Jean Lorraine Richardson Bankruptcy Reopened, Fraud Allegations

Jump To

Top Caption Trial Court Document The text of this document was obtained by analyzing a scanned document and may have typos.

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

April 21, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re: Jean Lorraine Richardson

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Hawaii

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 15-01389

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (7.8K)

• PDF

Trial Court Document

Date Signed:
April 20, 2026 é □ , SO ORDERED.

ety Robert J. Faris
ier OF ge United States Bankruptcy Judge

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

DISTRICT OF HAWAII

In re: Case No.: 15-01389
Chapter 7
JEAN LORRAINE RICHARDSON,

Debtor. Related: ECF 81

ORDER GRANTING DEBTOR’S MOTION TO REOPEN AND
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY RELIEF SHOULD NOT BE DENIED
Debtor Jean Richardson moves to reopen her chapter 7 case to pursue
allegations of fraud and to seek relief from prior orders. For the reasons set

forth below, the Motion to Reopen is GRANTED and Ms. Richardson is

ORDERED to show cause why all other requested relief should not be

denied.

I. Background

Sometime before 2008, Ms. Richardson and Darius A. Richardson,
M.D., began divorce proceedings in the Guam superior court.1 In 2012, the

Guam court entered a judgment in favor of Ms. Richardson and against Dr.
Richardson for $50,172.78.

Ms. Richardson filed a chapter 7 petition on November 16, 2015.
Among her scheduled assets were a "spousal support judgment based on a

November 10, 2008 Superior Court of Guam Judgment of Arrears" valued
at $26,821.52, and a "community property interest in her ex-husband, Dr.

Darius Richardson's medical practice" valued at $23,905.48.2 She also
scheduled a disputed, priority unsecured domestic support obligation in

favor of Dr. Richardson in the amount of $96,113.88.3
On February 22, 2016, Dr. Richardson commenced an adversary

proceeding seeking a determination that Ms. Richardson’s domestic

1 Darius A. Richardson, M.D., v. Jean Lorraine Richardson, Domestic Case No. DM 361-01 (Guam Super. Ct.).
2 ECF 3 at 10. These amounts add up to approximately the amount of the 2012 Guam judgment.
Fortunately, I need not determine the exact outcome of the Guam case.
3 ECF 3 at 16.
support obligations to him were nondischargeable.4 Ms. Richardson filed a

motion to dismiss the complaint, and Dr. Richardson filed a motion for
judgment on the pleadings.5 I ruled that Ms. Richardson’s debt to Dr.

Richardson for child support and spousal support was not dischargeable in
bankruptcy and that the Guam court should decide the amount of that

debt.6 I dismissed all other claims in the adversary proceeding. The court
entered final judgment on July 15, 2016.7 No one appealed.

In the meantime, the chapter 7 trustee negotiated a settlement
agreement with Dr. Richardson.8 The settlement resolved the estate’s

claims based on the 2012 Guam judgment but did “not affect the child
support or domestic support obligations” of either Ms. Richardson or Dr.

Richardson.9 The agreement required Dr. Richardson to pay $30,000.00 to
Ms. Richardson’s bankruptcy estate. I overruled Ms. Richardson’s

objections to the settlement and entered an order approving it on August

4 Adv. Pro. No. 16-90012.
5 Adv. ECF 8, 19.
6 Adv. ECF 25.
7 Adv. ECF 28.
8 A trustee may settle claims of the estate with court approval under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019.
9 ECF 36 at 3.
10, 2016.10 I also denied Ms. Richardson’s motion for clarification.11 Ms.

Richardson did not appeal.
Also in the meantime, on February 23, 2016, Ms. Richardson received

her discharge in bankruptcy.12 Her case was closed on February 18, 2022.13
Ms. Richardson filed the present Motion to Reopen (“Motion”) on

March 30, 2026, more than four years after closure and ten years after
discharge. The Motion is lengthy and disorganized, but it appears to assert

fraud both in this court and in the Superior Court of Guam.
II. Discussion

a. Motion to Reopen
A case may be reopened under 11 U.S.C. § 350 (b) on motion of the

debtor or party in interest “to administer assets, to accord relief to the
debtor, or for other cause.”14

The decision to reopen is discretionary.15 The Ninth Circuit has held

10 ECF 36.
11 ECF 39.
12 ECF 14.
13 ECF 60.
14 11 U.S.C. § 350 (b); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 5010.
15 Staffer v. Predovich (In re Staffer), 306 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the denial of a motion to
reopen a bankruptcy case is reviewed for abuse of discretion).
that a bankruptcy court may deny reopening when doing so would be

futile.16 But reopening does not require examination of the underlying relief
sought, and a court may reopen a case without resolving the merits of the

debtor’s allegations.17
Considering Ms. Richardson’s pro se status, I will grant her request

to reopen her case and will separately evaluate the merits of her underlying
claims.

b. Order to Show Cause
Ms. Richardson has been in litigation with her ex-husband for at least

eighteen years. She has asserted, or at least could have asserted, all of her
contentions many years ago. Many of her contentions appear, on their face,

to be time-barred or beyond the jurisdiction of this court. Her assertion of a

16 See Beezley v. Cal. Land Title Co. (In re Beezley), 994 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the court did
not abuse its discretion in denying reopening because reopening would not have affected the
dischargeability of the debt); Lopez v. Specialty Rests. Corp (In re Lopez), 283 B.R. 22, 27 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002)
(finding that a court is not required to reopen a case when the chance of recovery is remote); see also Smidt
v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC (In re Smidt), No. BAP CC-24-1071-FGL, 2025 WL 863113, at *3 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
Mar. 19, 2025) (“If Congress intended to require reopening on request in any and all circumstances, it
would have used a verb like ‘shall’ rather than ‘may’”).
17 See Menk v. Lapaglia (In re Menk), 241 B.R. 896, 916 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999) (holding that when a court is
presented only with a motion to reopen, merits issues should be left to the underlying litigation); see also
Staffer, 306 F.3d at 972 (affirming that a motion to reopen is a narrow procedural inquiry and that merits
issues must be left to the underlying litigation).
wide-ranging conspiracy to defraud among the bankruptcy trustee, her ex-

husband, their attorneys, and the courts of Guam is not inherently
plausible.

Section 105(d)(2) authorizes the court to issue orders on its own
motion to ensure that a case is handled expeditiously and economically.18

In order to spare her adversaries the burden of responding to claims that
probably lack merit, I will order her to show cause in writing, within 30

days from entry of this order, why this court should not deny all other
relief requested in her Motion. Her response must address the issues

below.
i. Timeliness under Rule 60(b)(3)

To the extent that Ms. Richardson seeks relief based on fraud,
misrepresentation, or misconduct, she must explain why such relief is not

barred by the one-year limitation in Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), made
applicable by Fed. R. Bankr. 9024. Rule 60(b)(3) requires that motions based

on fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct be filed “within a reasonable

18 11 U.S.C. § 105 (d)(2).
time” not to exceed “more than a year after the entry of the judgment or

order”19
The response must identify the specific order from which she seeks

relief, the date of that order, and the bases on which she contends the one-
year limitation does not apply.

ii. Authority to set aside judgments of the Superior Court
of Guam

Ms. Richardson also asserts that certain conduct constituted fraud
on the Superior Court of Guam.
Ms. Richardson must explain why this bankruptcy court has

authority to set aside or disturb orders entered by the Superior Court of
Guam, and even if such authority exists, why the bankruptcy court should

not defer to the Guam court. The response must cite legal authority
supporting the position.

iii. Fraud on the Court
Ms. Richardson alleges that there was fraud on this court and on the

19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).
Superior Court of Guam, asserting that various parties engaged in a

“scheme to defy Guam law . . . and the Bankruptcy Code . . . by making
false claims of material fact.”20 The Motion does not identify any

misrepresentation made to that court, nor does it explain how the court
was misled. Rule 60(d)(3) preserves the court’s power to set aside a

judgment for “fraud on the court.” The Ninth Circuit has held that fraud
on the court requires clear and convincing evidence of “an effort by the

government to prevent the judicial process from functioning in the usual
manner.”21 The Hawaii Supreme Court has similarly emphasized that only

the most egregious misconduct can meet the high threshold for a finding of
fraud on the court, and that even assuming the allegations are true, the

moving party must show acts that are “egregious, legally and factually
deficient, inaccurate and incomplete, materially false and misleading.”22

Ms. Richardson must therefore identify the specific acts and conduct

20 ECF 81 at 17.
21 United States v. Est. of Stonehill, 660 F.3d 415, 445 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the relevant inquiry of
fraud on the court is “not whether fraudulent conduct prejudiced the opposing party, but whether it
harmed the integrity of the judicial process”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
22 Greenspon v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 158 Hawai`i 39, 50, 583 P.3d 812, 823 (2026). The Hawaii court’s
decision is not binding on this court, but it is an instructive interpretation of the identical language in
Haw. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), the state counterpart to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3).
that she contends constitute fraud on this court and the Superior Court of

Guam and explain how those acts meet this exceptionally high standard.
III. Conclusion

The Motion is GRANTED in part: this case is reopened.
As to the rest of the relief sought in the motion, Ms. Richardson is

ORDERED to show cause, within 30 days of entry of this order, why all
other relief in the Motion should not be denied.

END OF ORDER