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March 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Grenisa C. Smith v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2025-CA-0415
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
• Judges: Cetrulo

• Disposition: OPINION AFFIRMING

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2.2K)

• PDF

Disposition

OPINION AFFIRMING

Combined Opinion

RENDERED: MARCH 20, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-0415-MR

GRENISA C. SMITH APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JESSICA E. GREEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 20-CR-001317

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION
AFFIRMING

---

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; CETRULO AND KAREM, JUDGES.

CETRULO, JUDGE: Grenisa Smith (“Smith”), pro se, appeals the order of the

Jefferson Circuit Court denying, without an evidentiary hearing, her motion for

relief under Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 60.02. After reviewing the

briefs and the record, we affirm the circuit court’s order.

FACTS & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In August 2020, a Jefferson County grand jury indicted Smith on one

count of murder. The charge was based on an incident that occurred on July 26,
2020, in Jefferson County when Smith shot and killed the victim following an

altercation. After several years, the parties reached a plea agreement wherein the

Commonwealth amended the murder charge to manslaughter in the first-degree

and recommended a sentence of 17 years of imprisonment. On April 18, 2023,

Smith accepted the offer and entered her guilty plea before the circuit court. The

plea document, signed by Smith and her attorney at the time, specifically

acknowledged her agreement to serve the 17-year sentence and her ineligibility for

probation. The court scheduled a sentencing hearing for July 2023.

In May 2023, however, Smith submitted a handwritten letter to the

circuit court, expressing her dissatisfaction with defense counsel and indicating

some confusion or second-guessing about her acceptance of the plea agreement.

The court ordered the letter to be filed in the record and distributed copies to

Smith’s attorney and the Commonwealth. Shortly thereafter, Smith’s attorney

filed a motion to withdraw as counsel due to the potential for a conflict of interest

to arise if Smith moved to withdraw her guilty plea.1

On July 18, 2023, the circuit court granted defense counsel’s motion

to withdraw. Based on the record before us, it does not appear that Smith took any

1
In further support of withdrawal, defense counsel stated that he recently received notice that
Smith filed a bar complaint against him containing similar accusations as those in Smith’s letter
to the court, and that the bar complaint remained open at the time he filed his motion to
withdraw.

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further action regarding her guilty plea, and the case proceeded to a final

sentencing hearing in August 2023. In its judgment of conviction, the circuit court

noted Smith’s presence and her representation by counsel2 at the sentencing

hearing and sentenced Smith in accordance with the plea offer.

The record reflects no further activity until March 2025, when the

circuit court entered an order denying Smith’s motion under CR 60.02. However,

Smith’s motion is absent from the record on appeal, and the only mention of it

having been filed is in the circuit court’s order. Given that the court’s order

provides the only insight as to the relief Smith sought in her motion, we quote the

circuit court’s order in its entirety:

[Smith] has filed a [CR] 60.02 motion and requested relief
from the final judgment of the sentence based upon
“excusable neglect” of counsel for not introducing
information related to [Smith]’s alleged extreme
emotional disturbance. [Smith] argues that counsel should
have introduced this information during the sentencing
portion of court proceedings.

The Court has considered the motion, and denies [Smith]’s
request without the need for a hearing. [Smith] incorrectly
assumes that a presentation of an emotional distress
defense could have mitigated the sentence in this matter.
The plea paperwork, which contains defendant’s signature
indicates “the defendant agrees to serve this sentence.
[Smith] is not eligible for probation.” No presentation
regarding emotional distress at sentencing would have
altered the final judgment in this matter. [Smith’s] motion

2
The court did not mention counsel by name, and no entry of appearance for subsequent defense
counsel appears in the record following prior counsel’s withdrawal in July 2023.

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is DENIED. [Smith] has not stated anything
extraordinary in nature in his [sic] pleadings, or presented
any indication that this “lack of presentation of emotional
disturbance” by counsel justified the relief under the rule.
This is a final and appealable order, and there is no just
cause for delay.

It is from this order that Smith appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Whether a Defendant is entitled to the extraordinary relief provided

by CR 60.02 is a matter left to the ‘sound discretion of the court and the exercise of

that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal except for abuse.’” Meece v.

Commonwealth, 529 S.W.3d 281, 285 (Ky. 2017) (quoting Brown v.

Commonwealth, 932 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Ky. 1996)). “The test for abuse of

discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair,

or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Foley v. Commonwealth, 425 S.W.3d

880, 886 (Ky. 2014) (citing Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky.

1999)). “Therefore, we will affirm the lower court’s decision unless there is a

showing of some ‘flagrant miscarriage of justice.’” Id. (quoting Gross v.

Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Ky. 1983)).

ANALYSIS

A CR 60.02 motion “allows appeals based upon claims of error ‘that

were unknown and could not have been known to the moving party by exercise of

reasonable diligence and in time to have been otherwise presented to the court.’”

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Meece, 529 S.W.3d at 285 (quoting Sanders v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.3d 427,

437 (Ky. 2011)). “[Rule 60.02] is for relief that is not available by direct appeal

and not available under [Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (“RCr”)] 11.42.”

Id. (quoting Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856). In other words, CR 60.02 provides an

extraordinary form of relief, and the movant bears the considerable burden of

demonstrating why she is entitled to such relief. Id. Relatedly, “[t]he structure

provided in Kentucky for attacking the final judgment of a trial court in a criminal

case is not haphazard and overlapping, but is organized and complete. That

structure is set out in the rules related to direct appeals, in RCr 11.42, and

thereafter in CR 60.02.” Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856.

On appeal, Smith presents a rather patchwork argument, mostly

relying on federal and Kentucky case law reviewing ineffective assistance of

counsel claims. To illustrate, Smith poses the issue for review to be whether her

rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution were violated when the circuit court failed to consider lesser charges

than murder, such as manslaughter in the second-degree or reckless homicide, at

final sentencing. Smith proceeds to conflate the circuit court’s alleged error in

denying her CR 60.02 with defense counsel’s failure to present evidence of

voluntary intoxication and extreme emotional disturbance at final sentencing.

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Smith concludes that the alleged cumulative errors by defense counsel resulted in

prejudice and deprived her of a meaningful defense.

To the extent that Smith raises ineffective assistance of counsel

claims, perhaps for the first time in this appeal, we decline to address them. It does

not appear that Smith sought any relief pursuant to RCr 11.42 prior to filing her

CR 60.02 motion.3 Our Supreme Court has made clear that one may not seek or

obtain relief pursuant to CR 60.02 prior to exhausting the avenues of relief

available by direct appeal and RCr 11.42. See Meece, 529 S.W.3d at 285-86.

Setting aside this procedural obstacle for the moment, we nevertheless

agree with the Commonwealth that insofar as Smith attributes error to the circuit

court for not reducing her bargained-for sentence nor considering unexpressed

mitigation theories, Smith fails to demonstrate the extraordinary circumstances

necessary for CR 60.02 relief. The circuit court’s order indicates that Smith sought

relief due to “excusable neglect.”4 Yet, on appeal from this order, Smith fails to

3
While the filing date of Smith’s CR 60.02 motion cannot be ascertained from the record, the
circuit court’s order was entered on March 7, 2025, a date still within the timeframe for pursuing
relief under RCr 11.42. See RCr 11.42(10) (providing that an RCr 11.42 motion shall be filed
within three years after the judgment becomes final, subject to specified exceptions).
4
Under CR 60.02(a), “[o]n motion a court may, upon such terms as are just, relieve a party . . .
from its final judgment, order, or proceeding upon the following grounds: (a) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; . . . .” (Emphasis added).

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identify a basis for excusable neglect, much less address how or why she is entitled

to relief under any provision of CR 60.02.

The circuit court’s order aptly noted Smith accepted the

Commonwealth’s plea offer and entered a guilty plea to a lesser charge of

manslaughter in the first-degree.5 That deal included her agreement to serve a 17-

year prison sentence, which is within the statutory penalty range for manslaughter

in the first-degree. See KRS 507.030(2) (“Manslaughter in the first degree is a

Class B felony.”); KRS 532.060(2)(b) (stating the sentencing range for a Class B

felony is no less than 10 years nor more than 20 years). On appeal, Smith does not

identify an actual infirmity with the sentencing hearing, process, or judgment.

Our Supreme Court explained in Gross that for a CR 60.02 motion to

be successful, “there must be circumstances of an extraordinary nature justifying

relief.” 648 S.W.2d at 857. This Court observed in U.S. Bank, NA v. Hasty, that

“[a] very substantial showing is required to merit relief under [CR 60.02’s]

provisions.” 232 S.W.3d 536, 541 (Ky. App. 2007) (citing Ringo v.

Commonwealth, 455 S.W.2d 49, 50 (Ky. 1970)). No such extraordinary

circumstances exist here, and we discern no abuse of discretion in the circuit

5
The record does not reflect the Commonwealth’s reason(s) for amending the murder charge,
but we find it worthwhile to point out a finding that a defendant committed murder while acting
under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance is a mitigating factor reducing the charge
to manslaughter in the first-degree. See Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 507.020(1)(a) and
507.030(1)(b).

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court’s conclusion that Smith failed to present grounds for relief cognizable under

CR 60.02. Other arguments made by Smith that are not addressed herein have

been determined to lack merit and/or relevancy to the resolution of this appeal.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the Jefferson Circuit Court’s

order denying relief pursuant to CR 60.02.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Grenisa Smith, pro se Russell Coleman
Pewee Valley, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky

Todd D. Ferguson
Office of the Solicitor General
Frankfort, Kentucky

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