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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Mahima Joishy v. Chubb Insurance Company of New Jersey

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-1843-24

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (25.3K)

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Combined Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1843-24

MAHIMA JOISHY,

Plaintiff-Appellant/
Cross-Respondent,

v.

CHUBB INSURANCE COMPANY
OF NEW JERSEY,

Defendant-Respondent/
Cross-Appellant,

and

FEDERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., CHUBB INA
HOLDINGS INC., CHUBB GROUP
HOLDINGS INC., CHUBB
LIMITED, PETRA
CONSTRUCTION &
MANAGEMENT LLC, and
ALEXANDER DUQUE, a/k/a
ALEXANDER DUQUE-SALAZAR,

Defendants-Respondents.

---

Argued March 5, 2026 – Decided March 18, 2026
Before Judges Mawla, Marczyk, and Bishop-
Thompson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Hudson County, Docket No. L-0597-20.

Gene Markin argued the cause for appellant/cross-
respondent (Stark & Stark PC, attorneys; Gene Markin,
of counsel and on the briefs).

Thomas A. Morrone argued the cause for
respondent/cross-appellant (Chasan Lamparello
Mallon & Cappuzzo, PC, attorneys; Thomas A.
Morrone and John V. Mallon, of counsel and on the
briefs; Thomas R. Lloyd, on the briefs).

PER CURIAM

A jury found plaintiff Mahima Joishy had no cause of action against

defendant Chubb Insurance Company of New Jersey regarding her insurance

coverage claims, resulting in the entry of judgment in defendant's favor on

February 7, 2025. Plaintiff appeals from March 17, 2022 orders, which denied

her cross-motion for summary judgment, and a May 2, 2022 order denying her

subsequent motion for reconsideration. Defendant cross-appeals from: a March

17, 2022 order denying its motion for summary judgment; a May 2, 2022 order

denying its motion for reconsideration; and a November 9, 2023 order denying

its motion in limine related to plaintiff's failure to secure an expert to prove her

claim for additional living expenses. We affirm.

A-1843-24
2
Around 2011, plaintiff purchased a homeowner's insurance policy from

defendant to insure her condominium, which she renewed in subsequent years.

Her 2014-2015 policy had various coverage limits, including $56,000 for

replacement of her home's contents; $10,000 for mold remediation; and

$229,700 for additions and alterations. The additions and alterations provision

was explained under a section entitled "Extra Coverages," and reads, in part, as

follows:

Additions and alterations
This coverage is in effect only if an amount of coverage
greater than zero is shown in the [c]overage [s]ummary
for your [a]dditions and alterations.

We cover your building additions, alterations, fixtures,
improvements, installations or items of real property
that are part of your unit as defined in the [m]aster
[d]eed. This includes breakage of glass or safety
glazing material in the building, or a storm door or
window. We also cover any other structure on the
condominium property that is:
• owned by you; or
• available for your exclusive use and which you are
required to insure.

For a covered loss to these items, we will pay up to the
amount of coverage shown in the [c]overage [s]ummary
for [a]dditions and alterations.

Also located under Extra Coverages was a provision entitled "Additional

living expenses," which, in part, provides:

A-1843-24
3
As described below, under certain conditions when
your condominium unit cannot be lived in because of a
covered loss to your condominium unit or, if
applicable, its contents, we provide coverage for
additional living expenses which consists of extra
living expenses, loss of fair rental value and forced
evacuation expenses. There is no deductible for this
coverage.

Extra living expenses. If a covered loss makes your
condominium unit uninhabitable, we cover the
reasonable increase in your normal living expenses that
is necessary to maintain your household's usual
standard of living, including the kenneling of domestic
animals not primarily owned or kept for business use.
We cover this increase for the reasonable amount of
time required to restore your condominium unit to a
habitable condition, or if you or members of your
household permanently relocate, the shortest amount of
time required to settle elsewhere. However, if you are
constructing additions, alterations, or renovations to
your condominium unit at the time of a covered loss,
we only cover the increase in your normal living
expenses incurred by you for the reasonable amount of
time required to restore the condominium unit to the
condition it was in prior to the covered loss. This
period of time is not limited by the expiration of this
policy.

Plaintiff's 2015-2016 renewal contained the same extra living expenses

provision, but also stated a covered loss is covered up to the earlier of "the

reasonable amount of time required to restore the condominium unit to a

habitable condition" or "two years from the date of loss, or a later date if agreed

to by us."

A-1843-24
4
The policy contained a "Rebuilding to code" provision, also listed under

Extra Coverages, which, in part, read:

After a covered loss to covered property, we cover the
necessary cost of conforming to any law or ordinance
that requires or regulates:
• the repair, replacement, or rebuilding of the damaged
portion of your additions and alterations made
necessary by the covered loss;
• the demolition, replacement, or rebuilding of the
undamaged portion of your additions and alterations
necessary to complete the repair, replacement, or
rebuilding of the damaged portion of your additions
and alterations; or
• the demolition of the undamaged portion of your
additions and alterations when your condominium
unit must be totally demolished.

On June 15, 2015, a broken pipe caused water damage to plaintiff's

condominium, which rendered it uninhabitable. Defendant concluded the loss

was covered under plaintiff's 2014-2015 renewal policy but also honored the

modified extra living expenses language contained in the 2015-2016 renewal.

During the summer of 2015, defendant paid for rental furniture for

plaintiff since some of her furniture was damaged. Plaintiff also hired a mold

remediation company in September 2015, which defendant agreed to pay for in

November 2015.

Plaintiff contacted construction companies in early 2016. In April 2016,

the condominium association passed a resolution requiring all units to "replace

A-1843-24
5
the plastic toilet supply lines." During this time, the mold remediation company

discovered asbestos. In June 2016, defendant contacted the condominium

association requesting clearance to begin work on the rebuild. Defendant

declined to renew plaintiff's policy around October 2016. On December 16,

2016, defendant agreed to extend the extra living expenses coverage to June

2017.

In early 2017, plaintiff met with at least two construction contractors.

Defendant notified plaintiff that its estimate of $39,486.36 for the reconstruction

was sufficient, but it would have a claims adjuster meet with plaintiff's

contractor to review issues pertaining to the scope of the rebuild.

Plaintiff retained an architect approved by defendant to draft and submit

rebuild plans to the condominium association in February 2017, as required by

the association's bylaws. On February 24, 2017, defendant notified plaintiff the

full scope of damages was estimated at $82,451, and the architect's proposal

recommended many alterations unrelated to the loss, which were not covered.

The architect submitted his plans to the association and began to solicit

contractors' bids between March and May 2017. He recommended Petra

Construction & Management for the reconstruction. Petra agreed to a scope of

work with defendant in June 2017. Following an inspection with defendant 's

A-1843-24
6
representative, Petra claimed defendant agreed additional work was needed

because of "code compliance and current site conditions."

Plaintiff and the association argued over certain aspects of the design. In

January 2018, the association approved the rebuild plans, and Petra began

construction. The work was to be completed by May 9, 2018.

In February 2018, Petra paused work because it found asbestos. The

association refused to cover the asbestos remediation. In June 2018, defendant

approved an asbestos remediator, who completed the remediation in August

1. Afterwards, Petra informed defendant it needed additional funds due to

wall damage caused by the asbestos remediator.

Plaintiff and Petra signed an amended contract in September 2018.

Defendant disbursed some funds but found the remainder of the amounts sought

were excessive and beyond plaintiff's policy coverage limit. In October 2018,

defendant notified plaintiff her additions and alterations coverage limit was

exhausted and issued her a final payment. Around December 2018, defendant

advised plaintiff it would stop paying her extra living expenses because the

rebuild should have been completed by then. Defendant inspected the work

done between October and December 2018, and informed plaintiff that Petra

A-1843-24
7
was not completing the work as required by the contract. As a result, defendant

refused to pay Petra additional funds, and Petra halted work.

In early 2019, defendant's representative met with the architect and Petra

to discuss the reasons for the reconstruction delay, which Petra blamed on cost

increases. Defendant also made two past-due rent payments for plaintiff's

temporary housing. In January 2019, defendant hired its own construction

expert who prepared a report showing the rebuild should have been completed

within four months of its initiation. As a result, defendant refused to provide

further coverage. It noted plaintiff's coverage limits were exhausted and the

extra living expenses coverage was met since it voluntarily paid them for two

years after plaintiff's loss. Plaintiff constructed her own timeline to highlight

what she perceived as defendant's delays and to show her efforts to ensure the

condominium was rebuilt. In August 2019, defendant provided a statement of

loss, showing it paid $580,343.06 on the claim.

In February 2020, plaintiff sued defendant alleging: breach of contract;

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; bad faith; and

breach of fiduciary duty. During discovery, plaintiff, two of defendant's claims

adjusters, and the architect were deposed.

A-1843-24
8
Each party moved for summary judgment. Their motions were denied on

October 30, 2020. The court found there were genuine issues of material fact

regarding "whether . . . [p]laintiff [wa]s entitled to further payments."

In June 2021, the architect provided a letter to plaintiff detailing the

deficiencies in Petra's work. The letter indicated while the demolition and

framing job were seventy percent complete, the overall job was incomplete.

Plaintiff was deposed in August 2021. She explained the condition of the

condominium had not substantially changed since January 2019. The mold

remediation company she hired demolished all the walls and removed any mold

it discovered. Plaintiff met with several contractors to determine what the

rebuild would cost. She noted, initially, defendant and one of the contractors

could not agree on the scope or cost of the rebuild.

Plaintiff testified mold was found in a wall cavity, which was a problem

throughout the condominium complex and resulted in the association hiring a

contractor to clean out those areas. The association notified defendant the issue

was unrelated to the loss.

Plaintiff acknowledged defendant had disbursed $37,000 to her in 2015.

Although she had no construction experience, she learned from a friend who was

a contractor the sums defendant offered to pay for the loss were inadequate.

A-1843-24
9
Plaintiff testified defendant's refusal to renew the policy in 2016 was

improper and created a hardship. Although she believed a contractor other than

the one approved by defendant would have successfully completed the job, she

acknowledged defendant did not limit her choice of contractors she could hire.

She also acknowledged defendant continued to cover her living expenses

following the non-renewal.

Plaintiff delegated the hiring of the contractor to her architect and later

met with Petra's owner once defendant and Petra had agreed on a scope of work.

She testified although Petra was hired in the summer of 2017, it did not begin

the rebuild until January 2018. Plaintiff blamed the condominium association

for the delay. She conceded defendant agreed to pay for the asbestos removal.

Although defendant alerted plaintiff she had exhausted her additions and

alterations coverage after it paid her an additional $11,000 for Petra's work,

plaintiff disputed the coverage was exhausted and claimed other coverage

clauses should have been applied. She claimed she never agreed to an extension

of the living expenses provision in 2018 because there was no mutual assent.

In January 2019, plaintiff met with a contractor who said it would

complete the work for $200,000. Plaintiff claimed the policy did not have firm

limits on the amount of coverage and defendant could transfer coverage limits

A-1843-24
10
between the provisions. Therefore, it did not matter that the additions and

alterations coverage limit was $229,700. Although plaintiff agreed the policy

contained monetary limits, she contended, "the reasonable expectation [of an

insured] would be that . . . [defendant would] cover [her] damaged [property]

fully for the true value."

Plaintiff testified the rebuilding-to-code provision meant all

reconstruction had to be to code, and since the condominium was not rebuilt,

defendant had not satisfied the policy requirements. The amount of time

required for payment under the additional living expenses coverage was

however long it took to rebuild her condominium. Plaintiff had no personal

knowledge of the work performed by Petra.

As noted, two claims adjusters were also deposed. The first adjuster had

thirty years of experience and took over the claim in 2019 from another adjuster

who had retired, to help resolve it. He believed the twenty-one months allocated

for reconstruction were beyond what was necessary. Plaintiff's policy contained

limits based on the terms of the coverages, and even those that did not have a

monetary limit were limited based on the period of restoration. He testified

defendant worked hard to resolve the claim, but plaintiff's contractors "hindered

the possibility of completing the project."

A-1843-24
11
The second adjuster testified plaintiff's property was not habitable when

he visited it. He explained plaintiff's policy did not contain an aggregate

monetary limit and once the limit on a specific policy provision was reached

there could be no further payouts. The policy did not define what a reasonable

amount of time to complete the rebuild was, but in practice it would be an

amount of time decided on between the contractor and defendant. Plaintiff's

additional living expenses coverage was terminated based on defendant's

estimation of the reasonable amount of time it should have taken to complete

the rebuild. The adjuster testified defendant acted reasonably as evidenced by

its efforts to work with contractors and the extensions it granted plaintiff after

various delays occurred.

The architect was deposed in October 2021. He explained the decision to

hire Petra was his and plaintiff's. He recounted his meeting with defendant and

Petra in 2019 to discuss the "progress or lack of progress" on the project. During

this time, he was "brought on as a consultant architect . . . to advise and

determine what[ wa]s going on." He did not independently determine what the

work would cost and based his opinion on plaintiff's contract with Petra and the

amount of work left to be paid for. The architect conceded he did not review

the contract in 2018 or 2019.

A-1843-24
12
The architect explained there was a change in the building code regarding

electrical issues since the condominium was originally built. He did not know

if any electrical work had been performed on the condominium when he

inspected it in 2021. There were also changes made to the lighting and HVAC

during the rebuilding process, but he was unsure whether they related to the

broken pipe. He opined Petra's work did not comply with the code because the

repair work had not yet been completed. The architect conceded he was not a

professional estimator of construction projects.

Defendant retained an expert who prepared a report on what a reasonable

amount of time for additional living expenses would be as of October 5, 2021.

He opined a twenty-one-month timeframe was sufficient to remediate the mold,

complete the rebuild, and pay plaintiff's additional expenses. The expert stated

the asbestos would have easily been identified by an experienced contractor, and

Petra's two-and-one-half-year delay in noticing the asbestos was "inexplicable."

Defendant's extension of coverage for forty-three months "vastly exceed[ed] any

reasonable timeframe to repair th[e] single bedroom condo[minium]."

Discovery concluded in January 2022. Each party again moved for

summary judgment.

A-1843-24
13
Defendant argued the policy language regarding the coverage limits was

clear and it had fully compensated plaintiff. The coverage under the additional

living expenses provision was not indefinite and was intended to last for a

reasonable amount of time. Also, plaintiff failed to retain an expert to opine on

this issue while defendant had retained an expert who opined twenty-one months

of coverage was reasonable. Defendant noted it paid forty-three months of

additional living expenses.

Plaintiff asserted the policy was clear defendant had to restore her

condominium to a habitable state, and its failure to do so was a breach of contract

and fiduciary duty. The building codes had changed since the loss, and

defendant was required to pay to rebuild pursuant to the new standards. She

contended defendant was responsible for the increased costs, which were not

limited by the rebuilding-to-code provision, because insurance policies are

contracts of adhesion. Plaintiff argued the additional living expenses coverage

was not limited in amount, but rather, whether the period of payment was

reasonable.

The trial court issued a written decision on March 17, 2022. It found the

rebuilding-to-code provision was "ambiguous and that a reasonable factfinder

could conclude that this provision is not limited, as [defendant] suggests, to only

A-1843-24
14
covering the 'increased' costs associated with bringing . . . the [u]nit [up] to

code." It was unclear how much work was performed to date but clear that

plaintiff's condominium needed more work to be code compliant. "[R]easonable

minds could differ regarding whether the [p]olicy's provision for costs

associated with rebuilding the [u]nit to code allows for more coverage than what

[p]laintiff has already been provided."

The court also declined to grant summary judgment regarding the

additional living expenses provision because there were "genuine issues of

material fact . . . regarding what constitutes a 'reasonable amount of time' taking

into account the totality of the circumstances surrounding the efforts to rebuild

the [u]nit." It found "[t]he true cause of the delays in the [u]nit's repair is very

much in dispute . . . along with whether [p]laintiff is entitled to addi tional

coverage under the [p]olicy's terms."

In April 2022, each party moved for reconsideration. Plaintiff contended

the rebuilding-to-code provision was a part of the extra coverage clauses of the

policy, and defendant's own construction standards acknowledged an obligation

to rebuild up to the latest code standards. This meant defendant's obligation to

pay until the rebuild was up to code was not limited.

A-1843-24
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Defendant argued each policy provision, except the contents clause, was

an extra coverage. The rebuilding-to-code coverage only applied to the costs of

a damaged item that did not comply with existing code. Expert testimony was

required to conclude whether an item had been adequately paid for to rebuild to

code. Petra's rebuild work did not involve code issues. The issue of additional

living expenses also required expert testimony, which plaintiff lacked.

Defendant argued summary judgment in its favor was appropriate because

plaintiff could not meet the burden of proof at trial.

The trial court made oral findings. It denied plaintiff's motion for

reconsideration, noting although it initial finding of ambiguity in the rebuilding-

to-code provision was not "dispositive with regard to a jury's determination."

The jury would consider the parties' evidence regarding how they interpreted the

policy and draw its own conclusions as to whether defendant complied with the

policy terms. The court denied defendant summary judgment because it

continued to find the rebuilding-to-code provision ambiguous and the matter

was "best left to . . . a jury to hear and . . . consider." This was also the case for

the additional living expenses provision because there was a dispute whether it

was defendant's fault or Petra's, "who refuses to proceed with the finalization of

completing the work on [plaintiff]'s condo[minium]."

A-1843-24
16
In May 2023, defendant filed a motion in limine to bar the additional

living expenses claim because plaintiff failed to retain an expert to prove the

claim. On May 26, 2023, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed

plaintiff's claim for additional living expense coverage with prejudice. The

court's order noted it did not consider plaintiff's opposition because her

certification exceeded the page limits under Rule 1:6-5. Plaintiff sought

interlocutory review, and we granted her motion, directing the court to consider

plaintiff's opposition.

On November 9, 2023, the trial court denied the motion in limine. It found

although plaintiff had not retained an expert to address "the objective coverage

issue and what the reasonable period of time" was to rebuild her condominium,

her strategy was "to challenge defendant's expert and present and argue other

factors that might have contributed to the delay." Although the strategy had its

risks because plaintiff was not an expert and could not opine on the coverage

issue, "N.J.R.E. 702 does not compel the use of an expert, it permits the use of

an expert." The court declined to rule prospectively on what plaintiff or a

contractor might testify to at trial, leaving the matter to the judge trying the case.

Following a five-day trial in January 2025, a jury found plaintiff did not

prove defendant breached the insurance contract by not providing additional

A-1843-24
17
coverage under the rebuilding-to-code provision of the policy. On February 7,

2025, the trial court entered an order for judgment of no cause of action based

on the verdict and dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.

I.

On appeal, plaintiff argues, as a matter of law, the ambiguity in the policy

required the trial court to interpret the policy as extending coverage to her under

the rebuilding-to-code provision and grant her summary judgment on this issue

rather than submit it to the jury. This is because insurance contracts are

contracts of adhesion and should be construed in favor of the non-drafting party.

She contends where an insurance contract is ambiguous, the insured's reasonable

expectations should prevail, and all ambiguities should be resolved against the

insurer.

Plaintiff alleges the rebuilding-to-code provision had no monetary limit

and provided coverage to the extent necessary to make the repairs conform to

laws or ordinances. The additional living expenses provision also contained no

pre-determined monetary limitation because it promised defendant would pay

for "extra living expenses such as secondary housing 'for the reasonable amount

of time required to restore your condominium unit to a habitable condition .'"

Plaintiff asserts we must reverse because the trial court found a genuine issue of

A-1843-24
18
fact regarding the "reasonable amount of time," but the jury did not reach the

issue because it determined the rebuilding-to-code provision afforded plaintiff

no coverage.

On the cross-appeal, defendant argues we should reverse the March 17,

2022 order because the trial court erred when it found the rebuilding-to-code

provision was ambiguous. The court also erred when it concluded plaintiff did

not need an expert to prove her claim for additional living expenses beyond the

forty-three months defendant already paid on plaintiff's behalf.

II.

On appeal, we review a contract, such as an insurance policy, de novo.

Pickett ex rel. Est. of Pickett v. Moore's Lounge, 464 N.J. Super. 549, 554-55

(App. Div. 2020). "[A] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal

consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special

deference." Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019) (quoting

Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378

(1995)). A trial court's grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is

subject to a de novo review as well, applying the same standard used by the trial

court. Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022).

A-1843-24
19
Rule 4:46-2(c) states a motion for summary judgment must be granted "if

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or

order as a matter of law." The court must "consider whether the competent

evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the

alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Brill v. Guardian Life

Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).

"To decide whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the trial court

must 'draw[] all legitimate inferences from the facts in favor of the non-moving

party.'" Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 472 (2020) (alteration in original)

(quoting Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 480 (2016)). "The court's

function is not 'to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but

to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Rios v. Meda Pharm.,

Inc., 247 N.J. 1, 13 (2021) (quoting Brill, 142 N.J. at 540).

Insurance policies "will be enforced as written when [the] terms are clear

in order that the expectations of the parties will be fulfilled." Flomerfelt v.

Cardiello, 202 N.J. 432, 441 (2010). A policy's terms and meanings are

A-1843-24
20
reviewed "according to its plain and ordinary meaning." Ibid. (quoting

Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 128 N.J. 165, 175 (1992)). If an ambiguity

exists, a policy is "construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured, in

order to give effect to the insured's reasonable expectations ." Ibid. This is

because policies are drafted by insurers. See Kampf v. Franklin Life Ins. Co.,

33 N.J. 36, 41 (1960).

Ambiguity does not arise merely "because two conflicting interpretations

have been offered" but because "the 'phrasing of the policy is so confusing . . .

the average policyholder cannot make out the boundaries of coverage.'"

Simonetti v. Selective Ins. Co., 372 N.J. Super. 421, 428-29 (App. Div. 2004)

(quoting Lee v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 337 N.J. Super. 509, 513 (App. Div.

2001)). It does not matter if a closer reading of the policy would have yielded

a different result or alerted an insured about a lack of coverage. Flomerfelt, 202

N.J. at 441. In analyzing a policy, a court cannot "write for the insured a better

policy of insurance than the one purchased." Ibid. (quoting Walker Rogge, Inc.

v. Chelsea Title & Guar. Co., 116 N.J. 517, 529 (1989)).

While consumer contracts, like insurance policies, must "be written in a

simple, clear, understandable[,] and easily readable way," they still must be read

"as a whole." N.J.S.A. 56:12-2. Reasonable expectations must be considered

A-1843-24
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objectively. Voorhees, 128 N.J. at 175. "[T]he judicial interpretive function is

to consider what was written in the context of the circumstances under which it

was written, and accord to the language a rational meaning in keeping with the

expressed general purpose." Owens v. Press Publ'g Co., 20 N.J. 537, 543 (1956).

When interpreting insurance policies, courts consider "the contractual terms, the

surrounding circumstances, and the purpose of the contract." Marchak v.

Claridge Commons, Inc., 134 N.J. 275, 282 (1993).

Pursuant to these principles, we discern no error in the trial court's

conclusion the rebuilding-to-code provision was ambiguous. Under the 2014-

2015 policy, a covered loss to plaintiff's property is covered by the additions

and alterations provision. The clause covers "additions, alterations, fixtures,

improvements, installations or items of real property." The rebuilding-to-code

provision covers "the necessary cost of conforming to any law or ordinance that

requires or regulates" repairs or the demolition of parts of a condominium.

Nothing in the rebuilding-to-code provision denoted its limit or how the

provision related to or should be applied vis-à-vis other provisions of the policy,

including the additions and alterations coverage limit. For these reasons, the

court properly denied defendant summary judgment.

A-1843-24
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However, the ambiguity of the provision was not the end of the inquiry

because a court must examine the reasonable, objective expectations of the

policy, Voorhees, 128 N.J. at 175, and apply "a rational meaning in keeping with

the expressed general purpose" of the policy, Owens, 20 N.J. at 543. In this

regard, summary judgment was properly denied to plaintiff because the policy

language does not conclusively support the notion she had unlimited coverage.

The policy's main provisions—such as the contents and the additions and

alterations—had definitive limits, and defendant made payments in accordance

with those limits. On the other hand, defendant also paid for other expenses,

which did not have a monetary cap in the policy for several years. Therefore, it

fell to the jury to decide whether defendant breached the policy by ceasing

payment under the rebuilding-to-code provision pursuant to the facts presented.

Put another way, the jury was not tasked with interpreting what the insurance

policy meant, but instead whether defendant was required to continue making

payments.

Although we lack the trial transcripts, including the transcript of the

charge conference, the appellate record contains the jury questionnaire, which

shows the jury was asked to decide whether plaintiff proved defendant breached

the insurance policy by not providing additional coverage under the rebuilding -

A-1843-24
23
to-code provision. "Additional coverage" clearly meant the dollar amount paid

out and requested to be paid out. If the jury answered "no," it was instructed to

return its verdict and not reach the secondary question of whether defendant

breached the policy by not providing additional coverage under the additional

living expenses provision. At oral argument, plaintiff conceded if there was no

breach of contract under the rebuilding-to-code provision, no further funds were

owed. Clearly, the jury was answering a monetary question, not a legal one.

The jury returned a unanimous verdict in the negative on the first question,

and so it did not reach the additional living expenses claim. For these reasons,

we affirm on the appeal and need not reach defendant's cross-appeal argument

the trial court erred when it denied the motion in limine to dismiss the additional

living expenses claim for plaintiff's failure to produce an expert to prove this

claim.

Regardless, defendant's brief on cross-appeal notes its expert testified

about the reasonableness of the additional living expenses and was subject to

cross-examination. Plaintiff does not dispute this assertion. Therefore, as the

trial court correctly predicted when it decided the in limine motion, plaintiff did

not need an expert of her own and could gamble on whether she could prove the

additional living expenses claim by cross-examining defendant's expert.

A-1843-24
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Affirmed.

A-1843-24
25