Kansas District Court Memo, Case 26-3035, April 14

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April 14, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Gavino Macias v. David Haehl, et al.

District Court, D. Kansas

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 5:26-cv-03035

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (30)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (772)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

GAVINO MACIAS,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 26-3035-JWL

DAVID HAEHL, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff Gavino Macias is hereby required to show good cause, in writing to the
undersigned, why this action should not be dismissed due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s
Complaint that are discussed herein. Plaintiff should also indicate if he is seeking a stay of this
case pending resolution of his state court proceedings.
I. Nature of the Matter before the Court
Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is
incarcerated at the Lansing Correctional Facility in Lansing, Kansas (“LCF”). The Court grants
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Plaintiff alleges in his Amended Complaint that he is being denied court access based on
the seizure of legal mail regarding his state criminal proceedings. (Doc. 4, at 2.) Plaintiff alleges
that his outgoing legal mail to his attorney and to the clerk of the District Court of Miami County,
Kansas, was seized by Defendants because they recognized Pat Lynn’s handwriting on the mail. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to ascertain whether the addresses were for Plaintiff’s
attorney and the court clerk and failed to determine whether there was a K.S.A. 22-3210
proceeding pending with Mr. Lowry serving as Plaintiff’s attorney. Id. at 3. Plaintiff alleges that
on February 6, 2026, Pat Lynn (Plaintiff’s cellmate) was served with two seizure notices for mail
sent to him by clerk Stephanie Gerken and attorney Forest Lowery. Id. Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ actions are criminal under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 “&
other offenses & must be prosecuted.” Id. Plaintiff claims that this deserves investigation by the
FBI, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the appointment of a special master, and class action certification. Id. Plaintiff claims that K.S.A. 44-12-702 entitles him to obtain the services of his cellmate—Mr.

Lynn.1 Id. at 3–4.
Plaintiff acknowledges that he contacted his defense attorney (through his mother) to have
his attorney seek injunctive and mandamus relief and protective orders in his state criminal case. Id. at 4. He claims he has only spoken to his attorney once by phone, he is not receiving copies of
pleadings in his state criminal case, and his attorney has committed malpractice and
colluded/conspired with Defendants. Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges that the state court judge presiding
over his criminal Case No. 24-CR-0147 in Miami County District Court should recuse, and the
district attorney should disqualify himself and his office. Id. at 6.
As Count I, Plaintiff alleges that the LCF and KDOC defendants have violated his

constitutional rights by seizing and opening his mail, by refusing to mail out Plaintiff’s legal mail,
and by violating his legal rights under K.A.R. 44-12-702. Id. at 8. Plaintiff also claims that these
defendants have violated criminal laws. Id. For his supporting facts, Plaintiff refers the Court to

1 The regulation provides that “[i]n accordance with applicable rules of the facility, an inmate may give, but shall not
charge for, assistance in legal matters to another inmate if the assistance is requested by the other inmate. Violation
of this regulation shall be a class II offense.” K.A.R. 44-12-702. The allegation that a state regulation has been
violated does not state a constitutional violation. See D.L. v. United Sch. Dist. No. 497, 596 F.3d 768, 776 (10th Cir.
2010) (finding that “Plaintiffs’ citations to Kansas case law to support their claim . . . is unavailing, as § 1983 affords
a remedy for violations of federal law and does not ‘provide a basis for redressing violations of state law.’ ”) (citation
omitted). The Tenth Circuit has held that an inmate has no constitutional right to work as a jailhouse lawyer. Brooks
v. Colorado Dep’t of Corr., 762 F. App’x 551, 559 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (citing Smith v. Maschner, 899
F.2d 940, 950 (10th Cir. 1990); cf. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 231, 121 S.Ct. 1475, 149 L.Ed.2d 420 (2001)
(declining “to cloak the provision of legal assistance [by prisoners] with any First Amendment protection above and
beyond the protection normally accorded prisoners’ speech” because “it is indisputable that inmate law clerks are
sometimes a menace to prison discipline” (internal quotations omitted)).
his attached Exhibits 1 through 3.2 Id. As Count II, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Lowry, Harth, Harding, Morrison, and
Dersch violated his 6th and 14th Amendment rights, violated state statutes and rules, and conspired
to deprive Plaintiff of his right to redress under K.S.A. 22-3210(d)(1). Id. For his supporting facts,
Plaintiff again refers the Court to his Exhibits 1 through 3. Id. As Count III, Plaintiff alleges that various Defendants have violated his right to receive
personal mail from family members without just cause or explanation. Id. at 9. Plaintiff believes
that his personal mail from his mother and cousin that includes copies of responses and orders in
his state criminal case, has been unlawfully seized to prevent him from filing pro se rebuttals. Id.
at 6.
The Exhibits that Plaintiff refers to for his factual support include his Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus filed on February 19, 2026, in the District Court of Leavenworth County, Kansas,
in Case No. 26-CV-069. (Doc. 5, at 2–19.) Plaintiff also attaches two “Notice and Protest of Mail
Withholding” from LCF addressing the withholding of mail on February 6, 2026, from Stephanie

Gerken and on the same date from Forest Lowry. Id. at 20–21. The Notices indicate that the mail
was withheld due to “Third-party communication – sending out legal mail for other residents.” Id.
He also attaches his grievance regarding mail from his family members. Id. at 23.
Plaintiff names thirty defendants in his Amended Complaint. Plaintiff names as
defendants: David Haehl, Acting Special Agent Supervisor of EAI at LCF; Michael Segretto,
Mailroom Supervisor at LCF; Jennifer Crouse, Mailroom Staff at LCF; Nicholas Ball, Deputy
Warden of Operations at LCF; Veronica Waters, Staff Attorney at LCF; Gloria Geither, LCF
Warden; the Kansas Department of Corrections (“KDOC”); Jeff Zmuda, KDOC Secretary of

2 Plaintiff failed to attach the exhibits to his Amended Complaint, but filed them later as Doc. 5.
Corrections; the State of Kansas; Andre Sandridge, EAI at LCF; Daniel Bryan, EAI at LCF;
Christopher Tomlinson, EAI at LCF; (fnu) West, EAI at LCF; (fnu) (lnu) EAI Male Agent, LCF;
Laura Kelly, Governor of Kansas; Todd Thompson, Leavenworth County District Attorney; (fnu)
Dedeke, Leavenworth County Sheriff; Joan Lowdon, Leavenworth County Chief Judge; (fnu)
(lnu) (2) KDOC Chief Counsel and Other Attorneys; Ryan Reece, LCF Deputy Warden; Kimberly

Betzhold, LCF Deputy Warden; (fnu) (lnu) (3), Mail Censor, KDOC; Paul Morrison, Attorney;
Veronica Dersch, Attorney; Forest Lowery, Former Attorney; Kenton Harding, Miami County
District Attorney; and Amy Harth, Miami County Chief Attorney. Plaintiff seeks declaratory
relief, injunctive relief, issuance of a protective order, appointment of counsel, compensatory
damages, and punitive damages. Id. at 10.
II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are

legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that
seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–
(2); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B) (where a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis the Court is
required to “dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—. . . (B) the action or appeal—
(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from suit.”).
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)
(citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court
liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts
all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th
Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise

a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
A pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are
insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,
1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to
relief’ requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint’s “factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a
complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did
it; how the defendant’s action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff
believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s
complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d
1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and
Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v.
Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the
complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at
1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the
line from conceivable to plausible.’” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in

this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in
a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it
innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S.
Ct. at 1974).
III. DISCUSSION
1. Preparation of Pleadings by Patrick Lynn
Plaintiff’s pleadings in this case were drafted by fellow inmate Patrick Lynn. On multiple
occasions in his own cases, Mr. Lynn has been made aware of the same deficiencies reflected in

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. See, e.g., Lynn v. Anderson-Verella, 257 F. App’x 80, 87 (10th
Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (finding that under Younger abstention doctrine district court should
abstain where state court proceedings are ongoing, and judicial immunity applied to claim for
money damages against state court judge); Lynn v. Kunen, 1998 WL 732804, at *1 (10th Cir. 1998)
(finding that Lynn presented no indication of improper extrajudicial bias or prejudice that would
warrant district judge’s recusal, and state public defender involved in criminal proceedings did not
act under color of state law and thus was not susceptible to a claim under § 1983); Lynn v.
Willnauer, 2022 WL 3027013, at *7, n.28 (D. Kan. 2022) (denying request for a referral to the
U.S. Attorney’s Office for investigation and presentation to a grand jury “for the same reasons set
forth in denying Plaintiff's previous requests for this same relief”) (citing see M&O, Doc. 45, at
41–42 (“Plaintiff has raised similar requests in prior cases and has been informed that he is not
entitled to this relief”) (citing Lynn v. Cline, Case No. 19-3003-CM (D. Kan. May 7, 2019)
(Doc. 15, at 13–14))); Lynn v. Willnauer, 2021 WL 1390384, at *17 (D. Kan. 2021) (“Governor
Kelly also enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); and Lynn v. Cline, 2019 WL 2005904, at *7

(D. Kan. 2019) (“The State of Kansas and its agencies are absolutely immune from suits for money
damages under the Eleventh Amendment.”). Likewise, Mr. Lynn has been advised on many
occasions that a § 1983 plaintiff does not have a cause of action under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242.
See, e.g., Lynn v. Roberts, 2008 WL 5411067, at n.3 (D. Kan. 2008) (“Neither 18 U.S.C. § 241 nor 18 U.S.C. § 242 constitutes a legal basis for plaintiff’s claims herein. Both Sections 241 and 242
provide criminal penalties for certain deprivations of civil rights, and neither gives rise to a private,
civil cause of action.”).
Mr. Lynn’s prior filings have subjected him to filing restrictions in this Court. See Lynn v.
Lundry, Case No. 20-3116-EFM, Doc. 29 (D. Kan. June 29, 2020). The order imposing filing

restrictions places restrictions on filing new actions and also provides that “[w]ith the exception of
a proper motion for relief from an order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60, the Clerk shall not accept or file
any pro se submissions, filings, pleadings, or other documents by Lynn or on his behalf, regardless
of the payment of a filing fee, without the express authorization of a judge of this Court.” Id. at 7.
Plaintiff appealed the order imposing filing restrictions, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal for failure to prosecute on November 18, 2020. See Lynn v. Lundry, 2020
WL 10618702 (10th Cir. Nov. 18, 2020), cert. denied 142 S. Ct. 355 (2021). In Lynn v. Roberts,
this Court held that:
Plaintiff's abusive litigation practices have not been limited to the
federal courts. A review of the electronic case management system
for the District of Kansas shows that this is one of 23 cases filed in
this district in which plaintiff has appeared as a party or otherwise
moved to intervene.[] Additionally, it appears that plaintiff has
pursued a number of cases in the state system, and has likewise
engaged in abusive litigation practices in that forum. See State ex
rel. Stovall v. Lynn, 26 Kan.App.2d 79, 79–80, 975 P.2d 813, 814 (1999). In fact, a review of the cases catalogued in Stovall suggests
that plaintiff sued a number of the same defendants in both the state
and federal system. Compare id. (identifying defendants in
plaintiff’s state cases) with supra note 3 (listing defendants in
plaintiff’s federal cases). In upholding filing restrictions placed on
plaintiff by the state district court, the Kansas Court of Appeals
found that plaintiff was “using the suits as a means to attempt to
harass the victim, witnesses, police investigators, judges, and others
involved in his case.” Stovall, 26 Kan.App.2d at 82, 975 P.2d at 815.
Similarly, in his appeal of the state case that led the court to question
its subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case (Doc. 116), the
Kansas Court of Appeals noted that “the record is replete with
Lynn’s unjustified and often outrageous accusations, obscenities,
profane language, and implied threats of bodily harm to judicial
officers.” Lynn v. Martin, 2003 WL 22990140, *2 (Kan. Ct. App.
Dec. 19, 2003).

Lynn v. Roberts, 2006 WL 2850273, at *4 (D. Kan. 2006) (footnote omitted).
Another court in this Circuit has issued “a permanent injunction prohibiting [an inmate]
from assisting other inmates or any other person with legal matters of any kind in [the] District
unless he graduates from a school of law and is licensed to practice law.” Unites States v. Melot, 2013 WL 11328451, at *4 (D. N.M. 2013). In another case, the court warned the pro se inmate
regarding filing restrictions and stated that:
Sharp is finally warned that as a pro se party, he is not permitted to
represent other detainees in their suits against the Court. As the
Tenth Circuit explained, “the competence of a layman is clearly too
limited to allow him to risk the rights of others.” Fymbo v. State
Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 213 F.3d 1320, 1321 (10th Cir. 2000)
(quotations omitted).

Sharp must stop filing complaints on behalf of other inmates. Sharp
is finally notified that if he continues to file frivolous complaints on
behalf of himself or others, the Court may modify the above
restrictions in the coming months to impose a blanket ban on his pro
se filings. The Court will issue separate notice with respect to any
heightened restrictions, but such warning is included in this ruling
to indicate where Sharp is headed, if he continues his abusive tactics.

Sharp v. New Mexico, 2021 WL 4150418, at *4 (D. N.M. 2021); see also id. at 2021 WL 4820736,
at *5 (“Sharp has also been warned that he cannot represent other detainees. If he continues to
draft complaints on behalf of other parties and/or violate this Order, the Court may assess a fine
for each violation and coordinate with the United States Marshall to collect that fine from his
inmate account.”) (citing United States v. Akers, 740 Fed. App’x 633, 635 (10th Cir. 2018)
(affirming $500 fine for each frivolous filing)); see also Joseph v. U.S. Public Defenders Office, 2021 WL 4691256, at *4 (D. N.M. 2021) (“If Joseph continues prosecuting actions for other
inmates, the Court may intervene on that issue. The Court may also impose a blanket filing
restriction on Joseph if he continues to file frivolous claims.”).
If Patrick Lynn continues to file pleadings for other inmates that include the same frivolous
and abusive filings that warranted his filing restrictions, the Court may find it necessary to clarify
that his filing restrictions apply to all pleadings he submits to this Court, including pleadings
drafted for other inmates. The Court will direct the Clerk to provide Patrick Lynn with a copy of
this Memorandum and Order to Show Cause.
The Court advises Plaintiff that he is responsible for the contents of the documents that he
signs. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court a
pleading, written notice, or other paper—whether by signing, filing,
submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented
party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such
as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost
of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing
new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after
a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the
evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on
belief or a lack of information.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Rule 11(c) provides for the imposition of sanctions based on Rule 11
violations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c).
2. Younger Abstention
The Court may be prohibited from hearing Plaintiff’s claims under Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 45 (1971). “The Younger doctrine requires a federal court to abstain from hearing a case
where . . . (1) state judicial proceedings are ongoing; (2) [that] implicate an important state interest;
and (3) the state proceedings offer an adequate opportunity to litigate federal constitutional issues.”
Buck v. Myers, 244 F. App’x 193, 197 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (citing Winnebago Tribe of
Neb. v. Stovall, 341 F.3d 1202, 1204 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v.
Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). “Once these three conditions are met,
Younger abstention is non-discretionary and, absent extraordinary circumstances, a district court
is required to abstain.” Buck, 244 F. App’x at 197 (citing Crown Point I, LLC v. Intermountain
Rural Elec. Ass’n, 319 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 2003)).
An online Kansas District Court Records Search shows that Plaintiff’s state criminal
proceedings are ongoing. See State v. Macias, Case No. MI-2024-CR-000147 (District Court of
Miami County, Kansas). On April 30, 2025, the state court entered a Sentencing Journal based on
Plaintiff’s guilty plea and sentenced Plaintiff to 123 months of incarceration with 36 months of
postrelease supervision. Id. On December 31, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion to withdraw guilty
plea. Id. The motion is drafted by Patrick Lynn, contains attacks on Plaintiff’s state court defense
counsel, and questions the judge’s impartiality. Id. Plaintiff—through Lynn—has filed multiple
motions, including a motion for disqualification of the entire District Attorney’s Office. Id. On
April 13, 2026, the state court entered an order continuing the status conference in the case to allow
new counsel to be appointed for Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff also filed a state habeas action on February 19, 2026. See Macias v. Haehl, Case
No. LV-2026-CV-000069 (District Court of Leavenworth County, Kansas). In fact, the petition
Plaintiff filed in that state case is attached to his Amended Complaint as factual support for his
claims in this case. The case remains pending with a hearing scheduled for April 16, 2026. Id. Therefore, it appears that the first and second conditions for Younger abstention would be
met because Kansas undoubtedly has an important interest in enforcing its criminal laws through
criminal proceedings in the state’s courts. In re Troff, 488 F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir. 2007)
(“[S]tate control over criminal justice [is] a lynchpin in the unique balance of interests” described
as “Our Federalism.”) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 44). Likewise, the third condition would be

met because Kansas courts provide Plaintiff with an adequate forum to litigate his constitutional
claims by way of pretrial proceedings, trial, and direct appeal after conviction and sentence, as
well as post-conviction remedies. See Capps v. Sullivan, 13 F.3d 350, 354 n.2 (10th Cir. 1993)
(“[F]ederal courts should abstain from the exercise of . . . jurisdiction if the issues raised . . . may
be resolved either by trial on the merits in the state court or by other [available] state procedures.”)
(quotation omitted); see Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1984) (state courts have obligation
‘to guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the constitution of the United
States . . . .’”); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1974) (pendant state proceeding, in all
but unusual cases, would provide federal plaintiff with necessary vehicle for vindicating
constitutional rights).
“[T]he Younger doctrine extends to federal claims for monetary relief when a judgment for
the plaintiff would have preclusive effects on a pending state-court proceeding.” D.L. v. Unified
Sch. Dist. No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Garza v. Burnett, 672 F.3d
1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007)); Myers v. Garff, 876 F.2d 79, 81 (10th Cir. 1989) (directing district court to stay claim for damages). Plaintiff
should show good cause why this Court should not abstain from hearing this case based on
Younger. Plaintiff should also indicate whether or not he is seeking a stay of this case pending
resolution of his state court proceedings.
3. Motion for Orders
Plaintiff has filed a motion asking the Court to order the Defendants to provide his six-
month account statement to support his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis or to extend
Plaintiff’s deadline to provide the account statement. (Doc. 6.) The Court is aware of the delays
in obtaining an account statement following the KDOC’s implementation of a new system.

Because the Court is granting Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the motion
is denied as moot.
IV. Response Required
Plaintiff is required to show good cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed for the
reasons stated herein. Plaintiff should also indicate if he is seeking a stay of this case pending
resolution of his state court proceedings. Failure to respond by the deadline may result in dismissal
of this matter without further notice.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma
Pauperis (Doc. 2) is granted. Notwithstanding this grant of leave, Plaintiff is required to pay the
full amount of the filing fee and is hereby assessed $350.00. Plaintiff is required to make monthly
payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account. The
agency having custody of Plaintiff shall forward payments from the prisoner’s account to the Clerk
of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00 until the filing fees are paid. 28
U.S.C. § 1915 (b)(2). The Clerk is to transmit a copy of this order to Plaintiff, to the finance office

at the institution where Plaintiff is currently confined, and to the Court’s finance office.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Orders (Doc. 6) is denied as
moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted until May 14, 2026, in which to
show good cause, in writing to the undersigned, why Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint should not
be dismissed or stayed for the reasons stated herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to provide Patrick Lynn with a
copy of this Memorandum and Order to Show Cause.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated April 14, 2026, in Kansas City, Kansas.
S/ John W. Lungstrum
JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE