Jump To

Top Caption Lead Opinion Dissent

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In Re C C M Baskin Minor

Michigan Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 374097

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (16.2K)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED
March 18, 2026
10:01 AM
In re C. C. M. BASKIN, Minor.

No. 374097
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2024-000868-NA

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and MURRAY and MALDONADO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to
minor child, CCMB, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) (parent caused physical harm to child or
sibling and there is a reasonable likelihood of injury if the child is placed with the parent), (3)(g)
(failure to provide proper care and custody despite the financial ability to do so), and (3)(j)
(reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to parent).1 We affirm.

I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises from a motor-vehicle collision involving respondent and her other minor
child, JDKB. On the day of the fatal car accident, respondent woke up, put CCMB, a girl aged
six, and JDKB, a boy aged four, in her car, to drive CCMB to school. Respondent put neither child
in a booster seat as she decided to not make the effort of retrieving the seats from the trunk of the
car where they were stored. After dropping CCMB off at her school, respondent then ran some
errands with JDKB and a friend in the car with her. On the way home from the errands, respondent
was traveling along I-94, and was attempting to turn onto I-75, when her car brakes gave out.
Respondent’s vehicle traveled down an embankment, onto I-75, and crashed into three other
vehicles. During the collision, JDKB, who was not restrained in his booster seat, was ejected from

1
While the trial court’s order does not expressly identify the statutory grounds for termination, it
indicated at the best-interest hearing that the grounds were “(b)([i]), (g), and (j).” Thus, we infer
that MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), and (j) were the statutory grounds for termination.

-1-
the car. After the ejection, JDKB was rushed to Children’s Hospital of Michigan where efforts to
revive him were unsuccessful and he died that day.

When a Michigan State Police Trooper spoke with respondent at the hospital soon after the
accident, the respondent was showing signs of marijuana impairment. The trooper put respondent
through a series of standard field sobriety tests during which she performed very poorly and
indicated to the trooper that she was under the influence of marijuana. Respondent also told the
trooper that she was a daily user of marijuana, that the car she was driving had faulty brakes and
other mechanical issues and that she had been trying to contact the person from whom she bought
the car to repair them. The respondent informed the trooper that she did not have a driver’s license
or valid insurance on the car.2

Two days after JDKB’s death, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
filed a petition seeking to terminate respondent’s parental rights at the initial disposition. In
support of its request, DHHS cited a risk of harm to CCMB given that JDKB’s death was the result
of respondent’s physical neglect. Respondent entered a “no contest” plea to statutory grounds and
jurisdiction.

A best-interest hearing was held over the course of three days in front of a referee. The
witnesses all confirmed the version of events in which respondent drove a car in disrepair, while
she was impaired, and while her children were unrestrained. At the end of the final day, the referee
found that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in CCMB’s best interests. On the same
day, the referee issued an order, recommending that the trial-court judge adopt the
recommendation as the evidence demonstrated that respondent made reckless choices that created
a serious risk of harm to others, including her minor children. The trial-court judge then adopted
the referee’s recommendation and terminated respondent’s parental rights to CCMB. This appeal
followed.

II. REUNIFICATION EFFORTS

On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court erred by finding that termination of her
parental rights was in CCMB’s best interests. However, while presenting that argument to this
Court, respondent briefly suggests that she should have been provided with a treatment plan and
reasonable efforts should have been made toward reunification. We conclude that this issue is
abandoned and waived for two reasons.

First, “[a]n appellant may not merely announce its position and leave it to this Court to
discover and rationalize the basis for its claims.” Mettler Walloon, LLC v Melrose Twp, 281 Mich
App 184, 220; 761 NW2d 293 (2008). “This Court is not required to search for authority to sustain

2
On April 3, 2025, respondent pleaded guilty or no contest to involuntary manslaughter as the
result of the motor-vehicle collision. Respondent was sentenced to six months in Wayne County
Jail and three years of probation. While this information is not in the lower court record, “[t]his
Court may take judicial notice of public records.” Precise MRI of Mich, LLC v State Auto Ins Co,
340 Mich App 269, 281 n 5; 985 NW2d 892 (2022).

-2-
or reject a position raised by a party without citation of authority.” Id. “It is not enough for an
appellant in his brief simply to . . . assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to . . . unravel
and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his
position.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). In the event a party “fails to cite authority
for this position . . . the issue is therefore deemed abandoned.” Id. at 221. Similarly, when an
issue “is not contained in the statement of questions presented[,] it is therefore deemed
abandoned.” Id.

The issue of whether respondent should have been provided with reunification efforts is
not included in her statement of questions presented on appeal. Additionally, when respondent
does address this issue within her brief, she includes insufficient authority in support of her
position. Respondent cites only one authority in her appellate brief, In re Newman, 189 Mich App
61; 472 NW2d 38 (1991), in support of her contention, but she does not identify what portion of
that decision supports her argument. Furthermore, our review of the Newman case does not show
anything that could be considered to offer support of her contention in light of the factual scenario
before us. Therefore, because respondent has failed to include the issue of reunification within her
statement of questions presented and include sufficient authority in support of her position
regarding reunification, we consider the issue to be abandoned.

Second, even if respondent did not abandon the reunification issue through her insufficient
briefing, she waived the issue by entering a no-contest plea to jurisdiction and statutory grounds
for termination. In particular, at a July 22, 2024 hearing, the trial court explained as follows when
accepting her plea:

The Court: Okay. And you understand that if the Court takes jurisdiction,
after accepting this no-contest plea, and the Court does not terminate your parental
rights after a best interest hearing; that the children will be adjudicated. The Court
will take jurisdiction over your children and order you to do certain things before
your children can be returned to your care. Do you understand that?

Then, after confirming with the attorneys that its advice of rights was satisfactory, the trial
court reiterated to respondent that the next step in the process was a best-interest hearing to
determine whether termination of her parental rights was appropriate:

But the Court, today, as I said respondent, we’re not terminating parental
rights because the Court doesn’t do that until a best interest finding is made. The
Court has to hear evidence and testimony about what is in the best interest of these
children.

Simply put, the trial court informed respondent during the plea colloquy that the next step
in the process was a best-interest hearing to determine whether it should terminate her parental
rights and, in the event that it did not terminate her parental rights, it would “order [her] to do
certain things before [CCMB] can be returned to [her] care.” Thus, while the trial court did not
expressly use terms such as “reasonable efforts” or “reunification,” the trial court did indicate to
respondent that reasonable efforts for reunification would occur only in the contingent event that

-3-
it did not decide to terminate her parental rights after making a best-interest determination.
Accordingly, the trial court again reiterated to respondent that the next step in the process was a
best-interest hearing to determine whether it would terminate her parental rights.

Under these circumstances, respondent waived any argument on appeal that she did not
receive reasonable efforts for reunification. See In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 264; 817 NW2d
115 (2011) (“Respondent may not assign as error on appeal something that she deemed proper in
the lower court because allowing her to do so would permit respondent to harbor error as an
appellate parachute.”).3

Moreover, the plea shows respondent demonstrated multiple instances of reckless choices
before operating and then when driving her car. It was those choices which created serious risk of
harm to herself, her minor children and other drivers on the road. On the day of JDKB’s death,
respondent chose to drive in a car in disrepair, without a driver’s license, without insurance, with
no vehicle registration, and without proper safety restraint for her young children. Additionally,
there was enough marijuana in her system to impair her functionality, in a vehicle she knew to
have had faulty brakes. These voluntary choices by respondent showed little to no regard for the
well-being for her children and resulted in the death of one of them. Therefore, respondent’s
position concerning reunification is contrary to her plea of no contest and, in any event as
discussed, respondent has waived the issue on appeal. See id.; In re Bullard, unpublished per
curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 23, 2023 (Docket No. 362065).4

III. BEST-INTEREST DETERMINATION

Respondent contends that the trial court erred when it concluded that termination of
respondent’s parental rights was in CCMB’s best interests. We disagree.

This Court “review[s] for clear error a trial court’s factual finding that termination of a
parent’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests.” In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 346; 990
NW2d 685 (2022). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and

3
We acknowledge In re MJC, 349 Mich App 42; 27 NW3d 122 (2023), in which this Court held
that “respondent-father, by pleading no contest to the statutory grounds for termination, [did not
waive] his right to bring a reasonable-efforts challenge on appeal.” Id. at 50. However, we
respectfully decline to follow that case now because respondent in this case, unlike, apparently,
the respondent in In re MJC, was informed during the plea process that reasonable efforts for
reunification would only occur if the trial court did not decide to terminate parental rights at the
best-interest hearing. See id. at 54. Moreover, we note that the case before us involves an
accelerated process by which respondent pleaded to both jurisdiction and grounds for termination.
Whereas, the In re MJC proceedings occurred during an extended three-year process, and the only
relevant plea discussed in In re MJC was the respondent’s plea to the grounds for termination. See
id. at 46-47.
4
“[U]npublished opinions are not precedentially binding under the rule of stare decisis” but “may
be considered persuasive.” Elizabeth Trace Condo Ass’n v American Global Enterprises, Inc, 340
Mich App 435, 444; 986 NW2d 412 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

-4-
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special
opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 276; 976 NW2d 44
(2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, “[a]ppellate courts are obliged to defer to a
trial court’s factual findings at termination proceedings if those findings do not constitute clear
error.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

“Even if the trial court finds that the [DHHS] has established a ground for termination by
clear and convincing evidence, it cannot terminate the parent’s parental rights unless it also finds
by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the children.” In re
Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App 426, 434; 871 NW2d 868 (2015). “In making its best-interest
determination, the trial court may consider the whole record, including evidence introduced by any
party.” Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 276 (quotation marks and citation omitted). A trial court “may
consider such factors as the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s
need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s
home.” In re Payne/Pumphrey/Fortson, 311 Mich App 49, 63-64; 874 NW2d 205 (2015)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, a child’s safety, well-being, and the risk a child
might face if returned to the parent’s care also are relevant to the best-interest determination. In
re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 141-142; 809 NW2d 412 (2011).

Respondent argues that the trial court erred by finding termination was in CCMB’s best
interests because the trial court did not give sufficient weight to the bond she and CCMB share.
We disagree.

While the trial court did not explicitly address the bond between respondent and CCMB,
the bond between a parent and the minor child is just one of the factors that may be considered. In
re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). Although there was evidence in the
record indicating that respondent and CCMB shared a bond, there also was evidence in the record,
which the trial court relied on, that weighed heavily in favor of termination regarding respondent’s
parenting ability. The evidence established that respondent put her 4-year-old and 6-year-old in a
vehicle that she knew was in disrepair, and left their booster seats in the trunk while they rode in
the car. When she met with law enforcement after the accident, she showed obvious signs of
impairment. Based on these facts, the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that respondent’s
significant threat to CCMB’s health and safety outweighed any bond shared with respondent.
Thus, notwithstanding any evidence of a bond between respondent and CCMB, the trial court did
not commit clear error when it found that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in
CCMB’s best interests.

Respondent next argues that the trial court erred when it relied on speculative anticipatory
abuse or neglect. We disagree.

“The doctrine of anticipatory neglect provides that how a parent treats one child is
probative of how that parent may treat other children.” In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 323; 964
NW2d 881 (2020). “However, the probative value of such an inference is decreased by differences
between the children . . . .” In re Kellogg, 331 Mich App 249, 259; 952 NW2d 544 (2020).

First, it should be noted that the trial court did not use the term anticipatory neglect in its
holding. Additionally, the trial court’s holding does not rely solely on JDKB’s death. Rather, the

-5-
record reflects that while CCMB was fortunate to make it to school that day, she also rode in
respondent’s car and was put at significant risk. For that same reason, if the court was applying
the doctrine of anticipatory neglect, there would be strong probative value in JDKB’s death.
Respondent has already demonstrated that by her actions of putting both children in danger.

Respondent’s anticipatory neglect argument relies on In re Figueroa, an unpublished per
curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 18, 2023 (Docket No. 362893). In that case,
the respondent’s parental rights with respect to his biological son were terminated based on the
respondent’s purported sexual abuse of his stepdaughter. Id. at 1-3. The Court held that while this
could certainly be a critical consideration, it should not be the only consideration in the best-
interest analysis. Id. at 4. Further, the Court held that the trial court erred in not analyzing the fact
that the respondent’s biological son and stepdaughter were different in certain respects, such as
having different genders and mothers. Id. at 4-5.

Here, the motor-vehicle collision itself was clearly not the trial court’s only consideration.
In addition to considering the risk that respondent exposed her minor children to on the day of the
fatal car accident, in part through her marijuana intoxication, the trial court considered that she
also showed up to a parenting visitation with CCMB smelling like marijuana. Further, the trial
court considered the fact that CCMB was doing well in foster care and would not regularly ask for
her mother.

Furthermore, Figueroa is not relevant to the instant case. First, respondent was the
biological mother of both children. Additionally, the neglect that led to JDKB’s death was not
dependent on his gender, it depended upon respondent’s actions relating to the condition of the car
in which she placed her minor children, that she did not put her children in safe seating, and that
respondent was operating the car under the influence of marijuana. Thus, in light of all of these
factors, to the extent the trial court relied on the doctrine of anticipatory neglect, it did not err in
doing so. As a result, the trial court did not commit clear error in concluding that termination of
respondent’s parental rights was in CCMB’s best interests.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, we affirm.

/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ Christopher M. Murray

-6-

Dissent

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED
March 18, 2026
10:01 AM
In re C. C. M. BASKIN, Minor.

No. 374097
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2024-000868-NA

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and MURRAY and MALDONADO, JJ.

MALDONADO, J. (dissenting).

Respondent Shaniqua Baskin contends on appeal that the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) failed to make reasonable efforts toward family reunification prior to the trial
court terminating her parental rights, including failing to provide her with a case service plan. The
majority concludes that respondent waived this issue by entering a no-contest plea to jurisdiction
and statutory grounds for termination. I disagree that respondent’s plea in this case constituted a
waiver of her right to challenge the sufficiency of the DHHS’s reunification efforts. Therefore, I
respectfully dissent.

I. WAIVER

“A waiver consists of the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”
Patel v Patel, 324 Mich App 631, 634; 922 NW2d 647 (2018). “Magic words are unnecessary to
effectuate a valid waiver, but a waiver must be explicit, voluntary, and made in good faith.” In re
MJC, 349 Mich App 42, 49; 27 NW3d 122 (2023), quoting Patel, 324 Mich App at 634. A valid
waiver may be shown by “express declarations or by declarations that manifest the parties’ intent
and purpose, or may be an implied waiver, evidenced by a party’s decisive, unequivocal conduct
reasonably implying the intent to waive.” In re MJC, 349 Mich App at 49 (quotation marks,
citation, and brackets omitted). “A party who waives a right is precluded from seeking appellate
review based on a denial of that right because waiver eliminates any error.” Id., quoting Cadle Co
v Kentwood, 285 Mich App 240, 255; 776 NW2d 145 (2009).

In In re MJC, this Court determined that the statutory requirement for the DHHS to provide
reasonable efforts to reunify a family is distinct from the statutory requirement that at least one

-1-
statutory ground for termination of parental rights be established by clear and convincing evidence.
In re MJC, 349 Mich App at 54. So in that case, the respondent-father’s waiver of his right to
contest the statutory grounds for termination did not also waive his right to contest the adequacy
of the DHHS’s reunification efforts. Id. Unlike the majority, I do not find In re MJC to be
distinguishable from the instant case on this point because just as in In re MJC the trial court did
not inform respondent that she has the statutory right to reunification services and that she was
waiving those services through her no-contest plea. See id. at 54.

Because of the importance of the relevant language during the plea colloquy at the July 22,
2024 hearing, I include a lengthy excerpt of the hearing transcript:

The Court: Your attorney has indicated to the Court that you wish to
enter a no-contest plea. That means that you are giving up
your right to trial . . . I’m just gonna [sic] have a conversation
with you; ask you some questions because I need to make
sure that you understand what it is you’re giving up before I
can accept the no-contest plea, and I need to make sure that
you are doing this voluntarily.

So first and foremost, you have the right to have a trial before
a judge, sitting with or without a jury. And the trial means
that Ms. Barash, who’s the assistant attorney general, she
represents DHHS; she would call witnesses, and then your
attorney, Mr. Alex, would have a chance to cross examine
any witnesses that she calls. And you would ask questions
of those witnesses through your attorney.

Additionally, you have the right to have witnesses come to
court to testify on your own behalf, and you have the right to
testify on your own behalf.

Ms. Baskin, do you understand that Ms. Barash, the assistant
attorney general, has the burden of proving the allegations,
by a preponderance of the evidence, for statutory grounds
and jurisdiction; and by clear and convincing evidence to
terminate parental rights? And that if you enter a no-contest
plea today that can later on in the future be used at a hearing
to terminate your parental rights. You understand this, Ms.
Baskin?

The Court: Are you making a no-contest plea today, of your own free
will, Ms. Baskin?

-2-
The Court: Has anyone promised you anything to make a no-contest
plea today?

The Court: Has anyone threatened you to make a no-contest plea today?

The Court: Okay. And you understand that if the Court takes
jurisdiction, after accepting this no-contest plea, and the
Court does not terminate your parental rights after a best
interest hearing; that the children will be adjudicated. The
Court will take jurisdiction over your children and order you
to do certain things before your children can be returned to
your care. Do you understand that?

The Court: Okay. Are all parties here satisfied with the Advice of
Rights?

[L-GAL]: Yes, your Honor.

The Court: The Court is, then, going to find that the no-contest plea will
be made knowingly and voluntarily. The Court is going to
find that there is a—there is a basis for jurisdiction and a
statutory basis to terminate parental rights.

But the Court, today, as I said Ms. Baskin, we’re not
terminating parental rights because the Court doesn’t do that
until a best interest finding is made. The Court has to hear
evidence and testimony about what is in the best interest of
these children.

I cannot conclude from this colloquy that the trial court clearly indicated to respondent that
she was entitled to reasonable efforts toward reunification—including a case service plan—and
that she was relinquishing that statutory right through her plea to jurisdiction and statutory grounds.
The only potential reference to reasonable efforts, DHHS services, or a case service plan was the
trial court’s statement that it may “order respondent to do certain things before [her] children can
be returned to [her] care.” But that statement did not make clear the DHHS’s responsibilities to
facilitate reunification. Therefore, I would conclude that, just as in In re MJC, respondent’s no-
contest plea in the present case did not amount to an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right.” Patel, 324 Mich App at 634. As a result, this issue has not been waived, and

-3-
this Court can consider whether the DHHS failed to make reasonable reunification efforts, such
that the trial court erred by terminating respondent’s parental rights.1

II. REASONABLE EFFORTS

It is well established that the DHHS “has an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to
reunify a family before seeking termination of parental rights.” In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79,
85; 893 NW2d 637 (2017), citing MCL 712A.18f(3)(b) and (c); MCL 712A.19a(2). Reasonable
efforts must be appropriate to address the specific barriers facing the family, so efforts will vary
according to circumstance. See In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich at 85-86. However, reasonable
efforts must include creating a case service plan “ ‘outlining the steps that both [the DHHS] and
the parent will take to rectify the issues that led to court involvement and to achieve
reunification.’ ” In re MJC, 349 Mich App at 55, quoting In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich at 85-86.

Generally, to preserve an argument regarding the sufficiency of reasonable reunification
efforts, a respondent must object to the services at the time that the efforts are offered. In re Frey,
297 Mich App 242, 247; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). However, when the DHHS never creates a case
service plan, a respondent never has the opportunity to object, so such a challenge is timely even
when made at the termination hearing. See In re Matamoros, ___ Mich __, _; __ NW3d ___
(2025) (Docket No. 371544); slip op at 3-4.

In this case, respondent’s trial counsel never challenged the DHHS’s reunification efforts.
Accordingly, this issue is not preserved and is subject to plain error review. In re Pederson, 331
Mich App 445, 463; 951 NW2d 704 (2020). “To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three
requirements must be met: 1) the error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or
obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights.” In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120,
135; 809 NW2d 412 (2011) (quotation marks omitted). “Generally, an error affects substantial
rights if it caused prejudice, i.e., it affected the outcome of the proceedings.” In re Utrera, 281
Mich App 1, 9; 761 NW2d 253 (2008). “If those three requirements are met, reversal is warranted
when the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” In re Boshell/Shelton, ___ Mich App __, _; __ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No.
371973); slip op at 6 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

In the present case, a careful review of the record compels the conclusion that the trial
court plainly erred in terminating respondent’s parental rights without the DHHS engaging in
reasonable reunification efforts.2 Indeed, the order terminating respondent’s parental rights

1
Additionally, although respondent did not include this issue in her statement of the questions
presented on appeal, she did address this issue in her supplemental briefing, which she submitted
in response to this Court’s order inviting the parties to address the lack of reunification efforts. In
re CCM Baskin Minor, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 6, 2026 (Docket
No. 34097). For this reason, I would not conclude that this issue is abandoned.
2
The DHHS is excused from its reunification requirements in cases involving aggravated
circumstances. MCL 712A.19a(2); In re Simonetta, 340 Mich App 700, 707; 987 NW2d 919

-4-
indicates: “Reasonable efforts were made to preserve and unify the family to make it possible for
the child(ren) to safely return to the child(ren)’s home. Those efforts were unsuccessful.” But
when the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights at the best-interest hearing, the court
stated:

[Respondent’s] reaction, denying accountability for her role in the crash suggest[s]
she may not increase her safety practice if this Court were to allow her to work
towards reunification. Her failure to recognize responsibility suggest[s] she does
not understand her duty to keep her children safe, or what it takes to keep them safe.
[Emphasis added.]

This statement contradicts the trial court’s finding that “reasonable efforts were made.” To the
contrary, this statement indicates that no reunification efforts were offered or even permitted.

For its part, the DHHS argues that it made the following efforts prior to seeking
termination: face-to-face interviews and follow-up with Children’s Hospital of Michigan,
coordination with law enforcement, interviews with family members, review of prior case files,
and seeking relatives for placement. Assuming arguendo that these efforts are appropriate to the
specific barriers facing the family, see In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich at 85-86, the DHHS’s
reunification efforts were still incomplete because there is no case service plan in the record. See
In re MJC, 349 Mich App at 55.

Consequently, I would conclude that the trial court plainly erred by determining that
reasonable efforts were made and terminating respondent’s parental rights at initial disposition. In
light of the accelerated proceedings, I would further conclude that this error affected the outcome
of the proceedings, causing prejudice to respondent. See In re Boshell/Shelton, ___ Mich App at
___; slip op at 8 (reiterating that the erroneous deprivation of reasonable efforts toward
reunification can seriously affect the fairness and integrity of child-protective proceedings).

For these reasons, I would reverse the order terminating respondent’s parental rights and
remand for further proceedings.

/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado

(2022). In its original petition, the DHHS included an allegation of murder or attempted murder
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(k), which constitutes an aggravated circumstance. See MCL
722.638(1)(a)(vi). But this allegation was removed from the amended petition, prior to the initial
disposition, after respondent pleaded nolo contendere to involuntary manslaughter.

-5-