McGregor v. Mesa Jame Corp. - Liability Release Covers Negligence Only

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

Date Submitted: January 19, 2026 Date Decided: April 21, 2026

Upon Consideration of the Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, GRANTED in part, DENIED in part. ) MEGAN MCGREGOR and KYLE MEMORANDUM OPINION MCGREGOR, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) Patrick C. Gallagher, Esquire of JACOBS & CRUMPLAR, P.A., Attorney for Plaintiffs. v. ) ) C.A. No. N25C-03-376 CLS Eric Scott Thompson, Esquire of MARSHALL DENNEHEY, PC, Attorney for Defendants. ) MESA JAME CORP., SKY ZONE ) LLC, SKY ZONE FRANCHISE ) GROUP, LLC, CIRCUSTRIX ) HOLDINGS, LLC, TRAMPOLINE ) SCOTT, J. ACQUISITION HOLDINGS, LLC, and ) TRAMPOLINE ACQUISITION PARENT HOLDINGS, LLC, ) ) Defendants. )

Before the Court is Defendants', Mesa Jame Corporation's, Sky Zone, LLC's,

Sky Zone Franchise Group, LLC's, CircusTrix Holdings, LLC's, Trampoline Acquisition Holdings, LLC's, and Trampoline Acquisition Parent Holdings, LLC's (collectively, "Defendants"), Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, asking the Court to enter judgment in their favor as to Megan McGregor's and her husband, Kyle McGregor's (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), claims under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(c). For the following reasons, the Defendants' Motion is GRANTED in part,

DENIED in part. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 15, 2024, Plaintiffs visited Sky Zone, a trampoline park, with their

1 2children. During the visit, Megan used the trapeze swing. Megan alleges that when

she let go of the swing, she "fell onto an underinflated or partially inflated airbag"

3and sustained injuries. When Kyle was called over to the area where Megan was

4injured, he purportedly "noticed multiple areas of duct tape applied to the airbag."

On August 26, 2023, Megan signed a release, titled "Participant and Arbitration Agreement, Indemnification, General Release and Assumption" (the "Release") for the Newark, Delaware Sky Zone location, for herself and on behalf

Compl., D.I. 1, ¶¶ 16-17. 1 Id. ¶¶ 18-19. 2 Id. ¶¶ 19-21. 3

4 Id. ¶ 23.

of her children. The Release insulates Defendants from liability and states that Megan understood she "was voluntarily participating in the ACTIVITIES, which

6[she] agree[d] are dangerous and entail both known and unknown inherent risks[.]"

7The Release expired on August 25, 2024.

Plaintiffs filed a Complaint on March 30, 2025, alleging claims for premises

8liability, gross negligence/recklessness, and loss of consortium. Defendants moved 9for judgment on the pleadings on November 4, 2025. Plaintiffs responded in

The matter is now ripe for decision. 10opposition on January 19, 2026. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(c), "any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." "In resolving a Rule 12(c) motion, the Court accepts the truth of

all well-pleaded facts and draws all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non- The standard of review on a motion for judgment on the pleadings tracks 11movant." the standard for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Accordingly, "[t]he 12

5 Defs.' Mot. for J. on the Pleadings, D.I. 21, Ex. F ("Release"). 6 Release ¶ 1.

See generally id. 7

8 See generally Compl. 9 See generally Defs.' Mot. for J. on the Pleadings. See generally Pls.' Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for J. on the Pleadings, D.I. 26 ("Pls.' Resp."). 10 11 Fortis Advisors LLC v. Boston Dynamics Inc., 2025 WL 1356521, at *3 (Del. Super. Apr. 29,

1. (citing D'Antonio v. Wesley Coll., Inc., 2023 WL 9021767, at *2 (Del. Super. Dec. 29, 2023)). 12 Silver Lake Office Plaza, LLC v. Lanard & Axilbund, Inc., 2014 WL 595378, at *6 (Del. Super.

Jan. 17, 2014) (quoting Blanco v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., 2012 WL 3194412, at *6 (Del. Super. Aug. 8, 2012)).

Court will not grant judgment on the pleadings unless, after drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, no material issues of fact exists and 13movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." DISCUSSION Defendants ask the Court to enter judgment in their favor because the Release

bars any claims against them as Plaintiffs expressly assumed the risk of an inherently

14dangerous activity. Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs' claim for gross

negligence/recklessness is conclusory and barred by the doctrine of the implied

15assumption of the risk. Plaintiffs concede that Megan signed the Release, but aver 16that the claim for gross negligence is outside the scope of the Release. In addition,

Plaintiffs proffer that Megan did not impliedly assume the risk of any injuries

17resulting from the facts of this case. Otherwise, Plaintiffs argue that the Complaint

18adequately states a claim for gross negligence/recklessness.

1. The Release does not bar claims for gross negligence/recklessness. Under Delaware law, "primary assumption of the risk is implicated when the plaintiff expressly consents 'to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct

13 Four Cents Holdings, LLC v. M&E Printing, Inc., 2025 WL 2366460, at *4 (Del. Super. Aug.

12, 2025) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Earthbound, LLC, 2024 WL 3067114, at *7 (Del. Super. June 5, 2024)).

14 Defs.' Mot. for J. on the Pleadings ¶ 10. Id. ¶¶ 11, 14. 15 16 Pls.' Resp. ¶ 5. 17 Id. ¶¶ 7-9. 18Id. ¶¶ 10-12.

toward him, and to take his chances of injury from a known risk arising from what

19the defendant is to do or leave undone.'" As such, "parties may enter into an

agreement that relieves a business owner of liability for injuries to business invitees that result from the owner's negligent conduct[,]" provided that the release is "clear and unequivocal" and "unambiguous, not unconscionable, and not against public 20policy."

Plaintiffs concede that Megan signed the Release, which clearly and

21unequivocally waives any claims of simple negligence against Defendants. Thus,

any claim for negligence against Defendants are dismissed. Plaintiffs argue, however, that consistent with Lynam v. Blue Diamond, LLC and Barth v. Blue 22 Diamond, LLC, 23 the Release does not cover claims of gross negligence or

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs. 24recklessness.

In both Lynam and Barth, the releases at issue relieved the defendants from liability caused by the "NEGLIGENCE OF THE 'RELEASEES' OR

19 Barth v. Blue Diamond, LLC, 2017 WL 5900949, at *2 (Del. Super. Nov. 29, 2017) (quoting

Helm v. 206 Mass. Ave., LLC, 107 A.3d 1074, 1080 (Del. 2014)) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

20 Lynam v. Blue Diamond LLC, 2016 WL 5793725, at *3 (Del. Super. Oct. 4, 2016) (citing Ketler

1. PFPA, LLC, 132 A.3d 746 (Del. 2016); Riverbend Cmty., LLC v. Green Eng'g, LLC, 55 A.3d 330, 336 (Del. 2012)). 21 Pl.'s Resp. ¶ 5. 22 2016 WL 5793725, at *4. 23 2017 WL 5900949, at *1. 24 Pl.'s Resp. ¶¶ 4-6.

In Lynam, this Court held that while an agreement can "insulate OTHERWISE.'" [d]efendants from liability for negligent conduct, it does not bar claims of 'more Similarly, in Barth, 26extreme forms of negligence,' such as 'reckless' conduct."

this Court concluded that the release form insulated the defendants from liability for 27negligence, but not recklessness.

The Release states that: Despite all known and unknown risks . . . I hereby expressly, unconditionally and voluntarily remise, release, waive, relinquish, acquit, satisfy and forever discharge and agree and covenant not to sue MESA JAME CORP., . . . and agree to hold said parties harmless of and from any and all manner of actions or omission(s), causes of action, suits, sums of money, controversies, damages, judgments, executions, claims and demands . . . in law or in equity, including, but not limited to, any and all claims which allege negligent acts and/or omissions 28committed by MESA JAME CORP[.]

Though the Release relieves Defendants of liability for negligent conduct, like

Lynam and Barth, the Release does not insulate Defendants from liability for gross

negligence/recklessness given that such agreements are generally not construed to cover these more extreme forms of negligence. The Court is not persuaded by Defendant's reliance on Ketler v. PFPA, LLC, given that the scope of the release

29there was only addressed in the context of a negligence claim. Consequently, the

25 Id. at *3; Lynam, 2016 WL 5793725, at *3. 26 Lynam, 2016 WL 5793725, at * 4 (internal citation omitted). 27 Barth, 2017 WL 5900949, at *3 (citing Lynam, 2016 WL 5793725, at *4). 28 Release ¶ 1. 29 132 A.3d at 747-48.

Court must next determine whether the Complaint adequately states a claim for gross negligence/recklessness.

1. A material issue of fact exists as to whether Defendants' conduct was grossly negligent/reckless.

Relying on Smith v. Silver Lake Elementary School, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claim for gross negligence/recklessness makes conclusory allegations that

30do not state a claim for relief. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that the

allegations in the Complaint sufficiently allege that Defendants engaged in grossly

31negligent/reckless conduct regarding the inflation of the airbag.

Under Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), claims for gross negligence must be stated with particularity so that the defendant is aware of

32potential liability. Gross negligence "requires a showing of negligence that is a

'higher level' of negligence representing extreme departure from the ordinary

33standard of care." "A recitation of conclusory allegations is not sufficient to meet

the particularity requirement when the plaintiff has not provided any facts supporting

34a claim of extreme departure from the standard of care."

30 Defs.' Mot. for J. on the Pleadings ¶¶ 11-13. 31 Pls.' Resp. ¶ 10. 32 Smith v. Silver Lake Elementary School, 2012 WL 2393722, at *2 (Del. Super. June 25, 2012). 33 Id. (quoting Hughes v. Christiana Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 73710, at *4 (Del. Super. Jan. 7, 2008))

(internal quotation marks omitted).

34 Id. (citing Brown v. Robb, 583 A.2d 949, 953 (Del. 1990)).

Here, unlike the plaintiffs in Smith, Plaintiffs plead facts demonstrating that a material issue of fact exists as to whether Defendants' conduct was an extreme departure from the standard of care. As alleged in the Complaint, Kyle noticed that

35duct tape was applied to the airbag when Megan was injured. Moreover, the

Complaint alleges that Megan did not hear any alarms ringing even though industry standards require working pressure alarms on inflatable structures and that similar injuries have resulted from underinflated/partially inflated airbags in the other Sky

36Zones across the United States. The Complaint also asserts the date of the injuries

and the location of the Sky Zone facility where the injuries occurred. From these facts as alleged in the Complaint, Defendants are aware of their potential liability, and the Court can draw a reasonable inference that Defendants knew or should have known there was an issue with the inflation of the airbag that raises material issues of fact as to whether Defendants' actions were grossly negligent/reckless.

1. A material issue of fact exists as to whether Plaintiff implied assumed the risk of injury.

Alternatively, Defendants claim that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by implied

37assumption of the risk. Plaintiffs argue that implied assumption of the risk is not

a valid defense because Megan could not appreciate the risk she was assuming--i.e.,

35 Compl. ¶¶ 23, 28. 36 Id. ¶¶ 25-29. Defs.' Mot. for J. on the Pleadings ¶ 14. 37

that Defendants "'increase[d] the risk of harm beyond what is inherent in the sport' by ignoring [industry] standards" and previous similar incidents at other Sky Zone

38locations.

This Court has held that the "doctrine of implied primary assumption of risk

39does not insulate a tortfeasor from liability for intentional or reckless conduct."

The Barth Court reasoned that while "defendants do not owe a duty to protect a plaintiff from the risks inherent in an activity to which the doctrine of implied primary assumption of risk applies," defendants owe plaintiffs a duty "not to increase the risk of harm beyond what is inherent in the sport through intentional or reckless behavior that is completely outside the range of the ordinary activity in the

40sport."

Neither party disputes that participating in the activities at Sky Zone qualifies as an inherently dangerous activity. There is, however, an issue of material fact that exists as to whether Defendants recklessly failed to maintain the inflation of the airbags under the trapeze swing and whether this conduct increased Megan's risk of

38 Pl.'s Resp. ¶ 9 (quoting Barth, 2017 WL 5900949, at *6) (internal quotation marks omitted). 39 Barth, 2017 WL 5900949, at *6. 40 Id. (quoting Peart v. Ferro, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 885, 894 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)) (internal

quotation marks omitted). The activities considered inherently dangerous include spectating certain sporting events, participating in a contact sport, bungee jumping or bouncing, operating a jet ski or engaging in other noncompetitive water sports, drag racing, and skydiving. Storm v. NSL

Rockland Place, LLC, 898 A.2d 874, 883 (Del. Super. 2005).

harm. Therefore, Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on this issue is denied. In sum, the only claim that Defendants are entitled to judgment on is any claim for simple negligence. Otherwise, drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs' favor, material issues of fact exist, and Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law for the claims concerning gross negligence/recklessness.

CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

is GRANTED in part, DENIED in part.

IT IS SO ORDERED. /s/ Calvin Scott Judge Calvin L. Scott, Jr.