Yates v Dublin Bouldering Gym Ltd - Personal Injury

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  Yates v Dublin Bouldering Gym Ltd and Anor (Approved) [2026] IEHC 181 (13 March 2026)

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?THE HIGH COURT

[2026] IEHC 181

[Record No. 2020/413P]

BETWEEN

KATHRYN YATES

PLAINTIFF

-AND-

---

DUBLIN BOULDERING GYM LIMITED

---

-AND-

---

THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS IRELAND

DEFENDANTS

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JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Paul Coffey delivered on the 13 th day of March 2026

Introduction

1. The plaintiff was born on 8 July 1994. At all material times she was a student at the Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland ("RCSI"), the second-named defendant, and a member of its Climbing Society.

2. The first-named defendant operated, at all material times, an indoor bouldering climbing facility in Sandyford, County Dublin ("the facility") which was open to members of the public. The business has since ceased.

3. The plaintiff's claim is for damages for personal injury arising from an accident which occurred on 2 February 2018, when it is alleged that the defendants, or one of them, wrongfully caused or permitted her to fall from a climbing wall at the facility as a result of which she sustained a displaced fracture of the left ankle and a sprain of the right ankle.

The plaintiff's case

4. In her pleadings, the plaintiff advances a single, undifferentiated claim against both defendants, without distinguishing their respective roles.

5. She alleges that she was permitted to participate in a hazardous activity without adequate risk assessment, warnings, training, supervision, or safety measures, in breach of duties at common law, in contract, and under statute.

Case against the first-named defendant

6. The plaintiff's case at trial was directed primarily against the first-named defendant. Following the evidence at trial and the subsequent refinement of her claim in written submissions, the plaintiff's case against the first‑named defendant was that its safety policies required the provision of induction and supervision to novice participants, neither of which was provided, thereby breaching those policies with the result that the plaintiff was left without the knowledge to deploy proper landing technique, which she maintains would have prevented her injuries.

7. Although the plaintiff's pleadings did not particularise the case in precisely those terms, the issue was fully canvassed at trial through the evidence and documentary material, and no objection was taken by the defendants to the case being advanced in that form. In those circumstances, and being satisfied that no procedural unfairness arises, I will consider the claim as so formulated.

Case against the second-named defendant

8. As against the second‑named defendant, the plaintiff contends that, by virtue of its own policies governing student activities, the Climbing Society of the RCSI was obliged to carry out a risk assessment of the activity and to ensure that any premises at which the student event was held had appropriate safety systems in place. It is further alleged that the society was required to ensure that students attending such an event were provided with appropriate safety instruction or training, obligations which the plaintiff says were not fulfilled.

Background and undisputed facts

9. The activity at the facility which led to the accident was indoor bouldering, which is indoor wall climbing without ropes or harnesses, an activity inherently involving the risk of falling, mitigated but not eliminated by wall design and by impact-absorbing floor matting. The facility was purpose-built and complied with applicable EU standards governing wall height, wall construction, wall angles, and the depth and coverage of safety matting.

10. Climbing routes on the bouldering walls were graded by difficulty on a scale of ten grades, with grades 1 and 2 being the easiest and intended for beginner climbers.

11. The plaintiff joined the RCSI Climbing Society during Freshers' Week in September 2017 and first attended the facility on 21 September 2017 as part of a large group organised through the society and, on that occasion, completed the facility's registration process.

12. The first-named defendant contends that registration entitled her thereafter to use the facility and to climb independently under its rules. The plaintiff, however, asserts that, as a novice climber participating in a group of not less than three, she was entitled under those rules to supervision, notwithstanding her registration. Although the registration form completed on that date records that an induction was provided, the plaintiff maintains that she did not in fact receive any induction. ****

13. The proprietor of the facility gave unchallenged evidence that induction was routinely provided to new climbers, which could be delivered either by way of a brief oral safety talk or by the showing a safety video. He described oral induction as typically lasting four to five minutes, which he said was often delivered to groups, particularly where people arrived together. He described the induction as a general safety orientation rather than a training session which addressed how the wall operated, the need to climb within one's limits, route selection (particularly for beginners), maintaining awareness of other climbers, keeping the fall zone clear, and the importance of down-climbing where possible rather than jumping. He described these as "important safety points", consistent with the language of the facility's risk assessment. He accepted that safe landing was mentioned as part of the induction but did not say that landing technique was taught as a physical skill. He also acknowledged that group inductions could be imperfect in that individuals might miss parts of what was said, and staff might not be aware if someone arrived late or was distracted.

14. The plaintiff's climbing expert gave unchallenged evidence that the facility's safety video both demonstrated and described a safe-landing technique. However, he was clear that, in his opinion, demonstration by video alone was insufficient to teach the technique effectively, and that safe-landing required progressive, supervised practice in order to develop familiarity and muscle memory.

15. Following registration on 21 September 2017, the plaintiff climbed independently without incident. She attended the facility for a second time on 2 February 2018, the date of the accident, when she was accompanied by two colleagues. On both visits she confined herself to low-difficulty routes (grades 1-2) and climbed cautiously. Neither visit was instructor-led, and the plaintiff was not under direct supervision while climbing. Instructors were available but only as a paid additional service.

16. The accident occurred approximately one hour into the second session. While completing a Grade 2 route, the plaintiff reached the top of the climb and, after touching the final hold with both hands as required, lost her grip and fell. The fall was predominantly vertical. She landed on her feet, her ankles gave way, causing her to fall to her left. It is not in dispute that a safe landing technique involves landing on both feet, with the knees bent, the chin tucked, keeping the arms close to the body and allowing the body to fall backwards on impact so as to dissipate the force of the fall. There was no evidence as to whether the plaintiff's knees were bent, her chin tucked, or her arms held close to her body at the moment of landing. The only direct evidence was that the plaintiff landed on both feet and did not roll backwards. The distance her feet fell was approximately 2.6 metres and the fall took approximately 0.75 seconds. There is no suggestion of any defect in the wall or matting that caused or contributed to the fall or to the injuries. It is common case that falling from a height is an inherent and foreseeable risk of bouldering, and that the plaintiff was aware of that risk.

17. The plaintiff sustained a displaced fracture of the left ankle and a sprain of the right ankle. She underwent open reduction and internal fixation of the left ankle, was hospitalised for five days, immobilised in plaster for six weeks, and used crutches for approximately seven weeks. One screw was subsequently removed, while a metal plate remains in situ. She developed an adjustment disorder characterised by low mood and sleep disturbance. While she made a good functional recovery, she reports ongoing symptoms including stiffness, cold sensitivity around the metalwork, and reduced running tolerance. There is no radiological evidence of osteoarthritis and only a minimal risk of future degenerative change. Special damages were agreed at ?1,200.

Applicable Law

18. The obligations owed by the operator of a recreational facility to those who attend to use it may arise from a number of sources. They may arise at common law under the law of negligence, where a duty of care is owed to persons who may reasonably be affected by the operator's acts or omissions, or in contract, where the terms governing the use of the facility define the respective rights and responsibilities of the operator and participants. The Occupiers' Liability Act 1995 may also regulate the duties owed by an occupier of premises to visitors in respect of dangers arising from the state of the premises, and statutory or regulatory regimes may in some circumstances impose specific safety obligations.

19. In the present case, although a claim under the Occupiers' Liability Act 1995 was pleaded, no case was ultimately pursued at trial that the plaintiff's injuries arose from any danger due to the state of the premises. Nor was any case pleaded or ultimately pursued that the first-named defendant was in breach of any applicable statutory or regulatory regime governing the operation of the facility. It is accepted that the design and construction of artificial climbing structures are the subject of European technical standards concerning matters such as wall configuration and the provision of impact-absorbing matting. Those standards regulate the physical safety characteristics of the installation itself. They do not impose requirements concerning the instruction or supervision of adult participants. The plaintiff's climbing expert, Dr Whelan, did rely on guidance issued by Mountain Training UK which advocated a regime of instructor-led training and supervision for novice climbers. In cross-examination, however, he accepted that the guidance upon which he relied was published after the accident. Accordingly, while such material may illustrate evolving best practise, it cannot retrospectively define the standard of care at the material time or convert a later-developed instructional regime into a pre-existing legal obligation. No breach of any statutory or regulatory obligation therefore arises for consideration.

20. The remaining issues therefore fall to be determined by reference to the common law of negligence and any contractual obligations or assumption of responsibility said to arise from the terms upon which the plaintiff was permitted to use the facility.

Negligence - the scope of the duty of care

21. The issue under the law of negligence is the scope of the duty of care owed by the operator of a recreational facility to an adult of full capacity who voluntarily engages in an activity involving obvious and inherent risks, and whether that duty extends to the provision of instruction or supervision.

22.?In the absence of binding Irish authority which directly addresses that issue, it is appropriate to have regard to the English decisions in Poppleton v Trustees of the Portsmouth Youth Activities Committee (a charity) [2008] EWCA Civ 646 and Maylin v Dacorum Sports Trust (t/a XC Sportspace) [2017] EWHC 378 (QB), which concern materially similar circumstances and squarely address the question arising in this case.

23. Both cases involved climbers who fell and sustained serious injuries while bouldering, Poppleton involving a relatively inexperienced climber and Maylin involving a novice. The authorities establish that where an adult of full capacity freely chooses to engage in an activity involving inherent and obvious dangers, the law does not ordinarily require the operator of the facility to prevent participation, to train the participant, or to supervise the activity. Nor is the operator generally obliged to protect such a participant from the consequences of risks which are inherent in and obvious from the activity itself. The duty of care is directed to dangers arising from the state of the premises or from risks created by the operator's own acts or omissions, and not to the elimination of the intrinsic hazards of the activity voluntarily undertaken.

24. The authorities further make clear that the provision of safety features, such as protective matting, does not render an inherently risky activity safe, nor does it impose a duty to ensure that injury cannot occur. It is obvious that such measures cannot eliminate the risk of serious injury resulting from an awkward fall. The fact that the operator charges for participation does not alter the analysis.

25. The Court of Appeal in Poppleton stated that if the law required training or supervision in such a case, it would equally be required for a multitude of other commonplace leisure activities which nevertheless carry with them a degree of obvious inherent risk, such as sea bathing.

26. I am satisfied that the reasoning in Poppleton and Maylin is consistent with Irish occupiers' liability law and with general common law principles governing voluntary risk-taking by competent adults. In the absence of any conflicting Irish authority, I adopt that reasoning as representing the applicable law in this jurisdiction in relation to the issue of alleged negligence before the Court.

27. The plaintiff placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Glencar Explorations Plc v Mayo County Council (No. 2) [2002] 1 IR 84 as the applicable framework for determining whether a duty of care arises under Irish law. Properly understood, however, application of the Glencar criteria leads to the same conclusion. While it is undoubtedly foreseeable that a participant may fall and be injured while bouldering, and while there is proximity between the operator of the facility and an adult participant who lawfully attends and uses it, the decisive question remains whether it would be fair, just and reasonable to impose upon the operator a duty to induct, train or supervise an adult of full capacity in respect of risks which are inherent in, and obvious from, an activity voluntarily undertaken. In my view it would not. The consequences of imposing a duty to induct, train, supervise or to teach landing technique, would fundamentally recharacterise the activity by converting a free-climbing facility into an instructor-led environment. It would impose obligations not demanded by law in analogous recreational contexts and generate intermediate liability across a wide range of sports.

28. The policy considerations articulated in Poppleton and Maylin? including respect for personal autonomy, the voluntary assumption of obvious risk, and the undesirability of converting ordinary recreational facilities into instructor-led environments fall squarely within the third limb of the Glencar analysis. The English cases do not displace Glencar but rather illustrate the application of the same principles in a closely analogous factual context.

29. The plaintiff also placed reliance on Rohan v Minister for Finance (Unreported, High Court, O'Hanlon J., 19 June 1992) where liability was found in negligence against the employer of the organiser of a sporting activity. That decision, however, arose in a materially different factual and legal context, involving an organised military sports training exercise in which the plaintiff, as organiser and instructor, was participating in the course of his employment, and where the design and conduct of the activity itself were in issue. It did not concern voluntary participation by a competent adult in a recreational activity involving obvious and inherent risks, nor did it address the scope of duty owed by the operator of a leisure facility in such circumstances. It therefore provides no assistance in resolving the present case.

30. The plaintiff further relied on the English case of Pinchbeck v Craggy Island Limited [2012] EWHC 2745, in which liability was found against the operator of a bouldering facility arising from deficiencies in the instruction and supervision of a novice climber. That case, however, arose in materially different circumstances, in that payment had been made to the defendant company for the express purpose of providing instruction and supervision to the plaintiff.

31. In light of the foregoing, the governing principle arising under the law of negligence and applicable to the present case is that the operator of a recreational facility is not generally under a duty to eliminate, reduce or guard against risks which are inherent and obvious in a voluntary leisure activity undertaken by adults of full capacity. Liability does not arise merely because injury results from the materialisation of such an inherent risk.

32. It follows that the law of negligence does not impose upon the operator of such a facility a general obligation to induct, train or supervise adult participants of full capacity so as to protect them from the ordinary incidents of the activity itself. In particular, it does not require the provision of instruction in safe landing technique or supervision of the kind contended for by the plaintiff. In those circumstances, the plaintiff's case can succeed only if the evidence establishes that the first-named defendant assumed responsibility for the plaintiff's safety beyond the ordinary scope of the general duty of care, whether by contract or by representation upon which the plaintiff relied.

The first-named defendant's safety documents and Wall Rules

33. The plaintiff relies on these documents to contend that the first-named defendant had assumed responsibility for the provision of instruction in safe-landing technique and supervision to the plaintiff.

34. Although the first-named defendant's safety statement frames induction as a condition of use of the facility, properly analysed, it is a safety policy, not a contractual representation to users. It describes the operator's intended safety procedures, but it does not impose or communicate an undertaking to provide instruction in climbing or safe-landing technique.

35. Internal management documents, required or encouraged by statute, such as safety statements or risk assessments, may be admissible as evidence of the safety systems adopted by an operator but they are not normative of duty. They are forward-looking instruments designed to identify hazards, assess risks, and reduce accidents but not sources of civil liability in themselves. They are not framed as representations to third parties and do not, of themselves, create or enlarge a duty of care, nor amount to contractual obligations or an assumption of responsibility, absent clear communication and reliance.

36. The first-named defendant's risk assessment recognises that the risk of falling from height at the facility is extreme, obvious and intrinsic to climbing. The control measures identified are directed to mitigation, not elimination, of that risk, and include induction of first-time users "to highlight the most important safety points". Properly construed, this is a reference to general safety information, not to instruction in technique.

37. By contrast to the internal safety documents maintained by the first-named defendant, the Wall Rules ("the Rules") are directed at participants and govern the terms upon which members of the public are permitted to use the facility. They regulate the relationship between the operator of the facility and those who attend to climb there. They set out the conditions upon which members of the public are permitted to use the wall and are incorporated through the registration process, by which participants complete a registration form acknowledging the risks of the activity and agreeing to abide by the Rules.

38. The Rules emphasise personal responsibility for safety and warn that injuries, including "broken or sprained limbs", the very injuries sustained by the plaintiff, are "common" despite matting. They do not require induction or instruction of any kind as a precondition of adult climbing and expressly permit registered adults to climb unsupervised.

39. The plaintiff's climbing expert classified the plaintiff as a "novice" boulderer on the date of injury, notwithstanding the fact that she had registered on her previous visit to the facility. The Rules do not contain a formal definition of "novice". However, they provide that any person who is not registered is treated as a "novice" and must not climb without supervision. Conversely, registration permits an adult to climb independently and therefore without supervision. Accordingly, I find that, by virtue of having registered, the plaintiff fell to be treated under the Rules as a registered adult user and not as a "novice" on the date of the accident.

40. The plaintiff's climbing expert nonetheless maintained that the plaintiff was a "novice" participating in a group of three on the date of the accident, and that, on that basis, the facility's Rules required that she be supervised by a suitably qualified instructor. In support of that contention, he relied on the rule which provide that groups of "three or more novices may only be supervised" by a supervisor holding specified training qualifications.

41. Properly construed, however, that provision merely regulates the competence required of any person who does provide supervision to such groups. It does not impose a general obligation that supervision be provided. This interpretation is reinforced by the adjacent provision in the Rules permitting an adult member to supervise up to two novice climbers subject to assuming responsibility and completing a supervision form. Read together, the provisions address who may supervise novices where supervision occurs. They do not mandate that registered adults be supervised.

42. The Rules provide that, before climbing without supervision, a participant is expected to be able to describe the dangers inherent in bouldering and the risks involved. Before climbing, each user is required by the Rules to register and thereby confirm that he or she is prepared to abide by the Rules and understands the risks inherent in participation. The Rules expressly provide that "instruction in climbing technique" is available only where it has been booked and paid for in advance. Properly construed, these provisions frame registration as the gateway to unsupervised climbing, characterising it as a mechanism by which adult users acknowledge and assume the obvious risks of the activity. They do not impose on the first-named defendant an obligation to induct, assess competence, to provide instruction in climbing technique or to supervise registered adults. Rather, they reinforce a free-climb model based on personal responsibility, with optional paid instruction available for those who seek it.

43. Under the Rules, registration is effected by completion of a registration form signed by the participant. In this case, the plaintiff completed and signed the registration form prior to using the facility. In the section executed by the plaintiff, she expressly acknowledged the risks associated with climbing, accepted that safety measures such as matting did not guarantee safety, agreed to abide by the Rules, and confirmed that failure to exercise care could result in injury. That portion signed by the plaintiff contains no representation or promise by the first-named defendant to provide induction, instruction, or supervision. A separate administrative section of the form, completed by staff only, recorded whether the plaintiff watched the facility's induction video and whether the staff member completed an induction with the climber. The placement of that information in an internal administrative record, rather than in the contractual portion of the document signed by the plaintiff, indicates that it was intended as an operational note rather than a contractual undertaking.

44. The plaintiff's climbing expert gave evidence that the facility's policies and Rules required not merely that an oral induction be provided but also that the safety video be shown. He expressed concern that an oral induction, particularly when delivered to large groups, could not be assumed to be effective because it was not time-bound and there was no assurance that all participants heard or absorbed the information provided. He further expressed the opinion that safe landing technique cannot be learned effectively by verbal or visual instruction alone. He explained that the technique requires demonstration and progressive supervised practice so that the climber develops familiarity and what he described as "muscle memory".

45. However, neither the safety statement, the risk assessment, the Rules, nor the registration form when properly construed, impose or communicate any obligation on the first-named defendant to provide practical skills training of that nature. At most, those documents refer to the provision of general safety information prior to use of the facility, described in the risk assessment as 'highlighting the most important safety points'. They do not require instruction in climbing technique or the supervised teaching of safe landing technique. The evidence therefore establishes, at most, that the facility made available general safety guidance concerning technique for the management of a fall, but not pursuant to any legal or contractual obligation. This aligns with the evidence of the facility's proprietor.

46. Having examined the safety statement, the risk assessment, the Rules and the registration form, I find no contractual undertaking by the first-named defendant to provide induction, instruction in safe landing technique, or supervision to the plaintiff. The documents regulate the conditions of access to the facility and record the participant's acknowledgement of the inherent risks of climbing, but they contain no promise that such induction, instruction or supervision would be provided.

47. The plaintiff gave no evidence that she relied upon the safety statement, risk assessment, or any representation that induction, instruction or supervision would be provided before she registered or commenced climbing. No contractual term or representation imposing such an obligation was pleaded or established.

48. While the evidence indicates that the facility ordinarily provided a short safety briefing or made a safety video available which included reference to safe falling technique, those practices formed part of the operator's internal safety procedures. They were not communicated as contractual terms and their existence does not convert them into contractual undertakings.

49. This interpretation is consistent with the facility's operational model, which permitted registered adult users to climb independently without supervision, with instruction in climbing technique available only where it had been specifically booked and paid for in advance.

50. In those circumstances, the documents governing use of the facility cannot reasonably be construed as imposing any contractual obligation on the operator to induct, instruct, or supervise adult participants as a matter of course. Nor do I find that there was any representation made or relied upon which could have given rise to a voluntary assumption of responsibility on the part of the first-named defendant to provide any such measures.

The plaintiff's climbing expert's criticisms of the second-named defendant

51. The plaintiff's climbing expert also criticised the second-named defendant for an alleged failure to carry out an activity-specific risk assessment and to adopt appropriate safety measures in relation to the bouldering activity. He expressed the view that, as organiser of the activity, the second-named defendant ought to have ensured that suitable safety systems, training, and supervision were in place prior to permitting participants to attend the facility.

52. In support of that opinion, he referred to obligations which he said arose under the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 and associated regulations. However, he did not identify any basis upon which the recreational activity in question constituted a work activity or the facility a place of work within the meaning of that legislation, nor did he identify any contractual or statutory provision imposing such obligations on the second-named defendant in respect of adult participants voluntarily engaging in a recreational activity.

53. Properly analysed, the duties imposed by the 2005 Act relate to occupational safety in the context of employment and workplaces. In the absence of any employment relationship or work activity, those provisions do not of themselves create obligations governing the organisation of voluntary recreational activities of the type in issue. Nor does the Act create a freestanding cause of action in damages for personal injury in favour of members of the public who are not employees.

54. To the extent that the plaintiff's climbing expert relied on what he regarded as desirable practice or general safety principles, that evidence does not establish an assumed responsibility on the part of the second-named defendant to conduct a risk assessment of the activity or to provide training or supervision. No additional danger, misrepresentation, or regulatory control on the part of the second-named defendant was identified which would displace the ordinary principle that adults of full capacity may choose to engage in activities carrying obvious inherent risks.

Was the plaintiff inducted?

55. Assuming, without deciding, that I am incorrect in my conclusion that the safety documents and contractual arrangements between the parties did not impose any obligation on the first-named defendant to provide induction, instruction or supervision of the kind contended for by the plaintiff, it is appropriate to address the factual dispute as to whether an induction was in fact given.

56. I do so, however, on the assumption that any such obligation extended only to the limited form of induction contemplated by the risk assessment, namely a short safety briefing "highlighting the most important safety points" prior to participation. It is of some significance that the plaintiff's own expert accepted that mere induction, whether delivered orally or by video, would be insufficient to achieve the instructor-led progressive training and development of "muscle memory", which he considered necessary, to ensure a safe landing. Notwithstanding that qualification, I turn to consider whether such a briefing was in fact given to the plaintiff when she attended the facility.

57. The documentary evidence includes a registration form signed by the plaintiff, which incorporates a staff-completed checklist. That checklist records by a "no" entry that the plaintiff did not watch the facility's induction video, and by a "yes" entry that the staff member who signed the administrative section of the form had completed induction with the plaintiff. The form does not describe the nature, duration, or content of any induction given, nor does it contain any confirmation by the plaintiff that induction was received. The staff member who appears to have completed and signed the checklist is now living in Australia and was not available to give evidence at the trial.

58. The plaintiff in examination in chief stated that she was not shown the safety video, received no oral induction or instruction, and that after signing the registration form and obtaining climbing shoes, she and others were free to climb. In cross-examination, it was put to her that she may have been inducted and simply could not recall. She accepted at one point that she did not recall, but in re-examination she stated that no one spoke to her on either visit to the facility about how to climb, where to climb, or how to fall.

59. The proprietor of the facility gave evidence that induction was routinely provided to arriving climbers and groups and typically lasted four to five minutes. He accepted, however, that large group inductions were difficult to deliver and that individuals could miss elements of the process, for example by arriving late or being briefly absent, without staff necessarily being aware.

60. In circumstances where the registration form was disclosed on discovery and a copy of it "served" on the plaintiff within the meaning of section 15(1)(a) of the Civil Law and Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2020, it is prima facie admissible as a business record under the provisions of section 14 and therefore not excluded from consideration by reason of any failure to serve a separate notice under section 15(1)(b) of the Act.

61. However, even where a business record is admissible under the statutory regime, section 16 of the Act requires the Court to further consider whether its admission is in the interests of justice and, separately, what weight, if any, should be attached to it. In that regard, the Court must have regard to all the circumstances, including the authenticity and reliability of the document together with any risk of unfairness arising where the person who supplied the information recorded in the document does not attend to give oral evidence and is not available for cross-examination.

62. Having had due regard to the interests of justice and all relevant circumstances, I treat the registration form as evidence of the first-named defendant's administrative system and the type of information it sought to record at the point of registration. However, given the absence of the staff member who made the relevant entry for cross-examination, I do not treat the staff-completed entries as conclusive proof of what occurred on the occasion in question. I merely note that the contents of the registration form are not inconsistent with an induction having been given, but they do not amount to proof that such an induction did in fact occur. The issue of whether and to what extent any induction was in fact provided to the plaintiff falls to be determined by reference to the evidence as a whole.

63. In the light of the plaintiff's evidence, the evidence of routine practice, and the acknowledged practical limitations of large group inductions, and the documentary record, I find that it is more likely than not that an induction was given by way of a short safety briefing provided to the arriving group on 21 September 2017. However, I also accept that the plaintiff whether through temporary absence or otherwise either did not personally receive, absorb or recall the safety information that was communicated.

Causation

64. Even if a duty of the kind contended for had been established, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that any alleged failure to provide induction or supervision caused or materially contributed to the fall or the injuries sustained. Although I have found that the first-named defendant was under no obligation to provide such measures, and that, in any event, an induction was given, I will nonetheless consider the issue of causation.

65. The plaintiff's climbing expert addressed the issue of causation and expressed the opinion that the fall resulted from the absence of instructional supervision. In his view, on the balance of probabilities, the accident most likely would not have occurred had the plaintiff been supervised by an appropriately qualified instructor. However, he did not identify any specific precaution that would have prevented the fall, nor did he specify what the plaintiff would have done differently had a supervisor been present.

66. Although his report had stated otherwise, the plaintiff's climbing expert did not state in his oral evidence that the plaintiff's injuries were attributable to improper landing technique. When he was cross-examined about his earlier opinion, he accepted that he had not observed the fall, did not know precisely how the plaintiff landed, and accepted that falls are dynamic and unpredictable. He further accepted that the plaintiff would only have had a split second to react. He further agreed that individual factors such as body weight, height, limb length, and reaction affect the manner and consequences of a fall, and that there was no medical evidence linking the manner of landing to the injuries sustained.

Causation of the fall

67. The plaintiff fell as a result of a momentary loss of grip while bouldering, a risk inherent in the activity. There was no evidence that the loss of grip was caused by any lack of induction, instruction, training or supervision, nor that the provision of such measures would probably have prevented the fall.

68. It is common case that falling is a foreseeable risk of bouldering. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff confined herself to routes of minimal difficulty appropriate to her status as a beginner, climbed cautiously and did not attempt any advanced routes, unsafe heights, or unsafe manoeuvres.

69. As to the cause of the fall itself, the plaintiff's evidence was: "I got to the top and touched with both hands the last (hold). As I shifted my weight, I just lost my grip and I remember ... landing on my feet and they just went." She did not attribute the fall to any defect in the wall, the holds or the matting, any interference by others, or any act or omission on the part of the defendants. Her evidence was that the fall occurred when she lost her grip while completing the route.

70. There was no evidence to suggest there was anything in the plaintiff's conduct prior to the fall which was contrary to any instruction she would have received at induction, whether as to route selection or manner of climbing. Equally, there is no evidence to suggest that, had an instructor been present, the plaintiff would probably have acted differently in the moments before the slip, or that either instruction or supervision could have prevented her losing her grip. On the engineering evidence, the fall was from a height consistent with the route and wall configuration. There is no suggestion that the wall or matting contributed to the occurrence of the fall.

71. I am not satisfied, therefore, that the fall itself was caused by any failure to induct, instruct, train or supervise the plaintiff.

Causation of the Plaintiff's Injuries

72. The evidence indicates that the fall occurred in circumstances where the plaintiff, confronted with an unexpected loss of grip, had only a split second in which to react before she hit the ground (the fall took approximately 0.75 seconds). In those circumstances, it cannot be assumed that the plaintiff could recall, process and execute verbally delivered guidance on body positioning. The proposition that a short safety briefing, whether communicated in person or by video, would have prevented the accident or its consequences is therefore inherently speculative. Indeed the evidence of the plaintiff's climbing expert was that mere induction without instructor-led progressive training to develop "muscle memory" would not be effective to ensure safe landing.

73. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff landed on both feet and then fell to her left. There is evidence that the plaintiff did not roll backwards, but the plaintiff, who bears the onus of proof, gave no direct evidence that she failed to execute the other components of safe landing, including, the bending of the knees, tucking of the chin and holding of the arms at the side. Accordingly, on the evidence established the question is whether, on the balance of probabilities, the fracture and sprain injuries to the plaintiff's ankles were caused or materially aggravated by a failure to roll backwards.

74. The plaintiff's climbing expert gave unchallenged evidence that the execution of all the components of safe landing technique would dissipate the forces of landing from a height. He did not state the extent to which those forces would be dissipated, and furthermore, did not state and was not qualified to state, that the plaintiff's specific injuries would probably have been avoided or materially lessened had she executed such a technique when landing, still less so if the only missing component was a failure to roll backwards.

75. The absence of medical evidence linking any alleged deficiency in landing technique to the plaintiff's specific ankle injuries is decisive. Whether a different landing pattern would probably have prevented or materially reduced the plaintiff's specific injuries is a medical question, and no such evidence was advanced. In the absence of such evidence, any finding on causation would be speculative. Accordingly, even if I were to assume that, in the split second between losing her grip and landing on the mat, the plaintiff would have both recalled and attempted to implement the verbally-delivered guidance on safe-landing technique, there is no medical evidence upon which I could conclude that adoption of such technique would probably have avoided the injuries or materially reduced their severity. This is not a case in which the court is required to do its best without the assistance of expert evidence to assess the extent of an injury where causation of that injury, but not its extent, has been established. Rather, the difficulty lies in the absence of evidence that the alleged breach caused any additional injury at all. In those circumstances, the court is not entitled to engage in estimation or apportionment.

76. I am therefore satisfied that the plaintiff's accident and her injuries were the result of the materialisation of an inherent risk of bouldering, rather than the likely consequence of any failure on the part of the first-named defendant to provide induction or supervision to the plaintiff.

77. For the same reason, even if the second-named defendant was under an obligation to carry out an activity-specific risk assessment in respect of the bouldering activity (which I do not find), there is no evidence before me upon which I could find that any failure to do so caused or contributed to the plaintiff's fall or to her injuries.

Conclusion

78. I have every sympathy for the plaintiff. However, for the reasons set out above, I cannot find liability and the claim must be dismissed.

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