HSI Subpoena Enforcement Against Delaware Department of Labor

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Petitioner, Miscellaneous ActionV. No. 25-322-CFC DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

Respondent. Claudia L. Pare, Assistant United States Attorney, THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE, Wilmington,

Delaware

Counsel for Petitioner Jennifer Kate Aaronson and Ian R. Liston, DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Wilmington, Delaware Counsel for Respondent

MEMORANDUM OPINION

April 13, 2026 Wilmington, Delaware

COLMF.CCWOLLY CHIEF JUDGE Pending before me is the Petition to Enforce of

Homeland Security Administrative Subpoena. D.I. 2. The recipient of the subpoena, the Delaware of Labor (DDOL), opposes the Petition.

The subpoena was issued by Homeland Security Investigations (HSI). HSI is one of three so-called "operational directorates" of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf t, https://www.ice.gov/about-ice https://perma.cc/A45S-PC9V. ICE is a component of the of Homeland Security (DHS). Operational and Support Components, Dep't of Homeland Sec., https://www.dhs.gov/operational-and-support-components https://perma.cc/JLK4- D9D6. Section 103 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (the INA or Act), codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1),' "charge[s] [DHS] with the and of [the INA] and all other laws relating to the and naturalization of aliens," with certain not relevant here. DHS has delegated authority to ICE. See DHS Deleg. No. 7030.2 (ICE) (delegating authority from DHS to ICE); 8 C.F.R. § 287.5 (authorizing certain ICE agents to

conduct searches, execute warrants, and make arrests); see also U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf t, supra ("Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) is the principal component of DHS . . . ."). The parties used DHS, ICE, and HSI interchangeably throughout their briefing and at oral argument. For ease of reference, will primarily use DHS. DHS issued the subpoena pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(d) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.4. D.I. 4 at 2. Section provides in relevant part that any officer shall have power to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses before officers and the of books, papers, and documents relating to the privilege of any person to enter, reenter, reside in, or pass through the United States or any matter which is material and relevant to the of [the IINA] and the of [DHS], and to that end may invoke the aid of any court of the United States. § 1225(d)(4)(A).^ Based on this statutory authorization, § 287.4(a)(1) delegates to DHS Special Agents in Charge and Special Agents in supervisory positions the power to "issue . . . subpoena[s] requiring the of records and evidence for use in criminal or civil investigations." The subpoena at issue cites § 1225(d) and § 287.4, and it states that the "production of the indicated records [covered by the subpoena] is required in connection with an or inquiry relating to the of U.S. laws." D.I. 4 at 2. Kenneth Krauss, the acting Assistant Special

Agent in Charge of HSI's Wilmington, Delaware office signed the subpoena. See D.I. 4 at 2. DHS served the subpoena on DDOL on April 7, 2025 by means of an electronic system called Egress. D.I. 2-1 Tf 19. (DHS had regularly used Egress before April 7 to serve subpoenas on and communicate with DDOL. D.I. 2-1 T| 14.) The subpoena required DDOL to produce to HSI Special Agent Kimberly Caraway by April 18 the wage reports that fi ft een Delaware fi led with DDOL for the third and fourth quarters of 2024. See D.I. 4 at 2, 4-5. For each of the fifteen businesses, the subpoena provided a name, address, and the unique seven-digit "file number" issued by the Delaware Division of Corporations for that

business. See D.I. 1 at 4-5; see also D.I. 2-1 16 n.2, 19. Wage reports are a creature of the Social Security Act (SSA). Section 1137 of the SSA, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7, requires each state to have "an income and eligibility verification system" under which "employers . .. in [that] State are required . . . to make quarterly wage reports to a State agency (which may be the agency administering the State's law)." § 1320b-7(a)(3). The purpose of wage reports is to "provid[e] employment related income and eligibility data" that "may be useful in verifying [an individual's] eligibility for, and the amount of, benefits available [to that individual] under" federally funded programs for the poor, elderly, and needy that are administered by the states. See § 1320b-7(a)(2)-(3), (b). Examples of such programs include

Medicaid, compensation, supplemental security income, and supplemental nutrition assistance. See § 1320b-7(b)-(c). Employers must disclose in their wage reports the names and social security numbers of their employees and the wages paid to each employee during the relevant quarter. See 20 C.F.R. § 603.2(i)-(k) (defining "unemployment (UC) information" and "wage information"); see also 45 C.F.R. § 205.51(c) (defining the wage to be contained in quarterly wage reports collected by state agencies). DDOL administers UC program and maintains the wage reports filed by Delaware employers in with Title 19 of the Delaware Code. Delaware employers are required to submit their wage reports to DDOL using

so-called UC-8 forms that can be downloaded from DDOL's website. See 19 Del.

Admin. C. § 1202(3.2); D.I. 32-1; Del. Dep't of Lab., Employer's Quarterly Report -Forms Set, https://laborfiles.delaware.gov/main/dui/forms/ Quarterly%20Tax%20Report%20-%202019.pdf https://perma.cc/JZ2C-EFKX [hereinafter UC Forms]. DDOL ignored the subpoena. And so, on June 3, 2025, the U.S. Office for the District of Delaware sent Secretary of Labor, LaKresha Moultrie, a letter and a copy of the subpoena by certified mail. D.I. 2-2. The letter informed Secretary Moultrie that the subpoena had been served on DDOL in April, that her department had not complied with the subpoena, that DHS had asked the

U.S. Office to file a legal action in this Court to enforce the subpoena, and that DDOL could avoid that legal action by complying with the subpoena by June 20, 2025. D.I. 2-2 at 2. member of Secretary Moultrie's staff signed the certified mail receipt on June 6, see D.I. 2-2 at 5, but neither Secretary Moultrie nor anyone else from DDOL responded to the letter or complied with the subpoena, see D.I. 2-1 24-25. On July 31, 2025, the U.S. Office filed the Petition. D.I. 2. On AAugust 1,1 issued an IOrder directing IDDOL to appear in ICourt on IAugust 6 and show cause why it should not be compelled to comply with the subpoena. D.I. 7. DDOL stated at the August 6 hearing that it intended to oppose the Petition. 8.6.25 Hr'g Tr. (docketed as D.I. 11) 10:9-11. The parties originally set a briefing schedule that spanned almost two months, D.I. 13, and later extended it, D.I. 20; D.I. 28. Briefing was completed November 20. /See D.I. 31. Based on the willingness to agree to such a schedule, concluded that there was no urgency for DHS to enforce the subpoena; and therefore, unlike when convened the show cause hearing within a week of the filing of the Petition, did not move the Petition to the top of the pile of the more than 100 motions pending before me as of November 20. held oral argument on the Petition on April 1,

2026.

have jurisdiction over the Petition under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(d)(4)(B).^ My review of the subpoena, however, is "strictly limited," Univ. of Med. & Dentistry ofN.J V. Corrigan, 347 F.3d 57, 64 (3d Cir, 2003) (citation omitted), because an

agency's "power of inquisition .. . is not derived from the judicial function," and "does not depend on a case or controversy for power to get evidence," United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950). As the Supreme Court held in Morton Salt, "[wjhen and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an body," that body "can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not." Id. at 642-43. For that reason, the Third Circuit "will not countenance judicial interference with agency decisions to conduct investigations, decisions that are committed entirely to agency discretion." SEC v. Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118, 127 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc). IThat said, subpoenas, unlike ICongressional subpoenas, are not self-executing. Id. at 123. And because a district court "acts judicially in a case or controversy" when it entertains a petition for of an subpoena, must ensure that "the integrity of the judicial process" "would not be abused by of the Id. at 124-25. "The burden of showing an abuse of the court's process is on the [party opposing

of the subpoena]." United States v. Powell, U.S. 48, (1964). "[Tjhis burden is a heavy one." United States v. LaSalle Nat'I Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 316(1978). "[T]he abuse of process issue is only reached after the has made a preliminary showing in support of the [subpoena]." United States v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d 368, 372 (3d Cir. 1975). To make that showing, the must demonstrate that (1) its has a purpose, (2) the sought by the subpoena is relevant to such an investigation, (3) the Govermnent does not already possess the covered by the subpoena, (4) the complied with the steps required by the applicable statute, and (5) the subpoena is not broad or Corrigan,

347 F.3d at 64. A.

turn first then to consider whether the has made the requisite preliminary showing in support of the subpoena. DDOL does not dispute that IDHS does not already possess the wage reports covered by the subpoena. ISee D.I. 2 at 8; D.I. 24 at 22. Nor does it dispute that DHS complied with the steps required by § 1225(d)(4)(A). See D.I. 2 at 8; see generally D.I. 24."^ Thus, address whether the has demonstrated that its

has a purpose, the subpoena seeks relevant to such an inquiry, and the subpoena is not broad or

In a sworn the filed in support of the Petition, Special Agent Caraway avers that DHS issued the subpoena to substantiate certain leads about alleged to employ unauthorized aliens. D.I. 2-1 5-7, 19. Section 274A of the INA, codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(l)(A), makes it "unlawful for a person or other entity to hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien." As noted above, § 1103(a)(1) charges DHS with the and of the Act and all other laws relating to the and naturalization of aliens. And together, § and § 287.4 expressly authorize DHS Special Agents in supervisory positions like Special Agent Krauss to issue subpoenas for documents any matter which is material and relevant to the of [the INA] and the of [DHS]." See ^ (emphasis added). The Supreme Court held in United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179 (1956), that "[this] comprehensive addition of the clause 'or any matter which is material and relevant to the of [the INA] and the of [DHS],' precludes [a] narrow[] reading" of the subpoena power conferred by the provision

now codified in § 1225(d)(4)(A).^ See U.S. at 185-86. Thus, the subpoena power by § "encompasses the full range of subjects covered by the [INA]," see Minker, 350 U.S. at 185, and the DHS for which the subpoena was issued here has a purpose. DDOL argues that the subpoena exceeds DHS's authority under § because it is an impermissible "John Doe" subpoena issued to "a third-party record holder for the purpose of identifying targets." See D.I. 24 at 13-

1. In support of its argument, DDOL cites Peters v. United States, 853 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1988). D.I. 24 at 14-16. The Ninth Circuit held in Peters that the provision now codified in § "does not authorize the [DHS] to issue a blanket John Doe subpoena where the targets of a general are unknown." See 853 F.2d at 700.® Assuming without deciding that this holding is correct, it has no application here because the subpoena is not a John Doe subpoena. The targets of DHS's investigation--fifteen Delaware businesses--are not only known here; they are identified in the subpoena.

The sought by the subpoena "must be relevant to some (any) inquiry that [DHS] is to undertake." See United States v. Oncology Servs. Corp., 60 F.3d 1015, 1020 (3d Cir. 1995) (emphasis in the original). In other words, I "must enforce the subpoena unless the [demanded] is

plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose of [DHS]." See id. (emphasis in the original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The DHS seeks by the subpoena--^wage reports for the last two quarters of 2024 for fifteen Delaware businesses--is clearly relevant to an inquiry

that DHS is to undertake, i.e., a worksite enforeement Special Agent Caraway articulates in 9 through 11 of her three compelling reasons why wage reports are relevant to such an inquiry: 9 First, HSI can input the from the wage reports into ICE databases to determine whether an employee's social security number has been issued by the Social Security Administration ("SSA"), and if so, whether the social security number is associated with more than one individual. Social Security numbers that have not been issued by the SSA can indicate that an individual may have made up the number and may be unlawfully present and working in the United States. Social Security numbers that are associated with multiple individuals in different locations also can indicate that an individual may be unlawfully present and working in the United States.

1. Second, HSI can compare the number of employees
   the business claims to have had in wage reports to the number of employees seen during surveillance. For example, if law conducts surveillance on a business and observes 20 employees enter but the wage reports consistently only identify 5 employees, this may be an indicator that some of the employees are being paid "under the table" or in cash and may be unlawfully present and working in the United States. This is also an indicatorthat the business may have underreported its gross wages, which decreases its overall tax liability and allows for a short-term net profit.

2. Third, the wage reports can help HSI maintain a
   covert investigation, as well as confirm whether records received from a business are genuine. For example, HSIcould subpoena Forms 1-9 (Employment Eligibility Verification) and payroll records from a business usingsubpoenas. However, once a business receives a subpoena, they are made aware that they are under This may cause a business to fabricate records that they did not, but were required to, maintain; cause a business to temporarily fire undocumented alien employees; and/or cause undocumented alien employees

to flee.

D.I. 2-1 Tin 9-11. DDOL does not appear to dispute that the requested wage reports are relevant to a worksite See D.I. 24 at 16-19. Instead, it faults the for "proffer[ing] no evidence that the whose wage records were subpoenaed are related to the 'tips'" that DHS says prompted its D.I. 24 at 17. But the sought by an subpoena need not be "reasonably relevant to the particular inquiry." Oncology Servs., 60 F.3d at 1020 (emphasis added). DHS "may seek on mere suspicion that there is a violation of the law." See id. at 1016. "The mere possibility of a new or continued fr om [DHS's] review of the [wage reports] provide[s] a sufficient basis to seek judicial of the [DHS] See id. at 1019; see also Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 642-43 ("[An agency] is more analogous to the Grand Jury, which does not depend on a case or controversy for power to get evidence but can investigate

merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not."); id. at 652 ("Even if one were to regard the [agency's] request for in this case as caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies have a right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior [within the scope of their authority] is consistent with the law and the public interest."). In challenging

whether the tips DDOL received justify an into the fifteen identified in the subpoena, DDOL in effect asks me to second-guess DHS's decision to initiate that But "[DHS's] decisions to conduct . . . are committed entirely to [its] discretion," and the Third Circuit "will not countenance judicial interference with [those] decisions." See Steel, 648 F.2d at 127.^

The subpoena requires DDOL to produce thirty documents--^two UC-8As for fifteen businesses. The documents are of recent vintage. All thirty of the UC-8As were filed with DDOL less than a year before DHS issued the subpoena. DDOL has more than 400 employees and an operating budget of approximately $90 million.^ And it does not presently, and could not credibly, argue that it would be for it to search for and copy these thirty records.^

Instead, DDOL says the subpoena is because the of the thirty wage reports to DHS will "interfere with the efficient of [Delaware's] UC program." D.I. 24 at 26. As DDOL explains it, this "[djisclosure would likely have a chilling effect on employers voluntarily filing quarterly wage reports and paying their UC tax assessments," and the alleged chilling effect puts at "risk[] the solvency of the [unemployment insurance (UI)] Trust Fund" from which UC payments are made. D.I. 24 at 26 (citing D.I. 14-1 49, 54-55); see also D.I. 24 at 3 ("Compelling would . .. damage the trust between employers and DDOL[] and pose a significant risk to the solvency of the State Insurance Trust Fund.") (citing D.I. I4-I 51, 53-54); D.I. 24 at 7 ("DDOL[] uses wage reports to calculate employers UI tax liability, which fund UI Trust Fund. Without employer UI taxes, the UI system collapses. Thus, the 'method of administration' that 'insures full of payment of when due' is maintaining the of wage reports."). DDOL's novel theory fails on many fr onts. For starters, DDOL does not explain how its of the thirty wage reports to DHS would ever have been disclosed to the public generally or Delaware employers had DDOL complied with the subpoena. The subpoena expressly requested DDOL "not to disclose the existence of [the] summons for an indefinite period of time" because

"[a]ny such will impede the and thereby interfere with the

of federal law." D.I. 4 at 5. And DDOL does not dispute that historically when DHS served DDOL with a subpoena, DDOL complied with DHS's request not to disclose the existence of the subpoena. See 4.1.26 Hr'g Tr. (docketed as D.I. 33) 8:19-9:1, 9:8-15. The only reason the public knows about the subpoena in question and that DHS intends to use the wage reports covered by the subpoena to conduct worksite is because DDOL refused to comply with the subpoena and forced the to file this action. Second, the UC-8A form itself expressly states that "[i]n with 20 CFR Part 603, wage and other insurance may be requested and utilized for other purposes, including, but not limited to, verification of an individual's eligibility under other programs." D.I. 32-1 at 2 (emphasis added); UC Forms, supra (emphasis added). DDOL's website states the same. See Del. Dep't of Lab., Employer Handbook, Delaware.gov, https://labor.delaware.gov/divisions/ unemployment-insurance/employer-handbook/ https://perma.cc/7KGM-B8J5. Thus, Delaware employers have been and continue to be on notice that their wage reports can be used for undefined purposes not related to compensation. Third, if a Delaware employer decided to read Part 603, it would see, as explained more fully below,

that Part expressly permits state agencies like DDOL not only to disclose UC like that included in wage reports to federal agencies with subpoena power but even to make those disclosures to those agencies "without the actual issuance of a See § 603.7(b)(2). Fourth, Delaware employers are required under federal and state law to file wage reports and pay UC taxes. See § 1320b-7(a)(3) ("[E]mployers ... are required . . . to make quarterly wage reports to a State agency ... ."); 19 Del. C. § 3125 (requiring disclosure); 19 Del. C. § 3345 (requiring payment of UC taxes);

19 Del. Admin. C. § 1202(3.2) ("Employers subject to Part III, Title 19, Delaware Code, shall report contributions due on forms prescribed or approved for this purpose by the Delaware Division of Insurance and in with instructions printed thereon (Form UC-8). Such reports shall be accompanied by payment of contributions."). Employers who violate these laws face financial penalties and even potential imprisonment. See 19 Del. C. § 3125(c) (subjecting employers who fail to timely file their reports to a penalty of 15 percent of the "total amount of contributions paid or payable"); 19 Del. C. §§ 3302(9)-(10), 3348(o)(4), 3350(b)(6) (subjecting employers who are delinquent in filing reports or paying assessments to a "delinquency assessment rate"); 19 Del. C. § 3382 (subjecting employers who "wilfully fail[] or refuse[] to make any such assessments . .. or to furnish any reports required" to a fine and up to sixty days of

imprisonment). Thus, DDOL is asking me to believe that Delaware employers will intentionally violate federal and state laws and risk the penalties associated with such violations in order to prevent the from obtaining wage reports with lawful subpoenas to assist in the of the country's laws. Not surprisingly, other than the conclusory and unsubstantiated averments of

Secretary Moultrie, see D.I. 24 at 3, 26 (citing D.I. 14-1 49, 51-55), DDOL cites no evidence to show that a Delaware employer would intentionally engage in this unlawful and risky activity. And I am neither willing nor able to adopt DDOL's cynical view of the State's employers. Federal courts "assume that [employers] will conduct their activities within the law." See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974); see also NLRB v. News Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695, 699 (1961) ("[W]e will not assume that unions and employers will violate the federal law."). Fifth, and to make matters worse, DDOL is also asking me to believe that so many Delaware employers will violate federal and state law to prevent DHS from obtaining wage reports that the solvency of UI trust fund will be put at risk. D.I. 24 at 3. DDOL does not suggest in any way how many employers would violate the law if they knew their wage reports were being obtained by lawful subpoenas to enforce laws; nor does DDOL suggest in any way how many employers would have to refuse to pay their UC taxes to put UI trust fund in financial jeopardy. But for DDOL's hyperbolic assertion that its

of wage reports to DHS will jeopardize the solvency of UI trust fund to hold true, the vast majority of employers in the State would have to intentionally violate federal and state and tax laws. That conclusion is

necessarily implied by the actuarial measure of solvency--^the so-called average high cost multiple or AHCM--^that Delaware uses for its UI trust fund. See Del. Dep't of Lab., Delaware Division of Insurance Announces New Tax Schedules for 2025, Delaware.gov (Feb. 3, 2025), https://news.delaware.gov/ 2025/02/03/delaware-division-of-unemployment-insurance-announces-new-tax- schedules-for-2025/ [https://perma.cc/ZDR7-B396] [hereinafter DDOZ Press Release]; see also 19 Del. C. § 3350C(a) (defining average high cost multiple). An AHCM of 1.0 indicates that the State is expected to be able to pay one year of UC benefits using the money already in the trust fund. DDOL Press Release, supra. And according to DDOL, the AHCM for trust fund as of February 3, 2025 is 0.91. Id. That means that if every Delaware employer failed to pay UC taxes this year, the fund could still cover 91 percent of the expected UC benefits for the year. See id. Thus, DDOL's assertion that of the subpoena will put at risk the solvency of UI trust fund does not pass the straight- face test. The subpoena is not

The having made the requisite preliminary showing in support of the subpoena, must grant the Petition unless DDOL proves that of the subpoena would undermine the integrity of the judicial process. See Steel, 648 F.2d at 128. DDOL argues that of the subpoena would constitute an abuse of the ICourt's process because an order compelling of wage reports to DHS would violate regulations codified in 20 C.F.R. Part 603 and Delaware statutes and regulations that implement those federal regulations. D.I. 24 at 3, 24-27; D.I. 14-1 18-21, 25-26. It also contends that the subpoena was issued for an "improper purpose," described by DDOL as "an intense agenda of enforcement." D.I. 24 at 31-32.

Part 603 was promulgated by the U.S. of Labor "to implement the requirements of Federal UC law the and of UC information." § 603.1. It "applies to States and State UC agencies," id., and the parties agree that state law must prevent the of UC information, including wage reports, "except as provided" in Part 603, see § 603.4(b)-(c); D.I. 24 at 23-24; D.I. 31 at 15. Section 603.5 provides in relevant part: of UC is permissible under the in (a) through (g) of this

section only if by State law and if such

does not interfere with the efficient of the State UC law. ofUC is permissible under thein (h) and (i) of this section without

such restrictions.

(emphasis added). Paragraph (h) of § 603.5, in turn, provides: "Disclosure of UC infonnation in response to a court order or to an official with subpoena authority is permissible as specified in § 603.7(b)." Thus, of UC infonnation in response to an official subpoena or court order is

not conditioned on state-law authorization or noninterference with the efficient

of the state UC system. See § 603.5(h). It is instead conditioned on whether § 603.7(b) permits the disclosure. Section 603.7(b)(2) for its part provides that "disclosure is permissible, where . . . [cjonfidential UC has been subpoenaed, by a local. State or Federal official, other than a clerk of court on behalf of a litigant, with authority to obtain such by subpoena under State or Federal law." And indeed under § 603.7(b)(2), "[t]he State or State UC agency may choose to disclose such UC to these officials without the actual issuance of a subpoena.'''' (emphasis added). As discussed above. Special Agent Krauss has the authority under § and § 287.4 to issue subpoenas for documents any matter which is material and relevant to the of [the INA]." See § (emphasis added). DDOL thus may disclose the covered wage

reports to DHS under § 603.5(h) and § 603.7(b)(2), regardless of whether DDOL is

under state law to do so or whether DDOL believes would interfere with the efficient of the UC system. DDOL insists that because § 603.5 provides that of UC in response to a subpoena is "permissible" as opposed to "mandatory," it is not required under Part 603 to disclose wage reports in response to DHS's subpoena. See 4.1 Tr. 40:19-24, 41:8-25. But the relevant question is not whether Part 603 requires disclosure. The relevant question here is whether a subpoena lawfully issued pursuant to § and § 287.4 requires disclosure. The answer to that question is clearly yes. And § 603.5(h) makes it equally clear that

the requirements of Part 603 do not override or impede that subpoena power. These are not close calls. To the extent DDOL argues that a Delaware statute or regulation prohibits with the subpoena, see D.I. 24 at 26-28, the state statute or regulation is preempted by § and § 287.4. "[T]he laws of the United States .. . shall be the supreme law of the land." U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2. "Where a state statute conflicts with, or frustrates, federal law, the former must give way." CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 663 (1993); see also Rose v. Ark. State Police, 479 U.S. 1, 3 (1986) (per curiam) ("There can be no dispute that the Supremacy Clause invalidates all state laws that conflict or interfere with an Act of

Congress."); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, U.S. 388, (1971) ("[Sjtate law may [not] undertake to limit the extent to which federal authority can be exercised."). conflict exists where the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). For that reason, federal courts have repeatedly found state statutes and constitutional provisions to be preempted when they prevent with a federal subpoena. See, e.g., Presley

1. United States, 895 F.3d 1284, 1292 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that "the privacy
   right in Florida's Constitution must yield" because it "would substantially impede the IRS's ability to summon bank records pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code"); Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. DEA, 860 F.3d 1228, 1236 (9th Cir.

2. (holding that the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) preempts an Oregon
   statute that "plac[ed] the initial burden of requiring a court order to enforce the subpoena upon the ADEA" because the state statute "interferes with the scheme Congress put in place for the federal of drug crimes and thereby undermines Congress's goal of strengthen[ing] law tools against the traffic in illicit drugs") (latter alteration in the original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); United States v. Zadeh, 820 F.3d 746, 750-52 (5th Cir.

3. (holding that the CSA preempts the Texas Occupations Code insofar as the
   latter prohibits the respondent from complying with a DEA subpoena); United

States ex rel. Off. of Inspector Gen. v. Phila. Hous. Auth, WL 382765, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2011) (holding that the Inspector General Act preempts two Pennsylvania statutes insofar as they prevent of the subpoenaed information); St. Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. United States, 717 F. Supp. 665, 666 (N.D. Iowa 1989) (holding that an Iowa law was preempted insofar as it prohibited with an subpoena issued by the

of Health and Human Services). Here, Congress granted officers broad power to "require by subpoena" testimony or the of documents any matter which is material and relevant to the of [the INA] and the of [DHS]." See^ 1225(d)(4)(A). Thus, to the extent DDOL argues that Delaware law prevents it from complying with DHS's subpoena, see D.I. 24 at 24, 26-28, that law is preempted.

All that remains is DDOL's complaint that DHS is "pursu[ing] an intense agenda of enforcement." See D.I. 24 at 32. This is a political argument; not a legal one. And this Court is not the proper "forum in which to air [DDOL's] generalized grievances about the conduct of government." See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968). It would be wholly inappropriate for me to consider this line of argument, and I decline to do so.

III.

For the reasons discussed above, the April 7 subpoena is valid and enforceable. will therefore grant the Petition. The Court will issue an Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

' All references to the INA or the Act are to the Act as amended.

^ Section literally refers to "the of the Service," not "the of DHS." The Act defines "Service" as "the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the of Justice." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(34). The Act defines "immigration officer" as "any employee or class of employees of the Service or of the United States designated by the Attorney General, individually or by regulation, to perform the functions of an officer specified by [the Act] or any section of [Title 8]." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(18). In 2002, as part of a major reorganization following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, ICongress created the IDHS and transferred the powers and personnel of theImmigration and Naturalization Service of the of Justice (the INS) to three components of DHS, one of which is ICE. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as amended in relevant part at 6 U.S.C. §§ 111, 202, 211, 251-52, 271, 291). have updated references to the "Service" accordingly. ^ The statute provides: Any United States district court within the jurisdiction of which or inquiries are being conducted by an officer may, in the event of neglect or refusal to respond to a subpoena issued under this paragraph or refusal to testify before an officer, issue an order requiring such persons to appear before an officer, produce books, papers, and documents if demanded, and testify, and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by the court as a contempt thereof. § 1225(d)(4)(B).

In a one-sentence footnote in the Background section of its brief filed inopposition to the Petition, DDOL states that Box 2 of the subpoena "was left blank," and that Box 2 "requires DHS to indicate what [the] subpoena [was] issued 'in reference to' and to include a 'Title of Proceeding' or 'File Number, if Applicable.'" D.I. 24 at 11 n.37. To the extent DDOL intended by this sentence to argue that DDHS failed to show that it took the steps required in support of the subpoena, it has forfeited the argument. See Higgins v.Bayada Home Health Care Inc., 62 F.4th 755, 763 (3d Cir. 2023) ("[T]he District Court was not required to consider [the plaintiffs argument] because 'arguments raised in passing (such as, in a footnote), but not squarely argued, are considered [forfeited]."') (last alteration in the original) (quoting John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. v. CIGNA Int'l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997)); .yee also id. ("A passing reference to an issue . . . will not suffice to bring that issue before this court.") (omission in the original) (citation omitted). ^ In 1956, when Minker was decided, what is now § 1225(d) was § 1225(a). See 350 U.S. at 180-81 (quoting the statutory provision at issue). ^ In Peters, too, what is now § 1225(d) was § 1225(a). See 853 F.2d at 695 (quoting the statutory provision at issue). ^ In a supplemental filed with the reply brief. Special Agent Caraway avers; "Each of the named in the subpoenas was the subject of at least one individual tip received by HSI. Some would havebeen connected with more than one tip." See D.I. 31-1|14. I did not consider thisaverment because Special Agent Caraway made it for the first time in support of the reply brief. See 'Argenzio v. Bank of Am. Corp., 877 F. Supp. 2d 202, 208 (D.N.J. 2012) ("Courts have held that a moving party may not. . . present new factual materials in a reply brief that it should have raised in its initial brief") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Spudis v. Metro Mattress Corp., 2026 WL 526706, at *4 n.2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2026) ("Courts . . . may decline toconsider exhibits attached, for the first time, to a reply brief") (citations omitted). ^ Del. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, Fiscal Year 2026 Budget: Labor, https://budget.delaware.gov/budget/fy2026/documents/operating/labor.pdf[https://perma.cc/4UJL-UC65] (last visited Apr. 9, 2026); Del. Dep't of Hum. Res., State of Delaware Executive Branch Workforce: EEC Representation Summary Fiscal Year 2024 (2024), https://dhr.delaware.gov/people-culture/documents/eeo- aa-report-action-plan-2024-2025.pdf [https://perma.cc/VHS6-GGQE].

^ In its brief filed in opposition to the Petition, DDOL faulted DHS for notproviding it with Federal Employer Identification Numbers (FEINs) for fourteen of

the fifteen businesses. ID.I. 24 at 19-20. IIt stated in its brief that IDHS's failure toprovide FEINs for each of the fifteen rendered the subpoena "indefinite" and "unreasonable," D.I. 24 at 20-21, and it intimated that this failuremakes it unduly for DDOL to locate many of the thirty documents covered by the subpoena, see D.I. 24 at 20 (stating that "[f]or some of the listed[] [in the subpoena] there were multiple possible whose records could possibly have been the subject of DHS's request," and that, therefore, without FEINs, DDOL is unable to "confirm or verify [the identity of]many of the businesses"). DDOL, however, admits that it was able to confirm the identity of and locate the wage reports for two of the fifteen listed in the subpoena without having FEINs for those businesses. See D.I. 18-1 12. And it does not dispute the assertion that historically (i.e., before the April 7 subpoena) when DDOL received subpoenas from DHS, it had worked cooperatively with DHS agents, including Special Agent Caraway, to confirm the identities of and locate the wage reports for those without resort to FEINs. See 4.1.26 Hr'g Tr. (docketed as D.I. 33) 8:19-9:1, 9:18-24, 20:7-9, 54:3-8; D.I. 24 at 29; D.I. 31 at 9. When asked DDOL's counsel at oral argument if DDOL would comply with the subpoena if DHS provided it with FEINs for all the listed in the subpoena, counsel stated, "At this point. Your Honor, no."

4.1 Tr. 26:17-21.

Accordingly, do not understand DDOL to be currently taking the position that itwould be unduly for it to locate and copy the records covered by the subpoena. In the event DDOL intended to maintain that position, would reject it as not credible given DDOL's resources, the limited number of documents coveredby the subpoena, DHS's willingness to work with DDOL to confirm the identity ofthe covered by the subpoena, the fact that DDOL was able to identify two of the without FEINs and without help from Agent Caraway, and the historical track record of DDOL working cooperatively with DHS agents toconfirm the identity of the listed in prior subpoenas for wage reports. I would also reject it because of DDOL's decision to ignore and not offer to workwith DHS or the U.S. Office to reach an accommodation with respect to the April 7 subpoena. See 4.1 Tr. 4:16-20, 9:22-24; see also Morton Salt, 338U.S. at 653 ("Before the courts will hold [a subpoena] seeking . .. to be arbitrarily excessive, they may expect the [respondent] to have made reasonableefforts before the [agency] itself to obtain reasonable conditions."); In re Subpoena

Duces Tecum, 228 F.3d 341, 351 (4th Cir. 2000) ("[A]s a condition to maintainingthe argument that an subpoena is overly broad and oppressive, [therespondent] would have to be able to point to reasonable efforts on his behalf to

reach accommodation with the government."). Section 603.5(e) provides that "[djisclosure of UC to apublic official for use in the performance of his or her official duties is permissible." During the period for public commentary on Part 603, some commenters questioned the need for § 603.5(h) "given that § 603.5(e) permits to public officials." Federal-State Compensation Program (UC); Confidentiality and of State UC Information, 71 Fed. Reg. 56830, 56839 (Sept. 27, 2006) (codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 603). In response, the of Labor stated: [Djisclosures under § 603.5(e) must be made under the agreements described in § 603.10, which require, among other things, the payment of costs and the safeguarding of information, before any may be disclosed. Thus, that provision is limited to cases where is explicitly or required under the State UC law. The subpoena exception, however, pertains to situations where officials have the authority to demand under their laws, but where State UC law may not permit such or where an agreement may not have been entered into, thus necessitating the public official to obtain the UC through a subpoena. Therefore, no change is made in the final rule. Id. (emphasis in the original).