Linley Investments v Riley - Horse Boarding Fees Dispute

| | [Home ]
[Databases ]
[World Law ]
[Multidatabase Search ]
[Help ]
[Feedback ]
[DONATE ] | |
| # High Court of Ireland Decisions | | |
| You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >>

  Linley Investments [Trading as Coolmore Castlehyde and Associated Stud Farms] v Riley, Coolagown Bloodstock Ltd v Riley (Approved) [2026] IEHC 161 (19 March 2026)

URL: https://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2026/2026IEHC161.html
Cite as:
[2026] IEHC 161 | | |
[New search ]

[Printable PDF version ]

[Help ]

An ?rd Ch?irt

The High Court

High Court record number: 2022/1427P and 2022/1429 P

[2026] IEHC 161

---

Linley Investments Limited, Trading as Coolmore Castlehyde and Associated Stud Farms

First Named Plaintiff

Coolagown Bloodstock Limited

Second Named Plaintiff

and

---

Nigel Riley

Defendant

---

Judgment of Mr Justice Peter Charleton delivered on Thursday 19 March 2026

1. For convenience there were two separated, but related, claims heard in this three-day action. The first, by Linley Investments, a branch of Coolmore stud, is for fees for covering mares owned by the defendant, Nigel Riley, resulting in the birth of live foals. The second is by Coolagown Bloodstock, effectively David Stack as the operator of the stud farm and witness to this, against the defendant for maintenance fees for keeping, feeding and caring for six mares owned by Nigel Riley. These mares were in Coolagown stud from various dates prior to the end of 2019. The horses were, with years of birth, Brief Angel (2013), Burren Rose (2002), Countess Ferrama (2009), Maggi Rocks (2011), On the Dark Side (2009) and Northern Mischief (2002). To those mares a number of foals were born. Maintenance is also due, once they come from under their mothers, a term for weaning, at about seven months. A mare with foal is charged at a higher rate while suckling. The fees are due, it is claimed by David Stack, under an oral agreement with Nigel Riley, for keeping horses at a charge of, initially, ?17 per day and at somewhat more where a horse has foaled. Charges vary in line with inflation going up from 2019 and so payment of those charges is significant in such an ongoing relationship. The two separate actions were heard together. Notice of trial issued in the Coolmore matter on 18 December 2024 and in Coolagown on 23 December 2024. But there will be one set of costs only as the matter was heard as a single case on 9, 10 11 March in Cork. This was a hybrid hearing with witnesses for the plaintiffs in court and Nigel Riley, who is a qualified lawyer in South Africa, giving evidence by an online link and representing himself, his Irish lawyers having come off record.

Horse boarding

1. The Court will deal with the maintenance claim first; that by Coolagown/David Stack. That boarding relationship with Nigel Riley started in 2013 and the fees go back to 2018, at least in part. To that claim for keeping six mares, the defence filed is more than uninformative; stating a denial of everything. That is the same approach in the Coolmore claim. At the hearing, a new form of defence emerged in the horse boarding claim that was never pleaded. It is based on a letter of 7 June 2021, at a time when David Stack was forcefully seeking payment of his boarding fees, then amounting to about ?148,000 but which has now grown to a claim of ?336,808. That is because some horses or foals continued to be kept by David Stack. There is a serious issue from that point on about mitigation of damages. That is considered later as keeping an animal at a rate and the owner not paying means that charges escalate day-by-day. In the letter, Nigel Riley completely repudiated the existing contract whereby he was to pay David Stack to keep his horses and, instead, claimed novation into an utterly different agreement. A serious problem emerged. What was to be done? Anyone passing a pawn shop in Cork or Dublin will see a notice to the effect that unclaimed goods are transferred in ownership to the pawn shop where a pledge is unredeemed over 30 days, or whatever. People who pledge their goods, be it jewellery or computer equipment, sign an agreement to that effect. Here, there was no written agreement and, it seems, no such condition. Jewellery will maintain worth over years but computer equipment may become obsolete over less than a year. Here, we are dealing with live animals.

2. After the issue of plenary proceedings on 8 April 2022, David Stack made an attempt, which I consider to have been done in good faith, to resolve this issue on a basis of transfer of ownership. Given that the matter was heard in Cork only in March 2026, four years later, that approach, which was ignored by Nigel Riley, was more than reasonable in the context of ordinary delays in getting witness actions on for trial. That letter of 4 January 2023, from David Stack to Nigel Riley, posited a compromise: he would own the horses and the debt would be reduced through transferring ownership in the horses and, further, by ownership he became responsible for future maintenance. This is how the outstanding balance as of 4 January 2023 of ?307,545 was suggested to be adjusted. By ostensibly taking ownership of horses, the debt for maintenance became ?257,545. All six mares were then alive and with a collective value put by David Stack on them of ?50,000. With animals, as time passes, they age and develop health issues. Since that, Brief Angel (valued at ?2,000) was given away, Burren Rose (value ?1,000) has been kept as a pet, Countess Ferrama (valued at ?40,000) has since died, On the Dark Side (value ?2,000) has been given away, and Northern Mischief died in 2025 (value ?2,000). The values are by David Stack and are reasonable and come from an expert in horse dealing. The Court is aware that a mare is usually past its breeding prime by about 15-20 years but with good care may live perhaps 10 years more.

The agreement

1. David Stack alleges a simple agreement: he kept mares for Nigel Riley, arranged for them to be covered and for this service he was to be paid. This is the background. He met Nigel Riley, a South African, and living in that country, in 2010. Nigel Riley claims they first met in 2013 but that is not important. They commenced an initial cordial business relationship based on racehorses. David Stack has access to about 180 acres of paddocks, by ownership or rental, and has some 72 loose boxes on his land where he keeps horses as a business for several people. In his own right, he buys and sells horses and breeds from stallions standing at his stud farm, which are perhaps in the ownership of others, and where covering is arranged by him. This kind of arrangement, of caring for a horse and arranging covering of mares, involves owners paying maintenance to a stud farm. As to shares of the sale of foals, that would be a matter of whatever arrangement is made between horse owners and stud farms.

2. That simple agreement is denied by Nigel Riley. That does not help his case. As to what basis Nigel Riley's horses were at the Coolagown stud farm in the care of David Stack was not fully explained by Nigel Riley. In so far as it was accepted that any sum for maintenance was due, the daily rate was posited at an unbelievable low rate of ?10. Nigel Riley's case should now be set out in brief. His evidence was that he never agreed any maintenance of his horses kept at the stud farm. That is an untenable proposition. Horses need care and feeding. What he claims, by way of a contorted legal argument, and he is admitted as an advocate at the South African bar, is that everything before the Court is a quantum meruit and that he has discharged everything due up to a crucial alleged meeting at Lawlor's Hotel in Naas in November 2019. If anything was due, he asserts, a charge of about ?10 per day would be appropriate and reasonable. He claims that he has cleared all of that. From November 2019, he asserts that what was a horse maintenance agreement, based on some form of quantum meruit, became one instead of a quasi-partnership whereby David Stack would keep the horses for free but foals would be shared in terms of profits from sale of 50:50 and all charges would be written off. I will deal first with that alleged novation of the agreement.

3. It is clear that from 2013 horses, mainly mares and not just those named, came to be on David Stack's stud farm. Nigel Riley was based in South Africa but was also infrequently in Ireland, visiting probably once a year up to the Covid pandemic of 2020. There had to be some kind of contract for Nigel Riley's horses to be here in Ireland and getting cared for and, as mares, being made pregnant at David Stack's stud farm through coverings at Coolmore. As might be the case where, at that stage, both parties trusted each other, nothing was reduced to writing. What is important, however, is that on the evidence of David Stack, which comes across as calm and trustworthy, and betimes self-deprecating - referencing here a silly interview he admitted giving to the Racing Post - payments were made up to 2018 for various horses, albeit slowly. That year more or less cleared what was due to him and then there was another part-payment in November 2019, but one which still left a large bill outstanding. As a matter of law, where a service is given and invoiced and paid for, there is proof of an underlying contract, despite nothing being written down. It must be accepted that racehorses are valuable, even as brood mares, and if not stabled with their owner, which here was impossible, must be kept by someone on a basis of a rational fee structure acceptable in the trade. Those caring for racehorses must be expert in the craft. David Stack is such a skilled operative with two full-time and two part-time employees. This agreement as asserted by David Stack meets indicia of rationality. By reason of the transparent honesty of David Stack, his evidence is preferred at all times where any contradiction arises with that of Nigel Riley. The Court does not accept anything contradictory to the evidence of David Stack asserted by Nigel Riley in evidence. Furthermore, invoices went from Ireland to South Africa and their payment up to 2018, and the part payment in 2019, indicate a contractual arrangement which supports the case made by David Stack. It is more than surprising, and is obstructive of a path towards the truth, that Nigel Riley should deny that arrangement both in cross-examination of David Stack and, also, in evidence.

4. But, a question arises as to changes in charges. In a labour law situation, an employee-employer arrangement may be on the basis of a particular wage and particular duties. But in the nature of long-term employment, that tends to change with the encroachment of technology and pressure of the cost of living. A collective bargain may be struck by a closed-shop union, which means that the union acts as agent for the workers. But, where there are non-union employees, by their accepting new terms and wages, the contract changes into the new terms by those employees working the new rosters, altered duties and accepting the different rate of pay, without protest. So, a contract may change and evidence of that change will be either express acceptance, perhaps through an agent, or the day-to-day functioning of both sides on new terms, again absent protest. Here, therefore, in so far as charges are raised on the basis of a change of rate for mares alone, or mares with foals under them, or mares with weaned foals, the Court is satisfied that bills were sent to Nigel Riley and his payments in 2018 and in 2019, and before, involve acceptance of the current rates. The Court does not accept that there was any difficulty in Nigel Riley receiving emails.

5. That issue being disposed of, the Court is entitled to calculate the sum due based on the rates accepted through payment by Nigel Riley. The main defence, however, which is not pleaded, is that the nature of the relationship between horse-owner and stud-farm changed radically in November 2019 and was re-formulated on a new basis. Where a contract changes, the burden is on the party asserting that change to prove the new terms which take over and replace what was originally agreed. That burden is on Nigel Riley. The Court does not accept any change of contract ever took place whereby the obligation of Nigel Riley to pay for the care of his horses became anything different.

Change from maintenance to partnership

1. According to Nigel Riley, a new and radically different contract was in place from November 2019 whereby instead of it being his obligation to pay to maintain his horses at Coolagown, and David Stack's duty to care for them and cover them with suitable stallions, in the stead a partnership was formed. Concisely stating that new alleged contract: Nigel Riley was to maintain ownership of the six relevant mares but David Stack was to care for them and cover them at his own expense on the basis that both would share equally on the sale of the, hopefully, valuable foals that would be born. Nigel Riley's evidence was that a range of concerns led to him having a serious talk, leading to a new agreement, over breakfast in Lawlor's Hotel in November 2019. The concerns alleged by Nigel Riley were: putting a Northern Mischief colt into Goff's sale and allegedly concealing a leg injury (to his knee, supposedly); accounts sent over to South Africa which had, it is claimed, no basis in services rendered; the availability of a supposedly good model for moving forward in their relationship based on the sharing of proceeds from foals by a stallion called Solskjaer, standing at Coolagown, owned by Nigel Riley; the falling through of a proposed deal to buy Countess Ferrama for an amount variously stated as between ?70,000 and ?100,00; and the paucity of returns on the boarding arrangement. These are the main points. All this led, Nigel Riley claims, to a sharing of foal revenues with no charge for horse maintenance agreement in place of his obligation to pay for boarding etc. That evidence is rejected in total. There was nothing in the evidence of Nigel Riley which indicated that he was remembering an actual event. Rather, it was contrived. In contrast, the evidence of David Stack came across as puzzled when this scenario was put to him and as honest.

2. A court will look, bearing in mind the burden of proof being on him that asserts, for some evidence that the relationship had radically changed. David Stack is clear that through 2019 his concern at not being paid heightened; hence, the WhatsApp exchanges read into evidence from the original messages on David Stack's mobile which the Court accepts as truthful. In November 2019 both parties met at Gough's sale in Kildare. That is common case. There, David Stack says, and the Court accepts this evidence as being honest and accurate, he pleaded with Nigel Riley for payment. Some story was spun of imminent ability to discharge by Nigel Riley. Those outside the risky world of investment in bloodstock may wonder at the forbearance, but it seems likely that David Stack remained hopeful. And there was, perhaps, some cause for optimism with past sales of foals and their classification. Hence, the Court accepts that there was a discussion. The Court, however, accepts the evidence of David Stack that there was no breakfast meeting and that the only discussion was in the foyer of Goff's and that this conversation was about payment of existing maintenance fees. Here, the only ostensible proof of a maintenance agreement changing into a partnership comes through a letter dated 7 June 2021 from Nigel Riley to David Stack. The letter is hearsay. It infringes the rule against self-corroboration: the evidence of a witness is not strengthened by him or her having narrated the same facts prior to testimony to another person and calling that person to give an account of that narration. Save for an allegation of recent fabrication, prior consistent statements, essentially, are not evidence. Nor is a letter making the same assertion as a witness. But, that letter is a handy reference point for the supposed novated agreement.

3. The letter provided a basis for Nigel Riley to cross-examine David Stack, who characterised it as lies. He wrote back immediately denying it; replying letter of 1 July 2021. In the denial, David Stack says: you had a business arrangement with me and people who have a business arrangement are obliged to pay - and you haven't and your letter makes no sense. It is unnecessary to reproduce the letter of 7 June 2021 from Nigel Riley beyond those essentials.?

4. Paragraphs 1 and 2 accept that from January 2016, David Stack was to keep and manage Nigel Riley's mares and sort out stallions. Then, paragraph 3 claims that when the stallion called Solskjaer was sent to David Stack, Nigel Riley would pay transport and purchase and the stud farm would "manage the stallion and bear all other costs". Income was to be paid in discharge of purchase and transport, first, and then split evenly. Then it is complained that the only income received on the mares kept was ?14,209 despite Nigel Riley investing, he states, ?200,000. This, the letter asserts, was poor management as was the injury to a colt out of Northern Mischief and "the continued deterioration of the South African currency, and my stated intention to you to sell all my Irish horses" and that a new agreement came about "at Lawlor's Hotel in October/November 2019." This is alleged to be: no fees for stabling; mares to be sole possession of Nigel Reilly; equal division of future sales of foals; proper care for horses; mating consultation; David Stack to pay all stallion covers; equal costs for vets. Then comes the startling proposition that the agreement was supposed to be secret; in paragraph 8. Following that is an admission that there were invoices sent on the basis of the management agreement and that these were received but deliberately not paid. As an aside, the Court accepts that any invoices sent to South Africa for general services were sent on Nigel Riley's express instructions.

5. It should be noted that the letter constitutes an admission in some respects. It accepts that there was an agreement to pay horse maintenance from "in or about January 2016". It accepts that David Stack was to make recommendations "as to what stallions should be utilised, and furthermore make all necessary efforts to maximise" Nigel Riley's "investment in the mares." It is evidence of agency in the covering of mares by stallions.

6. The letter then becomes a kind of legal statement of claim. Out of nowhere, at paragraph 7 it sets out heads of agreement: that Nigel Riley no longer "be required to pay any amounts for stabling"; that the mares would remain his "sole possession"; that foal sales would "equally divide"; that mares be "properly cared for"; that there would be consultation on "possible matings", but that the "final decision in this regard would be made by Coolagown"; that Coolagown/David Stack "be responsible for all stallion and other fees"; similarly "veterinary costs concerning the mares." This letter is a transparent attempt to invent an agreement to suit Nigel Riley.

7. Here, it is useful to refer to such correspondence as evidences the relationship between the parties. The WhatsApp traffic between David Stack and Nigel Riley is supportive of there being no new agreement hammered out over breakfast in Lawlor's Hotel in November 2019. All this WhatsApp traffic, which the Court examined on the mobile phone of David Stack, and read out, indicates an ongoing obligation asserted by David Stack that Nigel Riley pay for maintaining the mares and foals. There has been not a hint in that set of communications of a different agreement. The admissibility of and the security of the WhatsApp traffic has been denied by Nigel Riley. When a machine programmed to record communications, a computer or a small computer in the form of a smart-phone, collects the words the parties exchange as between themselves, there is a presumption in law that the machine is not making an error. WhatsApp operates very simply. Messages are sent by A to B and where B and A have corresponding identities by way of mobile number on their smart-phones, that data is retained for a time, unless deleted or the phone is destroyed without backup. Secondly, and apart from that, David Stack has given evidence of those messages. These indicate an increasingly desperate trader who has charge over, and responsibility for, valuable mares, seeking his fees to pay for the ordinary day-to-day essentials for horses of hay and composite nuts. A rational analysis of that exchange, which David Stack has not sought in any way to exaggerate, displays a pattern of honest seeking of fees that are due. There is also the invention of excuses by Nigel Riley; related to the imminent payment of legal fees to Nigel Riley, that moneys would shortly be dispatched. There was clearly avoidance of the core obligation of the contract to pay to keep the horses. Nigel Riley could have said in those messages: I am no longer responsible for keeping the horses, we have a different agreement. That is not there.

8. There is another reason, which is in addition to those stated. A mare gestates a foal for eleven months. So, one foal per year. A stallion can cover multiple mares in a year. It makes no sense for David Stack to be party to an arrangement with mares of him paying for the complete upkeep and incidentals while, in addition, being responsible to Coolmore or other studs for stallion fees. It is irrelevant that there had been an arrangement for the stallion Solskjaer. Again, that is simple maths. That there was an arrangement for that stallion could not possibly indicate agreement to a similar arrangement for six mares. It is not in the slightest persuasive. In summary, the Court is forced into not accepting the evidence of Nigel Riley. There was no new agreement of the kind alleged, or at all, made in November 2019. There is a sum due for horse maintenance.

Mitigation of damage

---

1. As and from the letter from Nigel Riley of 7 June 2021, the relationship between the contracting parties for horse maintenance had broken down. There was a repudiation of the horse maintenance contract by Nigel Riley. David Stack was then obliged to mitigate his damages. There was no contract whereby, by its explicit terms, on sums for maintenance being outstanding for a number of weeks, ownership in the mares would pass. Horse people tend to trust each other. But, even still, a simple form of agreement would have helped in this situation. A solution must be found in law and in fact. The Court moves to the letter from David Stack to Nigel Riley of 4 January 2023: basically, I will take ownership of the mares and I will reduce the bill due pro rata. That is the kind of letter that should have been sent immediately on receipt of the letter of 7 June 2021, some 18 months earlier. Alright, it can be hard for people under pressure to think of these solutions but the general obligation in the face of a blatant breach of contract, represented by the 7 June 2021 letter, is to minimise losses. It would be hard to think that through, at that time, without legal advice. This is not a criticism of David Stack. But, even still, the duty to mitigate arises as a matter of law. As of June 2021, there were maintenance fees outstanding for about two years. David Stack could not just let the horses die; that would be contrary to s 11 of the Animal Health and Welfare Act 2013. There was also an obligation of animal welfare on David Stack, as the person in possession and control of the mares, to provide proper food, water and care to the animals. He could not simply abandon or neglect the horses. Section 13 of the Act of 2013 requires a "person who has a protected animal in his or her possession or under his or her control or transports such an animal shall provide and supply" that animal with "a sufficient quantity of wholesome and uncontaminated drinking water or other suitable liquid appropriate to its physiological or behavioural needs which satisfies the animal's fluid intake requirements" together with "a quantity of suitable and wholesome food sufficient to satisfy the reasonable requirements of the animal" and the obligation of care extends to exercise and care according to "the animal's physiological or behavioural needs, in accordance with established experience and scientific knowledge." Horses fit the definition as being "kept for farming, recreational, domestic or sporting purposes in the State." I t was also rational for David Stack to await payment in hope for some reasonable time. After all, Nigel Riley, and this is the evidence, had been coming regularly to Ireland up to the Covid pandemic. Further, on his own evidence, he was involved in a large bloodstock enterprise, near Johannesburg. Further, he made an appearance at Tattersalls sales in England most likely last year or, less probably, 18 months ago and spent ?100,000 on horses; that expenditure is according to himself.

2. A letter could have been written by David Stack to Nigel Riley in the summer of 2021: you are in breach of contract as you have not paid for stabling and other services for your horses; ?148,000 is now outstanding; unless that sum is discharged within 30 days the only basis that the horses will continue to be kept is that ownership will pass to Coolagown/David Stack if the full sum is not received. It was a very difficult situation. Probably, given the less than cooperative nature evidenced by Nigel Riley during this court hearing, he would not have signed any ownership transfer forms. Further, and bizarrely, Nigel Riley told the Court that on the day the action began, or thereabouts, he had telephoned Fermoy Garda Station and made a formal complaint of theft of six mares, arising from the letter of 4 January 2023. No doubt this caused keen puzzlement to An Garda S?och?na.

3. What needs to be borne in mind here is that these mares had no personal value to Nigel Riley. They were livestock. The world of racing differs from that of show jumping. There was no relationship akin to that between the great Eddie Macken and the incomparable Boomerang or the distinguished Army Equestrian School partnerships. There, a very close relationship develops in part because it takes many years to develop fitness in the horse and this involving intensive and personal schooling by the rider. With keeping mares for breeding, there is not the same deep level of communication between person and horse. These mares were there to hopefully breed flat racing horses. But, what could be done? There is no legislation in Ireland akin to the Disposal of Uncollected Goods Act 1952 in the neighbouring kingdom - now repealed and replaced in a new form by the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977 s 12, or the Uncollected Goods Act 1995 in New South Wales. Contract foresight usually suffices. Introducing such legislation was considered in 1963; https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/1963-05-14/44/ but those in charge of goods or of unclaimed animals just cannot sit around and must seek a solution.? That being said, even in the absence of legislation, David Stack still had an obligation to mitigate his losses. An application could have been made to the court in order to obtain directions, for an order for sale, so that the ongoing financial burden of feeding and caring for the mares did not continue to accumulate indefinitely. Larner v Fawcett [1950] 2 All ER 727 is helpful in this regard, as it shows how a court can intervene to order the sale of property subject to a lien where the property is consuming value. There the relevant rule was in RSC 50 rule 2 for England & Wales. In the case, the trainer, Mr Larner, had kept and cared for a filly originally leased by the owner Mr Fawcett to a third party. When that third party failed to pay for the horse's upkeep, Mr Larner asserted a possessory lien and refused to release the horse until his charges were met. The owner, though aware of the horse's location, took no real steps to recover it or pay the accumulating costs. Faced with a three ‑ year ‑ old horse " eating its head off " and with litigation pending, the Court of Appeal felt empowered to order a sale even though a common ‑ law lien normally carries no right of sale, to prevent injustice where goods may deteriorate or where there is "just and sufficient reason" to sell them.

4. There could have been such a novation of the maintenance contract, perhaps with issues as to ownership which could have, if necessary, been sorted out by an application to the Circuit Court on an emergency basis or in default of appearance or defence. In these proceedings, the Court is asked in the pleadings to declare ownership in the horses to David Stack. That shows that the solution was live. This Court declares ownership in the mares and progeny now surviving, if any are unsold and alive, in David Stack. The Court is so entitled on an interlocutory basis and on a final basis. This could have been done before. Order 50 rule 3 of the Rules of the Superior Courts provides: "The Court on the application of any party to a cause or matter, may make any order for the sale, by any person or persons named in such order, and in such manner, and on such terms as the Court may think desirable, of any goods, wares, or merchandise which may be of a perishable nature or liable to injury from keeping, or which for any other just and sufficient reason it may be desirable to have sold at once." It was desirable to make such an order and the Superior Court rule is equally applicable in the local Cork Circuit Court. Had that been done within a reasonable time of the letter of 7 June 2021, which I regard as 6 months, something would have been obtained for some of the horses. Doing the best I can, given that Countess Ferrama later died, as did Northern Mischief, and the fact that the breeding mares were declining in value, an allowance of about ?50,000 would have been made by a court for sale value.

5. The result of that analysis is this. Fees were due to David Stack/Coolagown of ?148,000 as of June 2021. A further sum of ?40,000 should be added to that for possible charges, doing the best I can from the charge schedules given orally in evidence from David Stack, over the period of formulating a response, getting legal advice for that, and awaiting a reply and the ordinary exigencies of horse care that could have lasted six months and more. From that, on the sale of the horses that should have taken place in early 2022, a sum of ?50,000 may be allowed. It is way past that stage now and again, in these circumstances, the Court must do its best. That makes a decree of ?138,000 in favour of Coolagown Limited as against Nigel Riley.

Stud fees

---

1. There was a marked reluctance by Nigel Riley in questioning the witnesses from Coolmore to make similar allegations as were evident from his questioning of David Stack. Nonetheless, a claim of collusion to lead false evidence was maintained against David Stack and Coolmore. The Court dismisses this.

2. William Mackesey, the financial controller of Coolmore, and Edward FitzPatrick, a very senior farm manager, gave evidence for the relevant plaintiff. Both are skilled professional people and witnesses as to truth. Any contradictory evidence of Nigel Riley is dismissed.

3. Nigel Riley's case is that even though his mares were covered in Coolmore, it was nothing to do with him. He asserted that David Stack was not his agent. He clearly was Nigel Riley's agent and the evidence of William Mackesey and Edward FitzPatrick in that regard is accepted. There were five coverings of mares at a cost of ?70,000 together with incidentals. These coverings were proven with six contracts, five of which are before the Court even after this time, and one contract is lost. One contract bears a signature which could be Nigel Riley, but which he denies, and the others are signed by David Stack. In February 2021, Nigel Riley asked for the contracts and was sent a summary by email to South Africa on 25 February 2021. Nigel Riley denies receiving that, but also claims it was not what he asked for, was never sent it and that it was sent to the wrong email. The Court cannot accept that evidence. The Court also accepts that Coolmore is a professional operation and that what should be done is very probably done. The coverings are of mares then belonging to Nigel Riley. Both William Macksey and Edward FitzPatrick answered Nigel Riley's forensic prodding by asserting: they were your mares, we covered them for you, live foals were born which were yours, you owe us the money. That is right.

4. A detailed exegesis on agency is unnecessary. The Court accepts that Edward FitzPatrick first met Nigel Riley with David Stack in November 2017. What was he doing there, if not in the capacity of agent? Certainly, they were not merely buddies. There was talk about options. At all times the cover of mares was arranged as Nigel Riley's responsibility through his agent in that regard David Stack. Then there is the evidence from WhatsApp messages, which again the Court examined and read out from the mobile phone of Edward FitzPatrick. On 4 February 2020, on being chased by Coolmore for payment, Nigel Riley responds: " Eddie sorry i haven't got back to you but im still running this mob murder trial in israel and im assuming my phone is being monitored .i will be coming to ireland for feb sale on 14 .th. Alternatively you can message me Cheers N". There follow more messages, on 27 February 2020: "Nigel, have been expecting to see you this month. Our Acs people are getting impatient with me. What is the story?" At one stage as to entries in sales, Nigel Stack says, supportive of admitting agency: " i never do entries or any other admin. but will call you tomorrow". A vague allegation was made in Court of a chat having taken place but the Court finds that improbable as it lacks any specifics. Even less does it have any bearing on this bill which Nigel Riley should have paid.

5. Standing out here is the lack of any message from Nigel Riley: this is not my responsibility; all these coverings were arranged by David Stack and he should pay, not me. That, by the way, is what Nigel Riley claimed: that David Stack had a "special relationship with Coolmore". He was supposed to somehow magic away the charges. That is not accepted.

6. The Court does not need to refer to Kett v Shannon [1986] IESC 2, [1987] ILRM 364 but accepts that binding authority. The Court is certain that David Stack was Nigel Riley's agent and disclosed as such to Coolmore. If he was not, there would be some contemporary denial of responsibility by Nigel Riley. Instead, in Court, Nigel Riley came up with a privity of contract point. That is not pleaded. Take one of the contracts, 15 February 2018 to cover Burren Rose by Highland Reel. The agreement is expressed between "Highland Reel Syndicate" and "Mr Nigel Riley" for covering at a fee of ?17,500. The point made is that this unincorporated entity, perhaps 40 owners of a stallion, should sue by name in place of the Coolmore entity. Even if pleaded, that is not so as the contractual responsibility for managing the stallions is that of Coolmore. They step into the shoes of the syndicate and the syndicate have an entitlement to the fees through Coolmore.

7. There will be a decree on this against Nigel Riley of ?70,000.

Allegations of unpreparedness

---

1. The Court rejects the evidence of Nigel Riley and of Rowan Gerard Furman as to unpreparedness. This case was imminent and pleadings had closed well before a notice for trial. That was the time to apply for a visa from South Africa to Ireland. Further, on his own case, Nigel Riley was in England either 6 months ago or 18 months ago; in all probability last year. He never had the slightest difficulty getting visas, which in any event can be expedited. He is not likely, because of a past record, on his own evidence, of coming and going from Ireland on an annual basis, to be refused. He made no efforts. With him, blame is about other people, his solicitors who came off record before O'Regan J, his change of email address, his association with what he calls incompetents. The Court is not taking into account the controversy as to coming off record by Nigel Riley's solicitors; that matter was decided by O'Regan J but may be instructive otherwise. This was a simple case: did Nigel Riley owe a bill to David Stack/Coolagown? Yes, he manifestly did. Discovery was not necessary and in any event was never followed up. Did he have his horses covered in Coolmore? Yes, he clearly did and nothing to do with any document would ever have altered this. Instead, this simple case was through his advocacy as a litigant in person made confusing and complex. Notwithstanding that, the result is clear.

Pleadings

---

1. A court would always be reluctant to shut down a case because a defence emerges which is not pleaded. But in this case, Nigel Riley had legal representation. There is no hint in the defence that the true defence is novation of contract. It is not pleaded. There is no hint in the Coolmore case that that the true defence is lack of agency. Notwithstanding, evidence that might have backed up both defences, had it been accepted, was heard by the Court. On the pleadings and rules of court those defences were protested as inadmissible by counsel for Coolmore and Coolagown. As a matter of law, defences must be properly pleaded and there was no application by Nigel Riley to amend.

Decree

---

1. There will be a decree in favour of the Coolagown plaintiff for ?138,000. There will be a decree in favour of the Coolmore plaintiff for ?70,000. Both will be against David Riley. Court interest will run from today. Costs must follow the event, meaning one set of costs in the economic way this case was run for the plaintiffs jointly.

BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII
URL: https://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2026/2026IEHC161.html