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March 16, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Valerie Karl Hester v. Vladislav Bargman, M.D.

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-0335-24

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0335-24

VALERIE KARL HESTER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

VLADISLAV BARGMAN, M.D.,
RUTGERS, THE STATE
UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY,
RUTGERS BIOMEDICAL AND
HEALTH SCIENCES, RUTGERS
NEW JERSEY MEDICAL
SCHOOL, and UNIVERSITY
HOSPITAL, a/k/a UNIVERSITY
HOSPITAL NEWARK,

Defendants-Respondents.

---

Submitted January 28, 2026 – Decided March 16, 2026

Before Judges Gummer and Paganelli.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-2842-20.

Valerie Karl Hester, self-represented appellant.
Ruprecht Hart Ricciardulli & Sherman, LLP, attorneys
for respondents (Renee J. Sherman, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

On September 17, 2024, plaintiff Valerie Karl Hester failed to appear for

trial. The trial court entered an order dismissing her complaint. She appeals

from that order. Because we conclude the judge did not abuse her discretion by

dismissing the complaint, we affirm.

We glean the procedural history from the record. Plaintiff, represented by

an attorney, filed a medical malpractice complaint against defendants.

Defendants filed an answer and asserted various defenses. The parties engaged

in discovery. The court granted plaintiff's counsel's motion to withdraw as

plaintiff's attorney, noting the motion was unopposed and that plaintiff had

moved "to proceed pro se."

Trial in the matter was scheduled to begin on September 16, 2024.

Defendants' request for an adjournment was opposed by plaintiff and denied by

the Civil Part presiding judge.

Plaintiff and counsel for defendants appeared on September 16. Plaintiff

requested that the matter proceed as a bench trial. Defendants initially refused

to waive their right to a jury trial but ultimately agreed to proceed with a bench

trial.

A-0335-24
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Plaintiff stated she was "going to drop" her lawsuit against her former

attorney and "hire him back." The trial judge stated she "would allow it" if the

attorney was "going to step back in." However, after the judge gave plaintiff

time to contact the attorney, plaintiff advised the attorney "c[ould]n't come today

because this is a last-minute thing."

Plaintiff sought to submit her expert's report in lieu of the expert's live

testimony at trial. The judge explained that pursuant to the rules of court, the

report was "not admissible" unless the expert was present and defendants were

"allowed to cross-examine the" expert. The judge suggested plaintiff could start

the trial by giving her testimony and the "expert would have to be [t]here

tomorrow." The judge explained that, like a juror, she was an "average

layperson when it comes to medical malpractice." Therefore, she stated plaintiff

"need[ed] an expert to come in . . . to testify."

Because plaintiff was not feeling well, the judge recessed the matter to the

next day. The judge explained that the trial would begin in the morning with

plaintiff's expert scheduled to testify in the afternoon. Plaintiff stated she would

"try [her] best" and the judge reiterated that she would see the parties at

9:00 a.m. and if plaintiff's expert was not there in the afternoon, she would "have

to dismiss [the] case."

A-0335-24
3
On the evening of September 16, plaintiff emailed a judge who had

presided over earlier proceedings in this case. Plaintiff stated:

Please inform [the trial judge] that I will not be
attending trial tomorrow for reason that it's quite
impossible for anyone to obtain a [m]edical [e]xpert to
testify at this trial in [one] day.

On September 17, 2024, the judge reconvened the trial. Defendants'

counsel was present, but plaintiff failed to appear. The judge noted she was

provided with plaintiff's email from the other judge's chambers. The judge

referenced the email, noting plaintiff "knew the trial" was scheduled to proceed,

"did not have an expert" and was "not prepared to move forward." The judge

stated she had "no choice" but to dismiss plaintiff's complaint as the judge

previously advised.

On appeal, plaintiff requests that we "remand this matter back to the trial

court for an entry of a [d]efault [j]udg[]ment." She contends: (1) the judge

should have been disqualified because she was "friends" with defense counsel

and her former attorney; (2) the judge was biased and presented an unfavorable

demeanor; (3) the judge did not follow the "rules of evidence, [r]ules of . . .

[c]ourt," or judicial canons; (4) the judge's handling of landlord tenant matters

disqualified her from handling medical malpractice matters; (5) she was not

properly served or informed of the trial date; (6) the dismissal was "illegal"; (7)

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her United States and New Jersey constitutional rights were violated; and (8) an

$80 million default judgment should have been entered against defendants

because they did not personally appear at trial.

We review the judge's decision to dismiss the complaint for an abuse of

discretion. See Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 300 (2020) ("The

decision to dismiss a case . . . for failure to appear for trial falls within the

discretion of the trial judge."). See also R. 1:2-4(a)(c) ("[I]f without just excuse

. . . no appearance is made on behalf of a party . . . on the day of trial . . . the

court may order . . . the dismissal of the complaint."). An abuse of discretion

"arises when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably

departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Flagg

v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez

v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)). "In

other words, a functional approach to abuse of discretion examines whether

there are good reasons for an appellate court to defer to the particular decision

at issue." Ibid.

"To prove medical malpractice, ordinarily, 'a plaintiff must present expert

testimony establishing (1) the applicable standard of care; (2) a deviation from

that standard of care; and (3) that the deviation proximately caused the injury. '"

A-0335-24
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Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 478 (2013) (quoting Gardner v. Pawliw, 150

N.J. 359, 375 (1997)). "Absent competent expert proof of these three elements,

the case is not sufficient for determination by the jury." Rosenberg v. Tavorath,

352 N.J. Super. 385, 399 (App. Div. 2002) (citing Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J.

128, 134-35 (1961)); see also Medina v. Pitta, 442 N.J. Super. 1, 24 (App. Div.

2015) ("there is no question that expert testimony [i]s required for plaintiff's

claims to succeed" and "'the standard of practice to which [the defendant-

practitioner] failed to adhere must be established by expert testimony'") (quoting

Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318, 325 (1985)) (alteration in original).

We conclude the judge did not abuse her discretion by dismissing

plaintiff's complaint for failure to appear at trial. The judge explained that

expert testimony was required for plaintiff's case to proceed. According to

plaintiff's email, she was not ready to proceed because she did not have an

expert. Under these circumstances, dismissal was appropriate. Moreover, the

email was silent regarding when the expert could or would be available, and

plaintiff's failure to appear left the judge without any information regarding the

expert's availability to testify.

Defendants' decision to appear at trial through counsel was permissible

and would not be grounds for the court to enter a default judgment. See N.J.

A-0335-24
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Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. P.W.R., 410 N.J. Super. 501, 506 (App. Div.

2009) ("Because a party represented by counsel may defend at trial without

being physically present, default may not be entered when a party is not present

at a trial absent evidence that the party has not otherwise defended as required

by rule or court order"), rev'd on other grounds, 205 N.J. 17 (2011). See also R.

4:43-1 ("If a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has

failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules or court order, or

if the answer has been stricken with prejudice, the clerk shall enter a default on

the docket as to such party. . . .").

To the extent not addressed, plaintiff's remaining contentions lack

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

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