformatted).]

A-1871-23
6
"'An appellate court should not disturb the trial court's findings merely

because "it might have reached a different conclusion were it the trial tribunal "

or because "the trial court decided all evidence or inference conflicts in favor

of one side" in a close case.'" State v. Nelson, 237 N.J. 540, 551 (2019)

(quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007)). "'The governing principle,

then, is that "[a] trial court's findings should be disturbed only if they are so

clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and

correction."'" Id. at 551-52 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Robinson,

200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009)).

B.

We discern no error in the judge's denial of defendant's suppression

motion because the investigatory stop and the seizure of the handgun were

both lawful under prevailing constitutional principles.

"The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,

Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, in almost identical language,

protect against unreasonable searches and seizures." Caneiro, 262 N.J. at 300

(quoting State v. Smart, 253 N.J. 156, 164 (2023)). Searches and seizures

"without warrants issued upon probable cause are presumptively unreasonable

and therefore invalid." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]o

overcome that presumption under both constitutions, the State must show by a

A-1871-23
7
preponderance of evidence that the search falls within one of the well-

recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement." Ibid.

"Those exceptions include investigatory stops, also known as Terry stops

after the landmark United States Supreme Court decision, Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1 (1968)." State v. Alessi, 240 N.J. 501, 517-18 (2020). "[A]n

investigatory stop is an exception justified only by reasonable suspicion of

involvement in a crime." Id. at 523-24. Although the "[r]easonable suspicion

necessary to justify an investigatory stop is a lower standard than the probable

cause necessary to sustain an arrest," State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 356

(2002), police must have "some minimal level of objective justification for

making the stop." State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 511 (2003) (quoting United

States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). Thus, "[a]n investigative stop or

detention does not offend the Federal or State Constitution, and no warrant is

needed, 'if it is based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken together

with rational inferences from those facts," give rise to a reasonable suspicion

of criminal activity.'" State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384, 399 (2022) (quoting

State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 126 (2002) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21)).

To determine whether reasonable, articulable suspicion exists for an

investigatory stop, trial courts must conduct a highly fact-sensitive inquiry,

evaluating "the totality of the circumstances surrounding the police -citizen

A-1871-23
8
encounter, balancing the State's interest in effective law enforcement against

the individual's right to be protected from unwarranted and/or overbearing

police intrusions." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). No one fact is

issue-dispositive on what constitutes reasonable and particularized suspicion to

conduct a stop. See id. at 400 (stating residents of a high-crime area do not

possess lesser constitutional protection from police interactions); see also

Nishina, 175 N.J. at 511 (stating "[f]acts that might seem innocent when

viewed in isolation can sustain a finding of reasonable suspicion when

considered in the aggregate").

Our well-settled jurisprudence informs our conclusion that the judge

engaged in the requisite fact-specific inquiry based on the totality of the

circumstances. The judge did not impermissibly rely solely on the closed

investigation into the 9-1-1 caller's report of criminal activity at El Recodo to

find the investigatory stop comported with Terry. See State v. Nyema, 249

N.J. 509, 531-32 (2022); State v. Caldwell, 158 N.J. 452, 460 (1999). Nor did

the judge rely only on defendant's flight from Officer Napoli's vehicle as he

ran through the Park. See State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 168-69 (1994).

Instead, the judge evaluated the circumstances in their totality based on Officer

Napoli's credible testimony. The judge reasoned Officer Napoli had

reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity because

A-1871-23
9
defendant matched the description of one of the criminal actors reported by the

9-1-1 caller to be at El Recodo across the street from the Park, the event took

place an hour after the arrest at El Recodo, and defendant ran away from the

marked police vehicle while grabbing at his waistband.

There is sufficient, credible evidence in the record to support the judge's

conclusion that Officer Napoli had reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct

an investigatory Terry stop of defendant under well-established constitutional

principles.

C.

We are unconvinced that Officer Napoli's seizure of the firearm from the

ground near defendant's feet when he was stopped was unlawful. On the

contrary, the seizure was authorized under the plain-view exception to the

warrant requirement.

"Under the plain-view doctrine, the constitutional limiting principle is

that the officer must lawfully be in the area where he observed and seized the

incriminating item or contraband, and it must be immediately apparent that the

seized item is evidence of a crime." State v. Williams, 254 N.J. 8, 45 (2023)

(emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101 (2016)).

Officer Napoli observed the handgun in plain view on the ground near

defendant's feet during a lawful Terry stop. Because the credible evidence

A-1871-23
10
established that Officer Napoli could observe the suspected firearm lying next

to defendant's feet on the driveway, we are unconvinced the judge erred in

finding the plain view exception to the warrant requirement legalized the

seizure.

We have carefully considered the remainder of defendant's contentions

in view of the applicable law and the record and conclude they are without

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.

A-1871-23
11