Sturghiss v. Ronald Dinsmore LLC - Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Granted Without Prejudice

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April 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Michael-Tyrone Sturghiss v. Ronald Dinsmore LLC, Logan McTarnsey, Jacob Lightsey, and Greenwood City Police

District Court, S.D. Indiana

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:25-cv-01953

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (15)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

MICHAEL-TYRONE STURGHISS )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
) Case No. 1:25-cv-01953-TWP-KMB
RONALD DINSMORE LLC, )
LOGAN MCTARNSEY, )
JACOB LIGHTSEY, and )
GREENWOOD CITY POLICE, )
)
Defendants. )
)

ORDER ON MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Ronald Densmore, Logan McTarnsey, and
Jacob Lightsey ("together, Defendants") Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) (Dkt. 15). Pro se Plaintiff Michael-Tyrone Sturghiss
("Sturghiss") initiated this action against the Defendants alleging violations of his civil rights (Dkt.
1). The Court screened the Complaint and dismissed several claims, and Sturghiss' constitutional
and tort claims against the Defendants were allowed to proceed. For the following reasons, the
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is granted, but without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are not necessarily objectively true, but as required when reviewing a
motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court accepts as true the factual allegations in the
Complaint and draws all inferences in favor of Sturghiss as the non-moving party. See Emergency
Servs. Billing Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 668 F.3d 459, 464 (7th Cir. 2012).
On July 25, 2025, Sturghiss was driving a Nissan Murano when he was pulled over for a
minor traffic infraction (Dkt. 1 at 5). At the time of the stop, Sturghiss’ Nissan displayed the license
plate pictured below.

| ae Peete am

The Defendants told Sturghiss that the US DOT numbers on his license plate came back as
nothing. /d. Sturghiss alleges the three police officers (acting under color of law), unlawfully
stopped and detained him for a minor traffic infraction, without reasonable suspicion or probable
cause, and without issuing clear lawful justification. He was then detained without reasonable
suspicion or probable cause, and the Defendant Officers used unnecessary force. /d. He was placed
in a position of heightened risk by the officers drawing and aiming weapons (gunpoint) at him,
despite no threats being posed by Sturghiss and even though he was not resisting or posing any
danger. /d. Sturghiss was arrested but not given a reason for his arrest at the time. /d. at 7.
On September 26, 2025 Sturghiss initiated this action. In his caption, he lists himself as
Michael-Tyrone Sturghiss, pro se, sui juris Claimant, Plaintiff. (Dkt. 1). The Court screened the
Complaint and the following claims remain pending against Defendants:
Count I-Unlawful Stop and Detention (Fourth Amendment)
Count II-Excessive Force (Fourth Amendment)
Count V-Assault, Battery (state law claims)
(Dkt. 1 at 9, 11).

| The Court dismissed the Monell claim against the Greenwood City Police (Count IV) and the interstate
abduction claims. (Dkt. 9 at 4).

On December 18, 2025 Defendants filed their Answer to the Complaint (Dkt. 14) as well
as the instant Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Dkt. 15). Sturghiss filed a Response to
Defendant's Assertions on January 11, 2026 (Dkt. 17), which the Court discerns to be his response
to the motion for judgment on the pleadings.

II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) permits a party to move for judgment after the parties
have filed a complaint and an answer, and the pleadings are closed. Rule 12(c) motions are
analyzed under the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Pisciotta v. Old
Nat'l Bancorp., 499 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2007); Frey v. Bank One, 91 F.3d 45, 46 (7th Cir.
1996). The complaint must allege facts that are "enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although "detailed
factual allegations" are not required, mere "labels," "conclusions," or "formulaic recitation[s] of
the elements of a cause of action" are insufficient. Id. Stated differently, the complaint must
include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Hecker v. Deere &

Co., 556 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). To be
facially plausible, the complaint must allow "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Like a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court will grant a Rule 12(c) motion only if "it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any facts that would support his claim for relief." N.
Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of S. Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Craigs, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 12 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir. 1993)). The factual allegations
in the complaint are viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party; however, the Court
is "not obliged to ignore any facts set forth in the complaint that undermine the plaintiff's claim or
to assign any weight to unsupported conclusions of law." Id. (quoting R.J.R. Serv., Inc. v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 895 F.2d 279, 281 (7th Cir. 1989)). "As the title of the rule implies, Rule 12(c)
permits a judgment based on the pleadings alone. . . . The pleadings include the complaint, the

answer, and any written instruments attached as exhibits." Id. (internal citations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
In their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Defendants assert that Sturghiss' claims are
based upon fictitious legal conclusions he pled as facts: that his “USDOT” license plate is valid,
and thus an improper basis for a traffic stop, and that he is a “Non-US Citizen” on a “Do Not
Detain List.” (Dkt. 16 at 5). Defendants argue Sovereign citizen theories, such as those in Sturghiss'
Complaint, have been universally rejected as frivolous. United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753,
767 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Regardless of an individual’s claimed status of descent, be it as a “sovereign
citizen,” …that person is not beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. These theories should be
rejected summarily; however they are presented.”) Defendants point out that Sturghiss' choice to

flout the law by displaying a fictitious license plate, inevitably led to an encounter with law
enforcement. They argue that the lawsuit that follows "where Plaintiff seeks redress in any and all
forms the law allows" attempts to pervert the justice system. Because Sturghiss' claims are
premised upon sovereign citizen theories, Defendants ask the Court to dismiss his lawsuit, with
prejudice, at the Rule 12 stage. Id. at 6.
Defendants are correct in their assertion that portions of Sturghiss' Complaint rely on
“sovereign citizen” theories of law challenging the legitimacy of federal, state, and local
governments that have long been discredited. See, e.g., Bey v. State of Indiana, 847 F.3d 559, 559–
60 (7th Cir. 2017). But not all of Sturghiss' claims rely on sovereign theories. Accordingly, the
Court will disregard any of his arguments based on sovereign citizen theories when analyzing the
motion for judgment on the pleadings, and his non-sovereign theories will be construed.
Accepting his factual allegations as true at the pleading stage, and liberally construing his
pro se Complaint, Sturghiss' claims that he was detained without reasonable suspicion or probable

cause, and that the Officers used unnecessary force when they drew and aimed their weapons at
Sturghiss, even though he was not resisting or posing any danger, survive a judgment on the
pleadings. Id. Excessive force claims arising under § 1983 are analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment's “objective reasonableness” standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
Determining whether an officer's use of force is reasonable depends on the totality of the
circumstances, “including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether [he] is actively resisting arrest
or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396.
Here, Sturghiss alleges that he was being arrested for a fraudulent license plate, not a
violent offense and he asserts that he did not resist arrest. And in his Response brief, Sturghiss

makes factual allegations that he was held at gunpoint by the Defendants, including one officer
who pointed a firearm less than two feet from his head while another forcibly grabbed his wrist
and removed him from his automobile, seized his phone and handcuffed him without probable
cause. (Dkt. 17 at 2). He alleges that he was jailed for over two months and his automobile seized
and never returned. Id. Based on the allegations in his complaint, Sturghiss has adequately pled that he was falsely
arrested and that officers used excessive force. In addition, he has adequately pled state law claims
of assault and battery. However, while Sturghiss may have a claim related to excessive force under
the Fourteenth Amendment and state law claims for assault and battery, he has not named which
individual defendants participated in the excessive force and battery. Likewise, he has not alleged
any misconduct by any individual defendant that he named. "[I]ndividual liability under § 1983. .
. requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation." Colbert v. City of
Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation omitted). "The plaintiff must

demonstrate a causal connection between (1) the sued officials and (2) the alleged misconduct." Id. In addition, for a public official to be individually liable for a subordinate's constitutional
violation, the official must both "(1) know about the conduct and (2) facilitate, approve, condone,
or turn a blind eye toward it." Gonzalez v. McHenry County, Ill., 40 F.4th 824, 828 (7th Cir. 2022).
So although Sturghiss has adequately alleged some of his claims, his Complaint fails to state any
factual allegations against any individual defendant. Accordingly, judgment on the pleadings is
granted and Sturghiss' Complaint is subject to dismissal, but Sturghiss is granted an
opportunity to file an amended complaint with more specificity as to which officer did what.
IV. OPPORTUNITY TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT
The dismissal of the complaint will not in this instance lead to the dismissal of the action

at present. "The usual standard in civil cases is to allow defective pleadings to be corrected,
especially in early stages, at least where amendment would not be futile." Abu-Shawish v. United
States, 898 F.3d 726, 738 (7th Cir. 2018). In the interest of justice, the Court will allow Sturghiss
to amend his complaint if, after reviewing this Court's order, he believes that he can state a viable
claim for relief, consistent with the allegations he has already made. See Tate v. SCR Med. Transp., 809 F.3d 343, 346 (7th Cir. 2015) ("We've often said that before dismissing a case under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) a judge should give the litigant, especially a pro se litigant, an opportunity to
amend his complaint."); Luevano v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2013). Sturghiss hall have
through May 14, 2026, to file an Amended Complaint.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Dkt.
15), is GRANTED but without prejudice. Sturghiss is granted leave through May 14, 2026 to
file an Amended Complaint to sufficiently allege factual support in the pleadings in the action
against the individual officers. If nothing is filed, the dismissal will convert to one with prejudice
and his claims will be dismissed with prejudice.
The Clerk is directed to send a form Complaint with Sturghiss copy of this order.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 4/20/2026 O Watton ath
Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:
MICHAEL-TYRONE STURGHISS
1695 Farm Meadow Dr.
Greenwood, IN 46143
Daniel Mark Witte
TRAVELERS STAFF COUNSEL INDIANA
dwitte@travelers.com