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March 17, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

C.B. v. J.P.

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-1842-24

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (24)

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Combined Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1842-24

C.B.,1

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

J.P.,

Defendant-Respondent.

---

Submitted December 18, 2025 ‒ Decided March 17, 2026

Before Judges Marczyk and Bishop-Thompson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County,
Docket No. FV-09-1232-25.

Donelson, D'Alessandro & Peterson, LLC, attorneys
for appellant (Keith A. Peterson, on the briefs).

Matthew Jeon, attorney for respondent.

PER CURIAM

1
We use initials to protect domestic violence victims. R. 1:38-3(c)(12).
Plaintiff C.B. appeals from the denial of her application for a final

restraining order (FRO) under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act

(PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, following a hearing. Having considered the

record and the applicable legal principles, we reverse and remand for a new

hearing before a different judge.

I.

We glean the following undisputed facts elicited from C.B.'s testimony at

the FRO hearing, which was conducted on January 17, 2025. Both parties were

represented by counsel at the hearing. C.B. and J.P. dated for less than two

months during the summer of 2024. C.B. alleged and provided detailed

testimony J.P. sexually assaulted her on two occasions: July 23 and August 17,

1. According to C.B., J.P. used coercion and force to engage in

nonconsensual sexual acts with her, ignoring her repeated verbal refusals.

Despite the alleged assaults, the parties continued to interact, exchanging

messages with affectionate and sexual content, meeting in person, and engaging

in consensual sexual intercourse at least once following the first incident. The

relationship ultimately ended in late August 2024.

Between August 17 and 26, 2024, after the second alleged assault, C.B.

reported the incidents to the Jersey City Police Department and sought to obtain

A-1842-24
2
a temporary restraining order (TRO). She testified a department detective

instructed her to delay filing for the TRO until the police made contact with J.P.

Following this instruction, C.B. did not pursue the TRO until October 24, 2024,

after being informed the police had contacted J.P.

C.B. ultimately filed the complaint and obtained the TRO, alleging J.P.

committed the predicate acts of assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1; sexual assault,

N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1); criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3; and

harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. She further testified although J.P. had not

contacted her since the TRO was granted; she remained fearful and stated the

FRO was necessary to protect her from J.P.

J.P. did not testify or present any witnesses. After reciting the relevant

statutory definitions and case law pertaining to assault, sexual assault, criminal

sexual contact, and harassment, the court summarized C.B.'s testimony

regarding the alleged predicate acts. The court also made credibility

determinations, finding C.B.'s testimony generally credible and noting no

significant inconsistencies or evidence of fabrication. It further acknowledged

C.B.'s demeanor, responsiveness to the questions, and body language appeared

consistent with "a person that [wa]s generally truthful with the [c]ourt."

A-1842-24
3
However, the court found certain aspects of C.B.'s testimony regarding

the version of events were, "at times, . . . not plausible or logical," and therefore

discounted those portions of the testimony. Specifically, in reviewing the text

messages between the parties, the court found there were no references to the

alleged assaults, no apologies by J.P., and no expressions from C.B. regarding

her feelings about the alleged assaults. On that basis, the court further

discounted C.B.'s testimony.

Additionally, the court did not credit C.B.'s explanation for the delay in

contacting the police—namely, her claim she was advised by a detective not to

immediately seek a restraining order—finding this explanation "simply

implausible." The court opined, as a matter of law, no police officer would ever

offer such advice. It also found C.B.'s testimony unsupported because she did

not have the detective testify at the hearing.

The court "disregard[ed] all of [C.B.]'s testimony regarding the predicate

acts" and determined C.B. failed to satisfy the first prong of the analysis under

Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006). On January 17, 2025,

the court denied the FRO, dismissed the domestic violence complaint, and

vacated the TRO. This appeal ensued.

A-1842-24
4
II.

The scope of appellate review following the grant or denial of an FRO is

limited. T.B. v. I.W., 479 N.J. Super. 404, 412 (App. Div. 2024). In reviewing

"a trial court's order entered following trial in a domestic violence matter, we

grant substantial deference to the trial court's findings of fact and the legal

conclusions based upon those findings." J.D. v. A.M.W., 475 N.J. Super. 306,

312-13 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting N.T.B. v. D.D.B., 442 N.J. Super. 205, 215

(App. Div. 2015)). Generally, findings by a trial court "are binding on appeal

when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." T.M.S. v. W.C.P.,

450 N.J. Super. 499, 502 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J.

394, 411-12 (1998)).

"We defer to the credibility determinations made by the trial court because

the trial judge 'hears the case, sees and observes the witnesses, and hears them

testify,' affording it 'a better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the

veracity of witnesses.'" Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting

Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412). We afford "particular deference to the Family Part

because of its 'special jurisdiction and expertise' in family matters." Harte v.

Hand, 433 N.J. Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at

A-1842-24
5
412). We, however, review a trial court's legal conclusions de novo. C.C. v.

J.A.H., 463 N.J. Super. 419, 429 (App. Div. 2020).

In determining whether to enter an FRO under the PDVA, the court is

required to make certain findings regarding each alleged predicate act pursuant

to a two-step analysis. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125-27. Initially, "the [court]

must determine whether [a] plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the

credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A.

2C:25-19(a) has occurred." Id. at 125 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)). If a

predicate act is proven, the court must next determine whether a restraining

order is necessary to protect a plaintiff from immediate harm or further acts of

abuse. Id. at 127.

The predicate act of assault is committed when a person "[a]ttempts to

cause or purposely, knowingly[,] or recklessly causes bodily injury to

another[.]" N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a)(1). "Bodily injury" is "physical pain, illness or

any impairment of physical condition[.]" N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(a); see also State v.

Stull, 403 N.J. Super. 501, 505 (App. Div. 2008).

Sexual assault is another predicate act under the PDVA. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-

19(a)(7). A person commits a sexual assault if, during the act of sexual

penetration with another person, "[t]he actor commits the act using coercion or

A-1842-24
6
without the victim's affirmative and freely-given permission, but the victim does

not sustain severe personal injury." N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1).

N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b) provides that "[a]n actor is guilty of criminal sexual

contact if he commits an act of sexual contact with the victim under any of the

circumstances set forth in section 2C:14-2(c) (1) through (5)." "Sexual contact"

is defined as "an intentional touching by the . . . actor, either directly or through

clothing, of the victim's . . . intimate parts for the purpose of degrading or

humiliating the victim or sexually arousing or sexually gratifying the act or."

N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(d).

A person is guilty of the predicate act of harassment, "if, with purpose to

harass another," the person "[e]ngages in any other course of alarming conduct

or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such

other person." N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c). "'A finding of a purpose to harass may be

inferred from the evidence presented' and from common sense and experience."

H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 175 N.J. 309, 327 (2003) (quoting State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J.

564, 577 (1997)).

Here, the court did not make factual findings J.P. had committed one of

the alleged acts prohibited by the PDVA, nor did it engage in a principled

analysis to determine whether C.B. proved each act by a preponderance of the

A-1842-24
7
evidence. See Big Smoke LLC v. Twp. of W. Milford, 478 N.J. Super. 203,

227-28 (App. Div. 2024). The trial court also did not address the second prong

of Silver—whether an FRO was necessary to protect C.B.—based on her

testimony of ongoing fear and distress.

Instead, the court discounted C.B.'s testimony and determined her

credibility regarding her initial pursuit of a TRO based on judicial notice of a

purported practice by police officers, rather than on an assessment of the

relevant evidence. See N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. A.M.W., 480

N.J. Super. 496, 506 (App. Div. 2024). It likewise discounted C.B.'s testimony

due to the lack of allegations or apologies in the text messages between the

parties, without correlating this evidence to any specific predicate acts.

Therefore, no deference is owed to the court's ruling given the absence of any

legal conclusion. See Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019).

Absent an expressed holding on specific predicate acts, or other findings from

which an implicit determination may be discerned, we conclude reversal and

remand is warranted.

In sum, we reverse, reinstate C.B.'s complaint and TRO, and remand for

a new hearing before a different judge. See Entress v. Entress, 376 N.J. Super.

125, 133 (App. Div. 2005) (determining that "[i]n an abundance of caution," a

A-1842-24
8
remanded matter should be assigned to "a different judge for the plenary hearing

to avoid the appearance of bias or prejudice based on the judge's prior

involvement with the matter and his expressions" of doubt as to a party's

credibility); R. 1:12-1(d); Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 4

on R. 1:12-1 (2026) (stating "the appellate court has the authority to direct that

a different judge consider the matter on remand in order to preserve the

appearance of a fair and unprejudiced hearing"). We take no position with

respect to the outcome of the FRO hearing.

Reversed and remanded for a new hearing consistent with this opinion.

We do not retain jurisdiction.

A-1842-24
9