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March 17, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Y.F. v. E.O.

Massachusetts Appeals Court

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-P-0658

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-658

Y.F.

vs.

E.O.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, E.O., appeals from the extension of a

harassment prevention order issued in favor of the plaintiff,

Y.F., pursuant to G. L. c. 258E, § 3 (258E order). We affirm.

Background. On April 17, 2025, an ex parte harassment

prevention order issued against the defendant, presumably based

on an affidavit supporting the plaintiff's complaint, in which

the plaintiff claimed that the defendant, whom she had never met

in person, had committed three or more acts of harassment

against her. See G. L. c. 258E, § 1; Gassman v. Reason, 90

Mass. App. Ct. 1, 7 (2016).

On April 29, 2025, a District Court judge held a two-party

hearing. Both parties were present and represented themselves.
The affidavit in support of the harassment prevention order

described the following: In October 2024, the plaintiff

received a text message from an unknown number asking for her to

call the number back. The plaintiff did not return the call but

sent a text message and asked for the caller's identity.

Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff received a video call from the

defendant, who said that she knew that the plaintiff and the

defendant's husband, "Edward," were engaged in an affair. The

plaintiff responded that she was unaware that Edward was

married. The defendant told the plaintiff that she had obtained

from Edward's cellular telephone three videos of the plaintiff

that were of an intimate nature. Later, the defendant

threatened to distribute the videos to Edwards's contacts and to

post them online.

The plaintiff stated that the defendant continued to harass

her for the next five months, including by obtaining a job at

the plaintiff's place of employment; gaining access to the

plaintiff's work schedule and following her to her job and

threatening to talk to her supervisor; calling the plaintiff's

place of employment and sending e-mail messages to the

plaintiff's employer in an attempt to have her terminated;

continually calling the plaintiff until the plaintiff blocked

her cellular phone number and then contacting the plaintiff with

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a different phone number; and, in voicemails and text messages,

threatening to kill the plaintiff. When the plaintiff warned

the defendant to stop contacting her, the defendant responded

that "she won't stop until she finish[es] me."

At the two-party hearing, the judge first heard from the

plaintiff, who testified that the defendant "keeps following me,

stalking me, calling my job, doing all that you can think of to

abuse me." The plaintiff told the judge that she had copies of

e-mail messages that she wanted the judge to review.1 Finally,

the plaintiff testified that the defendant claimed to have three

videos "of sexual content, and she's harassing me, saying that

she might upload them to the internet, so I am embarrassed about

it."

The judge then gave the defendant an opportunity to be

heard. The defendant told the judge that the plaintiff entered

her "matrimonial home" and "constantly sleeps over with my

husband, has [a] sexual relationship with my husband." The

defendant explained that she had never met the plaintiff and

repeatedly told the judge that she had only spoken with the

plaintiff on two occasions. The first communication was the

initial text message after she had discovered the affair. The

defendant characterized her first contact with the plaintiff as

1 The e-mail messages were not admitted into evidence.

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a "friendly conversation." The defendant testified that during

the second telephone conversation, the plaintiff insulted her,

calling the defendant mentally unstable and referenced a sexual

assault that the defendant had confided to Edward about. The

defendant told the judge that she did not contact the plaintiff

again but that she did call the plaintiff's employer and

reported the fact that Edward and the plaintiff were in a dating

relationship, which the defendant claimed was against company

policy.

After the defendant testified, the plaintiff told the judge

that "all that she says is a lie. And these messages here, I

have all the proof that I need to show you. When this lady

contacted me at 3:54 in the morning, I didn't know who she was

. . . . Please read it so you will see she's a compulsive

liar." The judge turned to the defendant and said "Ma'am, I

just want to understand. Your testimony under oath is that

these are the only text messages that you sent?" While the

defendant had repeatedly testified that she had only contacted

the plaintiff twice, the defendant stated that "I have . . .

maybe like four or five few more of insults, yeah. That was

all." Although the record is not crystal clear, it appears that

the judge read the e-mail messages offered by the plaintiff.

The judge told the defendant that "the history of that

4
conversation, it's clearly not just that one conversation that

you both had. And the information directing her by name and

what was put, that's disturbing. That's disturbing. The whole

situation is disturbing."

The judge found that the plaintiff had established three or

more incidents in which she was in fear of the defendant. The

judge extended the harassment prevention order for a period of

six months.

In this appeal, the defendant argues, in essence, that the

plaintiff's testimony was not credible and that the defendant's

messages and actions did not rise to the level of harassment.

She also claims that the judge did not give her a fair

opportunity to be heard or allow her to present evidence, and

that the judge failed to consider the resulting harm that the

issuance of a 258E order would have on her and her autistic

child.

Discussion. To obtain a harassment prevention order, a

plaintiff must demonstrate "harassment," which the statute

defines in relevant part as "[three] or more acts of willful and

malicious conduct aimed at a specific person committed with the

intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property

and that does in fact cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage

to property." G. L. c. 258E, § 1. In reviewing the issuance of

5
a harassment prevention order, "we consider whether the judge

could find, by a preponderance of the evidence, together with

all permissible inferences," that the defendant committed three

or more qualifying acts of harassment aimed at a specific

person. A.T. v. C.R., 88 Mass. App. Ct. 532, 535 (2015). No

specific findings are required if, after reviewing the record,

we can "discern a reasonable basis for the order in the judge's

rulings and order." G.B. v. C.A., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 389, 396

(2018). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the

three acts were "maliciously intended," defined by the statute

as being "characterized by cruelty, hostility, or revenge."

A.T., supra, quoting G. L. c. 258E, § 1.

The defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence

for the judge to have found that she committed three qualifying

acts of harassment. We are not persuaded. Here, the plaintiff

presented evidence that the defendant repeatedly contacted her

by calling her on the telephone, leaving voicemails, and sending

text messages. The defendant threatened to kill her in text

messages and voicemails, changed her place of employment to that

of the plaintiff, and followed her to her job. At the hearing,

the judge implicitly credited the plaintiff's version of these

events, disbelieved the defendant's version, and concluded that

the evidence qualified as harassment under G. L. c. 258E, § 1.

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In sum, the plaintiff's affidavit and testimony at the

evidentiary hearing amply support three separate and distinct

acts of harassment.

The defendant argues that, while her text messages to the

plaintiff were "emotionally reactive," they were not made with

the intent to place the plaintiff in fear of physical harm.

When an alleged act of harassment consists solely of speech, it

"must be either a 'true threat' . . . or 'fighting words.'"

A.R. v. L.C., 93 Mass. App. Ct. 758, 760 (2018), quoting O'Brien

v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415, 425 (2012). True threats include

"direct threats of imminent physical harm" and "words or actions

that -- taking into account the context in which they arise --

cause the victim to fear such [imminent physical] harm now or in

the future." O'Brien, supra. Especially when viewed in the

context of the defendant's other hostile and unwanted conduct

directed at the plaintiff, the record supports a conclusion that

the defendant's statements in which she threatened to kill the

plaintiff and "finish her" caused the plaintiff to fear imminent

physical harm. See A.T., 88 Mass. App. Ct. at 536 (defendant's

threat to "make your life a living hell" fell within definition

of "true threat").

Turning to the defendant's argument that the plaintiff's

testimony was not credible, "[w]e accord the credibility

7
determinations of the judge who heard the testimony of the

parties . . . [and] observed their demeanor . . . the utmost

deference" (quotation and citation omitted). Noelle N. v.

Frasier F., 97 Mass. App. Ct. 660, 664 (2020). The judge had

the opportunity to evaluate the witnesses' demeanor and credited

the plaintiff's testimony about the defendant's three acts of

harassment. The judge noted the discrepancy in the defendant's

testimony and questioned her about the number of messages the

defendant sent to the plaintiff. The judge also characterized

the defendant's text messages as "disturbing." "We are in no

position to substitute our judgment for that of the judge on

credibility questions." Commonwealth v. Werner, 81 Mass. App.

Ct. 689, 698 (2012).

For the first time on appeal, the defendant contends that

the judge erred in failing to consider an audio recording of the

plaintiff making threatening and defamatory remarks to the

defendant. She also contends the judge erred in failing to

consider a document from the defendant's employer that would

rebut the plaintiff's stalking allegation and that the judge

improperly considered privileged communication between the

defendant and her husband.

We agree with the defendant that a hearing for a harassment

prevention order must comport with fundamental requirements of

8
due process. See R.S. v. A.P.B., 95 Mass. App. Ct. 372, 373 n.4

(2019). These requirements include fair notice of the

proceedings, a meaningful opportunity to be heard, a right to

testify, a right to present evidence, and a right to cross-

examine witnesses. See Idris I. v. Hazel H., 100 Mass. App. Ct.

784, 788 (2022). Because proceedings under G. L. c. 258E are

protective and not penal, "the rules of evidence need not be

followed, provided that there is fairness in what evidence is

admitted and relied on." A.P. v. M.T., 92 Mass. App. Ct. 156,

161 (2017), quoting Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. 592, 597-598

(1995), abrogated on another ground by Zullo v. Goguen, 423

Mass. 679, 681 (1996).

Here, after the judge announced her decision to extend the

harassment order, the defendant mentioned that she had her

employment application and denied the plaintiff's claim that she

applied to the plaintiff's employer for the purpose of harassing

and stalking her. The defendant also revealed that she had a

voice recording of the plaintiff "rape shaming" her. The

defendant did not move to introduce either the audio recording

or the employment application as exhibits during her testimony

and did not object when the plaintiff asked the judge to read

the messages sent by the defendant to her husband. We conclude

that the defendant has waived any due process claim regarding

9
the procedure followed by the judge. See Diaz v. Gomez, 82

Mass. App. Ct. 55, 63 (2012) (failure to raise due process claim

in trial court waives any due process claim on appeal).

Even if the claims were not waived, we discern no error.

In harassment prevention hearings, the general practice is that

"the law of evidence should be applied flexibly by taking into

consideration the personal and emotional nature of the issues

involved, whether one or both of the parties is self-

represented, and the need for fairness to all parties."

Mass. G. Evid. § 1106 (2025). As in abuse prevention hearings

under G. L. c. 209A, the court process "is intended to be

expeditious and as comfortable as it reasonably can be for a lay

person to pursue. Judges often must deal with large numbers of

these emotional matters in busy court sessions. The process

must be a practical one." Frizado, 420 Mass. at 598. Applying

these standards, we discern no due process violation. The

record shows that each party was given a fair opportunity to be

heard and does not suggest that the defendant was limited in any

part of her defense. Contrast Idris I., 100 Mass. App. Ct. at

789 (due process violation where judge "did not respond" to

counsel's repeated protest). In fact, the record reflects that

the judge acted fairly and conscientiously towards both parties.

For instance, at one point during the hearing, the defendant

10
apologized for using "a lot of hand gestures" during her

testimony. The judge reassured the defendant, saying "you're

fine," and the defendant continued to explain her version of

events. Finally, the judge did not interrupt the defendant when

she testified at length about a variety of personal issues such

as the impact that a harassment prevention order would have on

herself and her autistic son, as well as other personal details

about her mother's health issues and death. A review of the

transcript supports our conclusion that the defendant had a full

and fair opportunity to challenge the plaintiff's evidence and

present a defense and that she did not suffer from a denial of

due process.2

Order dated April 29, 2025,
extending harassment
prevention order affirmed.

By the Court (Shin, Walsh &
Allen, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: March 17, 2026.

2 Finally, there is no merit to the defendant's claim that
the judge erred in failing to make specific factual findings
related to the best interests of the defendant's seven year old
child, as that is not a relevant inquiry in a G. L. c. 258E
proceeding.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

11