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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Anthony Hall v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

Kentucky Supreme Court

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2025-SC-0016
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Disposition: MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (47.6K)

• PDF

Disposition

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING

Combined Opinion

IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.”
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, RAP 40(D), THIS
OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN
UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A
COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG
WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO
THE ACTION.
RENDERED: MARCH 19, 2026
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky
2025-SC-0016-MR

ANTHONY HALL APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM MENIFEE CIRCUIT COURT
V. HONORABLE ELIZABETH H. DAVIS, JUDGE
NO. 20-CR-00006

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

AFFIRMING

Appellant Anthony Hall pleaded guilty in the Menifee Circuit Court to

charges of kidnapping and murdering Jodi Stapleton, tampering with physical

evidence, and abuse of a corpse. The trial court held a penalty phase jury trial,

which resulted in a recommended sentence of life in prison. The trial court

sentenced Hall in accordance with the recommendation. Hall now appeals to

this Court as a matter of right. KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b). Following a careful

review, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2019, Appellant Hall and Jodi Stapleton began an on-again-off-again

relationship. In December 2019, Stapleton sent text messages and photos of

domestic abuse inflicted by Hall to her friend Ashley Stanley.
Stapleton continued to have a relationship with Hall. On March 26,

2020, Stapleton went to Hall’s house. The following evening, the couple argued

and violence erupted. Hall grabbed Stapleton from behind, threw her on the

bed, punched her multiple times, restrained her in a chair with weed-eater

string, hit her again, and taped a sock in her mouth to silence her. Stapleton’s

ribs and nose were broken, and she also suffered numerous head injuries that

resulted in subdural hemorrhaging.

Hall left Stapleton restrained in the chair and fell asleep. When he

awoke on March 28, 2020, he realized Stapleton was dead. He then “hogtied”

Stapleton’s body with electrical cords, wrapped it in a blanket and plastic, and

placed it in his laundry room under trash bags and clothes.

On March 30, 2020, Hall contacted Tara Williams, a woman he had

previously met on a dating site and invited her to his house. He met Williams

in Morehead, where he used Stapleton’s ATM card to withdraw money. He

used some of that money to get his weed-eater out of pawn. Hall and Williams

then went back to his residence where they attempted to have sex. Williams

testified, however, that Hall “really couldn’t keep it up.” At the time Williams

noticed the plastic bundle that concealed Stapleton’s body but did not know

what it was.

Hall then asked Williams to follow him in a truck to a friend’s house so

he could drop off a vehicle for the friend to borrow. The vehicle was Stapleton’s

Tahoe. Williams followed Hall “all over the place.” Ultimately, while Williams

was elsewhere, Hall burned the Tahoe at a remote location. Williams later

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picked up Hall on the side of the road, and the two then went their separate

ways.

Stapleton’s family ultimately became suspicious of text messages that

Hall was sending to them from Stapleton’s phone purporting to be from

Stapleton. Stapleton’s mother and a relative went to Hall’s home looking for

her. Hall became worried they knew something was wrong and then fled the

state.

On April 1, 2020, Hall was stopped by law enforcement in South Carolina

for trespassing. He admitted to a South Carolina deputy that he had killed

Stapleton. In an interview with a South Carolina detective, Hall admitted he

had punched Stapleton several times, killed her, tied her up, tried to hide the

body, and burned the Tahoe. In a later interview with Kentucky State Police

detectives, Hall again admitted to murdering Stapleton. A search warrant was

executed for Hall’s residence, where law enforcement discovered Stapleton’s

body.

Hall was indicted for murder, kidnapping, tampering with physical

evidence, and abuse of a corpse. Hall was initially represented for two years by

a public defender. With that public defender as counsel, Hall entered a plea of

guilty to the murder, kidnapping, and tampering charges in exchange for a

sentence of thirty years. However, before final sentencing, Hall fired the public

defender, retained private counsel, and moved to set aside his guilty plea. The

trial court granted that motion.

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While Hall’s case remained pending, his former public defender became

an Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney in the Menifee Commonwealth’s

Attorney’s office. Hall therefore moved to disqualify that entire office from his

case. At the hearing on the motion, Hall contended that the prosecution had

been unduly “combative,” which Hall believed was because his former public

defender was familiar with Hall and was informing the prosecution’s strategy.

The prosecution responded that it had obtained an ethics opinion indicating

disqualification of the entire office was not required, and that it had both orally

and in writing put in place a screening process separating the former public

defender from anything involving Hall’s case. The trial court denied Hall’s

motion to disqualify the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s office, concluding there

had been no showing of an actual impropriety and that the former public

defender had been appropriately screened from Hall’s case.

On the morning of his scheduled trial, Hall pleaded guilty to murder,

kidnapping, tampering, and abuse of a corpse. The trial court then began a

two-day penalty phase before a jury in which the jury heard testimony

regarding the factual circumstances of the crimes at issue, among other

information. Williams also testified to attempting to have sex with Hall in the

laundry room where Stapleton’s body was located, though Williams did not

know at the time that the plastic bundle contained Stapleton’s body. Stanley

testified to having received the text messages and photos from Stapleton

regarding Hall’s domestic abuse of her. Stanley showed the texts and photos to

the jury.

4
The jury recommended a sentence of life in prison, which the trial court

imposed. Hall now appeals as a matter of right.

ANALYSIS

Hall raises three issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred

in declining to disqualify the entire Commonwealth’s Attorney’s office; (2)

whether a witness whom Hall contacted to assist him in disposing of the

victim’s vehicle could properly testify to other activities such as attempted sex;

and (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting the text messages and photos

relating to Hall’s domestic violence against Stapleton a few months before the

murder. We review each issue in turn, providing additional facts as necessary.

I. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Refusing To Disqualify The Entire
Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Office.

Hall first argues that the trial court erred in refusing to disqualify the

entire Menifee County Commonwealth’s Attorney’s office from Hall’s

prosecution. Hall contends such disqualification was warranted because his

former public defender had become an Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney,

and that the prosecution failed to prove it put in place adequate procedures to

screen that former public defender from Hall’s case. Hall preserved this

allegation of error by his filing of a motion to disqualify, and we therefore review

the trial court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. Ward v. Commonwealth, 587

S.W.3d 312, 319 (Ky. 2019) (“We review a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s

motion to disqualify a prosecutor for abuse of discretion.”).

When a former public defender accepts employment with a prosecuting

office, the public defender must be disqualified from all matters in which he or
5
she was previously involved as a public defender. 1 In such situations, “great

pains should be taken to ensure no confidential information is gathered from a

defendant’s former counsel and the former counsel is not given any

opportunity, no matter how small, to participate in the action.” Calhoun v.

Commonwealth, 492 S.W.3d 132, 137 (Ky. 2016). Thus, there is no question

that disqualification of the former public defender from Hall’s prosecution was

mandatory, and that screening was required to ensure that he provided no

confidential information or assistance to the work of the Commonwealth

Attorney’s office on Hall’s case.

However, while an individual former public defender must be disqualified

and screened from the prosecution of any case in which he or she was involved

as a public defender, disqualification of the entire prosecuting office is not

automatically required simply because the defendant’s former public defender

has accepted employment with that office. Id. Rather, disqualification of the

entire prosecuting office is warranted only upon a showing of “special facts,”

such as the existence of actual prejudice or the prosecuting office’s failure to

use effective screening procedures:

1 See Rules of the Supreme Court (SCR) 3.130(1.11)(a)(2) (prohibiting former

government attorneys from “represent[ing] a client in connection with a matter in
which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or
employee” absent consent of the former employer); SCR 3.130(1.11)(d)(i) (prohibiting
current government lawyers from participating in matters in which they previously
“participated personally and substantially” absent consent); Kentucky Revised Statute
(KRS) 15.733(2)(e) (“Any prosecuting attorney shall disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which he . . . [h]as served in private practice or government service,
other than as a prosecuting attorney, as a lawyer or rendered a legal opinion in the
matter in controversy.”).
6
[A] former [public defender] must be disqualified from matters
involving a prior representation. But the entire office in which
that attorney works is not disqualified as long as the
disqualified attorney is appropriately screened.
Disqualification of the entire prosecuting office is not
necessary absent special facts, such as a showing of actual
prejudice; or, perhaps the screening procedures are
ineffective.

Id.

Hall contends that when a defendant seeks to disqualify an entire

prosecuting office that has employed the defendant’s former public defender,

the prosecuting office should bear the burden of proving that disqualification is

not warranted. We disagree. To the contrary, our case law establishes that a

defendant seeking disqualification of an entire prosecuting office bears the

burden of proving the “special facts,” such as actual prejudice or the use of

ineffective screening procedures, that warrant such a disqualification.

Indeed, in other analogous circumstances we have placed the burden of

proof upon a defendant seeking disqualification of an entire prosecuting office.

In Ward, for example, the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s office came into

possession of recorded jail calls between the defendant and his counsel. 587

S.W.3d at 319. The defendant moved for disqualification of that office for

violating his right to privileged attorney-client communications. Id. at 318. In

considering whether the prosecuting office’s conduct resulted in “actual

prejudice” warranting disqualification, we favorably noted another jurisdiction’s

allocation of the burden of proof to establish such prejudice to the defendant:

The burden is on Defendant to demonstrate that the
circumstances of the taping of any privileged call from the jail
constitute an affirmative action by the government to intrude
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into the attorney-client privilege, rather than an inadvertent
recording of such a call . . . . Mere possession by the
prosecution of otherwise confidential trial strategy
information does not establish prejudice.

Id. at 324 (quoting United States v. Guzman-Solis, No. CR-14-01729-001-TUC-

CKJ, 2015 WL 13283396, at *8 (D. Ariz. Oct. 19, 2015)). We then held that

disqualification was not warranted because no evidence had been presented to

support a finding of actual prejudice resulting from the Commonwealth’s

Attorney’s possession of the privileged phone calls. Id. at 326 (“[N]o evidence

suggests that defense strategy was communicated to the prosecutor. . . . [W]e

find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denying Ward’s motion to

disqualify the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Office . . . .”). Though not involving

a prosecuting office’s employment of a former public defender as we are faced

with here, Ward nonetheless placed upon the defendant the burden of proving

actual prejudice warranting disqualification of the entire prosecuting office.

We find the reasoning of Ward equally applicable to the circumstances

presented here, and thus conclude that when a defendant moves to disqualify

an entire prosecuting office on grounds that his former public defender is now

employed with that office, the defendant bears the burden of proving by

evidence the “special facts,” such as actual prejudice or ineffective screening

procedures, warranting such a disqualification.

Here, Hall made no such showing. Indeed, Hall offered no evidence at

all, instead relying solely on the fact that his former public defender had been

employed by the prosecuting office, Hall’s perception that the prosecution had

been unduly combative, and his speculation that this was due to the former
8
public defender providing assistance to the prosecution of his case. These bare

allegations fell far short of the evidentiary showing necessary to establish

special facts, such as actual prejudice or ineffective screening procedures,

warranting a disqualification of the entire prosecuting office.

We are also unpersuaded by Hall’s contention that because he does not

have inside access to the operations of the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s office,

he would never be able to satisfy a burden of proving special facts warranting

disqualification. To the contrary, a defendant seeking to establish facts

warranting disqualification of a prosecuting office has at his disposal the ability

to procure by subpoena the office’s written screening policies or other non-

privileged written materials relevant to the motion to disqualify. Where it

appears the motion to disqualify raises concerns sufficient to warrant the

holding of an evidentiary hearing, the defendant will also have the ability to

obtain testimony pursuant to subpoena from prosecuting office employees

regarding non-privileged matters relevant to the disqualification motion.

In sum, because Hall failed to meet his burden of proof, we perceive no

abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of his motion to disqualify the

Commonwealth Attorney’s office. This is particularly so given the

representations of the Commonwealth’s Attorney—who did not bear the burden

of proof—to the trial court that written and oral screening policies were put in

place to ensure the former public defender would not participate in or aid the

prosecution of Hall, and that such participation or aid had not occurred and

would not occur.

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Finally, we also acknowledge that in Calhoun, we noted a number of

relevant factors that may be relevant in determining whether a prosecuting

office has adopted effective procedures to screen a prosecutor from a matter in

which he or she previously served as a public defender. These factors include:

1) the providing of oral and written directions regarding the
screen to all staff members, pursuant to a written screening
policy;

2) the sending of letters to the prosecutor’s former clients,
ideally placed in the court record of the affected criminal
case;

3) the providing of the prosecuting office’s written screening
policy to every affected judge;

4) the placing of the written screening policy in every active
case file in which the prosecutor participated;

5) informing all employees, both orally and in writing, that
any violation of the screen must be reported immediately,
subject to discipline for failure to do so; and

6) the placing in a prominent place near case files of a list of
all cases from which the prosecutor is to be screened.

492 S.W.3d at 137-38. However, these factors are not a laundry list of

requirements that must be met in all cases to provide effective screening.

Rather, it must be left to the discretion of the trial court to determine based

upon the particular facts at issue whether screening procedures adequate to

prevent actual prejudice have been adopted. Here, Hall made no showing that

the prosecuting office’s screening procedures were ineffective, and thus the

trial court correctly denied his motion.

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II. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Admitting Evidence Of Hall’s
Attempted Sexual Liaison With Williams.

Hall also argues that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of

Williams (the woman Hall called after the murder to assist in the disposal of

the victim’s vehicle) regarding Hall’s unsuccessful efforts to have sex with her.

Hall contends this evidence was not relevant to the sentencing matters at issue

during the penalty-phase-only trial. He also contends this evidence was overly

prejudicial. Hall preserved his allegation of error by objecting to the admission

of this evidence at trial, and we thus review the trial court’s ruling for an abuse

of discretion. Brown v. Commonwealth, 723 S.W.3d 667, 672 (Ky. 2025) (“We

review a preserved allegation of error in the admission of evidence for abuse of

discretion.”).

On the first day of trial, a detective testified that Williams was visible on

video footage of Hall using Stapleton’s ATM card to withdraw money after the

murder, and that she had picked up Hall on the side of the road after he

burned Stapleton’s Tahoe. When the Commonwealth announced its intention

to call Williams herself to the stand on the second day of trial, Hall objected

that the detective had already testified to Williams’ involvement in the crimes,

Hall’s confessions to law enforcement already described the crimes, and the

only purpose of Williams’ testimony was for the Commonwealth to present the

jury with highly prejudicial and non-probative evidence that Hall attempted to

have sex with Williams in the room with Stapleton’s body. The Commonwealth

responded that Williams’ testimony about the crimes would differ from what

Hall had stated in his confessions. The trial court overruled Hall’s objection
11
because Williams’ testimony was not merely repetitive and she was a material

witness.

On the stand, Williams testified to Hall’s withdrawal of cash from the

ATM, her following of Hall in his vehicle as he drove the Tahoe to dispose of it,

and Hall’s failed efforts to have sex with her in the room where Stapleton’s body

was hidden because “he really couldn’t keep it up.” Hall contends the trial

court erred in allowing Williams’ testimony about the attempted sexual liaison

because it was not relevant to the sentencing matters at issue in the penalty-

phase-only trial.

As we have previously held, when a jury sits only to consider an

appropriate penalty, “common sense dictates” that the jury must be provided

with some evidence relating to guilt, “if they indeed are not ‘to sentence in a

vacuum without any knowledge of . . . matters that might be pertinent to

consider in the assessment of an appropriate penalty.’” Boone v.

Commonwealth, 821 S.W.2d 813, 814 (Ky. 1992) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Reneer, 734 S.W.2d 794, 797 (Ky. 1987)) (emphasis removed). Such evidence

may include the charges of which the defendant is guilty as well as the nature

and factual details of the crimes at issue. Id. In addition, we have also found

appropriate under such circumstances the admission of evidence relating to

“background information on the crime,” the defendant’s explanation of what

happened, and evidence relevant to “assessing aggravating and mitigating

circumstances, both statutory and non-statutory.” St. Clair v. Commonwealth,

319 S.W.3d 300, 312 (Ky. 2010). Ultimately, the trial court’s guiding star in

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considering the admissibility of evidence in a penalty-phase-only trial should

be whether the information is relevant to inform the jury of the crimes, the

defendant’s guilt, and other matters directly relevant to the penalty to be

imposed such as mitigating and aggravating circumstances and truth-in-

sentencing matters, subject as always to the obligation to avoid the admission

of unduly prejudicial evidence. See Kentucky Rules of Evidence (“KRE”) 401,

403.

Here, Williams’ testimony regarding Hall’s unsuccessful efforts to have

sex with her was relevant to his commission of the crimes of tampering and

murder. Evidence is relevant if it makes an allegation even slightly more likely

to be true than it would be without that evidence. Brown v. Commonwealth,

540 S.W.3d 374, 378 (Ky. 2018) (“It is enough if the item could reasonably

show that a fact is slightly more probable than it would appear [w]ithout that

evidence.” (quoting Turner v. Commonwealth, 914 S.W.2d 343, 346 (Ky. 1996))).

Williams’ testimony established that she met Hall on a dating site. After killing

Stapleton—and apparently while still needing assistance to dispose of her

Tahoe—Hall reached out to Williams, who remained unaware of his crimes. He

then met up with her, brought her to his residence, engaged in an

unsuccessful effort to have sex with her, and then used her unwitting

assistance in his disposal of Stapleton’s Tahoe. These facts give rise to an

inference that Hall’s true purpose in reaching out to Williams was to solicit her

unknowing assistance in destroying Stapleton’s vehicle and thereby hiding his

involvement in the murder. The evidence of Hall’s unsuccessful sexual liaison

13
with Williams thus made it more likely that he destroyed Stapleton’s Tahoe.

Indeed, it was part and parcel of the apparent method by which he

accomplished that crime—namely the procuring of a former romantic partner

under a pretense of a sexual liaison. In turn, Hall’s destruction of the Tahoe

also made it more likely he had killed Stapleton, as it was evidence of his

consciousness of guilt. Thus, because the unsuccessful sexual liaison was

relevant to Hall’s commission of the crimes of tampering and murder, it was

admissible in Hall’s penalty phase-trial.

We also do not conclude that the sexual liaison evidence was unduly

prejudicial. KRE 403 allows the exclusion of evidence “if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice.” In considering

whether evidence should be excluded under KRE 403, “a trial court must

consider three factors: the probative worth of the evidence, the probability that

the evidence will cause undue prejudice, and whether the harmful effects

substantially outweigh the probative worth.” Barnett v. Commonwealth, 979

S.W.2d 98, 103 (Ky. 1998).

As noted above, Hall’s failed sexual liaison with Williams was relevant to

demonstrating that his true purpose in contacting her was to procure

assistance with the destruction of Stapleton’s Tahoe and thereby conceal his

involvement in the murder. We acknowledge that Hall’s effort to attempt to

have sex with Williams in the room where he had stashed Stapleton’s body in a

plastic bag was also prejudicial. There is no denying that such conduct was

abhorrent.

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Nonetheless, we do not find that the harmful effects of that testimony

substantially outweighed its probative worth so as to result in undue prejudice

to Hall. While Hall received the maximum sentence possible, we cannot

attribute that to the jury hearing about the failed sexual liaison when it also

heard about a significant amount of far more horrifying conduct by Hall before

that liaison ever occurred. Indeed, the gruesome nature of Hall’s conduct was

vividly apparent even before the jury heard about his unsuccessful attempt to

have sex with Williams in the room where Stapleton’s body was located. The

jury heard that Hall had beaten Stapleton, tied her to a chair with weed-eater

string, beat her further, stuffed a sock into her mouth, and then went to sleep

while she remained injured and restrained and ultimately died. It is thus far

more likely that the jury’s imposition of the maximum sentence was the result

of the gruesome nature of Hall’s crimes rather than his unsuccessful sexual

liaison with Williams. As such, while the evidence of Hall’s attempted sexual

liaison was admittedly prejudicial, we do not find it unduly prejudicial or that

the trial court abused its discretion in declining to exclude that relevant

evidence.

III. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Admitting Text Messages And
Photos Relating To Hall’s Domestic Abuse Of Stapleton A Few
Months Before The Murder.

Hall also contends the trial court erred in admitting text messages and

related photos from Stapleton to her friend Ashley Stanley regarding Hall’s

domestic abuse against Stapleton a few months before the murder. Hall

argues this evidence was not relevant to sentencing, and that the text

15
messages were also inadmissible hearsay. These allegations of error were

preserved by Hall’s making of objections before the introduction of the

evidence, and thus we consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in

admitting that evidence. Brown, 723 S.W.3d at 672.

At trial, the Commonwealth called Stanley to the stand. The prosecutor

asked Stanley if Stapleton had communicated with her regarding her

relationship with Hall, and Hall objected that the elicited evidence would be

inadmissible hearsay. The prosecution responded that Hall told law

enforcement he snapped after seeing texts from Stapleton to Stanley about the

prior domestic violence. Thus, the trial court concluded those texts were

admissible because they did not go to the truth of the matter asserted, but

rather to the effect they had on Hall.

Stanley then testified and showed the jury texts from Hall to Stapleton,

which Stapleton had sent on to Stanley, in which Hall referred to not being able

to control built-up anger, apologized for harming Stapleton and causing her

pain, and said she “got the worst.” Stanley also showed the jury photos

Stapleton had sent her of injuries to her neck and jaw that occurred because

Hall “just freaked” after they were arguing. Time stamps indicate these photos

were from December 2019, a few months before the murder.

We first disagree that the text messages were inadmissible hearsay. An

out-of-court statement constitutes inadmissible hearsay only if it is offered to

prove that the content of the statement itself is true. KRE 801(c) (“‘Hearsay’ is

a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial

16
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”). An

out-of-court statement that is not offered to prove that its content is true, but

rather for some other purpose, is not hearsay.

Such was the case with the admission of Stapleton’s text messages to

Stanley. The messages were not offered to prove that Hall had in fact

committed domestic abuse against Stapleton as Stapleton stated in the

messages to Stanley, but rather to corroborate Hall’s assertion that he saw

such messages on Stapleton’s phone, “snapped,” and killed her. More

particularly, the jury heard Hall’s statements to law enforcement in which he

asserted that he had seen text messages in which Stapleton told a friend Hall

had hit her, that the cell phone was what set in motion the events leading to

Stapleton’s murder, and that he “snapped” and killed Stapleton. As such, the

text messages were admitted not to prove that Hall had previously committed

domestic violence against Stapleton, but rather to corroborate his statements

to law enforcement regarding the circumstances leading up to the murder.

Thus, because the messages were not offered to prove the truth of their

content, they were not hearsay.

The text messages were therefore also directly relevant factual and

background information regarding Hall’s commission of the crimes, and thus

admissible in his penalty-phase-only trial. Indeed, Hall stated to law

enforcement that he saw the messages, that the cell phone set the crime in

motion, and that he “snapped.” As such, the messages were also information

regarding the factual circumstances of the crimes admissible even in a penalty-

17
phase-only proceeding. Accordingly, we likewise perceive no abuse of

discretion in the trial court’s admission of that evidence.

In sum, we conclude that Hall failed to meet the burden of demonstrating

that disqualification of the entire Commonwealth Attorney’s office was

warranted. We also find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s admission of

evidence regarding Hall’s attempted sexual liaison with Williams, as that

evidence was relevant to his commission of the crimes at issue and was not

unduly prejudicial. Finally, the trial court also did not abuse its discretion in

admitting Stapleton’s text messages to Stanley because the text messages were

not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted and were relevant to

establishing the factual circumstances of the crimes.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment and sentence of the

Menifee Circuit Court.

All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Emily Holt Rhorer
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman
Attorney General of Kentucky

Joseph A. Beckett
Assistant Attorney General

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