Foxley v Ministry of Defence - Adjournment of Summary Judgment Applications

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  Foxley   v Ministry of Defence & Ors (Re Adjournment) [2026] EWHC 672 (KB) (19 March 2026)

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[2026] EWHC 672 (KB) | | |
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| | | Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 672 (KB) |
| | | Case No: KB-2024-001035 |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION

| | | Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
| | | 19 March 2026 |
B e f o r e :

MR JUSTICE CAVANAGH

Between:
| | LtCol Ian Foxley | Claimant |
| | - and - | |
| | (1) Ministry of Defence
(2) Department for Business and Trade
(3) Special Project Management Limited
(4) Airbus SE | Defendants |

**Derrick Dale KC, Russell Hopkins and Grace Corby (instructed by Leigh Day) for the Claimant
Bilal Rawat KC, John Goss, Emma-Louise Fenelon, Karl Laird and Gareth Rhys (instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the First and Second Defendants
Richard Kovalevsky KC (instructed by Oliver Rawkins of Reed Smith) for the Third and Fourth Defendants

Hearing dates: 17-19 March 2026**

HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT ON ADJOURNMENT ____________________

Crown Copyright ©

1. Mr Justice Cavanagh:
3. This is my ruling on whether the Defendants' applications relating to summary judgment and jurisdiction should be dealt with this week or should be adjourned off until another date. I notified the parties of my decision yesterday, which is that those applications must be adjourned to a later date. In the event, and by the time the decision fell to be taken, the parties were all in agreement that there was no alternative but to adjourn these applications. I said that I would give reasons orally today. I am giving judgment in some detail for three reasons. First, this is plainly an issue of importance to the parties. Second, it is impossible to know at this stage whether I will be the judge on the next occasion, and it may assist the judge who eventually deals with these applications to read a judgment which explains the course of action which I have taken. Third, the reasons that I give may have an impact on the submissions on costs that will be made later today. I am giving this judgment orally on the morning of 19 March 2026, so that the parties have the opportunity to consider it before making their submissions on costs.
5. In these proceedings, the Claimant pursues various claims, primarily in tort, against four Defendants. The first two Defendants, the Ministry of Defence and the Department for Business and Trade, are jointly represented by the Government Legal Department. I will refer to them, compendiously, as the Government Defendants. The Third and Fourth Defendants, GPT Special Project Management Ltd ("GPT") and Airbus SE ("Airbus"), are also jointly represented, by Reed Smith. Airbus is GPT's ultimate parent company. I will refer to them as GPT/Airbus.
7. The claim in these proceedings was issued on 28 March 2024. Originally, there were only three Defendants. Airbus was added later, in 2025. The Defendants have not yet filed Defences, pending the outcome of their applications for summary judgment/jurisdiction.
9. The following is a very brief summary of the nature of the Claimant's claim: at its centre, the claim alleges unlawful means conspiracy by the Government Defendants and by GPT and Airbus. This relates to the authorisation and payment of bribes in respect of the SANGCOM Project in Saudi Arabia by GPT, and alleged to be facilitated and authorised by the Government Defendants in 2010 whilst the Claimant was engaged by GPT as the Programme Director. The Claimant was dismissed by GPT on 31 December 2010. The Claimant also alleges that the facts and matters relied upon give rise to tortious claims of joint enterprise to further the commission of a tort by GPT as a result of which he suffered loss and damage, misfeasance in public office by named individuals, and negligence. There is also a contractual claim against GPT, involving Saudi law.
11. On 21 April 2021, GPT entered into a plea agreement with the SFO in criminal proceedings. Pursuant to this agreement it was agreed that GPT would plead guilty to an offence of corruption contrary to section 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 on the basis of the terms set out in the plea agreement and an annexed statement of facts. The particulars of the offence to which GPT pleaded guilty were that, between 1 December 2008 and 31 December 2010, GPT corruptly gave or agreed with others to give consideration to named persons in Saudi Arabia as an inducement or reward for doing or forbearing to do an act in relation to the Saudi Arabian National Guard's ("SANG's") affairs or business, and/or for showing favours to any person in relation to SANG's affairs or business, namely approving or granting and/or maintaining, Letter of Acceptance contracts and operations, maintenance, and training contracts with GPT.
13. Two individuals, Messrs. Cook and Mason, had been charged with offences relating to these matters. The first trial of these charges at Southwark Crown Court was abandoned. At the second trial, Messrs. Cook and Mason were acquitted of offences of making corrupt payments relating to GPT and SANGCOM, though one of them was convicted of another offence.
15. In these proceedings, the Government Defendants and GPT have applied for summary judgment under CPR, part 24, on limitation grounds. These applications were dated 18 September 2024 and 16 September 2024, respectively. In an order dated 9 May 2025 (which followed a Case Management Conference in January 2025), Senior Senior Master Cook ordered that the summary judgment applications would be heard by a High Court judge on the first available date after 18 June 2025, with a time estimate of three days, plus one day for pre-reading. This order was made by consent. The time estimate was, therefore, jointly agreed between the parties.
17. On 15 July 2025, the Claimant was given permission to add Airbus as a fourth Defendant, without prejudice to Airbus's right to challenge the Court's jurisdiction to hear the claim.
19. On 4 September 2025, Airbus made an application pursuant to CPR rule 11(1) for an order declaring that the Court has no jurisdiction to try the Claimant's claim against Airbus, on the basis that there is no serious issue to be tried because the claims against Airbus are time-barred. I will call this the "jurisdiction" application. This raises many of the same issues as are raised in the summary judgment application by GPT, but it also raises some additional factual matters. Though I do not think that there was a formal order to this effect, the parties sensibly proceeded on the assumption that the hearing of the summary judgment applications would also deal with the jurisdiction application. Indeed, Senior Master Cook had been made aware at the Case Management Conference in January 2025 that it was likely that Airbus would be joined and that Airbus would make a jurisdiction application to be added to the summary judgment applications. I understand, therefore, that the time estimate took this into account.
21. The hearing was listed to take place over three days in a three-day window over the course of this week. In the event, the hearing commenced on 17 March 2026.
23. The limitation issues at the heart of the summary judgment/jurisdiction applications
24. Briefly, the Defendants say that the causes of action in these proceedings accrued on or before 1 January 2011, shortly after the Claimant was dismissed from his employment by GPT, and the primary time limit therefore expired on 1 January 2017.
26. The Claimant relies, at least primarily, upon section 32(1) of the Limitation Act 1980. The Claimant's primary submission is that there was concealment or fraud on the part of the Defendants, and the Claimant could not have discovered or could not with reasonable diligence have discovered the alleged concealment or fraud so as to know that he had a claim until a point that renders his claims in time.
28. As Mr Derrick Dale KC, leading counsel for the Claimant, put it in the letter of 10 March 2026, the principal issue for the court to decide in the applications is whether on a summary judgment basis sections 32 (1)(a) and/or 32(1)(b) of the Limitation Act 1980 in relation to fraud or concealment cannot be relied upon by the Claimant to postpone the relevant limitation period for each cause of action.
30. The Claimant says that the essential facts relied upon in the particulars of claim for each cause of action against the Government Defendants and GPT are set out in the sentencing remarks by Bryan J, dated 21 April 2021, and accompanying statement of facts, in the criminal proceedings against GPT. The Claimant further says that the information provided in the jury bundle in the criminal proceedings, which was disclosed to him in the summer of 2024, provides the essential facts for the claim against Airbus, and that this is when time started to run, as against Airbus.
32. The Defendants each say that, even if, contrary to their primary arguments, the start of the period of limitation was postponed by the effect of section 32 of the Limitation Act 2010, so that time did not begin to run on or before 1 January 2011, time nevertheless began to run on a date which means that all of the claims are out of time, and that the position is sufficiently clear that the Court should grant summary judgment for the first three Defendants and should decline jurisdiction in relation to Airbus.
34. There is also some suggestion that the Claimant relies on section 14A of the Limitation Act 1980, so far as his negligence claim is concerned, but that issue is not being dealt with at this stage and it is not clear to me whether this point is being persisted with.
36. I stress that this is a brief and incomplete summary of the issues that arise in the applications.
38. It is plain that, in order to deal with the summary judgment/jurisdiction arguments, the Court will need to examine a great deal of documentation, covering a period in excess of 10 years, in order to assess what the Claimant knew or ought to have known at a particular time, and whether there was concealment or fraud on behalf of the Defendants, or each of them. It will also be necessary for the Court to consider a considerable amount of case-law about the extent of knowledge or understanding of the potential claims that a Claimant must have to start time running for the purposes of section 32, and for the Court to consider case-law about the circumstances in which issues such as these are suitable for determination by means of a summary process.
40. On Monday 16 March 2026, the day before the hearing began, the Court was notified of a dispute that has arisen between the Claimant and the Government Defendants, which is whether the Claimant is entitled to rely upon section 32(1)(a) of the Limitation Act 1980 (fraud) as well as section 32(1)(b) (concealment).
42. The summary judgment/jurisdiction applications
43. The order of Senior Senior Master Cook dated 9 May 2025 stated, at paragraph 7:
45. "Any applications in relation to use in court of material disclosed between the parties for the purpose of the summary applications should be made no later than six weeks before the listing of the summary judgment applications on notice to the parties and the media."
46. Pausing there, at the six-week stage before this hearing, the hearing was due to deal with four matters. These were:
48. (1) The Government Defendants' summary judgment and strike out application on limitation grounds;
49. (2) GPT's summary judgment application on limitation grounds;
50. (3) Airbus's application for an order that the Court has no jurisdiction to deal with the claim against it, again on the basis that there is no serious issue to be tried on limitation grounds; and
51. (4) A final much more minor matter. This is the Claimant's application, dated 2 December 2025, to rely upon the fourth witness statement of Paul Dowling, his solicitor (which was not opposed). This did not even rate a mention at the hearing before me and so I assume that this is agreed.
52. I will call these the "summary judgment/jurisdiction" applications.
54. The PII and confidentiality applications
55. Then, on 26 and 27 February 2026, considerably less than six weeks before the hearing date, the Government Defendants filed a further three applications, which they asked to have dealt with at this hearing.
57. These were, first, a public interest immunity ("PII") application dated 26 February 2026, with a time estimate of 3 hours. This was an application for PII in relation to material which was the subject of PII orders in the earlier criminal proceedings involving GPT, or which has been disclosed by the Government Defendants in these proceedings but in respect of which disclosure would circumvent the earlier PII rulings and/or risk harm to important public interests.
59. Second, the Government Defendants filed a confidentiality application dated 27 February 2026, with a time estimate of 3 hours. This was an application for a confidentiality ring, and for other relief, in respect of material which has been disclosed by the Claimant and by GPT/Airbus, as identified in an updated Confidential Schedule provided by the Government Defendants. The basis for the confidentiality application was that this is material the disclosure of which beyond the parties would risk harm to important public interests.
61. Finally, the Government Defendants made an application dated 27 February 2026 for retrospective extensions of time and for relief from sanctions, so as to be permitted to proceed with the PII and confidentiality applications. This aspect had a time estimate of 2 hours.
63. These applications were supported by the third witness statement of Christopher Wilson, a senior lawyer in GLD, dated 27 February 2026. This gave an explanation for the lateness of these applications. At paragraph 18 of this statement, Mr Wilson suggested that the court may have to decide whether the summary judgment applications will need to be adjourned, though he suggested that Airbus's jurisdiction application could still be heard in the time remaining.
65. The Government Defendants did not file a formal application for an adjournment.
67. The hearing which commenced on 17 March 2026
68. At the start of the hearing, on Tuesday 17 March 2026, the Claimant and GPT/Airbus sensibly and realistically accepted that, even though the applications were filed late, there was no alternative but to deal first with the application for relief from sanctions and an extension of time, and then with the PII and confidentiality applications. It was accepted that these had to be dealt with before the Court could proceed to deal with the summary judgment/jurisdiction applications.
70. Accordingly, I first dealt with the application for relief from sanctions and for an extension of time. These were not opposed by the Claimant or by GPT/Airbus, and I granted them.
72. I then dealt with the PII applications. As these involved a derogation from open justice, it was necessary for the Court to deal with them carefully and thoroughly. It was necessary for me to hear submissions at a Closed hearing, which took much of the day on 17 March 2026. Near the end of the day, however, I heard some Open submissions from Mr Dale KC on behalf of the Claimant in relation to the PII issues. His client was broadly neutral on the issue, but there were some matters that Mr Dale KC drew to my attention and submitted that I should take into account when carrying out the balancing exercise that PII requires the Court to carry out. Mr Richard Kovalevsky KC, leading counsel for GPT/Airbus, also remained neutral and did not make substantial submissions in relation to PII.
74. By the time that argument on PII was over, it was past 4pm, and so I said that I would rise and would give a brief Open ruling on the issue the following morning. In order to do so, it was necessary for me first to go into Closed session, to ensure that I did not inadvertently disclose material that was subject to PII in my Open ruling. I gave my Open ruling on the morning of 18 March 2026, in which I granted the Government Defendants' PII application in its entirety. This occupied the Court until just after 11 am.
76. There followed argument in relation to confidentiality. Once again, neither the Claimant nor GPT/Airbus took significant objection to the Government Defendants' application, but, nonetheless, it was necessary for me to consider the application in detail and with care, as it involved a derogation from open justice. The public interest was involved which went beyond the interests of the parties. It was necessary for the Court to go into private hearing whilst a substantial part of the submissions were made. Mr Dale KC made a number of points on the form of the order and it was necessary to give the parties time to discuss and seek to agree the appropriate wording for the order. I indicated that I was prepared to make the confidentiality orders that were sought and agreement on a suitable form of words for the order was reached by about 2:45 pm on 18 March 2026.
78. At that stage, submissions were made on whether it was feasible or desirable to continue this week to deal with the summary judgment/jurisdiction applications. Each of the parties' counsel agreed that it would not be possible to do so, even if (as was possible) the hearing could continue into a fourth day, Friday 20 March 2026. Even so, there would only be two days left for argument and submissions in relation to the summary judgment/jurisdiction applications.
80. I have made preliminary enquiries with KB Listing about alternative dates to deal with the summary judgment/jurisdiction applications. The parties have not yet made submissions on the appropriate length of the adjourned hearing but in my view it is clear that it will require at least 5 days, with 1-2 pre-reading days. On that basis, the preliminary indication is that the Court cannot accommodate an adjourned hearing of the summary judgment/jurisdiction applications until Autumn Term 2026 at the earliest, and there is a real possibility that it may not be until Hilary Term 2027.
82. The reasons for the decision to adjourn
83. As I have said, by the end of day two of the three-day hearing, all parties recognised and accepted the inevitability that the summary judgment/jurisdiction applications would have to go off to another date, even if the court could sit for a fourth day this week. Mr Dale KC canvassed with me in argument whether there was a chance that the matter could go part-heard, but, as I will explain, this is not a realistic option.
85. Notwithstanding that all of the parties were, in the end, in agreement that the matter had to go off, it is helpful, I think, to summarise the parties' positions on adjournment, as they stood immediately before the start of the hearing, and then to set down my reasons for the decision to adjourn the summary judgment/jurisdiction applications. Ultimately, the decision was mine, though the parties were in agreement with it.
87. The parties' views in relation to adjournment as they were expressed in correspondence before the hearing commenced
88. I have read correspondence between the parties between 27 February and the start of this hearing. It is possible, very briefly, to summarise the parties' positions, as set out in that correspondence, as follows:
90. At that stage, the Claimant was strongly opposed to an adjournment of the summary judgment/jurisdiction applications. His solicitors pointed out that no formal application had been made by the Government Defendants for an adjournment. The Claimant did not dispute that it was necessary for the PII and confidentiality applications to be dealt with before the summary judgment/jurisdiction applications could be dealt with. The Claimant did not consider that the explanations given by the Government for the late applications were justifications for them. However, the Claimant did not suggest that the lateness of the applications meant that the Court should not deal with them. The Claimant considered that the eight hour time estimate for the late applications was an overestimate and that it would still be possible to deal with the summary judgment/jurisdiction applications in the remaining time available. Furthermore, his position was that if there was the possibility of adding a fourth day to the listing it was all the clearer that sufficient time would be available.
92. The Claimant pointed out that these were the Defendants' applications, not his. The summary judgment applications were issued some 18 months ago. The Claimant's claims cannot proceed until they are determined. An adjournment would cause delay and would further escalate the Claimant's costs. It should be borne in mind that the Claimant is an individual litigant. It was made clear that if the summary judgment/jurisdiction applications were to be adjourned, the Claimant would seek the wasted costs from the Government Defendants.
94. The Government Defendants' position in pre-hearing correspondence did not change since Mr Wilson's third witness statement. They said that it would not be possible to deal with the summary judgment applications in the time available, though it may be possible to deal with the jurisdiction application. Therefore, regrettably, they said, the summary judgment applications would have to be adjourned.
96. On behalf of GPT/Airbus, it was emphasised in correspondence that they were not responsible for the late applications but they were concerned that they should not be prejudiced by them. They made clear that they did not object to the applications. They did not say that the Government Defendants' time estimate for these applications was excessive. They said that if sufficient additional time could be found for the hearings, they would not object to this week's hearing dealing will the summary judgment/jurisdiction applications, but they were opposed to the suggestion that the jurisdiction issue could be hived off from the summary judgment issues and dealt with separately. If the summary judgment applications had to go off, then the jurisdiction application by Airbus should go off also. In a letter dated 4 April 2025, Reed Smith proposed that this week's hearing should be used to deal with the PII and confidentiality applications, and the original applications should be heard at a later date. In a further letter the following day they said that it may be possible for the claims to proceed this week, if the Court allocates more time. They also said in correspondence that, if the original applications were to be adjourned, they would seek wasted costs from the Government Defendants.
98. The reasons for my decision to adjourn
99. As I have said, by the time that the decision to adjourn was taken, in the late afternoon of Wednesday 18 March 2026, all parties agreed that there was no alternative but to do so (irrespective of their position at the start of the hearing). This was, in itself, an overwhelmingly strong reason to adjourn, but I would have felt compelled to do so in any event, even if one or more of the parties had wished to press on. I will now set out my reasons for that view.
101. (1) There was no formal application to adjourn
102. That is so but it has been clear since the PII and confidentiality applications were made, over two weeks ago, that this issue would have to be considered by the Court. The Court does, of course, have power to make orders for adjournment of its own motion, pursuant to CPR 3.1.
104. There is no doubt that, even if it had not been raised by Mr Kovalevsky KC on behalf of Airbus/GPT on the afternoon of 18 March 2026, this was a nettle that I had to grasp. I would, in any event, have raised it of my own motion.
106. I proceeded on the basis that a total of four days would have been available this week, not the three days which were originally listed.
108. (2) The amount of time that has been taken up with the PII and confidentiality applications
109. These applications took almost two full days. By the time they had been dealt with, there were only two days left (even with the addition of an extra day).
111. I have no doubt that there was no alternative but to deal with the PII and confidentiality applications at this week's hearing. That would have been so, even if the applications had been made well in advance of the six-week deadline. However, if the applications had been made on a timely basis, it might have been possible, some weeks ago, for one or more of the parties to invite a judge to take a decision in advance to convert the three day listing for this week into a hearing of those matters, so that the parties would not have been put to the trouble and expense of last-minute preparation for the summary judgment and jurisdiction applications. On the other hand, there can be no certainty that this would have happened even if the PII and confidentiality applications had been made more than six weeks before the hearing. It is not clear to me that any party would have made such an application. It appears from the pre-hearing correspondence that the Claimant would have encouraged the Court to keep the listing to cover both the summary judgment/jurisdiction applications and the PII/confidentiality applications, in the hope that there would be time to deal with all of them within three days, albeit that such a view would, in my opinion, have been hopelessly optimistic. None of the parties took active steps to seek an adjournment in the period of just over two weeks between the filing of the applications and the start of the hearing. Also, if such an application had been made, it might not have been possible in the time available to place an application to adjourn before a judge, whether on the papers or at a hearing. Still further, even if this had happened, it is possible that the judge might not have been willing to take a decision on adjournment so close to the hearing date, given the complexity of the case and the amount of material that would have had to have been read and considered.
113. I also have no doubt that the time spent in the previous two days on the PII and confidentiality applications was proportionate. PII and confidentiality are very important matters. They concern not only the interests of the parties to the case, but also potentially give rise to derogations of open justice, which affect the wider public interest. The Court must consider such applications very carefully and thoroughly. As I have said, it was necessary to go into Closed hearing for the purposes of the PII application, and into private hearing for the purposes of the confidentiality application. These took time to set up. An indication of the substantial nature of these applications can be derived from the fact that the open file in relation to the PII application is some 318 pages long, and the Confidential Schedule for the confidentiality application was well over 100 pages long.
115. I should make clear that there has been no suggestion, and there can be no question, of the Government Defendants deliberately running down the clock in the way that they dealt with these applications.
117. A small amount of time, though only a few minutes, was also taken up with the parties making their positions clear about the adjournment issue. This was unavoidable.
119. As I have already said, the length of time that was taken up by the PII and confidentiality applications made it unavoidable that there would not be enough time to deal with the summary judgment/jurisdiction applications.
121. (3) Would it have been possible or fair to proceed with Airbus's jurisdiction application, even if the other Defendants' summary judgment applications were adjourned?
122. I agree with Airbus that this would not be either fair or realistic. There is too much of an overlap between the summary judgment issues relating to GPT and the issues that arise in the jurisdiction application on behalf of Airbus, even though they are not quite the same. In order to evaluate Airbus's application, the judge will have to be familiar with the basis for GPT's application, and the evidence that underpins it. The legal team that acts for both GPT and Airbus has prepared its evidence and skeleton argument on the basis that they will be heard together. To hive off the jurisdiction claim would lead to costly and unhelpful duplication, and would not be fair to Airbus, or, indeed to GPT.
124. It follows that the hearing of the summary judgment and jurisdiction applications must take place at the same time.
126. (4) Would it be worth starting the hearing of the original applications on the basis that it could proceed for two days and then go part-heard?
127. I am firmly of the view that it would not be in the interests of justice or the overriding objective for this to be contemplated. I am aware that I have a number of other judicial commitments in the coming months which mean that it is unlikely that any part-heard hearing could commence until Autumn 2026, and probably not until late Autumn/early Winter 2026. A gap in hearings of such a length would not be fair on the parties. It would vastly increase the work required and the expense, and would make the task of the judge almost impossible.
129. During his submissions on adjournment yesterday, Mr Dale KC floated the possibility of starting this week and then going part-heard, but he did not persist with it when I told him how long the gap between hearings was likely to be.
131. In my judgment, it would be the worst of all possible worlds to start and then to run out of time.
133. (5) Prejudice to the Claimant arising from the adjournment
134. Though the applications that will now be adjourned were made on behalf of the Defendants, it is the Claimant who is likely to be disadvantaged by the inevitable delay.
136. The Claimant is right that it is unfortunate that it is now approximately 18 months since the applications for summary judgment were made by the first three Defendants. However, the applications could not realistically have been heard until relevant disclosure was made and digested. This took place during the course of 2025 and was a large exercise.
138. It is also unfortunate that the adjournment of these applications will result in a further delay which is likely to be considerable. This is the best point in favour of proceeding and it is a significant one. The Defences have not yet even been filed.
140. However, the prejudice that will inevitably be caused to the Claimant by the delay, and the wasted costs that will be incurred by all parties, are outweighed by the factors in favour of adjournment to which I have already referred. The issue relating to wasted costs can be addressed in the costs applications that will follow the delivery of this judgment.
142. Moreover, this is a very important set of applications. The stakes for the Claimant are very high, and it would not be in the interests of the Claimant, or any other party, for them to be rushed.
144. A positive side effect of adjournment is that the case can be relisted with a more realistic time estimate for the length of the hearing, and for the judge's pre-reading time.
146. (6) Would there have been time in any event to consider the original applications?
147. For the reasons I have given, the fact that the PII and confidentiality applications had to be dealt with first, and took almost two days, meant that there was no possibility of being able to proceed to deal with the summary judgment/jurisdiction applications this week.
149. However, in my view, the practical reality is that there was no chance of concluding the hearing of the original applications within three (or even four) days, even if the Court had not been required to deal with the PII and confidentiality applications as well. Though the three-day time estimate may well have been a sensible estimate in January 2025, when the Case Management Conference took place, it should have become apparent to the parties well in advance of this hearing that the three-day estimate had become over-optimistic in the extreme, and unrealistic.
151. As I have said, these applications are very high stakes and are plainly very important to the litigation. If they succeed, then the Claimant's claims against the relevant defendant may arguably be at an end.
153. In order to be in a position to form a view about how much time would have been needed to deal with the original applications, I have read the parties' skeleton arguments.
155. The original three-day time estimate was a joint estimate made at the hearing before Senior Master Cook in January 2025.
157. The summary judgment/jurisdiction applications raise complicated issues of law and, particularly, of fact, requiring a review of what the Claimant knew or ought to have known about the various elements of his claims over a period of many years.
159. There are three sets of parties in this case, and the basis for the applications by the Government Defendants, on the one hand, and GPT/Airbus, on the other, are materially different. The applications of GPT and Airbus are, as I have said, somewhat different in nature between themselves.
161. In his letter to the court dated 10 March 2026, Mr Dale KC described the scope of the issues that the court will have to examine and consider in relation to the summary judgment/jurisdiction applications. He said:
163. "With regard to the factual inquiry, this will involve the court being asked to determine (i) what facts and matters were known to the Claimant at all material times between 2010 and 2024; (ii) what information was deliberately concealed by the first three defendants; (iii) what, in the circumstances, would constitute reasonably credible evidence to be able to properly plead each of the causes of action set out in the SoC."
164. This inevitably involves a close analysis at every stage of the matter, by reference to the context at the time, the evidential position, and what was or was not deliberately concealed.
166. The factual complexity of the applications is shown by the fact that the Claimant's skeleton argument is 173 pages long, with a further 66 pages of appendices. This is a record for the length of a skeleton argument in my judicial experience. Whilst there may be some force in the Claimant's counsel's explanation that a more detailed review of the issues in the skeleton argument will save the court some time in reviewing other documents, the fact remains that the length of the Claimant's skeleton argument is an indication that the matters that the Court will have to consider are very detailed indeed. The skeleton is enormously detailed, with copious cross reference to passages in very many documents in the chronological bundle (which have not been filled in in the version that I have been provided with).
168. Both the Claimant's skeleton argument and GPT/Airbus's skeleton argument have appendices with very detailed analysis of the evidence as regards what it is alleged that the Claimant knew or should have known at certain times. GPT/Airbus's appendix contains 36 pages of material in a tiny font.
170. It is absolutely clear that there will have to be a very wide-ranging factual inquiry. The daunting scale of the documentation that the Court will have to be taken to and to read must have been apparent to the parties by the end of the disclosure exercise, last year.
172. As for the legal analysis, this will involve the court considering the relevant case law on sections 32(1)(a) and (b) of the Limitation Act 1980, the legal issues that these provisions give rise to, and their application to the facts as established.
174. The same type of factual and legal analysis is also involved in respect of the claims against Airbus, although the factual issues differ to some extent.
176. Further, the Court will need to consider the very nature of the exercise sought to be conducted in the applications, the suitability of conducting this exercise in any event, and whether, in effect, as the Claimant contends, what the Defendants are asking the Court to do is to conduct a mini trial under the guise of a summary judgment/strike out application.
178. It is clear that there are large numbers of points made in each party's skeleton argument which require addressing orally by the opposite party or parties.
180. A further indication of the scale of the task can be seen from the fact that the application bundle, not including the material relating to PII or confidentiality (apart from a few pages of correspondence about the late application) is 1005 pages long. The Chronological bundle is 3810 pages long. The authorities bundle is 4392 pages long. It might be said that it will not be necessary to look at every page, but it must be at least possible that the Court might have to do so, or the documents would not be included in the bundle in the first place. Indeed, as was acknowledged in argument before me, this is a case in which the judge is going to have to read very many of the documents in the bundle.
182. Furthermore, it became apparent to the Court only the day before the hearing that the Government Defendants had not understood the Claimant to be relying on section 32(1)(a) of the Limitation Act 1980 as well as section 32(1)(b). It follows that the arguments prepared on behalf of the Government Defendants do not address this issue. This means that there will have to be argument on whether the Claimant is entitled to rely upon this additional point and, if the Claimant is permitted to rely upon it, then there will be additional argument on the issue by the Government Defendants which has not been budgeted for in the listing.
184. I should add that the estimate of one day or less for the judge's advance reading time for the applications was a significant underestimate. Judges are not superhuman, and they have other demands on their time. In the event, though I had some time to look at this matter on Friday of last week, as well as on Monday of this week, much of my preparation time was necessarily spent considering the PII and confidentiality applications and the application for relief from sanctions. I read into this as much as I could in advance, but I could only scratch the surface. It is clear that the Court will have to look at a large number of documents in detail that I have not yet been able to read, and to hear submissions on them before a conclusion can be reached on the applications. Also the Court will have to hear detailed legal submissions.
186. For all of these reasons, I consider that, even if the more recent applications had not been made, the Court would have had to consider very carefully at the start of the hearing whether the summary judgment and jurisdiction applications would have to be adjourned. I think that it is likely that this is what would have happened. It would not have been realistic to expect the hearing to conclude within three, or even four, days, even with robust case management and restrictions on length of submissions. That can only go so far. It is not helpful to curtail the parties' submissions to such an extent that they are unable to get their points across adequately. There is so much ground to cover that truncated submissions would not assist the Court.
188. The Defendants have made the point that they were taken aback by the size of the Claimant's skeleton argument, when it was received approximately a week before the hearing began. This is understandable. It should have been clear to the Claimant's legal team in advance of completing the drafting of the skeleton argument that, even if the PII/confidentiality applications had not been made, it would have been virtually impossible to conclude the hearing within the three-day listing. But even before they had sight of the Claimant's skeleton argument, it should have been apparent to the Defendants' legal advisers that it would be a tall order, to put it mildly, to complete the hearing of their applications for summary judgment/jurisdiction within three days.
190. I make clear that I do not criticise any party for the length of the skeleton arguments and the appendices thereto. It is not possible for me at this stage to form a view as to whether or not it may be helpful in the long run to have descended to so much detail. Rather, I refer to these matters simply to make the point that the length and detail of the Claimant's skeleton argument starkly illustrates that it may well have been necessary to adjourn even if the PII/confidentiality applications were not made.
192. Conclusion
193. It is never pleasant to have to adjourn a hearing, especially one that has been the subject of such careful and thorough preparation. However, I have no doubt that the right decision has been to adjourn the summary judgment and jurisdiction applications, on the basis that they can be relisted on some future date with a more realistic time estimate.
195. In my view, it is consistent with the overriding objective and the interests of justice to adjourn the applications to a later date. Also, this is consistent with the fairest way to deal with the issue relating to section 32(1)(a) that has arisen.
197. This will result in some considerable delay, which is most unfortunate, but at least the battle lines in the litigation are now clear, and so, if the applications fail and the claims proceed, it should be possible for the Court to impose tight timetables for future stages in the litigation at the next hearing.
199. I will now give the parties some time to reflect on this judgment and I will then hear any applications for costs that they might wish to make.

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