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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

O.D. v. J.S.

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-3904-23

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (24)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (9.4K)

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Combined Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3904-23

O.D.,1

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.S.,

Defendant-Appellant.

---

Submitted March 10, 2026 – Decided March 18, 2026

Before Judges Firko and Perez Friscia.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket
No. FV-07-2302-24.

Robert C. Pierce, attorney for appellant.

Pescatore & Sauter, LLC, attorneys for respondent
(Amy L. Sauter, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

1
We use initials and a pseudonym to protect the parties' privacy and the
confidentiality of these proceedings. R. 1:38-3(d)(10).
Defendant J.S. appeals from the June 28, 2024 final restraining order

(FRO) entered against him in favor of plaintiff O.D. pursuant to the Prevention

of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, based on the

predicate acts of stalking, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10.1, and harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-

4(c).2 The Family Part judge determined an FRO was necessary to protect

plaintiff from future acts of domestic violence. Defendant also appeals from an

October 1, 2024 order awarding plaintiff counsel fees in the amount of

$16,327.50. Because we find no reason to disturb the judge's findings, we affirm

both orders.

I.

The facts were established at the four-day hearing conducted in March,

May, and June 2024. Both parties were represented by counsel. Plaintiff and

four police officers, K.D., F.C., A.B., and L.C., testified on her behalf.

Defendant testified on his own behalf and presented testimony from an

employee, R.B., from Batesville Casket Company and his neighbor, F.M.

Defendant owns funeral homes in Passaic and Brooklyn, New York . Maps,

2
The June 28, 2024 FRO also states it was granted on the grounds of assault.
The judge made no findings on the predicate act of assault. We therefore limit
our discussion to the predicate acts of stalking and harassment.
A-3904-23
2
photographs, copies of the restraining orders, text messages, an email, an air

waybill, surveillance video, and status manifests were moved into evidence.

The parties dated from approximately 2015 until October 2022 but never

married. They have a seven-year-old child in common, "James." Plaintiff also

has a child from a previous relationship. In the Fall of 2022, the parties ceased

romantic relations, and defendant began sleeping in the basement of their Nutley

home, which they purchased together. The parties continued to reside there until

October 9, 2023.

On June 7, 2023, following an argument, plaintiff testified defendant

forced his way into her locked bedroom using a screwdriver, grabbed her, and

pinned her down to the point she could not breathe. As a result, plaintiff

sustained injuries to her arms and legs as depicted in the photographs moved

into evidence. Plaintiff testified that during this incident, defendant took her

cell phone and placed it in the ceiling beyond her reach. Plaintiff was able to

communicate with a friend from her laptop, and the police were called.

Defendant admitted at trial that he opened the locked door with a screwdriver

and took plaintiff's cell phone.

On September 8, 2023, defendant confronted plaintiff regarding her

whereabouts in Brooklyn after discovering a parking ticket was issued to her.

A-3904-23
3
Plaintiff testified the ticket was placed in her car and purse, and defendant could

have only known about it by searching her property. Defendant sent plaintiff a

text message asking if she had been in Brooklyn on a given date and requested

information about her whereabouts. Plaintiff responded she was in Brooklyn

but for work-related reasons, and it was none of defendant's business why she

was there. Defendant sent plaintiff a picture of the parking ticket she received

to demonstrate he knew she was in Brooklyn and that he saw her with another

man, which caused her to be "very scared."

On October 2, 2023, the parties got into an argument about who was going

to walk their dog. Plaintiff began to walk the dog, and defendant followed her

out of the house, leaving the children alone. Plaintiff tried to run away from

defendant, but he chased her. Plaintiff described defendant's behavior as "very

absurd," and defendant did not stop chasing her until she called her mother for

help.

Later that evening, defendant entered her bedroom to use the bathroom to

take a shower despite having a bathroom in the basement. After he showered,

plaintiff locked her bedroom door. Defendant then banged on the door, threw a

sock in plaintiff's face, and yelled at her not to ignore him. Afterwards, plaintiff

A-3904-23
4
sent defendant a text message about his behavior, and he denied the incident

ever happened and claimed he was not home at the time.

On October 6, 2023, one year after the end of their romantic relationship,

plaintiff testified defendant "stalked and harassed" her at a Red Roof Inn.

According to plaintiff, defendant appeared in the parking lot and parked behind

her vehicle to block her from leaving. Defendant opened plaintiff's car door and

threatened to tell her family and friends where he found her and what he believed

she was doing there. Plaintiff testified defendant would not allow her to leave

until she explained why she was at the hotel, but she refused. Plaintiff played a

video of the incident at trial, which was captured on a police body worn camera

and confirmed defendant's presence at the hotel.

Plaintiff testified the parties exchanged text messages about the incident.

Defendant denied being at the hotel and texted plaintiff that she was going

"crazy." Plaintiff later learned that defendant installed an app on James's iPad

to monitor his location. Defendant claimed he only went to the hotel because,

using the app, he noticed James was in Secaucus, which was "unusual."

Defendant tracked James to the hotel's parking lot where plaintiff also was.

Plaintiff testified in another text message defendant informed her that "it would

be in her best interest to get along with him and to just play it cool."

A-3904-23
5
As a result of these incidents, plaintiff sought and was granted a temporary

restraining order (TRO) against defendant on October 9, 2023, which was

amended on October 17, 2023. After the TRO was served, defendant moved out

of the parties' home but used a mobile device to remotely activate plaintiff's

ADT alarm system on October 13 and November 2, 2023, at 3:00 a.m., causing

her fear and anxiety. Regarding the October 13 incident, plaintiff testified she

was alone when defendant tampered with the alarm, which made her feel "very

uneasy" and "very fearful." At trial, defendant admitted that he activated the

alarm. The incident was reported to Officer L.C. At that time, defendant was

charged with contempt for violating the TRO and harassment.

Plaintiff agreed to dismiss the TRO in exchange for the entry of a consent

order providing for civil restraints. The consent order, entered on December 5,

2023, specifically stated that defendant agreed not to stalk or harass plaintiff.

The parties agreed to co-parent only using Our Family Wizard. The parties also

agreed that plaintiff would purchase defendant's interest in their home for

$100,000 in two payments of $50,000 due on January 1, 2024, and January 1,

1. Plaintiff was to have exclusive possession of the residence. Defendant

testified that plaintiff did not meet the first payment deadline.

A-3904-23
6
Notwithstanding the terms of the consent order, on January 3, 2024,

defendant tracked and followed plaintiff to a Hampton Inn. Plaintiff stated

defendant's actions caused her "fear," and she was "intimidated" by him.

Plaintiff went to the local police station and observed defendant had parked his

vehicle behind her in the parking lot. Surveillance cameras captured defendant's

presence at the police station, and criminal charges were filed.

Defendant countered he had a reason to be in those locations because after

delivering the remains of a body at Newark Liberty International Airport, he

drove to Batesville Casket Company in Moonachie to pick up a coffin.

Defendant testified he got lost in East Rutherford and drove into the Hampton

Inn parking lot when he saw plaintiff's vehicle. At 1:15 p.m., he arrived at

Batesville Casket Company, as confirmed by employee R.B.'s testimony.

Defendant claimed the encounter at the Hampton Inn and the police station were

"coincidences."

Plaintiff testified the stalking and harassing incidents were the result of

her starting to date other people, which defendant expressed to her. Police

officer K.D. testified about the January 3, 2024 incident and plaintiff's report of

what happened. Officer F.C. testified about the same incident and authenticated

the surveillance video that showed where the parties' vehicles were parked and

A-3904-23
7
a man that matched plaintiff's description of defendant. Officer F.C. testified

plaintiff's demeanor was "upset and scared."

Police officer A.B. testified about his investigation of the November 2,

2023 alarm incident. Officer A.B. contacted ADT Alarm Company and learned

the alarm was set off remotely by defendant using the ADP phone app. As a

result of this information, Officer A.B. testified defendant was charged with

contempt of the TRO and harassment.

Police officer L.C. testified about his investigation of the October 13,

2023 alarm incident. Officer L.C. testified plaintiff reported she did not activate

the alarm but believed defendant had done so because he had remote access.

Plaintiff testified she needed an FRO because she felt "scared" and

believed defendant was "incapable of adhering to any of the restraints" lodged

against him. Plaintiff explained that defendant "does [not] respect any sort of

boundaries and uses all . . . forms of stalking, harassment, [and] manipulation

. . . to hurt [her] in any way he can." Defendant testified he did not harass or

stalk plaintiff, and their "contretemps [were] fueled by competing views on how

to raise [James]."

The parties' neighbor, F.M., testified that he witnessed their garage door

being left open on October 19, 2023, at 11:45 p.m. and immediately reported it

A-3904-23
8
to defendant. According to defendant, F.M.'s testimony was relevant to show

he activated the alarm because "he was concerned with the safety of his son."

The judge found F.M. "credible" but "discount[ed]" his testimony because the

October 19, 2023 incident was not referenced in the amended TRO and occurred

after defendant set off the alarm on October 13, 2023.

In her comprehensive oral decision, the judge determined jurisdiction was

established under the PDVA because the parties dated, were former household

members, and have a child in common. The judge found plaintiff's testimony

was "credible" and "consistent," and plaintiff comported herself, sometimes

emotionally, in an appropriate manner maintaining "good eye contact"

throughout. The judge noted plaintiff was "extremely respectful" to the court.

Overall, the judge observed plaintiff was "not evasive at all" in answering

questions. The judge found plaintiff was not seeking an FRO "to get money or

. . . to stop paying defendant" for his share of their former home . Instead, the

judge reasoned plaintiff is seeking an FRO because she wants "to be left alone"

by defendant.

The judge found defendant was incredulous when he testified it was

merely a "coincidence" to find plaintiff at two different hotels and at the police

station in a different vehicle with different clothing on when plaintiff attempted

A-3904-23
9
to report the incident to the police. The judge noted defendant's testimony "did

not make any sense." The judge rejected defendant's testimony that he was

worried about James because he was with plaintiff at the hotel. The judge stated

"whatever [plaintiff] does with her son is her business" because she was the

parent in control at the time. The judge emphasized defendant's behavior was

"outrageous," and consequently, plaintiff's fear was "understandable." The

judge highlighted that defendant used "constant mind manipulation," and his

responses were "classic telltale signs of the definition of gaslighting," because

he tried to make plaintiff think she was "crazy" or making things up.

The judge determined the police officers were "very credible." The judge

noted Officer K.D. "just stuck to the facts," did not know the parties, had no

"bias", and "just reported what he saw." The judge credited Officer K.D.'s

testimony that plaintiff "showed emotions of being upset and scared." The judge

observed Officer L.C. had no "ulterior motive in this case," did not "embellish"

his testimony, and "just answered questions." The judge determined Officer

A.B. was "very credible" and testified plaintiff informed him defendant caused

the alarm to go off, resulting in a violation of the TRO and the contempt charge.

The judge found plaintiff proved the predicate act of stalking because

defendant, absent any communication from plaintiff, showed up at two different

A-3904-23
10
hotel parking lots on two separate occasions. The judge determined these two

instances were not coincidences, and plaintiff was "shocked" and "frightened"

by defendant's actions.

The judge also determined plaintiff proved the predicate act of harassment

based on these same events. The judge reasoned that the placement of the

tracking app on James's iPad was "outrageous" and meant to be "deceitful" as

part of defendant's "ulterior motive." The judge analyzed subsection (c) of the

harassment statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, in making her findings of fact and

conclusions of law and found plaintiff proved defendant committed harassment

under that subsection. The judge noted plaintiff did not prove subsections (a)

or (b) of the harassment statute.

Finally, the judge found that plaintiff needed an FRO. In doing so, the

judge credited plaintiff's testimony that she is afraid of defendant. The judge

analyzed both Silver3 prongs, the seven statutory factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-

29(a), and recognized plaintiff's need for an FRO. The judge considered the

history of domestic violence and prior TRO between the parties and the need to

protect plaintiff from further abuse. The judge determined there is "obvious

3
Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125-27 (App. Div. 2006).

A-3904-23
11
immediate danger" to plaintiff given her finding that defendant's "conduct is

go[ing] to continue," and defendant will continue to use James as "the motive of

having to know where . . . [p]laintiff is at all times."

The judge also granted plaintiff's request for counsel fees pursuant to

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(4).4 Plaintiff's counsel filed a certification of services,

and defendant filed opposition, and plaintiff filed a reply to defendant's

4
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(4) provides:

An order requiring the defendant to pay to the victim
monetary compensation for losses suffered as a direct
result of the act of domestic violence. The order may
require the defendant to pay the victim directly, to
reimburse the Victims of Crime Compensation Office
for any and all compensation paid by the Victims of
Crime Compensation Office directly to or on behalf of
the victim, and may require that the defendant
reimburse any parties that may have compensated the
victim, as the [c]ourt may determine. Compensatory
losses shall include, but not be limited to, loss of
earnings or other support, including child or spousal
support, out-of-pocket losses for injuries sustained,
cost of repair or replacement of real or personal
property damaged or destroyed or taken by the
defendant, cost of counseling for the victim, moving or
other travel expenses, reasonable attorney's fees,
[c]ourt costs, and compensation for pain and suffering.
Where appropriate, punitive damages may be awarded
in addition to compensatory damages.

A-3904-23
12
opposition. The judge awarded plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of

$16,327.50, in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(4) and RPC 1.5(a). This

appeal followed.

Before us, defendant argues:

(1) the entry of the FRO was based on the judge's
erroneous "all-or-nothing" approach to fact-finding and
decision-making warranting reversal;

(2) the predicate act findings were inadequate and
insufficiently supported;

(3) the need for an FRO was insufficiently established;
and

(4) the order awarding fees should be vacated.

II.

Generally, "findings by a trial court are binding on appeal when supported

by adequate, substantial, [and] credible evidence." Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414,

428 (2015). "We accord substantial deference to Family Part judges, who

routinely hear domestic violence cases and are 'specially trained to detect the

difference between domestic violence and more ordinary differences that arise

between couples.'" C.C. v. J.A.H., 463 N.J. Super. 419, 428 (App. Div. 2020)

(quoting J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 482 (2011)). "[D]eference is especially

appropriate 'when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of

A-3904-23
13
credibility.'" MacKinnon v. MacKinnon, 191 N.J. 240, 254 (2007) (quoting

Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998)).

We will not disturb a trial court's factual findings unless "they are so

manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant[,] and

reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Cesare, 154

N.J. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484

(1974)). However, we do not accord such deference to legal conclusions and

will review such conclusions de novo. Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269,

283 (2016).

The purpose of the PDVA is to "assure the victims of domestic violence

the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide." G.M. v. C.V., 453

N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting State v. Brown, 394 N.J. Super. 492,

504 (App. Div. 2007)); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. Consequently, "[o]ur law is

particularly solicitous of victims of domestic violence." J.D., 207 N.J. at 473

(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 584 (1997)).

Therefore, courts will "liberally construe[] [the PDVA] to achieve its salutary

purposes." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 400.

When determining whether to grant an FRO pursuant to the PDVA, the

judge must make two determinations. See Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125-27.

A-3904-23
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Under the first prong of Silver, "the judge must determine whether the plaintiff

has proven, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that one or more of the

predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19[(a)] has occurred." Id. at 125

(citing N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)).

If the court finds the defendant committed a predicate act of domestic

violence, then the second inquiry under Silver "is whether the court should enter

a restraining order that provides protection for the victim." Id. at 126. While

the second prong inquiry "is most often perfunctory and self-evident, the guiding

standard is whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the

factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) to -29[(a)][(7)], to protect the

victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Id. at 127.

"[T]he Legislature did not intend that the commission of one of the

enumerated predicate acts of domestic violence automatically mandates the

entry of a domestic violence restraining order." Id. at 126-27. The factors which

the court should consider include, but are not limited to:

(1) The previous history of domestic violence between
the plaintiff and defendant, including threats,
harassment and physical abuse;

(2) The existence of immediate danger to person or
property;

A-3904-23
15
(3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and
defendant;

(4) The best interests of the victim and any child;

(5) In determining custody and parenting time the
protection of the victim's safety;

(6) The existence of a verifiable order of protection
from another jurisdiction; and

(7) Any pattern of coercive control against a person that
in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with,
threatens, or exploits a person's liberty, freedom, bodily
integrity, or human rights with the court specifically
considering evidence of the need for protection from
immediate danger or the prevention of further abuse. If
the court finds that one or more factors of coercive
control are more or less relevant than others, the court
shall make specific written findings of fact and
conclusions of law on the reasons why the court
reached that conclusion. Coercive control may include,
but shall not be limited to:

(a) isolating the person from friends, relatives,
transportation, medical care, or other source of
support;
(b) depriving the person of basic necessities;

(c) monitoring the person's movements,
communications, daily behavior, finances,
economic resources, or access to services;

(d) compelling the person by force, threat, or
intimidation, including, but not limited to, threats
based on actual or suspected immigration status;

A-3904-23
16
(e) threatening to make or making baseless
reports to the police, courts, [DCPP] within the
Department of Children and Families, the Board
of Social Services, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), or other parties;

(f) threatening to harm or kill the individual's
relative or pet;

(g) threatening to deny or interfere with an
individual's custody or parenting time, other than
through enforcement of a valid custody
arrangement or court order pursuant to current
law including, but not limited to, an order issued
pursuant to Title 9 of the Revised Statutes; or

(h) any other factors or circumstances that the
court deems relevant or material.

[N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a).]

Although the court is not required to incorporate all of these factors in its

findings, "the [PDVA] does require that 'acts claimed by a plaintiff to be

domestic violence . . . be evaluated in light of the previous history of violence

between the parties.'" Cesare, 154 N.J. at 402 (quoting Peranio v. Peranio, 280

N.J. Super. 47, 54 (App. Div. 1995)). Whether a restraining order should be

issued depends on the seriousness of the predicate offense, on "the previous

history of domestic violence between the plaintiff and defendant including

previous threats, harassment, and physical abuse," and on "whether immediate

A-3904-23
17
danger to the person or property is present." Corrente v. Corrente, 281 N.J.

Super. 243, 248 (App. Div. 1995).

The court must also exercise care to "distinguish between ordinary

disputes and disagreements between family members and those acts that cross

the line into domestic violence." R.G. v. R.G., 449 N.J. Super. 208, 225 (App.

Div. 2017). The PDVA is not intended to encompass "ordinary domestic

contretemps." Corrente, 281 N.J. Super. at 250. Rather, "[t]he [PDVA] is

intended to assist those who are truly the victims of domestic violence." Silver,

387 N.J. Super. at 124 (quoting Kamen v. Egan, 322 N.J. Super. 222, 229 (App.

Div. 1999)). The second prong of Silver "requires the conduct must [be] imbued

by a desire to abuse or control the victim." R.G., 449 N.J. Super. at 228 (citing

Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 126-27).

III.

Defendant argues the judge's reference to an "all-or-nothing docket,"

where there are "no hybrids" and "no halfway points" warrants reversal of the

FRO. Defendant maintains he was already the subject of civil restraints under

the consent order, and the judge could have found he violated its terms and

granted relief pursuant to Rule 1:10-3, enforcement of litigant's rights, without

A-3904-23
18
finding PDVA predicate acts or the need for an FRO. We reject defendant's

arguments.

We have no reason to disturb the findings made by the judge. Her decision

was based upon substantial credible evidence in the record. Gnall, 222 N.J. at

428. The judge had the opportunity to observe the parties and witnesses and

determine their credibility. The judge found plaintiff's version of events was

credible and corroborated by the evidence. Defendant's contrary testimony was

clearly not deemed credible. Accordingly, we defer to the judge's factual

findings. Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12.

Defendant fails to cite any legal authority to support his position that

instead of entering an FRO, the judge should have held him in violation of

litigant's rights under Rule 1:10-3. We note the consent order was entered under

a non-dissolution docket number (FD), and therefore, was not under the

jurisdiction of the PDVA. After a thorough review of the record, we are satisfied

that the judge's findings meet the criteria under the PDVA.

IV.

Next, defendant contends the predicate act findings were inadequate and

insufficiently supported. We address each in turn.

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19
A.

Stalking

A person is guilty of stalking "if he [or she] purposefully or knowingly

engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a

reasonable person to fear for his [or her] safety or the safety of a third person or

suffer other emotional distress." N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(b). N.J.S.A. 2C:12-

10(a)(1) further defines that:

"Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a
visual or physical proximity to a person; directly,
indirectly, or through third parties, by any action,
method, device, or means, following, monitoring,
observing, surveilling, threatening, or communicating
to or about, a person, or interfering with a person's
property; repeatedly committing harassment against a
person; or repeatedly conveying, or causing to be
conveyed, verbal or written threats or threats conveyed
by any other means of communication or threats
implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at
or toward a person.

In State v. Ghandi, our Supreme Court held "that the Legislature intended

to cast a wide net of protection for stalking victims by broadly prohibiting and

punishing persistent, unwanted, and frightening behaviors." 201 N.J. 161, 187

(2010). The anti-stalking statute was implemented "to intervene in repetitive

harassing or threatening behavior before the victim has actually been physically

attacked." H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 175 N.J. 309, 329 (2003) (quoting State v. Saunders,

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20
302 N.J. Super. 509, 520 (App. Div. 1997)). Therefore, "acts of actual violence

are not required to support a finding of domestic violence." Ibid. Granting an

FRO to a victim of stalking "furthers the . . . [PDVA's] goal of 'assur[ing] the

victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can

provide.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 399).

Guided by the law and our standard of review, we conclude the judge did

not err in finding defendant committed the predicate act of stalking. The

uncontroverted evidence showed defendant tracked plaintiff to two different

hotel parking lots on two separate occasions and followed her to the police

station after he tracked her to the Hampton Inn. The stalking statute defines

"[r]epeatedly" as "on two or more occasions," "[e]motional distress" as

"significant mental suffering or distress;" and "[c]ause a reasonable person to

fear" as "to cause fear in which a reasonable victim, similarly situated, would

have under the circumstances."

We perceive no misuse of discretion in the judge's finding defendant

engaged in stalking, given the ample credible evidence in the record. The judge

found plaintiff's testimony—which we have described in detail—credible and

deemed defendant's denials not credible. Giving deference to those findings,

plaintiff's testimony was sufficient to establish that defendant physically stalked

A-3904-23
21
her at the two hotels on two separate occasions and at the police station parking

lot.

The judge recounted and accepted plaintiff's testimony that defendant's

actions put her in reasonable fear and noted defendant gaslighted her by calling

plaintiff "crazy" and accusing her of making up stories. The judge reviewed the

evidence as a whole and properly concluded the manner and substance of

defendant's statements, text messages, placement of the app on James's iPad

without informing plaintiff, monitoring her, and showing up at the hotels and

police station demonstrated he purposely or knowingly engaged in repeated

conduct that would evoke fear in a reasonable person.

B.

Harassment

Defendant argues the judge misapplied the law in determining he

committed harassment under subsection (c).

N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 defines harassment as:

Except as provided in subsection e., a person commits
a petty disorderly persons offense if, with purpose to
harass another, he:

a. Makes, or causes to be made, one or more
communications anonymously or at extremely
inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language,
or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm;

A-3904-23
22
b. Subjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or
other offensive touching, or threatens to do so; or

c. Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or
of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or
seriously annoy such other person.

A communication under subsection a. may be deemed
to have been made either at the place where it
originated or at the place where it was received.

A finding of harassment requires proof of an intent or purpose to harass.

Hoffman, 149 N.J. at 576-77. A purpose to harass may be inferred from the

evidence. State v. McDougald, 120 N.J. 523, 566-67 (1990). An assertion by a

plaintiff that he or she felt harassed is a subjective belief and insufficient to

prove a purpose or intent to harass. J.D., 207 N.J. at 487. A violation of N.J.S.A.

2C:33-4(c), by contrast, requires proof of a course of conduct. Id. at 478.

Common sense and experience may also inform a determination or finding of

purpose. Hoffman, 149 N.J. at 577 (citing State v. Richards, 155 N.J. Super.

106, 118 (App. Div. 1978)). "[T]he decision about whether a particular series

of events rises to the level of harassment or not is fact-sensitive." J.D., 207 N.J.

at 484.

As stated, the judge found plaintiff established the predicate act of

harassment based on defendant tracking her to two different hotel parking lots

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on two separate occasions. Moreover, defendant followed plaintiff to the police

station in January 3, 2024, after he tracked her to the Hampton Inn. The judge

disbelieved defendant's explanation for his conduct and found he had no valid

reason to be at the police station. This finding is sufficiently anchored in

plaintiff's and the officers' testimony. We are unpersuaded by defendant's

argument the judge should have given more weight to R.B.'s testimony

corroborating that defendant was working with him on January 3, 2024.

The judge properly assessed the "surrounding circumstances," which

further evidenced the requisite intent. R.G., 449 N.J. Super. at 226 (quoting

State v. Castagna, 387 N.J. Super. 598, 606 (App. Div. 2006)). The judge

reasoned that defendant's prior act of blocking plaintiff in at the Red Roof Inn

was designed to "harass" and "vex" her, and his denying being there was the

very definition of gaslighting. Moreover, the judge found defendant's failure to

inform plaintiff he placed a tracking app on James's iPad was "outrageous" and

"deceitful."

Having determined the judge found both predicate acts and deferring to

her credibility assessments, we reject defendant's challenge to the judge's

conclusion that the FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff under prong two of

Silver. The judge found plaintiff was in immediate danger because if the FRO

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was not entered, defendant's "conduct is going to continue." Further, the judge

explained the parties' financial circumstances are "interrelated at this point," and

the business of plaintiff buying out defendant's share of the home has not been

completed, so there is "a chance of further acrimony." The judge highlighted

the prior history of domestic violence and noted features of defendant's coercive

control over plaintiff. Therefore, we will not disturb the judge's reasoned

decision.

V.

We have also carefully reviewed defendant's challenge to the judge's

granting counsel fees and perceive no error. When a victim demonstrates that

attorney's fees "are a direct result of the domestic violence, they are reasonable,

and they are presented by affidavit [or certification] pursuant to Rule 4:42-9(b),"

the trial court may award attorney's fees as compensatory losses under N.J.S.A.

2C:25-29(b)(4). Grandovic v. Labrie, 348 N.J. Super. 193, 196 (App. Div.

2002). We accord substantial deference to a trial judge's assessment of counsel

fees and that determination "'will be disturbed only on the rarest of occasions,

and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion.'" McGowan v. O'Rourke,

391 N.J. Super. 502, 508 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Packard-Bamberger & Co.

v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001)). "It would be inimical to the [PDVA] to

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deny a victim an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in

successfully defending against a challenge to a[n FRO] . . . ." Grandovic, 348

N.J. Super. at 197.

The PDVA provides for attorney's fees "to avoid a chilling effect on the

willingness of domestic violence victims to come forward with their

complaints." M.W. v. R.L., 286 N.J. Super. 408, 411 (App. Div. 1995). If, after

considering the factors of Rule 4:42-9(b) and RPC 1.5(a)(1) to (8), "the court

finds that the domestic violence victim's attorney's fees are reasonable, and they

are incurred as a direct result of domestic violence, then a court, in an exercise

of its discretion, may award those fees." McGowan, 391 N.J. Super. at 508.

Because fees and costs in a domestic violence action are awarded as

damages, they are "not subject to the traditional analysis" for an award of fees

in family-type claims pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, and the court is not obliged

to consider the parties' financial circumstances. Id. at 507 (quoting Schmidt v.

Schmidt, 262 N.J. Super. 451, 454 (Ch. Div. 1992)).

The judge's thorough written opinion found plaintiff was a victim of

domestic violence entitled to compensatory damages and concluded the fee

application to be properly supported by a certification of services. See R. 4:42-

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9(b). The judge addressed the application, considering in detail each of RPC

1.5(a)'s factors in granting the award. The judge did not misuse her discretion.

To the extent we have not specifically addressed defendant's remaining

arguments, we conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion

in a written opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

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