Morin v. Healey - Dismissal of Case
Summary
The U.S. District Court for Massachusetts dismissed the case of Morin v. Healey, finding the amended complaint failed to remedy pleading deficiencies. The court previously advised the plaintiff that parole decisions are discretionary and not subject to judicial interference if exercised constitutionally.
What changed
The U.S. District Court for Massachusetts, in the case of Jeremy A. Morin, also known as Kelsea Morgan v. Maura T. Healey, Governor, and Kimberly Driscoll, Lt. Governor (Docket No. 1:25-cv-12078), has dismissed the plaintiff's amended complaint. The court found that the amended complaint did not cure the deficiencies identified in the original complaint, specifically regarding claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title II of the ADA. The court reiterated that parole decisions are discretionary and generally not subject to judicial review.
This dismissal signifies the closure of this particular legal action for the named parties. For legal professionals and courts, this case serves as a reminder of the pleading standards required for claims involving discretionary governmental functions and the limitations on judicial intervention in such matters. No specific compliance actions are required for regulated entities as this is a specific case outcome.
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March 6, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note
Jeremy A. Morin, also known as Kelsea Morgan v. Maura T. Healey, Governor, and Kimberly Driscoll, Lt. Governor
District Court, D. Massachusetts
- Citations: None known
- Docket Number: 1:25-cv-12078
Precedential Status: Unknown Status
Trial Court Document
UDNIISTTERDI CSTT AOTFE MS DASISSTARCIHCUT SCEOTUTRS T
CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-12078-RGS
JEREMY A. MORIN,
also known as Kelsea Morgan
v.
MAURA T. HEALEY, Governor, and KIMBERLY DRISCOLL, Lt. Governor
ORDER
March 6, 2026
STEARNS, D.J.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing a Complaint
against Governor Healey and Lieutenant Governor Driscoll alleging, among
other things, that they each failed to respond to Morin’s self-prepared
petition seeking a pardon. Doc. No. 1.
On November 12, 2025, the court entered a Memorandum and Order
that allowed Morin’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, assessed
the filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (b)(2), and directed the filing of an
Amended Complaint. Doc. No. 4. Morin was advised, among other things,
that the Complaint failed to allege a plausible claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title II of the ADA. Id. The Order explained that parole decisions are
discretionary and if otherwise constitutionally exercised, the judiciary may
not interfere. Id. Now before the court is Morin’s Amended Complaint. Doc. No. 8.
However, the Amended Complaint fails to remedy the pleading deficiencies
in the original Complaint. Morin references Garcia-Gasualdo v. Honeywell
Aerospace of P.R., Inc., 135 F.4th 10 (1st Cir. 2025) and Rivera-Diaz v.
Humana Insurance of P.R., Inc., 748 F.3d 387 (1st Cir. 2014) because they
“have some similiar (sic) issues as this action involves and why this action
that the Plaintiff is filing.” Id. at 5 – 6. Morin’s reliance on these cases is
misplaced because Garcia-Gasualdo concerns receipt of the notice of the
right to sue under the ADA and Title VII and Rivera-Diaz v concerns the fact
that filing a charge with the EEOC does not toll the statute of limitations
under Title VII or the ADEA. The Amended Complaint fails to remedy the
pleading deficiencies in the original Complaint. It thus does not "plausibly
narrate a claim for relief." Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012).
Plaintiff is reminded that to the extent she seeks release from
confinement, a challenge to the fact or duration of confinement may only be
pursued through a petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). If plaintiff wishes to challenge in federal
court the validity of her confinement, she may do so, with the attendant
procedural and exhaustion requirements, by bringing a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.
For the foregoing reasons, this action is DISMISSED for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted. The clerk shall enter a separate
order of dismissal.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Richard G. Stearns
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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