Bhullar v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 484

Original Word Document (84.5 KB) Federal Court of Australia

Bhullar v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 484

| Appeal from: | B hullar v Minister for I mmigration and M ulticultural A ffairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 909 |

| File number(s): | SAD 200 of 2024 |

| Judgment of: | O'SULLIVAN J |

| Date of judgment: | 23 April 2026 |

| Catchwords: | MIGRATION — appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 2) dismissing application for judicial review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming the decision of the delegate to refuse to grant the first appellant a study visa — where the first and second appellant arrived in Australia in September 2009 as holders of vocational education sector student visas (subclass 572) — where the first appellant had failed to satisfy genuine temporary entrant criterion in cl 500.212(a) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – no error on the part of the primary judge in finding no jurisdictional error – appeal dismissed |

| Legislation: | Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2, cl 500.212(a) |

| Cases cited: | C arrascalao v Minister for I mmigration and B order P rotection (2017) 252 FCR 352

Minister for I mmigration and C itizenship v SZJSS [2010] HCA 48; (2010) 243 CLR 164;

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611

Nahi v Minister for I mmigration and I ndigenous A ffairs [2004] FCAFC 10

Tickner v Chapman (1995) 57 FCR 451 |

| Division: | General Division |

| Registry: | South Australia |

| National Practice Area: | Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights |

| Number of paragraphs: | 56 |

| Date of hearing: | 13 March 2026 |

| Counsel for the Appellants: | The first appellant appearing in person |

| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Ms M Scanlon |

| Solicitor for the First Respondent: | Minter Ellison |
ORDERS

| SAD 200 of 2024 |

| BETWEEN: | HARPREET SINGH BHULLAR

First Appellant

RANJIT KAUR BHULLAR

Second Appellant

ABEYJOT SINGH BHULLAR

Third Appellant | |
| AND: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent | |

| order made by: | O'SULLIVAN J |
| DATE OF ORDER: | 23 April 2026 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The first appellant is appointed litigation representative for the third appellant pursuant to r 9.63 of the Federal Court R ules 2011 (Cth).

2. The name of the first respondent is amended to ‘Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’.

3. The appeal is dismissed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’SULLIVAN J:

1 The first and second appellants are citizens of India who arrived in Australia on 4 September 2009 as holders of vocational education sector student visas (subclass 572).

2 The third appellant was born in India in 2015 and is the son of the appellants.  He arrived in Australia in or about 2016.

3 On 14 December 2017, the first appellant applied for a student (class TU) (subclass 500) visa for the purpose of studying a Certificate IV in Commercial Cookery.

4 The second and third appellants were included as dependents on the first appellant’s visa application.

5 On 15 February 2018, a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) refused the application on the basis that the delegate was not satisfied that the first appellant met the genuine temporary entrant criteria in cl 500.212(a), at Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth).

6 On 5 March 2018, the appellants applied for a review of the delegate’s decision to the Administrative Appeals T ribunal.

7 The Tribunal sought further information from the appellants and provided them with a copy of Ministerial D irection 69, which was the relevant Direction at that time.

8 On 13 April 2020, the first appellant provided further information to the Tribunal, which included confirmation that he had enrolled in Certificate IV in Commercial Cookery, a genuine temporary entrant statement and a number of certificates reflecting the studies he had done previously.

9 Following a hearing on 20 July 2020, at which the first appellant attended, the Tribunal delivered an oral decision affirming the delegate’s decision.  On 6 August 2020, the Tribunal delivered written reasons.

10 The appellants applied for judicial review to the F ederal C ircuit and F amily C ourt o f A ustralia (Div 2) which was dismissed on 20 September 2024: B hullar v Minister for I mmigration and M ulticultural A ffairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 909 (J).

11 The appellants now appeal from that judgment.

Primary judge’s reasons

12 The primary judge considered the Tribunal’s reasons in detail: J [11]-[27], noting that the issue before the Tribunal was whether the first appellant was a genuine temporary entrant for stay in Australia as a student for the purposes of cl 500.212.

13 The primary judge observed that the Tribunal had regard to Direction 69 when considering whether the first appellant satisfied cl 500-212.

14 The primary judge noted that the Tribunal summarised the first appellant’s study history and circumstances, including his family ties to India and Australia, and did not accept that a course similar to Certificate IV in Commercial Cookery was not available in India.

15 The primary judge noted further that the Tribunal did not accept the first appellant’s evidence that he was not using the student visa program to circumvent its purpose and maintain ongoing residence, nor was the Tribunal persuaded by the first appellant’s explanation as to why he continually represented he was a genuine temporary entrant on each of his student visa applications before changing his mind and enrolling in further study.  The primary judge continued by referring to other aspects of the Tribunal’s reasons before considering the grounds of the application.

The application before the primary judge

16 The application before the primary judge contained eight grounds.  The primary judge observed, correctly, that a number of the grounds were either statements of fact or procedural matters.

17 However, since the first appellant was self-represented before the primary judge, his Honour took a broad view of the grounds and after explaining the nature of the application and common categories of jurisdictional error, addressed what the primary judge found to be the first appellant’s principal complaint which was that contained in ground seven: J [37].

… [The] AAT overlooked my intentions and has not given weightage [sic weight] to the fact that I have only studied the courses in past which were relevant and beneficial to my business portfolio. And hence AAT has made jurisdictional error in considering the facts in my case.

18 The primary judge interpreted this ground broadly, observing: at J [39], that the complaint was that:

… the Tribunal did not properly take into account [the first appellant’s] intentions (which the Court takes as a reference to his evidence before the Tribunal in respect of his stated intention to return to India to establish a business) and failed to give weight to his evidence that his prior studies were relevant and beneficial to his ultimate aim.

(square brackets provided)

19 The primary judge had regard to the matters stated in the other grounds as informing the first appellant’s principal complaint, but that taking each of those grounds individually (save for ground 7) found that none revealed jurisdictional error: J [40].

20 As to ground 7, the primary judge found that the Tribunal gave extensive consideration to the appellant’s stated intention in respect of returning to India to study and engaged “… in an active intellectual process with that evidence and its relation to the dispositive issues before it …”, referring to Tickner v Chapman (1995) 57 FCR 451 at [462]; C arrascalao v Minister for I mmigration and B order P rotection (2017) 252 FCR 352 at [46]: at J [44].

21 The primary judge found that the Tribunal had considered and understood the first appellant’s evidence and that on the application for judicial review, the first appellant was doing no more than disagreeing with the conclusions of the Tribunal: J [44].

22 One aspect of the Tribunal’s reasons that caused the primary judge some passing concern was the possibility that the Tribunal had interpreted the first appellant’s need for him to complete Certificate IV in Commercial Cookery as a legal requirement to run a restaurant in India. However, it became clear in the paragraphs of the Tribunal’s reasons which followed that the Tribunal was clarifying whether or not that was the case, ultimately noting that the first appellant had clarified that it was not the case that he required a Certificate IV in Commercial Cookery in order to run a restaurant in India: J [45].

23 On the question of the weight to be given to the first appellant’s evidence, the primary judge observed, correctly, that questions of weight do not ordinarily give rise to findings of jurisdictional error because that involves the Court reviewing findings rather than a review of the process by which the Tribunal arrived at its conclusions: Minister for I mmigration and C itizenship v SZJSS [2010] HCA 48; (2010) 243 CLR 164 at [36]: J [46].

24 Nonetheless, the primary judge observed that the approach did not mean factual findings were unassailable if they can be seen to be illogical or irrational, but that there was nothing illogical or irrational about the weight placed on any of the matters by the Tribunal: J [47]-[48].

25 Next, the primary judge continued by finding that the Tribunal had correctly interpreted and applied Direction 69 and cl 500.212.

26 The primary judge found the Tribunal understood its task, considered all of the first appellant’s claims and evidence and there was no evidence that the Tribunal had failed to consider relevant material.  The primary judge found the Tribunal’s findings were rational and based on a consideration of matters that were logically probative: J [49]-[50]; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [131].

27 Having adopted a broad approach to the grounds, ultimately the primary judge dismissed the application.

Grounds of appeal

28 Before this Court, the appellants advanced 11 grounds of appeal.  As was the case before the primary judge, a number of the grounds contained factual or procedural matters and in some cases repeat what was before the primary judge.  Nonetheless, three grounds: 2, 8 and 9 reflect the appellant’s substantive complaints about the primary judge’s decision.

Grounds 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 10

29 The Minister submits that these grounds are not proper grounds of review and should be dismissed as re-stating evidence that was before the Tribunal and inviting the Court to engage in a merits review.

30 Having said that, the Minister also submitted that if the Court adopts a broad approach and considers these grounds as background to the substantive complaints, the Minister did not oppose that construction.

31 I accept that submission and adopt that approach.

Grounds 5 and 7

32 The Minister submits that appeal grounds 5 and 7 set out new information which was not before the Tribunal, such that leave would be required if that evidence were to be admitted and relied upon.  To that extent, the first respondent opposes the new material in appeal grounds 5 and 7.

33 Adopting a broad approach, I propose to consider grounds 5 and 7.

34 Those grounds state, respectively:

5.    A Certificate IV in Commercial Cookery from Australia is not just about learning how to cook; it equips you with the full spectrum of skills needed to establish and run a hospitality business, from leadership and management to operational efficiency and customer service.  With the expertise gained from this qualification, I’ll be well-prepared to start a successful and sustainable hospitality business in India, offering high-quality services that stand out in the market.  I am interested in the culinary business and aspire to eventually own chains of restaurants after completion of my course studies from Australia.

…

7.    My economic situation in India is pretty good and as my in-laws, to help me starting my career in India, therefore I have no money issues.  Moreover, we have our property there with no mortgage and other assets as well.  Now about social ties I would say that all my social ties are with India only, because my parents, in-laws, relatives, and cousins all live in India.  I did not go to India in past because of my study commitments and financial issues.  But technology has made us survive all those years without seeing them in person.  I am truly attached to my parents and so is my wife.  We wish to get our son’s schooling done in India and under the affection and love of his grandparents.  I have few friends here but now it is emotionally very challenging, and one feels lack of warmth and support while away from family.  Therefore, I am looking forward to going back to my home country as soon as finish my studies.  I am also very keen to diversify my ongoing business in India after completion of the course studies.

35 A consideration of those two grounds shows that they are a combination of factual matters and submissions.  The latter part of ground 7 refers to the second appellant’s ties to India and his business intentions.

36 It is apparent from a consideration of those aspects of ground 7 that the appellant is inviting the Court to embark upon a merits review, a course which the Court has no power to do.

37 Accordingly, grounds 5 and 7 fail.

38 As to the remaining grounds: 1, 3, 4 and 10, there is nothing in those grounds which demonstrates error on the part of the primary judge such that these grounds also fail.

Ground 2

39 Ground 2 introduces a matter which was not before the primary judge.  It provides:

My academic background, career aspirations, and ties to my home country were not properly weighed against the guidelines set by the Department of Home Affairs.

40 The complaint is that these matters were not properly weighed against the guidelines within Direction 69.

41 The Minister submits that the question of weight to be given to evidence before it is a matter for the Tribunal and that this ground is no more than an invitation for this Court to engage in a merits review: Nahi v Minister for I mmigration and I ndigenous A ffairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [11].

42 I accept that submission.  As I have noted earlier, the Court has no power to engage in that process.

43 The Minister continues by submitting that in any event, the Tribunal did consider and give due weight to the first appellant’s academic history and ties to India such that there was nothing irrational or illogical about the Tribunal’s conclusions.

44 I accept that submission, which is clearly the case.

45 Finally on this ground, the Minister submits that the primary judge considered the Tribunal’s approach to weighing all matters and evidence before it: J [48]-[50], such that the primary judge correctly disposed of the complaints raised in ground 2.

46 I accept that was the case and no error has been demonstrated on the part of the primary judge such that ground 2 fails.

Grounds 8 and 9

47 These grounds provide:

8.    Therefore, I wish to complete my academic journey in Australia.  Still, the Department of Home Affairs and AAT overlooked by intentions and have not given weightage [sic weight] to the fact that I have only studied the courses in the past that were relevant and beneficial to my business portfolio.

9.    And hence AAT has made a jurisdictional error in considering the facts in my case.

48 The Minister submits that these grounds reproduce ground 7 before the primary judge and again attack the weight given to evidence by the Tribunal.

49 I accept that is the case and accept this submission.

50 These two grounds raise two components, the first is the particular evidence to which the first appellant referred and the second the weight to be given to that evidence.

51 As to the first component, the primary judge found the Tribunal gave careful and detailed consideration to the first appellant’s intentions about returning to India and opening a restaurant or a chain of restaurants and that he had only studied in the courses in the past that were relevant and beneficial to his business portfolio.

52 Further, the primary judge considered all of the matters raised by the first appellant before the Tribunal before dismissing the application.  No error has been demonstrated in relation to this component.

53 As to the weight to be given to various matters, once again, the first appellant is inviting this Court to engage upon a merits review, a process which the Court has no power to do.

54 No error has been shown on the part of the primary judge when considering these two grounds such that grounds 8 and 9 fail.

Conclusion

55 It is for these reasons that the appeal is dismissed.

56 There will be orders accordingly.

| I certify that the preceding fifty-six (56) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice O'Sullivan. |
Associate:

Dated: 23 April 2026