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March 6, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Neal Evan Price v. City of Chicago

District Court, N.D. Illinois

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:25-cv-00791

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (49)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.3K)

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Trial Court Document

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

NEAL EVAN PRICE )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. 25 C 791

v. )

) Chief Judge Virginia M. Kendall

)

CITY OF CHICAGO )

)

Defendant. )

             MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER                              
Plaintiff Neal Evan Price brings this Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) against the City 

of Chicago (the “City”) and Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”) alleging several federal and state
law claims stemming from the deactivation of his Lyft and Uber accounts. The City moves to
dismiss the SAC under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. 77). For the reasons below,
the Court grants the City’s Motion to Dismiss [77].

BACKGROUND

The following facts are set forth in the Second Amended Complaint, except where noted,
which the Court accepts as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. See Lax v. Mayorkas, 20 F.
4th 1178, 1181 (7th Cir. 2021).

I. The Transportation Network Provider Ordinance and Rules

Price’s lawsuit concerns the City’s Transportation Network Provider (“TNP”)
Ordinance—a city ordinance regulating rideshare companies and the drivers who work for them.
Price held a transportation network chauffeur license (“chauffeur license”) issued by the City,
authorizing him to work as a rideshare driver for Uber and Lyft. (Dkt. 66 ¶ 11). As such, Price was
subject to the TNP Ordinance. (Id. ¶ 10). The TNP Ordinance establishes a licensing and regulatory
framework for the rideshare industry. (Dkt. 66 ¶ 12); see also MCC § 9-115-020 et seq. Rideshare
companies like Uber and Lyft, referred to as “TNP licensees” in the Ordinance, must obtain a TNP
license to operate in Chicago. MCC § 9-115-020. TNP licensees can only hire drivers who have a

valid chauffeur license. Id. § 9-115-050(a)(1). For a driver to be eligible for a chauffeur license,
he must possess a valid driver’s license; be at least 21 years old; successfully complete a network
driver’s training program; and have no convictions for specific, enumerated offenses. Id. § 9-115-
150(b)(1)(i-iv). TNP licensees apply for a chauffeur license on a driver’s behalf, attesting that the
driver is eligible for a license under the TNP Ordinance and Illinois law. Id. § 9-115-150(b)(4).
TNP licensees must also perform criminal background checks of chauffeur license applicants and
obtain their driving records. Id. §§ 9-115-150(b)(4).

Upon receiving an attestation from a TNP licensee and “any other application information”
the Commissioner of the Department of Business Affairs and Consumer Protection (the
“Commissioner”) deems appropriate, the Commissioner “shall issue” a chauffeur license to “each

applicant that the Commissioner determines to be eligible for such a license.” Id. § 9-115-
150(b)(5). The same rules detailed above apply to applications to renew an existing chauffeur
license. Id. § 9-115-150(a). The Commissioner may seek penalties against any TNP licensee or
chauffeur license holder who violates the TNP ordinance, including but not limited to, fines,
license suspension, license revocation, restitution, and other equitable relief. Id. § 9-115-220(b)(i-
iv).

Rideshare companies and their drivers are also subject to the TNP Rules, promulgated by
the Department of Business Affairs and Consumer Protection (“BACP”). See Chicago Business
Affairs and Consumer Protection, Transportation Network Providers Rules, Aug. 10, 20201
(hereinafter “TNP Rules”). TNP Rule 1.10 covers notification of deactivated drivers. See Rule
TNP1.10. It requires rideshare companies to report driver deactivations for public safety concerns
to the City. (Dkt. 66 ¶ 13). TNP Rule 1.10 provides:

    I.  TNP licensee must have in place a process to notify and report 
       to the Department the name, associated driver’s license number, 
       associated vehicle identification number, and vehicle license 
       plate of an affiliated transportation network driver permanently 
       deactivated from the TNP’s platform for conduct that gave rise 
       to  a  public  safety  concern,  including  any  of  the  following 
       reasons:                                                      

            1. Criminal complaint or arrest;                         
            2. Criminal investigation;                               
            3. Allegation or complaint of sexual misconduct;         
            4. Allegation or complaint of traffic accident or incident 
            that resulted in a police report or insurance claim being 
            filed;                                                   
            5. Allegation or complaint of use or possession of an    
            illegal drug or substance;                               
            6. Allegation or complaint of driving under the influence 
            of intoxicating beverages, drugs, or substances;         
            7. Allegation or complaint of assault or battery;        
            8. Unauthorized TNP driver account sharing;              
            9. Use of fraudulent information or documents during     
            TNP  driver  onboarding  process,  including,  but  not  
            limited to, identify theft; or                           
            10. Conduct that gave rise to a public safety concern not 
            itemized above in this section.                          

   II.  TNP licensee must notify the Department within four business 
       days of deactivating a driver for the reasons specified in this 
       Rule. Licensees must identify their notification method in the 
       process plan that they submit to the Department.              

   III.  TNP licensee shall submit its written notification plan during the 
       license application process for issuance of a new or renewal TNP 
       license. For TNP license renewal application, the TNP’s written 
       notification plan shall include TNP’s review and audit of its 
       compliance with this rule during past license term.           

1 The TNP Rules can be accessed at

https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/dol/rulesandregs/TNPRulesAmendedeff81020.pdf.

Id. TNP Rule 1.10 does not require TNP licensees to deactivate drivers in response to customer
complaints or otherwise control how licensees handle deactivations. Id. Additionally, it has no
requirements or prohibitions regarding communication between TNP licensees about driver
deactivations. Id. Under TNP Rule 5.02, deactivation from a licensed TNP platform immediately
suspends the driver’s chauffeur license for that specific platform. (Dkt. 66 ¶ 14); see also Rule
TNP5.02.

II. Price is Deactivated by Uber and Lyft

On January 7, 2025, Uber deactivated Price’s account after a rider reported Price for

“dangerous driving.” (Dkt. 66 ¶ 15). Price claims that Uber did not investigate Price’s account of
the accident and the allegation was never “proven true.” (Id. ¶ 16). Price was not found criminally
or civilly liable for “dangerous driving.” (Id. ¶ 18). Uber previously deactivated Price from its
platform after Price was accused of getting into an accident and Price was later reactivated after
challenging the allegation. (Id. ¶ 17).

On January 22, 2025, Lyft deactivated Price’s account after it was notified of Price’s Uber
deactivation (Id. ¶ 20). Price received an email from Lyft regarding his deactivation, which states:
Pursuant to the City of Chicago’s Rule TNP 1.10, Lyft was notified that you have
been deactivated by other Transportation Network Provider (TNP) due to conduct
that gave rise to a public safety concern. As such you are also deactivated from the
Lyft platform.

Lyft and other ridesharing companies are TNPs. Lyft deactivated your account due 
to notification from another TNP of your deactivation on their platform. 

Lyft does not have information about the underlying incident. If you would like 
more information about the reported incident, we recommend you follow up with 
the TNP that deactivated your account on their platform.             

Next steps you can take: If you would like to be considered for reactivation on the 
Lyft platform, please contact the TNP that deactivated your account and request 
reactivation on their platform.                                      
Only the TNP that initially deactivated your account is able to resolve your account 
deactivation. Neither the City of Chicago nor the Department of Business Affairs 
and Consumer Protection can assist you.                              

(Ex. A, Dkt. 66). Price alleges that the City “shared and facilitated the sharing” of 

information about Price’s deactivation from Uber with Lyft, which led to his Lyft deactivation.
(Dkt. 66 ¶ 27). Price asserts the City did not notify him that it was sharing information with Lyft,
provide him with an opportunity to contest the allegations, or investigate the allegations prior to
sharing the information with Lyft. (Id. ¶¶ 29-31). Uber and Lyft’s deactivations of Price’s accounts
apply nationwide. (Id. ¶ 34). Price contends that, because of the City’s actions in sharing Uber’s
deactivation of Price with Lyft, his chauffeur license was automatically suspended pursuant to
TNP Rule 5.02. After the deactivation of his Uber and Lyft accounts, Price lost his ability to earn
a living as a rideshare driver. (Id. ¶ 35). In addition, Price’s TNP license was revoked, allegedly
without notice or hearing. (Id. ¶ 36).

III. Procedural History

On January 28, 2025, Price sued the City alleging violations of his civil rights under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985; antitrust violations under 15 U.S.C. § 2; and a state law claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. (Dkt. 10). The Court dismissed Price’s Original Complaint on June
25, 2025 for failure to state claims upon which relief could be granted. (Dkt. 41). On June 30,
2025, Price filed a First Amended Complaint reasserting the same claims that were previously
dismissed, along with additional state law claims for defamation, tortious interference with
business relationships, and negligence. (Dkt. 43). The Court dismissed Price’s First Amended
Complaint on October 28, 2025, again for failure to state claims. (Dkt. 64). On November 17,
2025, Price filed a Second Amended Complaint reasserting all nine of the same claims previously
dismissed. (Dkt. 66). The City now moves to dismiss the SAC under Rule 12(b)(6). (Dkt. 77).
LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the complaint must contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Kaminski v.
Elite Staffing, 23 F.4th 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Specifically, “a

plaintiff must allege ‘enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Allen v. Brown
Advisory, LLC, 41 F.4th 843, 850 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570, 127 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). At the same time, “allegations
in the form of legal conclusions are insufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” McReynolds
v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 694 F.3d 873, 885 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129
S.Ct. 1937). As such, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of the cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Further, the moving party
bears the burden of establishing the insufficiency of the plaintiff’s allegations.

                      DISCUSSION                                     
Price brings nine claims against the City in his SAC: violationd of his procedural and 

substantive due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a Monell claim, a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, an antitrust claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, and four claims
under Illinois law for intentional infliction of emotion distress, defamation, tortious interference
with business relationships, and negligence. In dismissing both of Price’s previous Complaints,
the Court gave Price sufficient guidance as to the problems with his pleadings. Unfortunately,
despite the addition of new facts and details, the SAC suffers from the same deficiencies as Price’s
previous attempts.

As a preliminary matter, Price filed a “Notice of Supplemental Evidence” after briefing on
the City’s Motion to Dismiss was complete. (Dkt. 105). In this Notice, Price asks the Court to
consider newly obtained evidence from Lyft. (Id. at 1). The evidence consists of documents
provided from Lyft indicating that it received a notification from the BACP that Price had been

deactivated on January 9, 2025. (Ex. B, Dkt. 105 at 13-14). In its cover email to Price, Lyft stated
that it received this “Rule TNP 1.10 Notification of Deactivated Drivers” from the City, not Uber.
(Ex. A, Dkt. 105 at 5). Price argues that this evidence is relevant to the Court’s evaluation of the
City’s involvement in the events underlying his claims. (Dkt. 105 at 1). Relevant or not, Courts
generally may not consider evidence outside of a complaint in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss. See United States ex rel. Sibley v. Univ. of Chi. Med. Ctr., 44 F.4th 646, 662 (7th Cir.
2022) (“[A] ruling on a motion to dismiss considers only the pleadings[.]”); Austin v. Cook Cnty., 2022 WL 4386685, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2022); Consolino v. Dart, 2023 WL 6141311, at *10
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2023). The proper course of action for Price to take would be to seek leave to
file an amended complaint adding new allegations based on this evidence. See Dart, 2023 WL

6141311, at *10. Nonetheless, because this evidence does not change the Court’s conclusions, and
to avoid the need for further amendment, the Court will consider it in its analysis.

I. Procedural Due Process Claim

In Count I of his SAC, Price asserts a procedural due process claim, alleging that the City
facilitated the sharing of unverified allegations between rideshare companies resulting in his
nationwide deactivation from Lyft, which deprived him of protected property interests without
procedural protections. (Dkt. 66 ¶¶ 46-56). The Fourteenth Amendment protects against the
deprivation of a protected interest without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XVI. To plead
a due process claim, “a plaintiff must allege the ‘deprivation of a protected interest’ and
‘insufficient procedural protections surrounding that deprivation.’” Martin v. Haling, 94 F.4th 667,
671 (7th Cir. 2024) (internal citations omitted). The Court dismissed Price’s procedural due process
claim in the previous Complaints because Price failed to identify or establish any constitutionally
protected property interest. (Dkt. 41 at 6); (Dkt. 64 at 7). The City argues that Price failed to do

so again. (Dkt. 77 at 7).

Price must first establish a constitutionally protected property interest to properly state a
procedural due process claim. See Citizens Health Corp. v. Sebelius, 725 F.3d 687, 694 (7th Cir.
2013) (“The threshold question in any due process challenge is whether a protected property or
liberty interest actually exists.”). “‘To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must
have more than an abstract need or desire’ and ‘more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must,
instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.’” FKFJ, Inc. v. Vill. of Worth, 11 F.4th 574,
592 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005)).
Entitlements are not created by the Constitution; instead, they are “defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.” See id.; Bell v. Cty. Of

Cntry. Club Hills, 841 F.3d 713, 717 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 577 (1972)).

First, Price asserts that he has a property interest in his employment as a ride share driver.
(Id.). Price relies on Bordelon v. Chicago School Reform Bd. Of Trustees, a case involving a public
employee—a school principle—who lost his job. 233 F.3d 524 at 531 (7th Cir. 2000). Unlike Price,

a public employee may have a constitutionally protected property interest in his state employment.
See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 539 (1985). Additionally, as this Court
has explained twice, the City could not have deprived him of any property interest in his
employment because the rideshare companies, not the City, were Price’s employers. See Palka v.
Shelton, 623 F.3d 447, 452 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that “[b]ecause the County, not the City, was
Palka’s employer, Palka cannot sue the City and its employees for depriving him of due process in
connection with the loss of his employment.”). As such, Price does not have a protected property
interest in his ability to work as a rideshare driver.

 Price then asks the Court to recognize his TNP license as a constitutionally protected 

property interest. (Dkt. 66 ¶ 47). To have a legitimate claim of entitlement to a government-issued
benefit, like a license, a plaintiff must show that an ordinance “provides substantive criteria which,
if met, dictate the issuance of the license or permit.” Mary Jane Sweet Spot, LLC v. City of Blue
Island, 2024 WL 1363635, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2024) (citing New Burnham Prairie Homes,
Inc. v. Vill. of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474, 1480 (7th Cir. 1990)). If the claimed injury is the revocation
or non-renewal of a license, the plaintiff must point to a source of law that creates a “system of
nondiscretionary rules governing revocation or renewal of that benefit.” Chicago United Indus.,
Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 669 F.3d 847, 851 (7th Cir. 2012). Additionally, “ a benefit is not a protected
entitlement if government officials may grant or deny it in their discretion.” FKFJ, Inc. at 592

(quoting Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 756).

Previously, this Court dismissed Price’s claim because he failed to assert any allegations
showing that the TNP Rules create a nondiscretionary system for awarding, revoking, or renewing
TNP licenses. (Dkt. 64 at 7). This time, Price points to Cohran v. City of Chicago, 2026 WL 234217 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2026) (Hunt, J.), a recent decision from this district that considered a motion to
dismiss on similar facts. (Ex. A, Dkt. 102). As explained below, this Court declines to follow the
reasoning in Cohran with respect to protected property interests.

In Cohran, the plaintiff, a rideshare driver, sued the City for allegedly violating her due
process and equal protection rights and tortiously interfering with her prospective business
relationship with a rideshare company. 2026 WL 234217 at *1. Similar to Price, Cohran alleged
that she was deactivated by Uber based on allegations that she spit on a passenger. Subsequently,
Lyft deactivated her after it was notified pursuant to TNP Rule 1.10 that she was deactivated by
another TNP licensee for conduct that gave rise to a public safety concern. Id. at *2. The Court

held that the plaintiff adequately stated a procedural due process claim, finding that the plaintiff
had a constitutionally protected interest in her chauffeur license. Id. at *6-8. The Court reached
this conclusion after citing this language in the TNP Ordinance: “the Commissioner shall issue a
transportation network chauffeur license ... for a maximum of a one-year period.” Id. at *5 (citing
MCC § 9-115-150(b)(5)). From this language, the Court concluded that “the process to issue or
renew a chauffeur license does not include any discretionary language that requires the
Commissioner to assess circumstances such as the appropriateness and desirability of a location,
whether there is an overconcentration of similar licenses, or the general welfare of the community.”
Id. at *5-6.

Yet, a more complete reading of the TNP Ordinance shows that there are key phrases

granting the Commissioner discretionary power to determine which applicants are eligible to
receive the chauffeur licenses. The TNP Ordinance first outlines the relevant criteria an applicant
must satisfy to be eligible for a chauffeur license. MCC §§ 9-115-150(b)(1)(i-xii). Section 9-115-
150(b)(5) goes on to state:

After receiving: (i) the attestation provided pursuant to subsection (b)(4), and (ii)
any other application information, as the Commissioner deems appropriate, the
Commissioner shall issue a transportation network chauffeur license, in a form
prescribed by the Commissioner, to each applicant that the Commissioner
determines to be eligible for such license. Each transportation network chauffeur
license shall be issued for a maximum of a one-year period.

§§ 9-115-150(b)(5) (emphasis added).

Reading this language as a whole, the TNP Ordinance grants the Commissioner the
authority to request additional applicant information beyond the listed eligibility criteria. Then, the
Ordinance grants the Commissioner the authority to determine which applicants are eligible for a
chauffeur license. The language “as the Commissioner deems appropriate” and “to each applicant

that the Commissioner determines to be eligible” indicates that there is “discretion vested in the
[Commissioner] regarding the nature of the decision to be made in evaluating an application . . .
.” Bayview-Lofberg's, Inc. v. Milwaukee, 905 F.2d 142, 146 (7th Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal of
due process claims and holding that plaintiffs did not have property interests in liquor licenses).
Furthermore, there is no limit placed on the Commissioner’s discretion to grant a chauffeur license.
Se Khan v. Bland, 630 F.3d 519, 527 (7th Cir. 2010) (“A property interest of constitutional
magnitude exists only when the state’s discretion is ‘clearly limited’ such that the plaintiff cannot
be denied the interest ‘unless specific conditions are met.’”); Quick v. Illinois Dep't of Fin. & Pro.
Regul., 468 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1007 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (plaintiffs adequately alleged a property
interest in a license where the law contained language mandating the issuance of licenses if there

were qualified applicants). The TNP Ordinance “lodges discretion” in the Commissioner to impose
additional criteria on applicants and “disapprove applicants he or she deems unsatisfactory,” so
Price does not have a protected property interest in the chauffeur license. See Mary Jane Sweet
Spot, LLC, 2024 WL 1363635 at *8 (holding that plaintiffs did not have property interest in a
business license).

Further, license renewal is not automatic; it requires another application subject to the same
requirements as applications for issuance. MCC § 9-115-150(a). As such, Price possessed only a
unilateral expectation to a chauffeur license because the TNP Ordinance explicitly grants the
Commissioner the discretion to grant or renew licenses. See FKFJ, Inc., 11 F.4th at 592 (there is
no property interest in a government license when the relevant law or ordinance “gives the
[decisionmaker] authority to approve applications for renewals, rather than mandating that the
[decisionmaker]approve and execute renewals when the requisite criteria is met.”); Mary Jane
Sweet Spot, 2024 WL 1363635 at *8 (no property interest in business license existed where

relevant law did not stipulate that individuals were entitled to license renewal as a matter of course
if they met certain undemanding criteria).

The provision of the TNP Rules regarding the automatic suspension of a chauffeur license
is also relevant given Price’s argument that he was deprived of his alleged property interest when
he was deactivated from Lyft and Uber. (Dkt. 66 ¶¶ 50-51). If a driver is deactivated from a licensed
TNP platform, their chauffeur license is immediately suspended. See Rule TNP5.02. First, the
rideshare companies, not the City, deactivated Price’s accounts. The City does not control if, when,
or how a TNP licensee may deactivate a rideshare driver, it only dictates what happens after with
respect to the driver’s status with the City. Further, a license is only a property interest if it is
revocable only for cause or there is a requirement for a pre-revocation notice or hearing. Club

Misty v. Laski, 208 F.3d 615, 619 (7th Cir. 2000); Frey Corp. v. City of Peoria, Ill., 735 F.3d 505,
512 (7th Cir. 2013). Applying this reasoning to the suspension of a license, there is no protected
interest here. When a driver has been deactivated by a rideshare platform, the TNP Rules do not
require a notice or a hearing before said driver’s chauffeur license is suspended. See Cohran, 2026
WL 234217 at *7 (recognizing that the TNP Rules “create a statutory regime that functionally
[revoke] a driver’s chauffeur license without a hearing”). Additionally, because the suspension is
automatic upon deactivation, there is inherently no for-cause requirement.

Further, according to TNP Rule 5.02, a chauffeur license is only valid if the driver “is
affiliated, active, and is in good standing with the City of Chicago and the affiliated TNP licensee’s
platform.” See Rule TNP5.02. A property interest must be “securely and durably yours under state
(or ... federal) law, as distinct from what you hold subject to so many conditions as to make your
interest meager, transitory, or uncertain.” Reed v. Vill. of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 948 (7th Cir.
1983), overruled on other grounds by Brunson v. Murray, 843 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2016). Since the

validity of a chauffeur license depends on decisions by private companies, it is not the kind of
secure and durable interest that is protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Frey Corp., 735
F.3d at 511 (holing that when “a third party controls what happens to the property owner’s site
approval—and there is nothing secure or durable about an interest controlled by a third party.”).
Price points to Supreme Court precedent holding that the Due Process Clause applies to
the deprivation of a driver’s license by the State. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 (1977). In doing
so, Price appears to be asserting that a chauffeur license is equivalent to a state-issued driver’s
license. (Dkt. 87 at 9). Chauffeur licenses, which allow individuals to work as rideshare drivers,
are more akin to business permits and licenses, which do not enjoy the same status as driver’s
licenses under the law and are subject to the type of analysis the Court engaged in above. See, e.g.,

Tranchita v. Callahan, 511 F. Supp. 3d 850, 880 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (analyzing whether hound hunting
license is a protected property interest under the Due Process Clause); Mary Jane Sweet Spot, LLC, 2024 WL 1363635 at *6-8 (same with respect to license to operate business). Accordingly, Price
does not have a protected property interest in his ability to work as a rideshare driver or his TNP
chauffeur license. Since Price does not allege any other facts from which this Court can infer the
existence of any other property interests, his procedural due process claim once again fails and is
dismissed.

II. Substantive Due Process Claim

Price also argues that the City violated his substantive due process rights when it shared
unverified allegations with rideshare companies resulting in his nationwide deactivation from
rideshare platforms. (Dkt. 66 ¶¶ 57-64). The substantive due process component of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects individuals from arbitrary action by the government.

See Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998). To state a substantiative due process
claim, a plaintiff must allege that the government violated a fundamental right or liberty, and that
the violation was arbitrary and irrational. Campos v. Cook County, 932 F.3d 972, 975 (7th Cir.
2019). If a right does not qualify as fundamental, then the government action need only bear a
rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest; put differently, the action must be
“neither arbitrary nor irrational.” Gen. Auto Serv. Station v. City of Chi., 526 F.3d 991, 1000 (7th
Cir. 2008). The City argues that Price’s substantive due process claim must be dismissed because
Price once again fails to assert a fundamental right. (Dkt. 77 at 6-7).

In examining Price’s prior Complaints, the Court twice held that Price’s asserted right to
his employment was not fundamental. (Dkt. 41 at 7-8); (Dkt. 64 at 7-9). Despite this, Price once

again claims that he has a right to “pursue his chosen occupation as a rideshare driver.” (Dkt. 66
at ¶ 59). The Court reiterates once again that “employment-related rights are not fundamental.”
Campos, 932 F.3d at 975 (cleaned up). While the right to occupational liberty is protected by the
Due Process Clause, it only encompasses the “liberty to follow a trade, profession, or other
calling.”. Hinkle v. White, 793 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 2015). This right, does not, however, include
the right to a particular job. Id; see also Fei Wang v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Illinois, 612 F. Supp.
3d 739, 751 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (citing Wroblewski v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 455 (7th Cir.
1992) and Roth, 408 U.S. at 575). Price does not have a fundamental right to the particular job of
rideshare driver. Furthermore, he is free to pursue other opportunities, such as working as a taxi
driver. Townsend v. Vallas, 256 F.3d 661, 670 (7th Cir. 2001) (An individual’s occupational liberty
may be violated only when the state “imposes a stigma or other disability on the individual which
forecloses other opportunities.”).

Price also once again alleges he has a fundamental right to possess his TNP license, (Dkt.

66 at ¶ 59), but this does not save Price’s claim. Maintaining a license to operate as a rideshare
driver is not among the liberty rights considered fundamental. See Sung Park v. Ind. Univ. Sch. of
Dentistry, 692 F.3d 828, 832 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that the list of fundamental rights is includes
“things like the right to marry, the right to have children, the right to marital privacy, the right to
contraception, and the right to bodily integrity.”). This Court does not consider maintaining a TNP
license to be “so deeply rooted and sacrosanct that no amount of process would justify its
deprivation.” Christensen v. Cnty. of Boone, IL, 483 F.3d 454, 462 (7th Cir. 2007). Because the
right to employment and the right to possess a TNP license are not fundamental, rational basis
review applies. As this Court previously found, TNP Rule 1.10 survives rational basis review. (Dkt.
41 at 8, Dk. 64 at 9); see also Cohran, 2026 WL 234217 at *11 (holding that TNP Rule 1.10 “easily

survive rational basis review” because it bears a rational relationship to maintaining public safety
on roads). Price has not plead anything in his SAC that changes this conclusion.

Price’s substantive due process claim still fails even considering his asserted interest in his
TNP license as a property interest. Substantive due process claims “involving only the deprivation
of a property interest are cognizable where the plaintiff shows ‘either the inadequacy of state law
remedies or an independent constitutional violation.’” LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v. Village of
Winnetka, 628 F.3d 937, 943 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 467 (7th Cir. 2003). As discussed above and below, Price failed to plead a protected property interest
in his TNP license or an independent constitutional violation. Additionally, Price still does not
argue that he does not have an adequate state law remedy. Accordingly, Price again fails to plead
a substantive due process claim, so the claim must be dismissed.

III. Monell Claim

Next, Price asserts a Monell claim against the City, arguing that TNP Rule 1.10 is an official

City policy which caused him to lose his ability to work as a driver nationwide. (Dkt. 66 at ¶¶ 65-
72). To prevail on a Monell claim, a plaintiff must show that a municipal policy or custom caused
a constitutional injury. Bohanon v. City of Indianapolis, 46 F.4th 669, 672 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing
Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 694 (1978). Under Monell, a
municipality may be liable for money damages under § 1983 “if the unconstitutional act
complained of is caused by: (1) an official policy adopted and promulgated by its officers; (2) a
practice or custom that, although not officially authorized, is widespread and well settled; or (3)
an official with final policy-making authority.” Thomas v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d
293, 303 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690). The policy or practice must be the
“moving force behind the” constitutional violation. Thomas v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., [74 F.4th

521, 524](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9415192/sarah-thomas-v-neenah-joint-school-district/#524) (7th Cir. 2023). The City argues that Price’s Monell claim fails because he fails to point
to a City policy that caused his injury. (Dkt. 77 at 5-6).

To start, Price has not plausibly alleged that he has suffered a constitutional violation. See
supra Secs. I-II. Even assuming he had, Price does not meet the Monell pleading requirements.
This Court dismissed the Monell claim in Price’s First Amended Complaint because Price failed
to allege the existence of a City policy requiring the sharing of information with TNP licensees.
(Dkt 64 at 10). Price makes the same allegations and arguments again, with the addition of facts
showing that the City, not Uber, shared information about Price’s Uber deactivation with Lyft. This
fact does not save Price’s SAC.

Even if the City informed Lyft of Price’s deactivation from Uber, there are no facts
suggesting that this action was taken pursuant to any explicit or implicit policy or custom. TNP
Rule 1.10 only requires TNP licensees to notify the City after deactivating a driver. See Rule
TNP1.10. Price does not point to any TNP Rule or other express policy that requires the City to

share information about driver deactivations with TNP licensees. Price also fails to allege the
existence of a widespread custom or practice of sharing driver deactivation information with TNP
licensees. To proceed under this theory of Monell liability, Price must allege facts that permit the
reasonable inference that the practice is, in fact, “widespread and the specific violations
complained of were not isolated incidents.” Thomas, 74 F.4th at 524 (citing Gill v. City of
Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 344 (7th Cir. 2017)). Allegations of “a few sporadic examples of an
improper behavior” will not suffice. Thomas, 74 F.4th at 524 (concluding that allegations of two
isolated incidents failed to plausibly allege widespread practice) (citing See Flores v. City of South
Bend, 997 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir. 2021)). Price only references two isolated incidents of the alleged
“illegal” information sharing—what happened to him and what happened to the plaintiff in

Cohran. As such, Price cannot maintain Monell claims against the City based upon the first two
theories of Monell liability.

Price’s claim also fails under the third theory of Monell liability because Price fails to allege
that his injuries were caused by the act of an official with “final policy making authority.” Howell
v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 987 F.3d 647, 653 (7th Cir. 2021). Even if Price could proceed
under any of these theories, his Monell claim would still fail because he only alleges but-for
causation, which this Court previously held was not enough. (Dkt. 41 at 5-6); (Dkt. 64 at 10).
Liberally construing Price’s SAC, the causation he alleges is no different than that of his First
Amended Complaint. He alleges once again: the City passed the TNP Rules, which require
rideshare companies to report to the City if a driver is deactivated for conduct that gave rise to a
public safety concern; without this policy, Uber would not have reported Price’s deactivation to
the City; and, if Uber did not report the deactivation, neither Uber nor the City would have notified
Lyft, which would not have deactivated Price’s account. (Dkt. 66 ¶¶ 66-71). Price’s reasoning still

“amounts only to a showing of but-for causation, which does not suffice under Monell.” Ruiz-
Cortez v. City of Chicago, 931 F.3d 592, 599 (7th Cir. 2019) (City of Chicago was not liable under
Monell where plaintiff only demonstrated but-for but not actual causation). Price’s assertions that
the City’s policy was the “moving force” and direct cause of his injury are mere recitals of the
elements of a Monell claim that do not cure his pleading deficiencies. (Dkt. 66 ¶¶ 69-70).

In sum, no City policy requires TNP licensees to take any action in response to notification
that another licensee deactivated a driver, and Price does not plead otherwise. Price acknowledges
that the City cannot be liable for the independent business decisions of Uber and Lyft. (Dkt. 87 at
1). The Court reiterates that any issues Price has with the rideshare companies’ decisions to
deactivate him must be taken up with them, not the City. Price’s Monell claim is dismissed.

IV. Conspiracy Claim

In Count IV of the SAC, Price asserts that the City conspired with rideshare companies
through its implementation of TNP Rule 1.10 to deprive him and “a class of drivers” of their “due
process rights” in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. (Dkt. 66 ¶ 75). Section 1985(3) “provides a cause
of action for persons who are victims of a conspiracy to deprive them of the ‘equal protection of
the laws’ or ‘equal privileges and immunities under the laws.’” Milchtein v. Milwaukee Cnty., 42
F.4th 814, 827 (7th Cir. 2022). A plaintiff bringing a § 1985 claim must plead:

     (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or 
     indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of 
     the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and 
     (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is 
     either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or 
     privilege of a citizen of the United States.                    

Id. Additionally, the plaintiff must allege that the conspiracy targeted a specific race or class,
resulting in an equal protections violation. See Katz-Crank v. Haskett, 843 F.3d 641, 650 (7th Cir.
2016) (holding that to state a claim under § 1985(3), “racial or class-based animus” is required);
Gunawardana v. Am. Veterinary Med. Ass’n, 2021 WL 4951697, at *3 (7th Cir. Oct. 25, 2021)
(affirming dismissal § 1985(3) claim because “[g]raduates of foreign veterinary schools are not a
protected class cognizable based on race or national origin.”).

Price’s previous attempts at bringing a § 1985(3) claim failed because he did not allege a
conspiracy with a racial or class-based animus. (Dkt. 41 at 9); (Dkt. 64 at 11-13). Price’s new
allegation that the City’s supposed conspiracy targeted “a class of drivers” still does not suffice to
state a claim. (Dkt. 66 ¶¶ 75, 81). Rideshare drivers are not a suspect class afforded protection
under § 1985(3). Grimes v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1359, 1365 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that ֻ§ 1985(3)
does not reach conspiracies motivated by economic or commercial concerns) (citing United Bhd.

of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 837-38 (1983)). Further, Price
does not specify which “[m]inority groups” are “possibly” included in the class of rideshare
drivers, nor does he allege he is a part of any of those groups. (Dkt. 66 ¶ 81). There are no other
facts alleged in the SAC that suggest discriminatory animus on the basis of a race or a protected
class. See Milchtein, 42 F.4th at 828 (religious classifications likely qualify for protection under
Section 1985(3); D'Amato v. Wisconsin Gas Co., 760 F.2d 1474, 1486 (7th Cir. 1985) (“race, ethnic
origin, sex, religion and political loyalty that have previously been recognized as possibly
supporting a Section 1985(3) claim”). Accordingly, Price’s pleadings again fail to meet the
requisite standard to survive a motion to dismiss. Chen v. Yellen, 2022 WL 2818709, at *7 (N.D.
Ill. July 19, 2022) (dismissing § 1985(3) claim because plaintiff “failed to allege class-based
animus.”). Price’s § 1985(3) claim is dismissed.

V. Antitrust Claim

Next, Price alleges that TNP Rule 1.10 violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act because it

“facilitates an unlawful monopoly.” (Dkt. 66 at ¶ 84). Section 2 of the Sherman Act imposes
liability on “[e]very person who shall monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States.” 15 U.S.C. § 2. To state a claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Price must
allege that the City “(1) possesses ‘monopoly power in the relevant market’ and (2) engages in ‘the
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as
a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.’” Viamedia, Inc. v.
Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 451 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004)) (citations omitted). The City argues
that dismissal is appropriate because Price fails to plead sufficient facts showing that the City has
monopoly power. (Dkt. 77 at 9-10).

A plaintiff must prove the existence of a relevant commercial market before a court can 

evaluate whether he or she has stated a claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. See Tiz, Inc. v.
S. Glazer’s Wine & Spirits, LLC, 2024 WL 2785142, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 30, 2024) (citing Agnew
v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 337 (7th Cir. 2012). Price sufficiently establishes
that the relevant market is “rideshare services within the City of Chicago”. (Dkt. 66 at ¶89). See
Republic Tobacco Co. v. North Atlantic Trading Co., Inc., 381 F.3d 717, 738 (7th Cir. 2004) (A
relevant market has “both a product and a geographic dimension.”).

Despite this, Price again does not meet the requisite standard to state a claim under Section
2 of the Sherman Act because the facts set forth in the SAC are insufficient to permit an inference
that the City had any power in the relevant market to create a monopoly. See Walter Kidde Portable
Equip., Inc. v. Universal Sec. Instruments, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 895, 901–02 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
(“Dismissal is proper where the antitrust plaintiff fails to identify any facts from which the court
can infer that defendants had sufficient market power to have been able to create a monopoly.”).

Monopoly power is the power to control prices or exclude competition. United States v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391, 76 S.Ct. 994, 100 L.Ed. 1264 (1956). Price still does
not allege how the City’s regulation of Uber and Lyft gives the City power to control prices or
exclude competition. Price states that the City “facilitates” a monopoly by allowing companies to
share driver data and exclude drivers from the market. (Dkt. 66 at ¶ 84). He also asserts that TNP
Rule 1.10 allows established rideshare companies to “control the driver pool” and “creates a barrier
to entry” for new companies. (Id. at ¶ 95). This Court has previously stated these allegations, even
if true, do not assert that the City controls rideshare prices or manipulates competition among
drivers or companies through its TNP Rules. (Dkt. 64 at 12).

At most, Price alleges that the rideshare companies, not the City, are engaging in

anticompetitive behavior by sharing driver data and excluding or deactivating drivers. In fact, Price
added numerous allegations that reference Uber’s conduct but fails to allege new facts to establish
the City possesses the power to control prices or exclude competition. Once again, Price’s
grievances are with the rideshare companies, not the City. Accordingly, Price’s antitrust claim is
dismissed.

Price has been given three tries to adequately allege federal law claims against the City but
has not been able to meet the pleading standards under Rule 12(b)(6). Accordingly, Counts I-V are
dismissed with prejudice.

VI. State Law Claims

Price’s remaining claims are state law claims: intentional infliction of emotional distress,
defamation, tortious interference with business relationships, and negligence. Because Price fails
to state a federal law claim, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state

law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3). See Doe-2 v. McLean County Unit Dist. No. 5 Bd. of Dirs., 593 F.3d 507, 513 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Ordinarily, when a district court dismisses the federal claim
conferring original jurisdiction before trial, it relinquishes supplemental jurisdiction over any state-
law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3).”). Price’s state law claims (Counts VI-IX) are dismissed
without prejudice; Price is free to bring them in state court. See Jackson v. City of Joliet, 2025 WL
1940386, at *22 (N.D. Ill. July 15, 2025); Home Builders Ass’n of Greater Chicago v. City of
Chicago, 213 F. Supp. 3d 1019, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 2016).

                      CONCLUSION                                     
 For the reasons set forth above, the City’s Motion to Dismiss [77] is granted. Counts I-V 

of Price’s Second Amendment Complaint [66] are dismissed with prejudice. All remaining counts
are dismissed without prejudice.

                                             cD   la” 
                                  APA  CICS         AME   er 
                               VifgthiA M.  KErfidall 
                               Jnited States District Judge 

Date: March 6, 2026

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