Julie Lawson v. PennyMac Loan Services, Inc.

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April 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Julie Lawson v. PennyMac Loan Services, Inc.

District Court, M.D. Tennessee

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 3:21-cv-00197

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

JULIE LAWSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
) Case No. 3:21-cv-00197
PENNYMAC LOAN SERVICES, INC., ) Judge Aleta A. Trauger
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM
The court has entered an Order (Doc. No. 227) setting aside the Judgment (Doc. No. 215)
and vacating its prior Orders (Doc. Nos. 214, 217) accepting the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”), granting the defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and
declining to consider the plaintiff’s untimely Objection to the R&R.
Accordingly, the court will now consider on its merits the plaintiff’s Objection (Doc. No.
216) to the R&R (Doc. No. 213), despite its technically being untimely. For the reasons set forth
herein, the objections (set forth in the document titled Objection) will be overruled, the R&R will
be accepted, and the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 165) will be granted. This case will
be dismissed and a new judgment will enter, restarting the time for the plaintiff to appeal.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
After being served with a report and recommendation as to a dispositive matter, any “party
may serve and file specific written objections to [a magistrate judge’s] proposed findings and
recommendations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The district court must review de novo any portion
of the report and recommendation “that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
In conducting its review, the district court “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended
disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.” Id.
However, the district court is not required to review—under a de novo or any other
standard—those aspects of the report and recommendation to which no objection is made. Thomas

v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). The district court should adopt the magistrate judge’s findings
and rulings to which no specific objection is filed. Id. at 151. “The filing of vague, general, or
conclusory objections does not meet the requirement of specific objections and is tantamount to a
complete failure to object.” Cole v. Yukins, 7 F. App’x 354, 356 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Langley
v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 502 F.3d 475, 483 (6th Cir. 2007) (issues raised in a “perfunctory
manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation,” are waived (quoting Indeck
Energy Servs., Inc. v. Consumers Energy Co., 250 F.3d 972, 979 (6th Cir. 2000))). Likewise, “[a]
general objection to the entirety” of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation has the same
effect as a complete failure to object. Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505,
509 (6th Cir. 1991). Finally, arguments made in an objection to a magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation that were not first presented to the magistrate judge for consideration are deemed
waived. Murr v. United States, 200 F.3d 895, 902 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000).
Although pro se pleadings and filings are held to less stringent standards than those drafted
by lawyers, see, e.g., Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011), pro se litigants are not
entirely exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Wells v.
Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
II. BACKGROUND
As the R&R succinctly summarized it, this case
concerns a dispute between Ms. Lawson and her mortgage provider over how
proceeds from her home insurance policy were to be applied after a fire destroyed
Ms. Lawson’s home. Ms. Lawson believes that one of her mortgage providers,
Pennymac, breached the deed of trust between the two parties because Pennymac
failed to apply those insurance proceeds to the principal sums owed on Ms.
Lawson’s mortgage and instead allowed Ms. Lawson to use the proceeds to rebuild
her home.
(Doc. No. 213 at 1–2.)
After the plaintiff initiated this lawsuit in state court, Pennymac removed it to this court on
March 10, 2021 on diversity grounds. (Doc. No. 1.) Following various amendments to the
Complaint, the dismissal of certain claims, and the agreed dismissal of former defendant SWBC
Mortgage Corp. (from which Pennymac took over servicing the plaintiff’s loan in November
2018), the only remaining claim is a breach of contract claim against Pennymac. The claim is based
on the plaintiff’s contention that Pennymac breached the Deed of Trust by failing to apply the
insurance proceeds to the mortgage principal, because it was not “economically feasible” to rebuild
or restore her home (the “Property”) after it burned, as required by the Deed of Trust. (See Doc.
No. 61-1, Deed of Trust ¶ 5.)
Pennymac seeks summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that the undisputed facts
establish that repair and restoration of the plaintiff’s Property was “economically feasible.” The
defendant’s motion (Doc. No. 165) was supported by a Memorandum of Law (Doc. No. 166),
Statement of Material Facts (“SMF”) (Doc. No. 167), and a substantial quantity of evidentiary
material. The plaintiff responded by filing (1) a Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. No. 208); (2) a Response to the defendant’s SMF, her own Declaration, and numerous
exhibits (Doc. Nos. 203, 203-1 to 203-33); and (3) an Amended Response to the SMF (Doc. No.

207), Amended Declaration (Doc. No. 207-1), “First amended continued responses to Pennymac
statement at document 167” (“Continued Responses”) (Doc. No. 207-2), and additional exhibits
(Doc. No. 207-3). The first part of the plaintiff’s Amended Response to the SMF consists of lists
of the “evidence,” pages of “definitions,” “Formal Requests” asking the court to (among other
things) “accept [her] amended declaration as support of this statement and as support of the
evidence referenced in this statement” and to “accept each document referenced in this statement
as support of the fact where it is referenced,” and thirty pages of argument. (See generally Doc.
No. 207 at 1–39.) At page 40, she appends a copy of the defendant’s SMF, on which the plaintiff

wrote, after every fact, “See amended ev. B,” referring to her Continued Responses (Doc. No. 207-
2). (See Doc. No. 207 at 40–53.) Her Continued Responses address each factual statement in the
SMF with greater particularity, stating in response to each, “I cannot agree with this statement,”
“I cannot fully agree,” or “I object”1—even to innocuous and obviously undisputed facts, such as
the date the plaintiff obtained the mortgage loan at issue, the fact that she executed a Promissory
Note and Deed of Trust in connection with the loan, and the fact that the loan was secured by the
Property as collateral. (See generally Doc. No. 207-2.) The plaintiff even disagrees with obviously
undisputed facts that Pennymac supports by citing the plaintiff’s deposition testimony.
For example, in response to Pennymac’s SMF No. 8 (“On November 29, 2017, a fire
occurred at the Property.”), which is supported by a citation to the plaintiff’s deposition testimony

(Doc. No. 168-1, Lawson Dep. 27 (“[T]he fire was November 29, 2017.”)), the plaintiff states: “I
object to Pennymac only supporting this statement with the bad deposition I objected to in its
entirety (described in my response to Pennymac statement 2). To create movement in this civil

1 The plaintiff’s Response and Continued Responses do not comply with Local Rule 56.01,
which requires that a response to a statement of facts “must contain individually numbered,
concise, non-argumentative responses corresponding to each of the movant’s numbered
undisputed material facts,” and each numbered response “must start with ‘Undisputed,’
‘Undisputed for Summary Judgment Purposes Only,’ or ‘Disputed.’” L.R. 56.01(e)(1)–(2). In
addition, for each disputed fact, the respondent must provide “evidentiary citations supporting the
respondent’s position” that are “limited to evidence specific to that particular fact.” L.R.
56.01(e)(3). Legal argument is to be made only in the separate memorandum responding to the
motion for summary judgment, not in the response to the statement of facts. L.R. 56.01(e)(5).
Regardless, the Magistrate Judge construed the plaintiff’s Continued Responses as affirming that
she disputed every factual statement in the defendant’s SMF.
case, I believe I have already provided Pennymac with proper evidence it could use, such as the
fire report.” (Doc. No. 207-2, Resp. SMF No. 8 (citing, in a footnote, Doc. No. 203.8, page 34 to
46).)
In fact, many of the defendant’s factual statements are supported by a citation to the

plaintiff’s deposition or to the Affidavit of Johnny Morton (Doc. No. 167-1), and the plaintiff
objects on the basis that these are a “bad affidavit” and a “bad deposition.” (Doc. No. 207-2,
passim.) She contends that the Morton Affidavit is “improper” because it “contains irrelevant
statements,” conflicts with other evidence in the record (that she does not cite), “misstates events,”
lacks a proper foundation, and constitutes hearsay. (Doc. No. 207-2 ¶ 1.) She objects to her
deposition as “bad” because, as set forth in her own Declaration, it was “taken by a journalist not
licensed to transcribe the deposition” and lasted longer than was permissible. (Id. ¶ 2 (citing
generally Doc. No. 207-1, Lawson Am. Decl.).)
In sum, the plaintiff purports to disagree at least in part, as a matter of principle, with every
one of Pennymac’s 91 statements of fact. The Magistrate Judge found that, although the Continued

Responses contain lengthy responses to each statement of fact, the plaintiff failed to adequately
dispute any material fact and failed to provide precise citations to the evidence in the record that
supports her disputes, as required by Local Rule 56.01(e). Regarding the “bad” deposition and
affidavit, the R&R noted that, in support of her assertions, the plaintiff cited very generally to her
33-page Declaration without specifying a page or paragraph number. While this failure alone was
“enough to end the court’s review and to find no merit to the contention that the deposition was
‘bad,’” the Magistrate Judge nonetheless reviewed the Declaration, which, as the R&R notes,
led to a document containing unidentified snippets of online articles or posts
concerning the court reporter (Docket No. 203-26). This confusing trail of
documents and seemingly irrelevant materials does not demonstrate that Ms.
Lawson’s deposition was improper or “bad” for any reason. The same is true for
Ms. Lawson’s legal arguments that the affidavit of Pennymac’s business records is
“improper” or that the “best evidence rule” is contradicted, among others. She
provides no legal support for these arguments.
(Doc. No. 213 at 9.) The Magistrate Judge concluded that Lawson did not properly or adequately
dispute any of Pennymac’s statements of fact. Accordingly, she concluded that, “to the extent that
the statements of fact asserted in Pennymac’s [SMF] are supported by the record, the court is
permitted to rely upon those statements of fact as undisputed.” (Id.)
The R&R’s recommendation that summary judgment be granted in favor of Pennymac
turned on whether the record established, as a matter of law and undisputed fact, that it was
economically feasible to repair or restore the Property when Pennymac took over the loan on
November 2, 2018. The Magistrate Judge found that the term “economically feasible,” as used in
the Deed of Trust, was not ambiguous,2 that the terms means “economically reasonable” or
“economically practicable” (rather than merely “economically possible”), and that the “undisputed
record shows that Ms. Lawson had or could have had access to an adequate amount of funds to
cover the estimated cost to rebuild her home such that repair or restoration of her property was
economically reasonable or practicable.” (Doc. No. 213 at 13, 16.) In addition, the Magistrate

Judge found that the “undisputed record shows that Ms. Lawson intended to rebuild with the
insurance proceeds she received and that she believed that she would receive additional [insurance]
proceeds. The record also shows that she acted accordingly with respect to her rebuild.” (Id. at 16–
17 (citing documents in the record supporting these conclusions).) Finally, the R&R determined
that the “undisputed record” shows that “Pennymac provided funds to Ms. Lawson for her
rebuild.” (Id. at 17 (citing documents in the record).) As a result of these factual findings, the
Magistrate Judge determined that, “as of November 2, 2018 when Pennymac took over the loan

2 Neither party argued that it was ambiguous.
from the original lender, both Ms. Lawson and Pennymac believed that it was economically
feasible to repair or restore Ms. Lawson’s property and that it was, indeed, economically feasible
to do so.” (Id. at 17.)
The R&R acknowledges the plaintiff’s attempts to address the issue of economic feasibility

and found that her response documents do not “point out the existence of genuine issues of material
fact, address the merits of her legal claims, or set forth any legal arguments, let alone any legal
arguments that are responsive to Defendant’s summary judgment motion. Instead, Ms. Lawson
presumably expects the court to piece her argument together based on” the additional documents
to which she cited, including “her 55-page response to Pennymac’s [SMF]; her 33-page
declaration; and her 33-page ‘continued’ response to Pennymac’s [SMF].” (Id. at 18 (citing Doc.
No. 208 at 5 (citing Doc. Nos. 207, 207-1, 207-2)).)
The Magistrate Judge nonetheless noted that she had “combed through” the plaintiff’s
Response to Pennymac’s SMF and had found “references to economic feasibility within several
footnotes” in which the plaintiff pointed to documents that she believed supported her position that

rebuild was not economically feasible. The R&R considered these documents and concluded that,
although they document the plaintiff’s informing Pennymac about “financial troubles,” the same
documents also show that Lawson continuously sought Pennymac’s approval of rebuild plans and
design elements, showing that she intended to rebuild. (Id. at 19.) More critically, these documents
all post-dated November 2, 2018—the date by which the plaintiff contends that Pennymac should
have known it was not economically feasible to repair or restore her Property. (See id. (citing
Fourth Am. Compl. Doc. No. 97 ¶¶ 41 (“[Pennymac] knew or should have known by 11.02.2018
that the amount of the Proceeds would not cover the Rebuild.”), 162(d) (“Defendant’s
nonperformance occurred . . . no later than its constructive knowledge of economic infeasibility
(11.02.2018).”)).)
In sum, finding that Pennymac’s motion was well supported and that the plaintiff’s
response documents failed to establish the existence of a material factual dispute as to her breach

of contract claim, the Magistrate Judge recommended that Pennymac’s Motion for Summary
Judgment be granted.3
III. THE PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS
First Objection
The plaintiff objects to the R&R’s “suggestion” that she did not demonstrate “genuine
factual disputes” that would allow a jury to find in her favor. (Doc. No. 216 at 1.) In support of
this first objection, she asserts that “genuine factual disputes and evidence to support it for [her]
active claim of Defendant’s first breach of contract, including resulting damages,” can be found
on “on pages 10–27 of document number 207,” specifically “facts 1–50 and supporting evidence
at annotations 28–128.” (Doc. No. 216 at 2.) Similarly, the evidence supporting her “active
claim[s]” regarding the defendant’s second, third, and fourth breaches of contract can be found on

pages 28–34 and 34–38 of document number 207, facts 51–54 and 55–58, annotations 129–89 and
190–218. (Id.) In other words, without specifically identifying which facts she refutes, she refers
the court to the entirety of her Amended Response to the SMF (which also incorporates by
reference her Continued Responses (Doc. No. 207-2)).

3 The R&R does not reach alternative arguments raised by Pennymac, including that
Lawson abandoned the specific breach of contract claim included in the operative pleading and
that she should be equitably estopped by her own statements and conduct from claiming that repair
or restoration was not “economically feasible,” or its arguments regarding some of the plaintiff’s
damages claims. (See Doc. No.166 at 14–22; Doc. No. 213 at 20 n.9.)
This objection will be overruled in its entirety, as it amounts to a blanket objection to the
entirety of the R&R, without pointing specifically to disputed facts or showing that the Magistrate
Judge erred in finding them undisputed.
Second Objection

The plaintiff contends that Pennymac “did not successfully meet its burden of showing the
absence of genuine factual disputes” and that the R&R erred in finding that it did. (Doc. No. 216
at 3.) But she affirms that the R&R correctly concluded that she “dispute[s] all facts in Pennymac’s
statement of material facts.” (Id.) This objection, too, will be overruled, for the same reasons. It is
insufficiently specific to warrant consideration.
Third Objection
Third, Lawson objects to the R&R on the basis that, she claims, she provided citations to
the evidence that supports her disputes with the defendant’s fact statements, in accordance with
Local Rule 56.01(e). In support of this objection, she includes a “few examples” of the evidence
she mustered to support her position. She cites to “basic papers,” including Doc. Nos. 203-6, 203-

7, 203-8, 203-10, and 203-23. (Doc. No. 216 at 4.) She claims that the first of these documents
shows “Southwest [former defendant SWBC Mortgage Corp.] did not report the loss payout to the
IRS.” (Doc. No. 216 at 4.) The other documents are her loan application, the insurance policy, her
“first written notice to Pennymac of [her] steadfast desire to rebuild,” and a document showing she
“likely could have gotten a construction loan.” (Id.) She cites other documents in the record that
supposedly show that “rebuild was not possible” with several banks, bids she gave Pennymac in
December 2018 and March 2019, “journal entries” and “audio recordings” showing “breaches of
contract” and that several banks “knew [she] had no money for a rebuild.” (Id.) She cites to
documents that she characterizes as showing Pennymac’s “mishandling of the loss payout,”
memorializing the “forced sale of the property,” and additional “evidence of breaches of contract”
and putting Pennymac on “notice of bad behavior.” (Id. at 5.)
This objection will be overruled. Again, Lawson has not pointed to any specific fact that
she contends is both disputed and material to the question of whether repair or restoration was

feasible as of the date she first informed Pennymac that she desired to rebuild. The objection again
amounts to a very general objection that the R&R was incorrect. It is insufficiently specific and
therefore “tantamount to a complete failure to object.” Cole, 7 F. App’x at 356.
Fourth Objection
Lawson generally objects that the R&R fails to consider “all documents [she] provided in
2025.” This includes essentially all of the documents she filed in response to the Motion for
Summary Judgment. (Doc. Nos. 207, 207-1, 207-2, 207-3, 208, 203-1 through -33, 204 (thumb
drive of audio recordings), 209 and 210 (Motion to Correct Clerical Errors and supporting
Memorandum).) She contends that, through these documents, she “showed [the court] each bank’s
failure to perform under paragraphs 2 and 5 of the deed of trust and resulting damages from that

nonperformance, which is covered primarily by documents 203 through 210.” (Doc. No. 216 at 6.)
This general objection to the entirety of the R&R is, again, not sufficiently specific to
qualify as a “proper” objection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), which, as set forth
above, requires that the plaintiff lodge “specific written objections to the proposed findings and
recommendations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Moreover, to the extent the Magistrate Judge declined
to review all of the plaintiff’s exhibits, it was because she failed to provide pin cites, explain what
her exhibits show, or explain what portion of the defendant’s fact statements were truly disputed.
Fifth Objection
The plaintiff objects to “errors and omissions” in the R&R, each of which is listed in
seventeen numbered paragraphs.(Doc. No. 216 at 8–12.) For example, the plaintiff states that
paragraphs 37–42 of her Amended Response to the SMF (Doc. No. 207) show that neither SWBC

nor Pennymac “applied the insurance proceeds to the principal sums owed on my loan when it was
economically infeasible to rebuild.” (Doc. No. 216 at 8.) These referenced paragraphs state:
37. Southwest, and then Pennymac, failed to take responsibility despite the clearly
worded bank responsibility (described in section 5 of the agreement and at
paragraphs 11 to 13 above)
38. These banks failed to use the loss payout to pay down the loan when a rebuild
was not economically [sic] feasible.
39. These banks failed to use the loss payout to pay down the loan when a rebuild
would have harmed bank security in the agreement.
40. Pennymac willfully failed to take responsibility for its obligations as set forth
in section 5 of the agreement.
41. I began to understand this Pennymac failure on 12.11.19 and demanded a
remedy the same day.
42. Despite the Pennymac failure and my requests for it to make good on its word,
Pennymac refused to do what it agreed to do.
(Doc. No. 207 at 21–22 (footnoted citations omitted).)
The documents the plaintiff cites in support of each of these statements primarily
substantiate the undisputed fact that Pennymac did not comply with the plaintiff’s demand that it
retroactively apply the insurance proceeds to the mortgage loan.4 Otherwise they consist of the

4 As the Magistrate Judge noted, Lawson appears to believe that the Deed of Trust required
Pennymac to retroactively apply the insurance proceeds to the Loan on the date when repair or
restoration became no longer economically feasible (that is, as of the date she received the
insurance check in December 2017 (see Doc. No. 168-33 at 2, Lawson Dep. Ex. 32 (Dec. 11, 2019
letter from Lawson to Pennymac, demanding that the defendant “[a]pply the restricted escrow
balance of $210,132.02 toward [her] loan balance retroactively to December 2017”)), rather than
as of the date the parties recognized that it was no longer economically feasible. (See R&R at 19
loan documents and the 2018 mortgage interest statements. Aside from the problem that the
plaintiff’s citations send the court on a wild goose chase to track down the various documents, the
cited documents do not actually establish the existence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact,
and they do not support the plaintiff’s contention of economic infeasibility.

The other cited “errors” are similarly either not material or not supported by the cited
documents. For example, the plaintiff claims that there is a dispute as to whether the initial loan
amount was for $236,378 or $240,562. (Doc. No. 216 at 8 (citing Doc. No. 207 at 28 (citing Doc.
No. 203-33 at 6, 8, 30)).) Aside from the fact that the documents to which she points do not
establish that the loan amount was for $236,378 instead of $240,562 (see, e.g., Doc. No. 203-33 at
8 (amortization schedule showing loan amount of $240,562 00), that purported dispute is simply
not material to the economic feasibility question. Likewise, the plaintiff disputes the R&R’s
statement that she “eventually decided to stop pursuing a rebuild of her home and to sell her
property” (Doc. No. 213 at 4 (citing Doc. No. 97 ¶ 101; Doc. No. 168-1, Lawson Dep. 207–08)),
asserting that she did not “choose” to sell her Property—rather, she was “obstructed from

rebuilding . . . and run off my property under threat of a manufactured foreclosure.” (Doc. No. 216
at 9.) But whether she “chose” to sell or felt “obstructed” is not really material; the material fact is
that she ceased trying to rebuild and put her house on the market in the summer of 2019. And the
documents cited in the R&R support that fact. (See Lawson Dep. 207–08 (agreeing that she had
stopped trying to rebuild and had “[d]efinitely” decided to sell by July 4, 2019); Doc. No. 97 ¶ 101
(“Rebuilding was blatantly out of Lawson’s reach at this point and [Pennymac] was claiming the

n.8.) But Lawson does not point to any provision of the Deed of Trust supporting such retroactive
application.
Loan was in default, forcing Lawson to put the Property on the market, which she did on
06.07.2019”).)
Under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure governing motions for summary judgment, a
court must “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
By its terms, Rule 56 anticipates “that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between
the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986) (emphasis in original). In other words, even if genuine, a factual
dispute that is irrelevant or unnecessary under applicable law is of no value in defeating a motion
for summary judgment. On the other hand, “summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a
material fact is ‘genuine.’” Id. at 248. A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the
lawsuit under the governing law.” O’Donnell v. City of Cleveland, 838 F.3d 718, 725 (6th Cir.
2016) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). A dispute is “genuine” “if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Peeples v. City of Detroit, 891
F.3d 622, 630 (6th Cir. 2018). Under Rule 56, “[a] party asserting that a fact . . . is genuinely
disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
In this case, the plaintiff does not take issue with the defendant’s and the Magistrate Judge’s
characterization of the dispositive issue as whether Pennymac knew or should have known as of
December 2018 that the plaintiff’s quest to rebuild her home was not “economically feasible.” She
does not object to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion, as a legal matter, regarding the appropriate
definition of “economically feasible.”
14

Instead, she engages in a wholesale objection to every fact set forth in Pennymac’s SMF,
irrespective of whether the fact is actually disputed. This tactic—equivalent to the proverbial
“crying wolf’—did the plaintiff no favors. Although she has, indeed, inundated the court with
filings, her response documents do not actually articulate what parts of the defendant’s factual
statements she believes are untrue or disputed, and her citations to the record do not show that they
are untrue or disputed. Nor, as relevant here, does her Objection state with specificity what factual
findings the Magistrate Judge reached to which she objects and that are material to the
“economically feasible” issue.
The plaintiff's Fifth Objection, like the others, will be overruled, as it fails to establish the
existence of a material factual dispute or that the R&R erred in concluding that the plaintiff failed
to show that genuine issues of material fact exist on her breach of contract claim that would warrant
permitting that claim to proceed to trial.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the objections set forth in the plaintiff’s Objection (Doc.
No. 216) will be overruled. The court will accept and adopt in its entirety the thoughtful and
thorough R&R (Doc. No. 213), and defendant Pennymac’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
No. 165) will be granted. This case will be dismissed with prejudice.
An appropriate Order is filed herewith.
Mhtith ag —_
United States District Judge