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March 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Van-Royen

Court of Appeals of Kansas

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 128853

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 128,853

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,

v.

WYATT VERN VAN-ROYEN,
Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; ANDREA PURVIS, judge. Submitted without oral argument.
Opinion filed March 20, 2026. Vacated and remanded with directions.

Peter Maharry, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Julie A. Koon, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach,
attorney general, for appellee.

Before PICKERING, P.J., CLINE, J., and CAREY L. HIPP, District Judge, assigned.

PER CURIAM: Wyatt Vern Van-Royen appeals his sentence for attempted robbery
and criminal threat, challenging only the imposition of certain costs and fees in the
journal entry that the district court did not articulate and approve on the record at his
sentencing. The State concedes the error; thus, we vacate and remand with directions.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The underlying facts of Van-Royen's convictions are immaterial to this appeal
given Van-Royen only appeals the imposition of certain fees and costs. The only salient
facts concern what the district court said at sentencing and what later appeared in the
journal entry.

At sentencing, the district court stated:

"I will impose the ordinary costs and fees in this case, as well as a $100 BIDS
administration fee. Attorney's fees will be waived as the defendant will be in custody for
the near future.
"I will impose extradition costs of $2,904.85. In my mind, those go with the
ordinary costs and fees in this case, but those will be imposed as well."

The district court made no mention of witness fees or bond forfeiture alias warrant
(BFAW) fees. Yet the journal entry imposed the following: court costs ($195), DNA
database fee ($200), extradition costs ($2,904.85), BIDS application fee ($100),
booking/fingerprint fee ($33), witness fees ($10), and BFAW fees ($96.50).

ANALYSIS

Preservation

Van-Royen did not object to the witness fees or the BFAW fees at sentencing;
however, he had no opportunity to do so. At sentencing, the district court approved only
"ordinary costs and fees," and the witness and BFAW fees appeared only in the journal
entry. "Failing to object does not prejudice a party who had no opportunity to do so when
the ruling or order was made." K.S.A. 60-246; State v. Gonzalez, 307 Kan. 575, 591, 412
P.3d 968 (2018).
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Standard of Review

K.S.A. 28-172a(d) authorizes when a district court may impose fees. Statutory
interpretation is a question of law over which appellate courts have unlimited review.
State v. Daniels, 319 Kan. 340, 342, 554 P.3d 629 (2024). We review the extent to which
the district court has discretion to award court costs and expenses for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Lopez, 36 Kan. App. 2d 723, 726-27, 143 P.3d 695 (2006). A judicial
action constitutes an abuse of discretion if (1) it is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2)
it is based on an error of law; or (3) it is based on an error of fact. State v. Younger, 320
Kan. 98, 137-38, 564 P.3d 744 (2025).

Upon criminal conviction, court costs "shall be taxed against the defendant."
K.S.A. 22-3801(a). K.S.A. 28-172a sets out the fees that may be assessed in criminal
proceedings. Subsection (d) provides: "All other fees and expenses to be assessed as
additional court costs shall be approved by the court, unless specifically fixed by statute."
K.S.A. 28-172a(d).

The Kansas Supreme Court has previously interpreted this statutory provision to
hold that "docket fees and other costs that are specifically fixed by statute must be taxed
against the defendant, but that other fees to be assessed as court costs need to be
approved by the district court before they are taxed." State v. Alvarez, 309 Kan. 203, 208,
432 P.3d 1015 (2019). Put another way, although docket fees and other costs specifically
fixed by statute are mandatory, other fees and costs may be assessed at the district court's
discretion only so long as the district court first finds that those costs bear a reasonable
relation to the defendant's prosecution. 309 Kan. at 208.

Here, the district court imposed "ordinary costs and fees" at sentencing, with no
mention of witness fees or BFAW fees. Those fees appeared only in the journal entry.
The State concedes that K.S.A. 22-3801(a) and K.S.A. 28-172a control and the district

3
court did not make proper findings that would allow it to impose these fees. We therefore
vacate the witness and BFAW fees and remand with instructions for the district court to
make on-record findings regarding whether these fees bear a reasonable relation to the
prosecution before imposing them.

Vacated and remanded with directions.

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