Maryland Supreme Court Rules on AG Disclosure of Grand Jury Material in Child Abuse Investigation

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April 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re: Criminal Investn. No. CID 18-2673 Balt. City Circuit Court

Court of Appeals of Maryland

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 4/25

• Judges: Biran

• Opinion

• Authorities (18)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2.5K)

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Combined Opinion

In Re: Criminal Investigation No. CID 18-2673 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City,
Nos. 4, 5, & 6, September Term 2025. Opinion by Biran, J.

MARYLAND CONSTITUTION – ARTICLE V, § 3 – ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
INVESTIGATORY AUTHORITY – GOVERNOR’S AUTHORITY TO DIRECT
INVESTIGATIONS – Article V, § 3(a)(2) of the Constitution of Maryland permits the
Attorney General to “[i]nvestigate, commence, and prosecute or defend any civil or
criminal suit or action or category of such suits or actions … which the General Assembly
by law or joint resolution, or the Governor, shall have directed or shall direct to be
investigated, commenced and prosecuted or defended.” In 2015, the Governor of Maryland
directed the Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) to investigate and prosecute “crimes
of exploitation,” including crimes involving abuse of children. The Supreme Court of
Maryland held that the Governor did not exceed his authority under § 3(a)(2) in issuing
this directive. The directive did not encroach on the authority of State’s Attorneys. Section
3(a)(2) contemplates that State’s Attorneys and OAG will have concurrent authority to
prosecute categories of crimes, as directed by the General Assembly or the Governor. In
addition, the Court held that when the Governor directs OAG to prosecute a category of
crimes, the Governor does not violate Maryland’s constitutional separation of powers by
exercising legislative power. A § 3(a)(2) directive is an executive action when the
Governor issues it.

GRAND JURY – SECRECY – MARYLAND RULE 4-642(d) – DISCLOSURE –
PARTICULARIZED NEED – A circuit court may grant a motion for disclosure of grand
jury material under Maryland Rule 4-642(d) if the moving party demonstrates a
particularized need for disclosure. Petitioners are current and former clergy and staff of the
Archdiocese of Baltimore and the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Erie, Pennsylvania who
have not been charged with any crimes. OAG sought a court order under Rule 4-642(d) to
disclose Petitioners’ identities for the purpose of holding them to public account in
connection with alleged sexual abuse of children. The Supreme Court of Maryland held
that the interest of public accountability does not give rise to a particularized need for
disclosure of Petitioners’ identities.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No: Misc. 1144
Argued: September 5, 2025

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF MARYLAND

Nos. 4, 5, & 6

September Term, 2025

IN RE: CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
NO. CID 18-2673 IN THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY

Fader, C.J.
Booth
Biran
Gould
Eaves
Killough
McDonald, Robert N.
(Senior Justice, Specially Assigned),

JJ.
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State
Government Article) this document is authentic. Opinion by Biran, J.

2026.04.27
Filed: April 27, 2026
11:49:44 -04'00'
Gregory Hilton, Clerk
Grand juries operate in secret. In the absence of an indictment, Maryland

prosecutors generally may not disclose grand jury material without a court order. To obtain

a court order, the moving party must demonstrate a particularized need for disclosure of

grand jury material. The dispositive question in the present cases is whether a requestor

may meet that burden by showing that the public’s interest in learning negative information

about uncharged individuals outweighs the need for continued secrecy of that information.

The Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”), the Respondent here, served two

grand jury subpoenas for records on the Archdiocese of Baltimore (“AOB”). The

subpoenas compelled AOB to produce records relating to allegations of child sexual abuse

committed by clergy and other individuals affiliated with AOB, dating back to 1940. OAG

claims it had authority to obtain and serve the grand jury subpoenas based on a letter issued

by then-Governor Lawrence J. Hogan, Jr., directing OAG to investigate crimes of

exploitation, including abuse of children. AOB produced hundreds of thousands of

documents in response to the grand jury subpoenas. OAG did not summon any witnesses

to the grand jury that issued the subpoenas, nor did the grand jury issue any indictments.

However, that was not the end of the matter.

OAG drafted a document entitled “Attorney General’s Report on Child Sexual

Abuse in the Archdiocese of Baltimore” (the “Report”). The Report includes information

that OAG learned from the records that AOB produced in response to the grand jury

subpoenas. The Report focuses on more than 150 former and current AOB clergy and staff

who allegedly (and, in many instances, indisputably) committed acts of child sexual abuse.

One of the Petitioners before us in these appeals is an alleged perpetrator of such abuse.
The Report also identifies clergy and laypeople who did not themselves abuse

children. The Report alleges that some of these individuals concealed acts of abuse, did not

do enough to stop the abuse, or otherwise engaged in problematic conduct in relation to

such abuse. The remaining Petitioners are among this group of non-perpetrators. No

Petitioner has ever been charged with any crime relating to the allegations in the Report.

OAG sought to make the Report public. Because the Report contains grand jury

material, OAG moved for a court order to publish the Report. OAG contended that release

of the Report was necessary to inform the public of the scale and scope of child sexual

abuse within AOB and of the actions within the leadership of the Church to keep that abuse

secret. Petitioners objected to the disclosure of their names and other identifying

information in the Report on several grounds. First, they asserted that OAG lacked

authority to conduct the investigation because Governor Hogan’s directive was too broad

and open-ended, intruding on State’s Attorneys’ constitutional role to investigate and

prosecute crime. Second, they claimed that, even if OAG had authority to investigate AOB,

it lacked authority to issue a public report about the investigation. Third, Petitioners argued

that a circuit court may not order disclosure of grand jury material for the principal purpose

of holding uncharged individuals to public account.

After conducting a hearing, the circuit court granted OAG’s disclosure motion with

respect to Petitioners. The court concluded that OAG had constitutional authority to

conduct the investigation and to write a report about that investigation, and that the interest

in public accountability warranted disclosure of Petitioners’ identities.

2
Petitioners appealed to the Appellate Court of Maryland, which affirmed the circuit

court’s ruling in part. The Appellate Court held that OAG had authority to conduct the

investigation and to write a report detailing the results of its investigation. The Appellate

Court also rejected Petitioners’ contention that Maryland law categorically prohibits the

disclosure of grand jury material to achieve public accountability. However, the Appellate

Court held that the circuit court erred by not considering OAG’s disclosure motion with

respect to each Petitioner individually. The Appellate Court directed a remand to the circuit

court to conduct the required analyses. Petitioners sought further review in this Court.

We conclude that OAG had authority to investigate child sexual abuse allegedly

committed by AOB clergy and staff. However, the circuit court should have denied OAG’s

motion to disclose Petitioners’ identities. OAG proffered that the purpose of disclosure was

public accountability. Many grand jury investigations obtain damaging information and

allegations about uncharged individuals that the public might benefit from learning. One

of the primary purposes of grand jury secrecy is to protect uncharged persons from public

disgrace in the absence of a criminal charge and a forum in which to seek vindication. To

overcome an objection to disclosure of otherwise secret information about an uncharged

individual, a requestor must show that disclosure will serve an interest beyond the public’s

interest in learning the information. Because OAG did not meet that burden here, we

reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court. 10F

1
As discussed below, Petitioners filed three petitions for certiorari. We granted the
three petitions, and heard oral arguments in the three cases on the same day. Because the
questions we decide are raised in all three cases, we choose to issue one opinion.

3
I

Background

A. OAG’s Investigation

OAG’s Letter Seeking Prosecutive Authority

On March 25, 2015, Deputy Attorney General Thiruvendran Vignarajah sent a letter

to Governor Hogan’s Deputy Legal Counsel, Mark Crooks, requesting “a grant of authority

to [OAG] to prosecute certain categories of crimes” (the “Vignarajah Letter” or the

“Letter”). 2 The Letter indicated that OAG had made similar requests for prosecutive
1F

authority to Governors Glendening, Ehrlich, and O’Malley during their administrations,

and had received grants of authority from those Governors to investigate and prosecute

various categories of crimes.

One of the categories covered in the Vignarajah Letter was “crimes of exploitation.”

The Letter stated that OAG’s request regarding these crimes “consolidates previous

requests for authority to prosecute computer crimes, financial abuse of vulnerable adults,

and telemarketing fraud, and adds a request for authority to investigate and prosecute

human trafficking, abuse and neglect of children, and child pornography.” According to

2
The Vignarajah Letter was not made part of the record in the circuit court. On
December 1, 2025, in response to a suggestion at oral argument, OAG moved to
supplement the record with the Vignarajah Letter. Sixteen of the Petitioners consented to
OAG’s motion to supplement the record; the remaining Petitioner did not respond to the
motion. On December 18, 2025, we granted the motion to supplement the record. At the
suggestion of the responding Petitioners, we directed the parties to file supplemental letter
briefs addressing any issues raised by the Vignarajah Letter. The parties filed supplemental
briefs and supplemental response briefs in January 2026.

4
the Letter, OAG’s “request for broader authority reflects the ways in which children and

vulnerable adults are targeted, trafficked, and terrorized.” 3
2F

Governor Hogan’s Letter Directing OAG
to Investigate “Crimes of Exploitation”

On April 24, 2015, Governor Hogan sent then-Attorney General Brian Frosh a letter

authorizing and directing OAG, under Article V, § 3 of the Maryland Constitution, to

“undertake investigations and prosecutions” into certain “crimes of exploitation,” 4 3F

including but not limited to, “crimes involving child abuse” (the “Hogan Directive”). 5 The
4F

Hogan Directive authorized OAG, in conjunction with its investigation of these crimes of

3
The other categories of crimes covered in the Vignarajah Letter were organized
crime, natural resources crime, illegal dumping, tax fraud, securities crime, Medicaid fraud,
health care fraud, insurance fraud, and procurement fraud/state employee misconduct. In
addition, OAG asked for authority to accept case referrals from State’s Attorneys, the State
Prosecutor, and the United States Attorney. According to the Letter, Governor Hogan’s
predecessor, Governor Martin O’Malley, had granted authority to OAG to prosecute all
categories of crimes referenced in the Letter, and to accept case referrals from the other
prosecutors. OAG explained that, by way of the Vignarajah Letter, it was seeking to expand
its authority in two of those categories. As discussed above, crimes of exploitation was one
of the categories for which OAG was seeking expanded authority, including the authority
to prosecute crimes involving the abuse of children.
4
As discussed above, the Vignarajah Letter requested prosecutive authority
regarding several categories of crimes. In granting OAG’s request for authority to
prosecute crimes of exploitation, Governor Hogan provided OAG with a letter specific to
that part of the Vignarajah Letter. The record does not reflect whether Governor Hogan
sent other category-specific authorization letters to OAG in response to the Vignarajah
Letter.
5
The other crimes referenced in the Hogan Directive were child neglect, abuse and
neglect of vulnerable adults, financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult, human trafficking,
and child pornography, as well as a number of crimes committed “in furtherance” of crimes
of exploitation, and “crimes that might be discovered or otherwise come to [OAG’s]
attention during [its] handling of any such matter.”

5
exploitation, “to use all necessary subpoena powers, to present to an appropriate grand jury

any evidence and testimony considered necessary to carry out this authorization and

directive, and to act with the full powers, rights and privileges possessed by a State’s

Attorney.”

The Grand Jury Subpoenas

According to OAG, based on the Hogan Directive, OAG opened a criminal

investigation in 2018 into child sexual abuse and conspiracy to conceal child sexual abuse

by AOB clergy and employees. Pertinent to the present appeals, OAG obtained two

subpoenas for records from a grand jury sitting in Baltimore City (collectively, the

“Subpoenas”). The Subpoenas compelled AOB to produce records pertaining to allegations

of child sexual abuse dating back to 1940. AOB’s compliance with the Subpoenas took

several years to complete, and resulted in the production of hundreds of thousands of

records.

OAG did not call any witnesses to the grand jury that issued the Subpoenas or to

any successor grand jury, nor did any grand jury in Baltimore City return any indictments

against anyone affiliated with AOB. 6 According to OAG, “most of the abusers and those
5F

who concealed their wrongdoing are dead and no longer subject to prosecution.” Report at

2.

OAG charged one person in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County with child sex
6

abuse offenses in connection with its investigation of AOB. That individual is not
mentioned in the Report. In June 2023, he was acquitted of all charges.

6
The Report

That being the case, OAG sought another way to “expos[e] the Archdiocese’s

transgressions to the fullest extent possible.” Id. The 456-page Report, dated April 2023,

includes information that OAG obtained by way of the Subpoenas. 7 According to OAG,
6F

its goal in releasing the Report is to “make public for the first time the enormous scope and

scale of abuse and concealment perpetrated by the Archdiocese of Baltimore.” Id.; see also

id. (“This report seeks to document this long and sordid history.”). The Report states that,

“[w]hile it may be too late for the victims to see criminal justice served,” OAG hopes that

full disclosure of AOB’s misconduct “will bring some measure of accountability.” Id.

The Report begins with a “List of Abusers” – 156 priests and other individuals

affiliated with AOB – whose alleged (and in some cases, proven) acts of abuse are detailed

in case descriptions later in the Report. Id. at iii–vi. 8 After providing additional background
7F

information, the Report sets forth a “Summary of [AOB’s] Abuse and Cover Up.” Id. at 9.

The summary begins:

As the case descriptions in this Report make clear, from the 1940s through
2002, over a hundred priests and other Archdiocese personnel engaged in
horrific and repeated abuse of the most vulnerable children in their
communities while Archdiocese leadership looked the other way. Time and
again, members of the Church’s hierarchy resolutely refused to acknowledge
allegations of child sexual abuse for as long as possible. When denial became
impossible, Church leadership would remove abusers from the parish or
school, sometimes with promises that they would have no further contact
with children. Church documents reveal with disturbing clarity that the

7
OAG does not dispute that the specific information at issue in these appeals –
Petitioners’ identities – is grand jury material.
8
AOB had previously included 115 of these individuals in a publicly issued list of
priests who, according to AOB, had been “credibly accused” of abuse.

7
Archdiocese was more concerned with avoiding scandal and negative
publicity than it was with protecting children.

Id. The summary provides details about the people who held leadership positions in AOB

throughout the period under investigation, and it specifies alleged acts and omissions of

these leaders in response to reports of child sexual abuse. Id. at 13-19.

The Report then makes two recommendations: (1) the General Assembly should

amend the statute of limitations for civil actions involving child sex abuse; 9 and (2) AOB
8F

should expand its list of credibly accused individuals beyond clergy. Id. at 19-20.

Most of the remaining 435 pages of the Report are comprised of 156 “abuser

narratives” – one for each of the 156 people contained in the List of Abusers. Within these

narratives, the Report names other individuals who were not accused of committing acts of

abuse. The Report alleges that many of these individuals concealed abuse committed by

others or otherwise engaged in conduct that allowed the scourge of child sexual abuse

within AOB to continue.

B. Proceedings in the Circuit Court

In November 2022, OAG filed a motion in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City

seeking an order to disclose publicly the information in the Report that it had obtained by

way of the Subpoenas. OAG told the court that it was unable to bring indictments of some

9
The Report notes that, as of April 2023, “the General Assembly was poised to pass
legislation … that, if signed by the Governor, would eliminate the State’s civil statute of
limitations for suits for damages for child sexual abuse.” Report at 20. That legislation, the
Child Victims Act of 2023 (the “CVA”), did become law. This Court subsequently upheld
the CVA against constitutional challenge. See Roman Cath. Archbishop of Wash. v. Doe,
489 Md. 514 (2025).

8
of the individuals discussed in the Report due to their deaths, the expiration of statutes of

limitations, and other impediments. Thus, OAG explained, the only way to inform the

public of the scale and scope of child sexual abuse within AOB – and the actions that

Church leaders took to keep that abuse secret – was to publish the Report.

The circuit court initially authorized OAG to release a redacted version of the

Report. The court directed OAG to withhold more than 35 persons’ identities in this version

of the Report, so that these individuals could receive notice and an opportunity to respond

to the motion to disclose. On April 5, 2023, OAG publicly released the redacted Report.

Thirty of the notified individuals, including the 17 Petitioners before us, objected to

their inclusion in the Report. OAG then filed a “renewed” motion to disclose the objectors’

identifying information. After holding a hearing, the circuit court authorized disclosure

with respect to all but three of the individuals whose identities were initially redacted. The

court found that “there is a particularized need to publish a report that is as transparent and

open as possible,” and that “the need for individualized accountability for both actions and

inactions” outweighed Petitioners’ interest in not having their identities revealed. The court

stayed its order with respect to any affected individuals who noted an appeal.

C. Appeals

Eighteen individuals challenged the circuit court’s disclosure order in four separate

appeals during the Appellate Court’s September 2023 Term. None of these persons has

ever been charged with a crime relating to the allegations in the Report.

Fourteen current and former members of AOB’s clergy were the Appellants in

Appeal No. 1846. See In re Crim. Investigation No. CID 18-2673 in the Cir. Ct. for Balt.

9
City, No. 1846, Sept. Term, 2023 (Md. App. Ct. Oct. 23, 2024) (“In re Crim. Investigation,

No. 1846”). Of this group, five are or were senior AOB personnel who received reports of

abuse, while the other nine are or were lower-level clergy included in the Report due to

their interactions with alleged abusers and/or victims. None of these individuals is alleged

to have committed any acts of abuse.

A former non-clergy employee of AOB was the sole Appellant in Appeal No. 1847.

See In re Crim. Investigation No. CID 18-2673 in the Cir. Ct. for Balt. City, No. 1847,

Sept. Term, 2023 (Md. App. Ct. Oct. 23, 2024) (“In re Crim. Investigation, No. 1847”).

This individual is not alleged to be an abuser.

A former non-clergy employee of AOB was the sole Appellant in Appeal No. 1848.

See In re Crim. Investigation No. CID 18-2673 in the Cir. Ct. for Balt. City, No. 1848,

Sept. Term, 2023 (Md. App. Ct. Oct. 23, 2024) (“In re Crim. Investigation, No. 1848”).

The Report alleges that this individual committed acts of abuse.

Two priests within the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Erie, Pennsylvania (the

“Erie Diocese”) were the Appellants in Appeal No. 1849. See In re Crim. Investigation No.

CID 18-2673 in the Cir. Ct. for Balt. City, No. 1849, Sept. Term, 2023 (Md. App. Ct. Oct.

23, 2024) (“In re Crim. Investigation, No. 1849”). These individuals were not accused of

sexual abuse, nor were they ever AOB clergy or staff. OAG included these priests in the

Report to detail their alleged involvement in AOB’s effort to transfer an abusive priest to

the Erie Diocese.

The Appellants collectively argued that: (1) OAG lacked constitutional authority to

investigate AOB; (2) OAG lacked constitutional authority to write and issue the Report;

10
and (3) the circuit court erred in applying the balancing test set forth in In re Criminal

Investigation No. 437 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, 316 Md. 66 (1989), in

determining whether to order disclosure of their identities. In addition, each Appellant

argued that the circuit court erred in finding that OAG established a particularized need for

disclosure of their identity. Finally, the Erie Diocese Appellants asserted that OAG

improperly exercised extraterritorial authority over them and violated their right to

reputation under the Pennsylvania Constitution.

The Appellate Court held that OAG had authority to investigate AOB, based on the

Hogan Directive. E.g., In re Crim. Investigation, No. 1846, slip op. at 22-29. The court

further opined that OAG’s authority to write the Report detailing its investigation is implied

in its authority to conduct that investigation. E.g., id. at 2 n.2. In addition, the Appellate

Court concluded that the circuit court properly invoked the Criminal Investigation No. 437

balancing test in assessing whether to authorize disclosure of Appellants’ identities. E.g.,

id. at 34-37. The Appellate Court rejected the Erie Diocese Appellants’ argument that OAG

lacks extraterritorial authority to impose a “quasi-criminal punishment” on them. In re

Crim. Investigation, No. 1849, slip op. at 38-39. The court also held that releasing the Erie

Diocese Appellants’ names in the Report does not violate their right to reputation under

the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. at 39-40.

However, the Appellate Court held that the circuit court abused its discretion by

failing to conduct an individualized assessment of the need for disclosure with respect to

each Appellant. E.g., In re Crim. Investigation, No. 1846, slip op. at 43-46. The court

vacated the circuit court’s judgment and remanded with instructions for the circuit court to

11
individually analyze whether there is a particularized need to disclose each Appellant’s

identity. E.g., id. at 46-47.

All Appellants filed petitions for certiorari, which we granted on March 21, 2025.

The cases were docketed as Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7 of this Court’s September 2025 Term. OAG

and the Petitioner in No. 7 (the Appellant in In re Crim. Investigation, No. 1847)

subsequently resolved that case, resulting in the voluntary dismissal of that appeal.

The remaining Petitioners present three common questions, which we have

reordered and rephrased slightly:

1. Whether the Maryland Constitution authorizes the Governor to direct
   OAG to investigate and prosecute any “crimes of exploitation” for an
   unlimited time, and without accounting for the competing authority of the
   State’s Attorneys and the General Assembly.

2. Whether this Court’s creation in 1989 of a balancing test for release of
   secret grand jury information overruled its earlier authority categorically
   prohibiting a prosecutor from releasing information about uncharged
   individuals to hold them to public account.

3. Whether OAG has constitutional authority to publish a report based on
   secret grand jury information that intentionally identifies uncharged
   individuals for the purpose of holding them to public account.

In addition, in No. 6, the Erie Diocese Petitioners present a question specific to themselves:

1. Whether the Appellate Court erred by remanding the case to the circuit court to conduct an individualized analysis when the undisputed record establishes as a matter of law that there is no particularized need to disclose the Erie Diocese Petitioners’ identities.

12
II

Standard of Review

An appellate court normally reviews a circuit court judge’s decision regarding

disclosure of grand jury information for abuse of discretion. See Crim. Investigation No.

437, 316 Md. at 101. However, to resolve these appeals, we must decide questions of law.

Thus, our review is de novo. See, e.g., In re Special Investigation Misc. 1064, 478 Md. 528,

545 (2021).

III

Discussion

A. OAG’s Authority to Investigate AOB

Petitioners argue that OAG lacked authority to investigate child sexual abuse within

AOB. They contend that, in directing OAG broadly to investigate “crimes of exploitation,”

Governor Hogan exceeded his authority under Article V, § 3(a)(2) of the Maryland

Constitution to direct OAG to investigate and/or prosecute a “category” of criminal cases.

In addition, Petitioners assert that the Hogan Directive encroaches on the State’s Attorneys’

constitutional authority to prosecute criminal cases. Finally, Petitioners contend that the

Hogan Directive violates Maryland’s constitutional separation of powers.

In response, OAG argues that the Governor has express constitutional authority to

direct OAG to investigate categories of crimes, notwithstanding that such directives may

effectively provide OAG and State’s Attorneys with concurrent prosecutive authority over

such crimes. Furthermore, OAG maintains that Governor Hogan properly exercised

13
executive authority by directing OAG to investigate crimes of exploitation, including

crimes involving abuse of children. We agree with OAG on this issue.

OAG’s powers are limited to those vested in the Attorney General by the Maryland

Constitution and the enactments of the General Assembly. State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v.

Burning Tree Club, Inc., 301 Md. 9, 32 (1984). Article V, § 3(a)(2) of the Constitution

grants the Attorney General authority to:

[i]nvestigate, commence, and prosecute or defend any civil or criminal suit
or action or category of such suits or actions … on the part of the State or in
which the State may be interested, which the General Assembly by law or
joint resolution, or the Governor, shall have directed or shall direct to be
investigated, commenced and prosecuted or defended.

(Emphasis added). Section 3(a)(2) does not expressly place any limitations on the

categories of crimes the Attorney General may investigate and prosecute. It also contains

no limitations on how the Governor may define a particular category of crimes or on the

length of time such a directive may be in force. The Hogan Directive authorized OAG to

investigate and prosecute “crimes of exploitation,” including “crimes involving child

abuse.” Thus, the Hogan Directive encompassed an investigation of child sexual abuse

allegedly committed by clergy and others affiliated with AOB.

Petitioners argue that Governor Hogan exceeded his authority under § 3(a)(2) by

granting OAG such a broad mandate. They contend that the word “category” in § 3(a)(2)

must be read narrowly to mean a discrete set of factually related matters. Thus, according

to Petitioners, while Governor Hogan may have had authority to direct OAG to investigate

particular alleged acts of child abuse, he did not have authority to direct OAG to investigate

14
all “crimes of exploitation” or all crimes involving abuse of children in Maryland. We

disagree.

Prior to 1976, Article V, § 3 provided that the Attorney General “shall commence

and prosecute or defend any suit or action in any of said Courts, on the part of the State,

which the General Assembly, or the Governor, acting according to law, shall direct to be

commenced, prosecuted or defended[.]” See 1976 Md. Laws 1436 -37, Ch. 545 § 1. If this

version of § 3 had been in effect in 2015, Governor Hogan likely would not have had the

power to direct OAG to investigate and prosecute all crimes involving child abuse, let alone

all crimes of exploitation. However, as Petitioners acknowledge, the 1976 amendment to

§ 3 broadened the General Assembly’s and the Governor’s power to direct OAG in two

respects: it added “investigate” to the existing verbal phrase (“commence and prosecute or

defend”), and added “category of such [criminal or civil] suits or actions” to the existing

direct objects (“any suit or action,” which was also updated to include civil matters).

Petitioners argue that these amendments to § 3 must be read in light of the historical

autonomy of Maryland’s State’s Attorneys and corresponding limitations on the powers of

the Attorney General. See, e.g., MD. CONST. (1851) art. XXXII (abolishing the Attorney

General’s office in favor of elected State’s Attorneys); 1862 Md. Laws 197, Ch. 177

(establishing that State’s Attorneys represent the State in prosecutions and defenses in

which the State is interested). Petitioners point to Murphy v. Yates, 276 Md. 475 (1975), in

which this Court declared a statute unconstitutional for giving an appointed Special

Prosecutor the power to prosecute certain offenses. This was a “clear invasion of the State’s

Attorney’s most awesome discretionary power: to determine whether or not to prosecute.”

15
Id. at 495. Notably, the Court stated that if the General Assembly wished to create a State

Prosecutor with authority that was concurrent with that of State’s Attorneys, a

constitutional amendment would be necessary. Id.

The General Assembly responded to Murphy by passing legislation in 1976 that led

to two constitutional amendments, one of which was the 1976 amendment to § 3 that allows

the General Assembly and the Governor to direct OAG to investigate and prosecute any

“category” of crimes. 10 Petitioners assert that both proposed constitutional amendments
9F

were part of a legislative strategy to create a Special Prosecutor in the aftermath of Murphy.

See Richard Ben Cramer, Crime law advances: Prosecutor plan approved by Senate,

BALT. SUN, Mar. 16, 1976, at C1. Whether or not that was the case, the amendment to § 3

addressed the powers of the Attorney General, not a Special Prosecutor. And the

amendment expressly authorized the General Assembly and the Governor to direct the

Attorney General to prosecute any “category” of criminal offenses. Thus, contrary to

Petitioners’ contention, the plain language of § 3(a)(2) reflects an intent to allow the

General Assembly and the Governor to direct OAG to prosecute significantly more crimes

than had been the case before the 1976 amendment.

The dictionary definition of “category” includes “any of several fundamental and

distinct classes to which entities or concepts belong” and “a division within a system of

classification.” Category, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, available at

10
The other amendment modified the State’s Attorneys’ duties from those
“prescribed by law” to those “prescribed by the General Assembly.” 1976 Md. Laws 1438,
Ch. 545 § 4 (amending MD. CONST. art. V, § 9).

16
https://perma.cc/EX48-K2RK. Crimes of exploitation and crimes involving child abuse

both qualify as categories of crimes under these definitions, as they are distinct classes of

crimes made up of individual offenses that share similar qualities or elements. 11 Thus, on
10F

its face, § 3(a)(2) gave Governor Hogan the authority to direct OAG to investigate both

crimes involving child abuse and, more broadly, crimes of exploitation.

Contrary to Petitioners’ contention, our interpretation of § 3(a)(2) does not encroach

on State’s Attorneys’ authority. It does not take prosecutive authority over any criminal

cases from State’s Attorneys and vest that authority exclusively in the Attorney General.

Rather, § 3(a)(2) contemplates that State’s Attorneys and OAG will have concurrent

authority to prosecute categories of crimes, as directed by the General Assembly or the

Governor. As Murphy anticipated, this arrangement raises no constitutional issue

concerning the powers of State’s Attorneys, because § 3(a)(2) is part of the Maryland

Constitution itself. See Murphy, 276 Md. at 495; see also In re Special Investigation No.

244, 296 Md. 80, 87-88 (1983) (rejecting assertion that overlap with State’s Attorney’s

powers prevented OAG from having authority to conduct an investigation that the

Governor directed); In re Special Investigation No. 281, 299 Md. 181, 199-200 (1984)

(rejecting argument that only the State’s Attorney may petition a circuit court to continue

11
As discussed above, § 3(a)(2) does not expressly constrain the General Assembly
or the Governor in choosing how to define a particular category of crimes. In this case, we
need not consider the outer limits of what constitutes a “category” under § 3(a)(2).

17
a grand jury’s term, where OAG made such a request based on its authority under a

§ 3(a)(2) gubernatorial directive). 12
11F

For the same reason, we disagree with Petitioners’ contention that Governor Hogan

improperly exercised legislative authority by directing OAG to investigate and prosecute

crimes of exploitation, including child abuse crimes. In authorizing both the General

Assembly and the Governor to direct OAG to prosecute categories of crimes, § 3(a)(2)

creates an area of overlap of governmental power between the legislative and executive

branches. When the Governor directs OAG to prosecute a category of crimes, the Governor

does not violate Maryland’s constitutional separation of powers by exercising legislative

power. A § 3(a)(2) directive is an executive action when the Governor issues it. 1312F

12
The Vignarajah Letter reflects that, upon OAG’s request, several recent
Governors have granted OAG prosecutive authority over multiple broad categories of
crimes. The record does not reveal whether those Governors informed the General
Assembly or the State’s Attorneys of the extent of their § 3(a)(2) directives. If the General
Assembly believes that § 3(a)(2) strikes an improper balance of power between the General
Assembly and the Governor, or allows the General Assembly and the Governor to infringe
on the prerogatives of State’s Attorneys in ways that are undesirable, it may initiate further
amendments to § 3(a)(2).
13
At oral argument, OAG argued that gubernatorial directives to OAG continue in
perpetuity unless rescinded. As the directive here was issued by the Governor and to the
Attorney General who were in place when the investigation occurred, we do not need to
resolve that issue in this case and do not offer any opinion on it. Nonetheless, it may
behoove incoming Governors expressly to rescind prior OAG directives at the outset of
their terms and to issue new directives as they deem necessary. The Vignarajah Letter
suggests that OAG historically may have treated a new Governor’s directives as effectively
rescinding the previous Governor’s directives, at least to the extent the new Governor
declined to provide authority to OAG over a category of criminal or civil cases that the
previous Governor had granted to OAG. An express statement of rescission seemingly
would eliminate any potential confusion about the continuing viability of a former
Governor’s directive.

18
In sum, Governor Hogan was constitutionally authorized to direct OAG to

investigate and prosecute crimes of exploitation, including but not limited to, crimes

involving abuse of children. Under the Hogan Directive, OAG had authority to investigate

allegations of child sexual abuse within AOB.

B. Disclosure of Grand Jury Material

Petitioners argue that the circuit court may not order disclosure of grand jury

material for the purpose of holding them to public account. They rely on In re Report of

Grand Jury, 152 Md. 616 (1927), in which this Court prohibited disclosure of grand jury

information that would tend to accuse unindicted individuals of misconduct. In contrast,

OAG maintains that this Court’s decision in Criminal Investigation No. 437 abrogated the

categorical rule of In re Report of Grand Jury by establishing a balancing test for circuit

courts to apply in considering requests for disclosure of grand jury material. OAG also

claims that In re Report of Grand Jury is distinguishable from this case on its facts, and

that the circumstances of this case demonstrate that a categorical rule barring disclosure

for the purpose of public accountability is ill-advised.

We agree with Petitioners that Criminal Investigation No. 437’s balancing test has

no application here. The interest of public accountability does not give rise to a

particularized need for disclosure of grand jury material sufficient to overcome an

uncharged person’s objection to disclosure. 14
13F

14
Because we hold that the circuit court may not order disclosure of the grand jury
information at issue here as to all Petitioners, we need not decide the question that bears
only on the Erie Diocese Petitioners. For the same reason, we will not reach the third

19
1. Grand Jury Secrecy

a. Historical Foundations

At its inception in England in the twelfth century, the grand jury (then called the

Grand Assize) did not operate in secret. Rather, “its deliberations were open to the public,

and it functioned solely in the interest of the Crown.” Richard M. Calkins, Grand Jury

Secrecy, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 455, 456 (1965) (“Calkins”); see also Crim. Investigation No.

437, 316 Md. at 71 (discussing the Grand Assize). In the fourteenth century, a new group

emerged as the accusatory body in England, “le graunde inquest.” Calkins at 457. The

question presented by all Petitioners, i.e., whether OAG lacked constitutional authority to
write and publish the Report. However, we note that, separate and apart from any
constitutional constraints on OAG, the Rules of Professional Conduct restrict all
prosecutors’ extrajudicial statements in matters that go beyond grand jury proceedings. See
Md. Rule 19-303.8(e) (providing that the prosecutor in a criminal case shall generally
“refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of
heightening public condemnation of the accused”); Md. Rule 19-303.6 (prohibiting
extrajudicial statements that an attorney “knows or reasonably should know will be
disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding”). Similarly, a United States Department
of Justice (“DOJ”) policy generally prohibits federal prosecutors from naming unindicted
coconspirators in charging documents. See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-11.130
(2018). And another DOJ policy states that “there is ordinarily no legitimate governmental
purpose served by the government’s public allegation of wrongdoing by an uncharged
party[.]” Id. § 9-27.760 (2024) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Petitioners objected to the disclosure of their own identities. We need not decide
whether the circuit court erred in authorizing disclosure of other uncharged individuals’
identities.

20
Grand Inquest “adopted the custom of hearing witnesses in private, thereby establishing

some independence of action from the Crown.” Id.

Scholars point to 1681 as a turning point in the history of grand jury secrecy. In that

year, King Charles II sought to indict the Earl of Shaftesbury and another political opponent

for treason through public grand jury proceedings. Id.; see also MARVIN E. FRANKEL &

GARY P. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTITUTION ON TRIAL 9 (1977) (“FRANKEL &

NAFTALIS”). However, the grand juries resisted, reaffirming the practice of hearing

evidence in private. Calkins at 457 & n.7; FRANKEL & NAFTALIS at 9. By insisting on

closed proceedings, the jurors emphasized secrecy as a protective device for unindicted

individuals. See Calkins at 457 (noting that, after the jurors declined to indict the Earl of

Shaftesbury following their private deliberations, “[t]he case was thereafter celebrated as

a bulwark against the oppression and despotism of the Crown”).

The rule of grand jury secrecy “was imported into our federal common law and is

an integral part of our criminal justice system.” Douglas Oil. Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops

Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 218 n.9 (1979). Although secrecy eventually came to be understood as

furthering the grand jury’s evidence-gathering role, the “common-law concept of secrecy

that was imparted to American jurisprudence arose initially from a need to protect the grand

jurors and private citizens from the oppression of the state.” Calkins at 458.

b. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) codifies the federal common law

requirement of grand jury secrecy. Rule 6(e) generally prohibits disclosure of grand jury

matters by government attorneys, government personnel who assist government attorneys,

21
grand jurors, interpreters, court reporters, operators of recording devices, and transcribers

of recorded testimony. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2)(B). In Douglas Oil, the Supreme Court

summarized the reasons for maintaining grand jury secrecy as a default policy in Rule 6(e):

(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated;

(2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to
prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning
the grand jurors;

(3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witness[es] who
may testify before the grand jury and later appear at the trial of those
indicted by it;

(4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have
information with respect to the commission of crimes; and

(5) to protect [an] innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the
fact that he has been under investigation, and from the expense of
standing trial where there was no probability of guilt.

Id. at 219 n.10 (citation modified). The first four of these purposes of secrecy protect the

integrity of the grand jury investigation. The fifth protects uncharged individuals from

“public ridicule.” Id. at 219.

Rule 6(e) permits a court to authorize disclosure of a grand jury matter in several

instances, including as pertinent for our purposes, “preliminarily to or in connection with

a judicial proceeding[.]” Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i). In Douglas Oil, the Supreme Court

held that parties requesting disclosure under this provision “must show that the material

they seek is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial proceeding, that the

need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued secrecy, and that their request is

structured to cover only material so needed.” 441 U.S. at 222. The Court described this test

22
as requiring the requestor to demonstrate that a “particularized need for disclosure

outweigh[s] the interest in continued grand jury secrecy.” Id. at 223.

c. Grand Jury Secrecy in Maryland

i. In re Report of Grand Jury

As was the case federally, grand jury secrecy became a part of Maryland common

law. In In re Report of Grand Jury, our predecessors held that grand juries may not report

their findings outside of criminal indictments, to the extent such reports “condemn the acts

and impugn the motives” of uncharged persons. 152 Md. at 632. The Court explained:

At common law the function of the grand jury is confined to investigations
of violations of the criminal law, and unless such investigations disclose facts
which would constitute a recognized violation of the criminal law, they have
no power or authority to criticize any particular individual or number of
individuals. If the evidence obtained through their investigations warrants a
presentment or indictment, under the law and the oath which they are
required to take, they are bound to present or indict, and if in their judgment
it falls short of showing the commission of a criminal offense, they are bound
to refrain from making public the results of their investigation.

Id. at 623. In that case, after investigating the construction of a Baltimore City high school,

the grand jury did not return any indictments. See id. at 617. However, the grand jury

delivered a report to the court in which it criticized the City’s construction methods and

choice of materials and complained about the “inefficiency” of H.G. Perring, the

supervising engineer of the City’s Public Improvement Commission. Id. Mr. Perring, along

with the Mayor and other City officials, filed petitions in the Criminal Court of Baltimore

City to strike the grand jury’s report from the records of the court. Id. at 619.

At the time, by statute, the grand jury of Baltimore City was required at each term

of court to report to the court on the conditions of the City jail. See id. at 623. In addition,

23
it had long been the practice in Maryland for grand juries, “upon asking for their discharge,

to make statements as to general conditions within their jurisdiction.” Id. This Court

observed that “[s]uch reports may have salutary effect and should be permitted so long as

they do not point out individuals as subjects of public criticism and opprobrium.” Id.

The report at issue before the Court fell on the wrong side of this line. It was “a

censure of the conduct of persons engaged in the public business, impugning their integrity

and fairness, and pointing them out as public servants whose official acts should merit

condemnation at the hands of the people.” Id. at 631. Making such a report therefore

exceeded the grand jury’s power. Id. The Court explained: “It is apparent that this should

be so, for the protection of the good name and reputation of the people, otherwise a

condition would exist which the establishment and zealous maintenance of the grand jury

was intended to prevent, namely, that of having an individual publicly charged with

misconduct without probable cause.” Id. The Court therefore ordered the report stricken in

its entirety. Id. at 632; see also Coblentz v. State, 164 Md. 558, 567 (1933) (grand jury

proceedings must be secret, in part, to ensure that “individuals whose conduct may be

investigated, but against whom no indictment may be found, are to be protected from

disrepute”); In re Rep. of Grand Jury of Carroll Cnty., 39 Md. App. 472, 477 (1978) (report

of grand jury that disclosed alleged misconduct of uncharged Board of Education official

contravened the rule set forth in In re Report of Grand Jury).

ii. Codification of Grand Jury Secrecy

The General Assembly first codified a requirement of grand jury secrecy in 1955.

See 1955 Md. Laws 188 -89, Ch. 130. That statute applied to the “stenographers” who

24
transcribed grand jury testimony. See Md. Code Ann., Art. 26, §§ 40, 42 (1957) (requiring

stenographers to take an oath of secrecy and providing criminal penalties for violation of

the secrecy obligation). In 1974, the General Assembly added similar requirements for

grand jurors. See 1974 Md. Laws 1724 -25, Ch. 464.

Under current law, grand jurors, grand jury bailiffs, clerks, court reporters, and

interpreters are required to take an oath not to disclose any grand jury materials. Md. Code,

Cts. & Jud. Proc. (“CJP”) § 8-415 (1973, 2020 Repl. Vol.). Another statute provides that

“[a] person may not disclose any content of a grand jury proceeding.” Id. § 8-507(a). A

violation of this prohibition is a misdemeanor offense. Id. § 8-507(b). The statute does not

prevent a grand jury from “submitting a report as required by law.” Id. § 8-507(c)(1). 15 It
14F

also provides an exception for “[a]ny other governmental unit or person” that makes “a

disclosure authorized by law.” Id. § 8-507(c)(2).

iii. Maryland Rule 4-642(d)

One such disclosure authorized by law is a disclosure per court order issued under

Maryland Rule 4-642(d). This Court adopted Rule 4-642, Maryland’s analog to Rule 6 of

the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, in 1984. Rule 4-642(d) provides:

Unless disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury is permitted by
law without court authorization, a motion for disclosure of such matters shall

15
By statute, a Baltimore City grand jury is required to submit a report “on each of
its investigations and recommendations” at the end of the period for which it sits. CJP § 8-
417(c). In addition, as was the case a century ago, Maryland grand juries today “may be
asked to tour local correctional facilities and other locations and to report on operations
and conditions at those facilities,” and “may be asked to submit a report that summarizes
the grand jury’s activities and recommends improvements to the criminal justice system.”
Md. Judiciary, Serving on a Maryland Grand Jury, available at https://perma.cc/94B2-
W2DC.

25
be filed in the circuit court where the grand jury convened. If the moving
party is a State’s Attorney who is seeking disclosure for enforcement of the
criminal law of a state or the criminal law of the United States, the hearing
shall be ex parte. In all other cases, the moving party shall serve a copy of
the motion upon the State’s Attorney, the parties to the judicial proceeding if
disclosure is sought in connection with such a proceeding, and such other
persons as the court may direct. The court shall conduct a hearing if requested
within 15 days after service of the motion.

In drafting what became Rule 4-642(d), the Rules Committee intended “to a large extent

[to] follow[] the language of Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) regarding non-disclosure and the

exceptions to non-disclosure.” Standing Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc., Meeting

Minutes, at 15 (Oct. 15 & 16, 1982); see also Crim. Investigation No. 437, 316 Md. at 81

(“It is apparent that the federal disclosure rule and the Maryland disclosure rule are cut

from the same cloth.”). One difference, however, between Rule 6(e) and Rule 4-642(d) is

that the federal rule authorizes disclosure to someone other than the government or a

criminal defendant only if the disclosure is “preliminar[y] to or in connection with a

judicial proceeding[.]” Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i). Rule 4-642(d) does not include such

a limitation.

iv. Criminal Investigation No. 437

Five years after the adoption of Rule 4-642, in Criminal Investigation No. 437, this

Court adopted a balancing test for circuit courts to use in analyzing a motion to disclose

grand jury material under Rule 4-642. That case arose out of a grand jury investigation of

a pharmacy. 316 Md. at 68-70. The grand jury returned no indictments. Id. at 69. OAG (as

here, the governmental body that conducted the grand jury proceedings) subsequently filed

a motion in circuit court for an order to disclose grand jury material to the federal

26
government. Id. at 70. OAG also asked for authority to include a transmittal letter with the

records in which OAG summarized and described the records. Id. The purpose of the

disclosure was to facilitate a potential effort by the federal government to seek civil

sanctions. See id. After holding a hearing, the circuit court granted the State’s motion. The

pharmacy and one of its employees (collectively, the “Pharmacy”) appealed. Id.

This Court emphasized that “[s]ecrecy is the lifeblood of the grand jury.” Id. at 76;

see also id. (“[T]he proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy

of grand jury proceedings.” (quoting Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 218-19)). Thus, a circuit

court evaluating a motion to disclose grand jury material “must always be reluctant to

conclude that a breach of [grand jury] secrecy has been authorized.” Id. at 81 (quoting

United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 425 (1983)). While we acknowledged that

“the veil of secrecy with which the grand jury is cloaked must be lifted at times in the

interest of justice[,]” we simultaneously emphasized that “this may be done only discretely

and limitedly.” Id. We observed that, before the adoption of Rule 4-642, we had “followed

the lead” of the U.S. Supreme Court and had “made the particularized need requirement

for disclosure a part of the case law of this State.” Id. at 83.

We then endorsed the particularized need standard in deciding motions for

disclosure of grand jury material under Rule 4-642. Id. at 83 & n.10. Adapting Douglas

27
Oil’s test to Rule 4-642(d), 16 we held that to obtain an order to disclose grand jury materials
15F

in Maryland, the moving party must show that:

1) the material they seek is needed to avoid a possible injustice; and

2) the need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued secrecy; and

3) their request is structured to cover only material so needed.

Id. at 85, 100.

We also listed seven non-exclusive considerations that a circuit court may balance

when weighing a motion for disclosure, including:

1) the need to protect the unindicted individual from disclosure;

2) the grand jury has concluded its operations;

3) the particularized need requirement applies to civil governmental agencies
as well as to private parties;

4) the materials sought for disclosure are rationally related to the civil
proceedings contemplated;

5) the materials sought may be available through ordinary discovery or other
routine avenues of investigation;

6) disclosure will save time and expense; [and]

7) no indictments were returned as a result of the grand jury’s investigation.

Id. at 100-01. We stated that “[n]one of these considerations, in itself, is usually sufficient

to show that there is or is not a particularized need for disclosure.” Instead, the weight

given to each factor depends on the particular circumstances. Id. at 101.

16
We recognized that an adaptation was necessary because the Douglas Oil test
referenced Rule 6(e)’s judicial proceeding requirement. As discussed above, Rule 4-642(d)
does not include the same limitation.

28
Having articulated the particularized need standard, we upheld the circuit court’s

disclosure order, finding no abuse of discretion. Id. at 103-06. We rejected the Pharmacy’s

contention that the State’s disclosure motion was premature because the grand jury

materials were not sought for use in connection with a judicial proceeding. Id. at 103-04.

We reiterated that Rule 4-642, unlike Rule 6(e), does not require that the materials be

sought for use in a judicial proceeding. Id.

We also rejected the Pharmacy’s contention that, in making the referral to federal

authorities, the State was effectively “accus[ing] [the Pharmacy’s] professional employees

of criminal conduct despite the absence of a grand jury indictment.” Id. at 104. We

acknowledged “the long-established rule” that “if a grand jury does not indict, it may not

publicly criticize.” Id. However, we concluded that the language contained in OAG’s

transmittal letter did not actually “brand … [the Pharmacy’s] professional employees with

criminal conduct.” Id. at 105.

1. Public Accountability Cannot Justify Disclosure of Grand Jury Material Over the Objection of Uncharged Individuals.

OAG contends that the circuit court properly assessed its request to disclose

Petitioners’ identities under the balancing test this Court adopted in Criminal Investigation

No. 437. We disagree. When a requestor’s purpose in seeking disclosure of grand jury

material is to publicize alleged misconduct by uncharged individuals who object to such

disclosure, no balancing of interests is appropriate. Public accountability for such

uncharged persons does not give rise to a particularized need for disclosure.

29
OAG told the circuit court and stated in the Report itself that its purpose in releasing

the Report is to bring some measure of accountability and to document the “long and sordid

history” of AOB clergy and staff supporting abusers and concealing abuse. However, OAG

claims that it offered other justifications for disclosure of Petitioners’ identities in addition

to public accountability. For example, at oral argument OAG stated that release of the

Report would help answer the questions, “How did this happen?” and “How can we make

sure it doesn’t happen again?” OAG proffered that identifying Petitioners’ positions within

the Church, which would effectively identify Petitioners themselves, was necessary for the

public to understand how Petitioners “fit into the systematic concealment of child abuse”

within AOB.

We disagree with OAG’s assertion that it proffered a purpose for disclosure of

Petitioners’ identities that is materially different than holding Petitioners to public account.

Public accountability and OAG’s other stated justifications are different sides of the same

coin. At bottom, OAG seeks to shine a light on Petitioners’ alleged misconduct.

OAG has not cited, nor have we found, any case in a jurisdiction with a disclosure

regime similar to Maryland’s 17 that has approved the release of grand jury material for the
16F

17
Unlike Maryland, a minority of states have procedures in place for publication of
grand jury reports that name uncharged individuals. But those jurisdictions typically
provide safeguards to ensure fair treatment of uncharged individuals, as a matter of due
process. See 3 WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.3(h), at 40-41 (4th ed.
2015). For example, a Pennsylvania statute authorizes an investigating grand jury to submit
a report to the supervising judge. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4552 (a). If the supervising judge
finds that the report is critical of an uncharged person, the judge may permit that person to
submit a response to the allegations in the report. Id. § 4552(e). The supervising judge may
then allow the response to be added to the report before the report is made part of the public

30
purpose of holding uncharged individuals to public account, over the objections of those

individuals. 18 To be sure, under Rule 4-642(d), a court may order disclosure of grand jury
17F

material not only in connection with an already filed or contemplated judicial proceeding.

But every case in which a Maryland court has found a particularized need for disclosure,

both before and after the adoption of Rule 4-642, has involved the proposed use of grand

jury material in connection with a particular legal proceeding or at least to determine

whether a particular person or entity may be entitled to legal relief. For example, the

disclosure in Criminal Investigation No. 437 was not made to the public at large, but rather

to a government agency for the purpose of allowing that agency to determine whether to

seek available relief. See also Martinez v. State, 309 Md. 124, 142-43 (1987) (stating that

record. Id. Notably, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that this and other
potential remedies were insufficient to protect the right to reputation under the
Pennsylvania Constitution of uncharged former and current priests who were condemned
as “predator priests” in a grand jury report released in 2018. See In re Fortieth Statewide
Investigating Grand Jury, 197 A.3d 712 (2018). The Court ordered the permanent
redactions of these priests’ names from the grand jury’s report. Id. at 724.
18
In the Second and Seventh Circuits, a federal district court may order disclosure
of grand jury material in instances not strictly covered by Rule 6(e)(3)(E). See In re Biaggi,
478 F.2d 489, 494 (2d Cir. 1973) (affirming release of redacted grand jury transcripts based
on the “special circumstances” of the case, i.e., the waiver of grand jury secrecy protection
by Representative Biaggi, who had been the subject of the grand jury investigation);
Carlson v. United States, 837 F.3d 753, 766-67 (7th Cir. 2016) (federal district court has
inherent authority to unseal grand jury materials in circumstances not addressed by Rule
6(e)(3)(E)). That was also the case previously in the Eleventh Circuit, see In re Petition to
Inspect & Copy Grand Jury Materials (“Appeal of Hastings”), 735 F.2d 1261, 1268-69
(11th Cir. 1984), although that Court no longer subscribes to that proposition. See Pitch v.
United States, 953 F.3d 1226, 1229 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (overruling Appeal of
Hastings). We have not found any case in any of those circuits in which a court authorized
disclosure of grand jury material for the purpose of holding uncharged individuals to public
account, let alone over the objection of such individuals.

31
there is a particularized need in using grand jury materials for impeachment, refreshing a

witness’s recollection, and testing a witness’s credibility, whether at trial or in a

suppression hearing); Jones v. State, 297 Md. 7, 14-15 (1983) (holding that, after a State’s

witness testifies on direct examination, “a defendant is entitled to inspect the grand jury

testimony for cross-examination purposes”); In re Crim. Investigation No. 51,843 in the

Cir. Ct. for Prince George’s Cnty., 119 Md. App. 112, 115-17, 124-28 (1998) (affirming

in part an order to disclose grand jury materials to former arrestees in civil rights cases they

filed against the County and others).

Contrary to OAG’s contention, we did not overrule or abrogate In re Report of

Grand Jury in Criminal Investigation No. 437. To the contrary, we cited In re Report of

Grand Jury favorably in that case for several propositions. See Crim. Investigation No.

437, 316 Md. at 71, 72, 72 n.4, 73. And we reaffirmed “the long-established rule … that if

a grand jury does not indict, it may not publicly criticize.” Id. at 104. We do not read

Criminal Investigation No. 437 to suggest that if OAG had requested an order to disclose

damaging grand jury information about the Pharmacy in an OAG-authored report to be

made available to the public, this Court would have endorsed the balancing of that interest

against the need for continued secrecy. To our knowledge, such a request by a Maryland

prosecutor in 1989 would have been unprecedented, just as OAG’s request to disclose

Petitioners’ identities in this case is unprecedented. Thus, we are unsurprised that the Court

in Criminal Investigation No. 437 did not include dicta explaining that the balancing test it

was adopting would have no application to such a scenario.

32
This case presents that scenario. We hold that the balancing test this Court adopted

in Criminal Investigation No. 437 has no application where the purpose of the requestor in

seeking disclosure is to publicize negative information about uncharged individuals who

object to such disclosure. Put another way, the “injustice” sought to be avoided through the

disclosure of grand jury material, see Crim. Investigation No. 437, 316 Md. at 100, cannot

be the inability of the public to hold uncharged individuals accountable for their conduct,

at least where those individuals object to such disclosure. Many grand jury investigations

produce negative information about uncharged individuals that the public might benefit

from learning. That commonly present interest is insufficient to constitute a particularized

need that may outweigh the continued interest in secrecy, where an uncharged person

objects to disclosure.

OAG’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. To the extent OAG contends

that the intensity of public interest in the conduct of uncharged individuals is a factor that

a circuit court should be able to balance against the need to protect uncharged individuals

from reputational harm, we disagree. The interests promoted by grand jury secrecy do not

increase or decrease based on how much the public wants to learn the information

contained in grand jury materials. 19
18F

19
See, e.g., Order Denying Petition to Unseal Grand Jury Transcripts, In Re: Grand
Jury 05-02 (WPB) & 07-103 (WPB), No. 25-mc-80920-RLR, 2025 WL 2076030, at *1
(S.D. Fla. July 23, 2025) (denying United States’ request to unseal transcripts of testimony
taken in 2005 and 2007 grand jury investigations of Jeffrey Epstein, where the government
sought disclosure because “[p]ublic officials, lawmakers, pundits, and ordinary citizens
remain deeply interested and concerned about the Epstein matter,” including as to whether
there was predication for an investigation into uncharged third parties).

33
We also disagree that In re Report of Grand Jury is distinguishable because it

involved a report made by the grand jury itself, as opposed to a report made by another

entity such as OAG. According to OAG, the decision in In re Report of Grand Jury “rested

on the reputational consequences that can ensue when a person is condemned by the same

body responsible for issuing an indictment.” This distinction does not support OAG’s

position. Reputational harm to an uncharged person may well be more severe when

criticism comes from the prosecutor that led a grand jury investigation than when it comes

from the grand jury itself.

OAG also contends that a categorical rule against disclosure is inapt here because:

(1) the Report contains only information gleaned from pre-existing documents, as opposed

to grand jury testimony or deliberations; and (2) the grand jury has disbanded, eliminating

any chance that disclosure would interfere with the grand jury’s operations. We disagree.

Although these factors are appropriate to consider where the moving party points to a

particularized interest justifying disclosure, they do not move the needle where the

requestor seeks to further the public’s general interest in accountability, over the objection

of an uncharged individual.

A contrary decision would be an unwise departure from centuries of grand jury

practice that protects the rights of individuals. Petitioners were not charged with any

crimes, yet OAG would publicly accuse them of illegal or inappropriate conduct without

their having an opportunity to contest the allegations in a court of law. Should the circuit

court on remand authorize disclosure, Petitioners would face the court of public opinion

without any effective means of rebutting OAG’s accusations. This would defeat one of the

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main purposes of the grand jury process: preventing unindicted persons from being “held

up to public ridicule.” Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 219.

A contrary result also would undermine the efficacy of the grand jury as an

investigative tool. The erosion of secrecy that OAG proposes would discourage

cooperation in grand jury investigations. See id. (“[I]f preindictment proceedings were

made public, many prospective witnesses would be hesitant to come forward voluntarily,

knowing that those against whom they testify would be aware of that testimony. Moreover,

witnesses who appeared before the grand jury would be less likely to testify fully and

frankly, as they would be open to retribution as well as to inducements.”). It also would

likely encourage the filing of motions to limit or quash grand jury subpoenas.

We do not minimize the harm that so many children suffered at the hands of clergy

and others within AOB. Nor do we discount the interest of the public in understanding the

history of child abuse in AOB and other institutions. Investigative journalism, criminal

prosecutions, and civil actions have exposed much of what went on within AOB.

As stated above, see note 14, we do not decide whether the circuit court erred in

authorizing OAG to disclose the identities of uncharged individuals who are not among the

Petitioners before us. The Report in its redacted form is now a matter of public record.

Thus, even if we were to conclude that no grand jury information should have been made

public in the Report, we would not be able to provide a remedy to any uncharged person

who was improperly identified.

That is not the case for Petitioners. They object to the disclosure of their names and

identifying information for the purpose of holding them to public account. The rule of

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grand jury secrecy prohibits that disclosure. For this reason, a remand to the circuit court

to conduct an individualized analysis of the need to disclose each Petitioner’s identity is

inappropriate. OAG has offered only public accountability and other materially

indistinguishable interests as justifying disclosure of all Petitioners’ identities. That interest

is insufficient to overcome each Petitioner’s objection to disclosure. Accordingly, we

reverse the judgments of the Appellate Court in all three appeals and direct remands to the

circuit court for entry of an order denying OAG’s motions to disclose with respect to

Petitioners’ identities.

IV

Conclusion

The Appellate Court correctly held that OAG had authority to investigate allegations

of child sexual abuse in AOB, based on the Hogan Directive.

A court may not order disclosure of secret grand jury material, over the objection of

an uncharged individual, for the purpose of holding that person accountable in the court of

public opinion. The circuit court erred in granting OAG’s request to disclose Petitioners’

identities. The Appellate Court erred in ordering remands to the circuit court for additional

analysis under Maryland Rule 4-642(d). We reverse the Appellate Court’s judgments and

direct remands to the circuit court for entry of an order denying OAG’s motions to disclose

Petitioners’ identities.

JUDGMENTS OF THE APPELLATE
COURT OF MARYLAND REVERSED.
CASES REMANDED TO THE
APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND
WITH THE INSTRUCTION THAT THEY

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FURTHER BE REMANDED TO THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE
CITY FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
FIFTY PERCENT OF COSTS IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND
AND THIS COURT TO BE PAID BY
RESPONDENT AND FIFTY PERCENT
OF SUCH COSTS TO BE DIVIDED
EQUALLY AMONG PETITIONERS.

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