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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Laurie Yokosh v. Frank Bisignano

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24-1632

• Judges: Maldonado

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (7K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by Maldonado

In the

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit

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No. 24-1632
LAURIE JEAN YOKOSH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

FRANK BISIGNANO,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 2:22-cv-00949 — Brett H. Ludwig, Judge.

---

ARGUED JANUARY 15, 2025 — DECIDED MARCH 19, 2026

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Before ROVNER, JACKSON-AKIWUMI, and MALDONADO, Cir-
cuit Judges.
MALDONADO, Circuit Judge. Laurie Yokosh appeals the
partial denial of her application for Social Security disability
benefits. This case has a lengthy history with remands from
both the district court and the Social Security Appeals Coun-
cil. But our review today is limited to the Administrative Law
Judge’s (“ALJ”) most recent determination that Yokosh was
2 No. 24-1632

not disabled from August 14, 2015, to August 31, 2017, and
therefore not entitled to benefits for that time. Yokosh argues
that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of her treat-
ing psychologist. But the ALJ considered the relevant factors
and offered well-supported reasons for giving this opinion lit-
tle weight. We review with deference and affirm.
I. Background
A. Personal and Medical History
Yokosh is 63 years old. She holds a GED and has worked
in various roles, including as a customer service representa-
tive, a receptionist, and most recently a bookkeeper at her
brother’s company. Yokosh’s brother provided accommoda-
tions because of her medical problems and eventually al-
lowed her to reduce to part-time hours. Yokosh stopped
working in August 2015.
Yokosh has struggled with mental and physical impair-
ments, but her chronic back pain was the main reason she
stopped working. She sought treatment in July 2015, and x-
rays showed degenerative spondylosis (spinal osteoarthritis)
and mild scoliosis. Yokosh began physical therapy and started
taking anti-inflammatory medication, both of which she re-
ported provided mild relief a month later.
Seeking further treatment, Yokosh visited a specialist in
spinal disorders. She received an MRI, which showed multi-
level degenerative disc disease, and was referred to a pain
management specialist to treat neck, back, and hip pains. She
was prescribed medication and received a series of steroid in-
jections and ablation procedures that provided some short-
term relief. Yokosh’s pain continued to worsen, and in 2019
No. 24-1632 3

she underwent left hip replacement surgery because of osteo-
arthritis.
The toll of Yokosh’s physical pain triggered mental health
issues, which had been dormant for some time. (Yokosh had
previously been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and had re-
ceived Social Security disability benefits from 2000 to 2006
while she received treatment.) In November 2015, she visited
Dr. Roland Manos, Ph.D., for a mental status examination.
Dr. Manos reported that Yokosh shared that she had
weaned herself off her psychotropic medications in 2007 and
had experienced “occasional episodes of anxiety” but no “ex-
treme mood swings” since then. Yokosh felt “frustrated” and
“concerned” about her health but not “hopeless.” Dr. Manos
and Yokosh discussed her daily activities (including rolling
cigarettes, reading, and watching television), hobbies (includ-
ing playing cards and cooking), and social activities (includ-
ing getting together with friends and family). Yokosh also told
Dr. Manos that she had “no difficulty concentrating on her job
duties,” but that her pain affected her persistence. Dr. Manos
reported that Yokosh was able to correctly complete a series
of activities testing memory, knowledge, concentration, and
abstract reasoning. Based on these results and Yokosh’s over-
all presentation, Dr. Manos diagnosed her with depression
and anxiety and opined that she could understand and re-
member simple instructions, had no difficulty interacting
with others, could maintain concentration, could cope with
routine work stress, and could adapt to changes in the work
environment.
In June 2016, Yokosh began receiving psychotherapy treat-
ment twice a month from Dr. Itzhak Matusiak, Ph.D., a clini-
cal psychologist specializing in pain management. Yokosh
4 No. 24-1632

told Dr. Matusiak about her frustrations dealing with her
pain, sharing that she struggled with self-worth and despair,
and Dr. Matusiak advised her on various coping mechanisms.
In late 2016, Dr. Matusiak described Yokosh as having a “bet-
ter outlook,” though still frustrated by her “diminished cur-
rent functionality.” During her sessions, Yokosh also dis-
cussed her frustrations with her boyfriend and the various ac-
tivities she engaged in such as rolling cigarettes, shoveling
snow, gardening, cooking, baking for the holidays, and trav-
eling.
In November 2016, five months after he began treating her,
Dr. Matusiak evaluated Yokosh using the P-3 Test, a psycho-
logical assessment used to assess the mental status of individ-
uals suffering from chronic pain. Dr. Matusiak interpreted Yo-
kosh’s scores and concluded that she was able to “read the
test items and appropriately attend to their content”; that she
had “higher than average levels of anxiety”; and that her
symptoms of anxiety, depression, and somatization were sig-
nificant enough to “cause concern that elevated situational
stress demands, mood swings, and perhaps even ordinary life
reversals could cause [her] to lose control.” Based on these
test results, Dr. Matusiak opined that Yokosh had mild limi-
tations in understanding, remembering, or carrying out sim-
ple instructions; moderate limitations in her ability to make
judgments on simple work-related decisions; marked limita-
tions with complex instructions, interacting with others, and
responding appropriately to changes at work; and extreme
limitations in making judgments on complex work-related
decisions. He also opined that Yokosh had “significant prob-
lems” with short-term memory, attention, and concentration
as well as depression and anxiety. Yokosh’s mood and
No. 24-1632 5

psychological symptoms continued to fluctuate, but she
stopped seeking treatment from Dr. Matusiak in June 2017.
In 2022, a psychological expert, Dr. Michael Rabin, Ph.D.,
reviewed Yokosh’s record. He opined in a hearing that Yo-
kosh had “persistent depressive disorder with mixed anxiety
and depressed mood” but that she had only mild limitations
in mental functioning. Dr. Rabin generally agreed with Dr.
Manos’s assessment, though he was not convinced Yokosh
needed to be limited to simple work. Dr. Rabin also explained
that he was unable to assess the reliability of Dr. Matusiak’s
opinion and report because no test scores had been provided.
B. Administrative Proceedings
Yokosh applied for disability insurance benefits in Sep-
tember 2015, alleging that she had been disabled since August
14, 2015. The application was originally denied, but her case
was remanded twice. First, in 2019, on the parties’ stipulation,
the district court remanded, the case was assigned to a differ-
ent ALJ, and that ALJ determined that Yokosh had become
disabled on November 26, 2017. Then, in 2021, the Social Se-
curity Appeals Council remanded again, directing the ALJ to
further review whether Yokosh was disabled before Novem-
ber 26, 2017. In 2022, the ALJ held a hearing, where two med-
ical experts and a vocational expert testified, and determined
that Yokosh had become disabled on September 1, 2017. No
one is contesting the conclusion that Yokosh was eligible for
benefits starting September 1, 2017, so we focus our discus-
sion on the determination that she was not eligible for benefits
before then.
The ALJ applied the five-step analysis established in 20
C.F.R. § 416.920 (a)(4). At step one, the ALJ concluded that
6 No. 24-1632

Yokosh had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
the alleged onset of her disability on August 14, 2015. At step
two, the ALJ determined that Yokosh had several severe phys-
ical impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar and
cervical spine, osteoarthritis of the left hip, and small fiber
neuropathy. The ALJ also determined that Yokosh’s mental
impairments, namely depression and anxiety, were non-se-
vere because she had only mild limitations in the four areas
of mental functioning (understanding, remembering, or ap-
plying information; interacting with others; concentrating,
persisting, or maintaining pace; and adapting or managing
oneself). At step three, the ALJ concluded that, prior to Sep-
tember 1, 2017, Yokosh’s severe impairments did not meet or
medically equal a listing for presumptive disability. See 20
C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. Before moving to step four,
the ALJ determined Yokosh’s residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) prior to September 1, 2017. The resulting RFC in-
cluded findings that Yokosh could occasionally bend, stoop,
reach overhead, lift from the floor, and climb ladders. It did
not include a limitation on engaging in complex tasks. Finally,
at step four, the ALJ concluded that, based on her RFC, Yo-
kosh was capable of performing her past relevant work as a
bookkeeper. The ALJ therefore determined that Yokosh was
not disabled prior to September 1, 2017.
At issue in this appeal is the finding at step two that Yo-
kosh’s mental impairments were non-severe. Specifically, Yo-
kosh disagrees with the ALJ’s decision to give “little weight”
to Dr. Matusiak’s opinion that Yokosh was limited in perform-
ing complex work tasks. The ALJ explained that he dis-
counted this opinion for several reasons. To start, Dr.
Matusiak’s opinion was inconsistent with other information
in the record, including the test results and conclusions of
No. 24-1632 7

other experts, all which indicated that Yokosh had only mild
limitations in mental functioning. In addition, Dr. Matusiak’s
treatment notes—which did not indicate significant limita-
tions in memory, attention, concentration, ability to interact,
or mood—did not support his conclusions. In fact, the limita-
tions Dr. Matusiak identified were inconsistent with some of
Yokosh’s own reports of her activities. Further, Dr. Matusiak
had only seen Yokosh for five months at the time he provided
his opinion. Finally, the ALJ noted that the “conservative”
treatment Dr. Matusiak was providing appeared to be the ap-
propriate level of care for Yokosh.
C. District Court Proceedings
Yokosh sought review in federal court, arguing that the
ALJ failed to provide good reasons for rejecting Dr.
Matusiak’s opinion that she had difficulties engaging in com-
plex work tasks. 1 The district court affirmed the ALJ’s deci-
sion, finding that he adequately articulated his reasons for
discounting the opinion. The court also agreed with the Com-
missioner that even if the ALJ had included a limitation in the
RFC precluding complex tasks, consistent with Dr.
Matusiak’s opinion, Yokosh still would have been found not
disabled for the relevant time frame because a vocational ex-
pert testified (and no one disputed) that over 2,000,000 jobs
were available in the national economy for someone with Yo-
kosh’s RFC. In other words, any error was harmless. Yokosh
appeals.

1 Yokosh also challenged a determination by the ALJ that she did not

have a severe eye impairment prior to September 1, 2017, but she does not
raise that issue on appeal, so we discuss it no further.
8 No. 24-1632

II. Discussion
We review the district court’s affirmance of the ALJ’s deci-
sion de novo, but “we defer to the agency’s factual find-
ings[.]” Crowell v. Kijakazi, 72 F.4th 810, 813 (7th Cir. 2023).
And we will reverse an ALJ’s decision “only if it is the result
of an error of law or it is not supported by substantial evi-
dence, which is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quot-
ing Butler v. Kijakazi, 4 F.4th 498, 501 (7th Cir. 2021)).
Yokosh’s primary argument on appeal is that the ALJ
erred in discounting Dr. Matusiak’s opinion about her ability
to perform complex work. 2 If the ALJ had given more weight
to this opinion, Yokosh contends, her RFC would have limited
her to simple work-related tasks and decisions, which would
not have included her previous work as a bookkeeper, and
she likely would have been found disabled and entitled to
benefits.
For claims filed before 2017, like Yokosh’s, the opinions of
treating physicians can, under certain circumstances, be given
controlling weight. 3 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (c)(2); Baptist v. Ki-
jakazi, 74 F.4th 437, 444 (7th Cir. 2023). But an ALJ may give
less weight to an opinion that is, for example, inconsistent
with the opinions of other physicians, internally inconsistent,
or based solely on the patient’s subjective complaints. Baptist,
74 F.4th at 444. In doing so, the ALJ must “examine[] the

2 Yokosh also challenges the district court’s apparent willingness to

affirm on harmless error grounds. Because we conclude that the ALJ com-
mitted no error, we need not address this argument.
3 The agency revised certain relevant regulations for claims filed on or

after March 27, 2017.
No. 24-1632 9

appropriate factors under agency regulations”—which in-
clude the length, nature, and extent of the physician and
claimant’s treatment relationship; whether the physician sup-
ported his opinion with sufficient explanation; and whether
the physician specializes in the medical conditions at issue—
and must “minimally articulate[] [his] reasoning[.]” Crowell,
72 F.4th at 816; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (c). This is “a very defer-
ential standard that we have, in fact, deemed ‘lax.’” Elder v.
Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 415 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Berger v.
Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir. 2008)).
Here, the ALJ considered the relevant factors and offered
well-supported reasons for giving Dr. Matusiak’s opinion
“little weight.”
First, the ALJ identified inconsistencies between Dr.
Matusiak’s opinion and other evidence in the record. For ex-
ample, the ALJ noted that the record showed Yokosh present-
ing “with generally normal psychiatric symptoms,” which
was inconsistent with Dr. Matusiak’s opinion that she had sig-
nificant limitations due to mental impairments. The ALJ cor-
rectly observed that the treatment notes “generally indicate
that she had an appropriate mood, appropriate affect, normal
interactions, and normal behavior,” and describe her as
“pleasant and cooperative.”
Additionally, Dr. Matusiak’s opinion was at odds with the
opinions of Dr. Manos (who reported that Yokosh could
maintain concentration, adapt to changes, and “would not
have difficulties interacting with others”) and Dr. Rabin (who
reported that Yokosh had “no more than a mild limitation” in
all areas of mental functioning), whose opinions in turn were
consistent with the rest of the record. Further still, the ALJ
noted that Dr. Matusiak’s opinion was inconsistent with
10 No. 24-1632

Yokosh’s self-reported robust daily activities. This evidence,
the ALJ concluded, “does not suggest greater than mild limi-
tations in her ability to perform work related activities.” These
were reasonable bases for discounting Dr. Matusiak’s opin-
ion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (c)(4) (“[T]he more consistent a
medical opinion is with the record as a whole, the more
weight we will give to that medical opinion.”); Zoch v. Saul,
981 F.3d 597, 602 (7th Cir. 2020) (ALJ reasonably rejected opin-
ion that conflicted with the medical evidence and other re-
ports).
Yokosh argues that the ALJ’s conclusion about consistency
was flawed because he ignored the fact that she was diag-
nosed with a pain disorder. We disagree. Although the ALJ
did not mention this diagnosis or use the phrase “pain disor-
der,” he amply discussed evidence about pain. The ALJ ex-
pressly noted that Yokosh discussed her pain with Dr.
Matusiak; considered her testimony that her pain limited her
ability to do things like sit, stand, walk, and climb stairs; con-
sidered physical examination and imaging results that indi-
cated Yokosh suffered from tenderness and pain; and consid-
ered that Yokosh had received pain management interven-
tions such as injections and an ablation. The ALJ thus did not
improperly “ignore [an] entire line[] of contrary evidence.”
See Arnett v. Astrue, 676 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2012).
Second, the ALJ considered Dr. Matusiak’s opinion and
reasonably concluded that it was not well supported. Indeed,
the opinion was not even supported by Dr. Matusiak’s own
treatment notes—his notes did not indicate that Yokosh had
significant limitations with memory, attention, concentration,
ability to interact, or mood. Nor did they indicate concern that
No. 24-1632 11

Yokosh could “lose control” when faced with certain stress-
ors.
Yokosh argues that the ALJ’s conclusion about supporta-
bility was flawed because he failed to discuss the P-3 Test Dr.
Matusiak used, but again we disagree. Although the ALJ did
not mention the test by name, he referred and cited to Dr.
Matusiak’s evaluation containing the test results. And in any
event, the ALJ “is not required to spell out in the record every
piece of evidence that he considered and then accepted or re-
jected . . . It is enough that [he] build a logical bridge between
the evidence and his conclusions.” Crowell, 72 F.4th at 815. The
ALJ did that here.
Third, the ALJ considered the length, nature, and extent of
the treatment relationship. He expressly noted that Dr.
Matusiak had been counseling Yokosh for only about five
months at the time he provided his opinion; 4 that their session
discussions generally revolved around frustrations with her
physical pain and her intimate relationship, as well as various
activities in which she was involved; and that the “conserva-
tive” care being provided appeared to be appropriate and sta-
ble, given that Yokosh continued with the same course of
treatment. It was reasonable for the ALJ to determine that
these considerations did not justify affording Dr. Matusiak’s
opinion more than little weight, especially in light of the in-
consistencies discussed above.

4 Yokosh argues that the ALJ misrepresented the length of her rela-

tionship with Dr. Matusiak, pointing to a section of the opinion that states
Dr. Matusiak had been treating her for only one month. But this is clearly
a drafting error because the ALJ later explained twice that the time frame
was five months.
12 No. 24-1632

Finally, although not expressly noted in so many words in
the written decision, the ALJ was aware that Dr. Matusiak
specialized in pain management counseling. Yokosh argues
that the ALJ ignored Dr. Matusiak’s specialization, but this in-
formation is in the record, which the ALJ reviewed. And in
the written decision the ALJ consistently referred to him as
“Dr. Matusiak” and noted he had a Ph.D. Under these circum-
stances, we are satisfied that the ALJ appropriately consid-
ered his qualifications.
It is true that we have previously remanded where an ALJ
failed to acknowledge the specialty of a physician. See Gerst-
ner v. Berryhill, 879 F.3d 257, 263 (7th Cir. 2018); Larson v.
Astrue, 615 F.3d 744, 751 (7th Cir. 2010). But those cases suf-
fered from other issues not present in today’s case. In Larson,
for example, the ALJ “said nothing” about any of the factors
used to weigh treating physician testimony. 615 F.3d at 751.
And in Gerstner, the ALJ did not mention the physician’s spe-
cialty or the nature and extent of the treatment, and he failed
to acknowledge that the physician’s opinion was consistent
with other opinions in the record. 879 F.3d at 263. Here, as
already explained, the ALJ did not “sa[y] nothing” about the
regulatory factors in weighing Dr. Matusiak’s opinion as a
treating physician, and he discussed at length the inconsist-
encies between Dr. Matusiak’s opinion and others in the rec-
ord. See Larson, 615 F.3d at 751.
And in any event, an ALJ “need not consider explicitly
every factor[.]” Grotts v. Kijakazi, 27 F.4th 1273, 1277 (7th Cir.
2022). We have affirmed decisions where the ALJ considered
some, but not all, of the regulatory factors, as long as the rea-
soning was minimally articulated and supported by the rec-
ord as a whole. See, e.g., Crowell, 72 F.4th at 815–16 (affirming
No. 24-1632 13

despite ALJ’s failure to address one of the factors); Elder, 529
F.3d at 415–16 (affirming where ALJ discussed only two of the
relevant factors).
In short, the ALJ’s decision was more than minimally ar-
ticulated and well supported, and we “will not substitute our
judgment . . . by reweighing the evidence.” Karr v. Saul, 989
F.3d 508, 513 (7th Cir. 2021).
We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.