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March 17, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Flores-Reyes

Montana Supreme Court

• Citations: 2026 MT 56
• Docket Number: DA 23-0730
• Nature of Suit: Direct Appeal

• Disposition: REVERSES and REMANDS

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (5.2K)

• PDF

Disposition

REVERSES and REMANDS

Combined Opinion

                        by Bidegaray

03/17/2026

DA 23-0730
Case Number: DA 23-0730

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2026 MT 56

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

ALEJANDRO FLORES-REYES,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DC-22-375
Honorable Shane A. Vannatta, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Tammy A. Hinderman, Appellate Defender Division Administrator,
Emma N. Sauve, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana

For Appellee:

Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Katie F. Schulz, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Matthew Jennings, Missoula County Attorney, Andrea R. Haney,
Brandon Zeak, Deputy County Attorneys, Missoula, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: February 11, 2026

Decided: March 17, 2026

Filed:

---

Clerk
Justice Katherine Bidegaray delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Alejandro Flores-Reyes appeals from the denial by the Fourth Judicial District

Court, Missoula County, of his motion to suppress evidence discovered during a

warrantless search of a Nissan Rogue he was driving. Flores-Reyes argues on appeal that

the search was unconstitutional; that the District Court lacked authority to reinstate a

previously dismissed information; and that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for

failing to object and affirmatively stipulating to the admission of testimonial hearsay.

We hold that the constitutionality of the search is dispositive and therefore do not reach the

other issues. Thus, we address the following restated issue:

Whether the contents of a closed, zippered pouch discovered in a concealed
compartment of the vehicle was the fruit of an unconstitutional search.

We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 On May 27, 2022, Nacheyla Dempsey reported that her 2012 Nissan Rogue had

been stolen. She identified her uncle, Travis Lozeau, as a possible suspect. On June 21,

2022, Missoula police officers located the Nissan parked at Montana Lil’s Casino. The

vehicle’s license plate confirmed it was the vehicle reported stolen.

¶3 Officers entered the casino and detained Flores-Reyes, who had arrived in the

Nissan and possessed its keys. After being advised of his rights, Flores-Reyes told officers

he had recently purchased the vehicle from Ty Gardipe in Spokane for $2,500 and had

driven to Missoula to complete the paperwork. He stated that he had cleaned out the

vehicle when he acquired it and that everything inside the vehicle belonged to him.

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¶4 Officers contacted Dempsey by telephone. Dempsey consented to a search of the

Nissan. Officers did not request or obtain Flores-Reyes’ consent.

¶5 While searching the vehicle, an officer reached beneath the steering wheel and

manipulated a plastic panel below the center console, revealing a concealed void space.

Inside that concealed compartment, the officer located a small black zippered pouch. The

pouch was closed. The officer opened it and discovered approximately 2,085 blue pills

later suspected to contain fentanyl. At that point, officers stopped the search and arranged

to have the vehicle towed so they could seek search warrants.

¶6 Relying in part on the discovery of the pills inside the closed pouch, officers applied

for and obtained warrants to search the Nissan more thoroughly and to search Room 544

of the Super 8 motel, where Flores-Reyes had been staying. Execution of those warrants

resulted in the seizure of additional narcotics, including approximately 1.5 pounds of

heroin, approximately 38 grams of methamphetamine, and additional fentanyl pills from

concealed areas within the vehicle, as well as methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia

from the motel room.

¶7 The State initially charged Flores-Reyes with two counts of criminal possession of

dangerous drugs with intent to distribute under § 45-9-103, MCA, and one count of felony

theft. The information was later amended to add an additional count of criminal possession

with intent to distribute. The theft count was subsequently dismissed. Thereafter, at the

State’s request, the District Court dismissed the case to allow Flores-Reyes to face federal

prosecution arising from the same conduct. When the federal prosecution was later

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abandoned, the State moved to reinstate the previously dismissed case. The District Court

granted that motion and reinstated the previously dismissed amended information without

requiring the State to seek leave to file a new charging document.

¶8 Before trial, Flores-Reyes moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the Nissan

and the motel room, arguing that the warrantless opening of the concealed compartment

and closed pouch violated Article II, Sections 10 and 11, of the Montana Constitution and

the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He further argued that the

subsequently obtained warrants were also tainted because they were based on evidence

discovered during the unlawful search. The District Court denied the motion, concluding

that Flores-Reyes lacked a legitimate possessory interest in the stolen vehicle and therefore

had no reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents.

¶9 Following a jury trial conducted under the reinstated amended information,

Flores-Reyes was convicted of three counts of criminal possession with intent to distribute

under § 45-9-103, MCA, based on the fentanyl, heroin, and methamphetamine seized from

the vehicle and motel room. He was sentenced to consecutive terms at the Montana State

Prison. Flores-Reyes now appeals on numerous grounds. We hold that the denial of his

motion to suppress is dispositive.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10 We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress to determine whether its

findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether its conclusions of law are correct.

State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶ 12, 302 Mont. 228, 14 P.3d 456.

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DISCUSSION

¶11 Whether the contents of a closed, zippered pouch discovered in a concealed
compartment of the vehicle was the fruit of an unconstitutional search.

¶12 Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II,

Sections 10 and 11, of the Montana Constitution protect individuals against unreasonable

searches and seizures. Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject only to a few

specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. State v. Munson, 2007 MT 222,

¶ 50, 339 Mont. 68, 169 P.3d 364 (citing Elison, ¶ 39). The State bears the burden of

establishing that a warrantless search falls within a recognized exception. State v. Peoples,

2022 MT 4, ¶ 57, 407 Mont. 84, 502 P.3d 129.

¶13 The exception on which the State relies is third-party consent. Consent may be

given by a person possessing common authority over the property. Munson, ¶ 50; State v.

McLees, 2000 MT 6, ¶ 13, 298 Mont. 15, 994 P.2d 683. Common authority rests not on

bare title ownership but on “mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint

access or control for most purposes.” McLees, ¶ 13 (citing United States v. Matlock,

415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S. Ct. 988, 993 (1974)). Thus, the validity of third-party consent

depends upon whether the consenting party shared mutual use and joint access such that

the nonconsenting party assumed the risk that the property would be inspected. Here,

although Dempsey was the titled owner of the vehicle, the record reflects that she had not

possessed or used the vehicle for several weeks and had no joint access to or mutual use of

Flores-Reyes’ personal effects within it and no common authority over a closed personal

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container placed beyond public view. Title ownership alone does not establish common

authority over the personal effects of another.

¶14 The scope of consent is measured by objective reasonableness—what a typical

reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the

consenting party. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250-51, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1803-04

(1991); State v. Parker, 1998 MT 6, ¶ 21, 287 Mont. 151, 953 P.2d 692. In Jimeno, the

United States Supreme Court concluded that a suspect’s general consent to search his

vehicle for narcotics permitted inspection of a paper bag lying in plain view on the

floorboard. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251-52, 111 S. Ct. at 1803-04. That case, however,

involved consent given by the suspect himself and an expressly identified object of search.

Here, officers did not obtain consent from Flores-Reyes, did not articulate narcotics as the

object of the search, and did not encounter a container in plain view. Instead, they

manipulated a concealed panel to expose a hidden void space and opened a closed personal

pouch. Under Montana’s independent constitutional protections of privacy and security

from unreasonable searches, consent to enter a vehicle to recover property does not

reasonably extend to opening sealed containers absent mutual use or joint access sufficient

to establish common authority.

¶15 In Parker, we concluded that it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe

that consent extended to closed containers where the vehicle owner and both passengers

had consented to the search, and none claimed ownership of the container searched.

Parker, ¶ 22. We also relied on Parker’s disclaimer of any interest in the fanny pack at

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issue. Parker, ¶ 22. Here, in contrast, Flores-Reyes did not consent to the search,

affirmatively asserted that everything in the vehicle belonged to him, and did not disclaim

any interest in the closed pouch. Moreover, officers discovered the pouch only after they

manipulated a concealed panel to expose a hidden void space. Under these materially

different circumstances, Parker does not support the extension of third-party consent to the

sealed container at issue.

¶16 Although we agree that Dempsey’s consent permitted the officers to enter the

vehicle for purposes of recovering and inventorying property before returning it to

Dempsey, the registered owner, the scope of that consent did not extend to a generalized

exploratory search of a closed container in which Flores-Reyes expressly claimed

ownership. In State v. Hill, 2004 MT 184, 322 Mont. 165, 94 P.3d 752, we held that when

police, at the owner’s request, take possession of a vehicle after allowing the unauthorized

driver to retrieve his possessions, the owner becomes the sole party remaining with

authority to consent to a search of the contents. Hill, ¶ 35. There, the defendant disclaimed

ownership of the items searched and effectively surrendered them to the owner’s control.

Hill, ¶ 35. Here, by contrast, Flores-Reyes was not permitted to retrieve his belongings

and affirmatively asserted that everything in the vehicle belonged to him. Nothing in the

record indicates that he surrendered any possessory interest in the zippered pouch.

¶17 Moreover, in Elison, we recognized that placing an item beyond public view in a

location from which others may be excluded evidences an expectation of privacy. Elison,

¶ 49. Officers discovered the pouch at issue only after they manipulated a concealed panel

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to expose a hidden void space containing the pouch zipped closed. Under these

circumstances, the sealed container was not simply an item within the passenger

compartment, but an object deliberately placed beyond public view. The scope of a consent

search is defined by its stated purpose and the object reasonably understood to be sought.

Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251, 111 S. Ct. at 1804. Consent to enter a vehicle to secure visible

property does not reasonably extend to opening sealed containers concealed within hidden

compartments absent surrender or disclaimer of ownership.

¶18 Here, officers entered the vehicle to secure and remove property before returning it

to Dempsey. They did not articulate narcotics as the object of the search and had no

probable cause to believe contraband was present. The officers discovered the closed

pouch only after they manipulated a concealed panel to expose a hidden void space. Under

these circumstances, opening the sealed pouch exceeded the objectively reasonable scope

of the consent provided, transforming a caretaking entry into an investigative search and

rendering the discovery of the pills unconstitutional. The pills discovered in the pouch

formed the sole basis for the subsequent warrant applications.

¶19 The record establishes that officers halted their search after discovering the pills to

seek search warrants for the remainder of the vehicle and for the motel room where

Flores-Reyes was staying. The warrant applications relied explicitly on the discovery of

the fentanyl pills in the sealed pouch as probable cause. The subsequently issued warrants

led to the seizure of additional fentanyl, heroin, and methamphetamine—evidence that

8
formed the basis of Flores-Reyes’ three convictions for criminal possession with intent to

distribute under § 45-9-103, MCA.

¶20 We have recognized a few narrow exceptions to the general rule that courts are not

allowed to use evidence that stems from an illegal act of the police when derivative

evidence is “(1) attenuated from the constitutional violation so as to remove its primary

taint; (2) obtained from an independent source; or (3) determined to be evidence which

would have been inevitably discovered apart from the constitutional violation.” State v.

Baldwin, 2024 MT 199, ¶ 25, 418 Mont. 70, 555 P.3d 748 (quoting State v. New, 276 Mont.

529, 536, 917 P.2d 919, 923 (1996) (citing additional authority)). The State has not argued,

and the record does not establish, any such exception.

¶21 Because the warrant applications relied on the unlawful discovery of the pills in the

closed pouch as probable cause, the evidence subsequently seized pursuant to those

warrants was also tainted as fruit of the poisonous tree. State v. Pearson, 217 Mont. 363,

366, 704 P.2d 1056, 1058-59 (1985). The District Court therefore erred in denying the

motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION

¶22 The District Court erred in denying Flores-Reyes’ motion to suppress. The pills

discovered inside the closed pouch were obtained in violation of Article II, Sections 10 and

11, of the Montana Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and must be suppressed. Because the subsequently issued search warrants

9
were predicated on that unlawful discovery, all evidence seized pursuant to those warrants

was also tainted and must likewise be suppressed.

¶23 We therefore reverse the order denying the motion to suppress, vacate Flores-Reyes’

convictions and judgment, and remand to the District Court with instructions to suppress

the evidence obtained from the closed pouch and all evidence derived from that unlawful

search.

¶24 Reversed and remanded.

/S/ KATHERINE M BIDEGARAY

We Concur:

/S/ CORY J. SWANSON
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON

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