Rahshjeem Benson v. Warden FCI Edgefield — Fourth Circuit Vacates Habeas Dismissal, Remands FSA Credits Dispute

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April 22, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Rahshjeem Benson v. Warden FCI Edgefield

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: 24-6713

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

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Combined Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 24-6713 Doc: 48 Filed: 04/22/2026 Pg: 1 of 17

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-6713

RAHSHJEEM BENSON,

Petitioner – Appellant,

v.

WARDEN FCI EDGEFIELD,

Respondent – Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Rock
Hill. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior District Judge. (0:24-cv-01195-HMH)

Argued: March 19, 2026 Decided: April 22, 2026

Before KING, AGEE, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the opinion in which
Judge King and Judge Harris joined.

ARGUED: Claire Victoria Madill, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Todd Stuart Timmons, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James
Wyda, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Bryan P. Stirling, United States Attorney, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
USCA4 Appeal: 24-6713 Doc: 48 Filed: 04/22/2026 Pg: 2 of 17

AGEE, Circuit Judge:

Rahshjeem Benson, a federal prisoner, was sentenced in December 2020. But he

was not transferred to his designated Bureau of Prisons (BOP) facility—Federal

Correctional Institution Edgefield (FCI Edgefield)—until March 2022. Prior to his arrival

at FCI Edgefield, Benson alleges that he participated in First Step Act (FSA) programs and

earned FSA credits which could expedite his pre-release custody or supervised release.

Once Benson arrived at FCI Edgefield, the BOP administered a risk and needs

assessment to determine the FSA programs best suited for a prisoner based on his risk of

recidivism. But because Benson did not receive the assessment until he arrived at FCI

Edgefield, the BOP refused to give him any credits he alleges that he previously earned.

Benson filed a pro se habeas petition, requesting that the BOP award him the

approximately 150 FSA credits he claims that he earned before arriving at FCI Edgefield.

Without conducting discovery or requiring a response from the Government, a magistrate

judge recommended dismissing his petition. The district court similarly declined to require

a response from the Government, rejected Benson’s objections to the magistrate judge’s

recommendation, and dismissed his petition.

For the reasons that follow, we vacate and remand for additional proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

I.

A.

2
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Before discussing the factual background and procedural history, a brief recitation

of the relevant statutory framework is in order.

The FSA was designed to promote the release of federal prisoners who are less likely

to recidivate and thereby reduce the federal prison population. White v. Warden of Fed.

Corr. Inst. – Cumberland, 164 F.4th 326, 330 (4th Cir. 2025). Congress directed the

Attorney General in the FSA to develop a “risk and needs assessment system” to be used

by the BOP to (1) determine each prisoner’s risk of recidivism and risk of violent or serious

misconduct; (2) assign the prisoner to “appropriate evidence-based recidivism reduction

[(EBRR)] programs or productive activities [(PAs)]”; and (3) assess when a prisoner is

“ready to transfer into prerelease custody or supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632 (a). The

FSA also tasks the BOP with providing “all prisoners with the opportunity to actively

participate in [EBRR] programs or [PAs] . . . throughout their entire term of incarceration.”

Id. § 3621(h)(6).

Through participation in FSA programming, prisoners earn time credits that can be

used to expedite pre-release custody or supervised release. Specifically, “[a] prisoner . . .

who successfully completes [EBRR] programming or [PAs] . . . shall earn 10 days or time

credits for every 30 days of successful participation.” Id. § 3632(d)(4)(A). And if a prisoner

is “at a minimum or low risk for recidivating” and “has not increased [his] risk of

recidivism” “over 2 consecutive assessments,” he “shall earn an additional 5 days of time

credits for every 30 days of successful participation.” Id.

The FSA does not define “successful participation.” Instead, a BOP regulation

provides that “successful participation” in programming “requires a determination by

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[BOP] staff that an eligible inmate has participated in the EBRR programs or PAs that the

[BOP] has recommended based on the inmate’s individualized risk and needs assessment,

and has complied with the requirements of each particular EBRR Program or PA.” 28

C.F.R. § 523.41 (c)(2).

B.

In December 2020, Benson was sentenced in the District of Maine to 57 months’

imprisonment in connection with various bank-fraud-related convictions. At that point,

Benson was taken into custody at the Donald W. Wyatt Detention Center (Wyatt) in Rhode

Island. However, his BOP-designated facility was FCI Edgefield.

Since Benson was facing other charges in the District of Massachusetts with a trial

date set for March 2021, he remained at Wyatt and his transfer to FCI Edgefield was

delayed. 1 The Massachusetts charges resulted in additional convictions and a 108-month

prison sentence to run concurrent with the sentence imposed by the District of Maine.

Relevant to the case now before us, Benson claims that he accrued approximately 150 days

of time credits under the FSA during his time at Wyatt.

On March 30, 2022—nearly fifteen months after being taken into custody at

Wyatt—Benson arrived at FCI Edgefield. On arrival, Benson received his FSA risk and

needs assessment and was classified as having a “low” recidivism risk. FCI Edgefield did

1
According to the Government, Benson was briefly removed from Wyatt at one
point. But after his “counsel expressed concern over this,” he was returned to Wyatt.
Response Br. 9. Benson maintains that he was detained at Wyatt continuously following
his arrest in 2019. For purposes of this appeal, this dispute is of no moment.
4
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not, however, recognize the approximately 150 FSA credits Benson allegedly earned while

at Wyatt.

Sometime after Benson’s arrival, the BOP re-administered his risk and needs

assessment. As a result, Benson’s risk of recidivism was raised from “low” to “medium.” 2

When he filed the habeas petition in this case, Benson had accrued 220 days of BOP-

approved FSA credits at FCI Edgefield. J.A. 19. His anticipated release date is November

22, 2027. Find an Inmate, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/

https://perma.cc/2WGE-TV8F.

Benson filed multiple grievances at FCI Edgefield seeking recognition of the

approximately 150 days of FSA time credits he allegedly earned at Wyatt, but all of those

grievances were denied. Thereafter, Benson filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241, raising the same issue. Without seeking briefing, discovery, or hearing argument,

the magistrate judge recommended dismissing Benson’s petition. Benson filed objections.

The district court agreed with the magistrate judge, rejecting Benson’s three

objections and dismissing his petition without prejudice and without requiring the

Government to respond. First, it rejected his argument that the magistrate judge

“disregarded the plain language of the FSA in stating that he was not eligible to earn time

credits until he arrived at FCI Edgefield.” J.A. 37. Despite concluding that Benson was

eligible to earn FSA credits as of December 15, 2020, the district court found “no evidence

2
The Government moved to supplement the record with Benson’s updated
assessment, to which Benson objected. Because the updated assessment informs this
Court’s analysis, we grant the Government’s motion and consider Benson’s new
assessment in evaluating this appeal.
5
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in the record that he ‘successfully participated’ in any [FSA] programs . . . before he arrived

at FCI Edgefield on March 30, 2022.” J.A. 38. And consistent with the BOP’s regulation

defining “successful participation” as being linked to the completion of a prior risk and

needs assessment, the district court held that Benson could not have earned FSA credits

before his assessment on March 30, 2022.

Second, the district court rejected Benson’s argument that the BOP’s “regulation

requiring that inmates undergo an initial risk and needs assessment before earning time

credits is based on an impermissible construction of the FSA.” J.A. 39. Applying Chevron 3

deference, the district court concluded that the BOP permissibly linked credits to the risk

and needs assessment. Based on that interpretation, it reasoned that the BOP was not

required to award credits for programming before its administration of an assessment.

Finally, the district court rejected Benson’s argument that the BOP erred by failing

to administer his risk and needs assessment sooner. It noted that Benson received his

assessment the day that he arrived at FCI Edgefield, in line with BOP guidance.

Benson timely appealed, and this Court appointed the Federal Defender of the

District of Maryland to represent him. The parties dispute whether this Court has Article

III jurisdiction but, if it does, it has statutory jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

3
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
6
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On appeal, we are tasked with resolving two issues. First, the Government contends

that this Court lacks Article III jurisdiction because Benson’s “medium” recidivism risk

assessment renders this controversy moot. If we have jurisdiction, then we may reach the

second issue: whether the district court erroneously concluded Benson was ineligible to

accrue FSA credits during his post-sentencing detention at Wyatt but before his risk and

needs assessment at FCI Edgefield. We address each issue in turn below.

A.

Although the BOP initially categorized Benson as a “low” recidivism risk, upon re-

administration of the risk and needs assessment, it assigned him a “medium” recidivism

risk. The Government contends that the higher risk status stands as a statutory bar to

Benson having his FSA credits applied, rendering this case moot. We disagree.

“[F]or a controversy to be moot, it must lack at least one of the three required

elements of Article III standing: (1) injury in fact, (2) causation, or (3) redressability.”

Townes v. Jarvis, 577 F.3d 543, 546–47 (4th Cir. 2009). “A case becomes moot—and

therefore no longer a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ for purposes of Article III—when the issues

presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the

outcome.” United States v. Ketter, 908 F.3d 61, 65 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Already, LLC

v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013)). Mootness is difficult to prove, though, as “[a] case

becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever

to the prevailing party.” Id. (citation omitted).

Under the FSA, a prisoner’s recidivism determination is not static; Congress

directed the BOP to administer “periodic risk reassessments.” Id. § 3624(g)(1)(B). As a

7
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prisoner’s risk of recidivism ebbs and flows with each reassessment, so too does his

eligibility for expedited pre-release custody or supervised release. To that end, to be

eligible for pre-release custody based only on a risk of recidivism, a prisoner must be at “a

minimum or low risk to recidivate pursuant to [his] last 2 reassessments.” Id.

§ 3624(g)(1)(D). Still, prisoners with “medium” or “high” risks of recidivism are not left

empty-handed. The FSA permits those prisoners to “petition to be transferred to prerelease

custody or supervised release [upon] approv[al] by the warden of the prison,” based on

certain statutorily-prescribed determinations. Id. § 3724(g)(1)(D)(i)(II).

Here, upon his arrival at FCI Edgefield, Benson received a “low” recidivism risk.

But the BOP subsequently re-administered the risk and needs assessment and found that

he was a “medium” recidivism risk, placing him outside the reach of certain provisions of

the FSA. See id. § 3624(g)(1)(D). As a result, the Government argues that Benson is up a

creek without a paddle because, even if we grant his habeas petition, his situation does not

change. He remains a “medium” risk of recidivism and thus ineligible for expedited pre-

release custody or supervised release.

On the surface, this argument has some appeal. A favorable determination in the

risk and needs assessment essentially permits Benson to open a locked door to applying his

FSA credits—and it is within the BOP’s purview, not ours, to give him the key. However,

the Government overlooks key provisions of the FSA and misapplies this Court’s precedent

in advancing its mootness argument.

Looking to the FSA, prisoners at “medium” or “high” risks of recidivism are not

deprived of all opportunities to apply FSA credits. As noted earlier, a prisoner is eligible

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for pre-release custody or supervised release if, inter alia, he “has shown through the

periodic risk assessments a demonstrated recidivism risk reduction or has maintained a

minimum or low recidivism risk, during [his] term of imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3624 (g)(1)(B). But a prisoner is also eligible if he (1) “has been determined . . . to be a

minimum or low risk to recidivate pursuant to the last 2 reassessments of the prisoner;” or

(2) “has had a petition to be transferred to prerelease custody or supervised release

approved by the warden of the prison, after the warden’s determination that” he (a) “would

not be a danger to society if transferred to prerelease custody or supervised release;” (b)

“has made a good faith effort to lower [his] recidivism risk through participation in

recidivism reduction programs or [PAs];” and (c) “is unlikely to recidivate.” Id.

§ 3642(g)(1)(D)(i); see id. § 3642(g)(1)(D)(ii).

In other words, the FSA does not squarely foreclose a prisoner’s eligibility for

prerelease custody or supervised release based on a single determination that he has a

“medium” risk of recidivism. To be sure, it limits that prisoner’s options, but it leaves two

paths to eligibility (albeit narrower paths than prisoners with uninterrupted records of

“minimum” or “low” risk assessments): (1) two subsequent reassessments of “low” risk;

or (2) the warden’s approval of the prisoner’s petition.

Under our precedent, Benson’s statutorily-prescribed paths to FSA eligibility for

prerelease custody or supervised release are sufficient to establish Article III jurisdiction.

This Court has recognized that, “[i]n some cases, like the one at hand, a plaintiff will seek

immediate relief from a federal court as a necessary antecedent to the ultimate relief he

seeks from a different entity, like an administrative agency.” Townes, 577 F.3d at 547. But

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that dynamic does not, in and of itself, deprive this Court of jurisdiction. Instead, to

establish redressability in such situations, “a party must demonstrate that a favorable

decision from the federal court likely would provide him immediate relief, but need not

demonstrate that it likely would provide him the ultimate, discretionary relief sought from

the agency.” Id. To require otherwise “would involve courts in the speculative (if not

impossible) task of predicting how an agency will exercise its discretion.” Id. at 548.

In the case before us, if Benson were to prevail on his claims, he could access a

metaphorical “bank” of approximately 150 days of FSA credits. True, these credits would

only become available to him upon the BOP’s exercise of its discretion—either through

two consecutive determinations that he is a “low” risk of recidivism, 18 U.S.C.

§ 3632 (d)(4)(A), or through the warden’s approval of Benson’s petition to be transferred

to prerelease custody or supervised release, id. § 3724(g)(1)(D)(i)(II). We cannot know

now how the BOP will choose to exercise its discretion, but that isn’t the point of decision

for our jurisdictional analysis as it relates to mootness. What counts is that under the FSA,

the agency could grant Benson access to his alleged “bank” of credits if we clear the path

by first addressing Benson’s argument on appeal.

In other words, “if [Benson] prevails on the merits before us, he likely will obtain

the immediate relief he seeks,” i.e., the opportunity to access his pre-assessment credits

upon the agency’s favorable exercise of discretion. Townes, 577 F.3d at 549. So while “we

refuse to speculate as to how [the BOP] w[ill] exercise its discretion,” we conclude that

Benson “has set forth facts sufficient to demonstrate that his claims are not moot, and we

accordingly turn to the merits of his appeal.” Id.

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B.

Benson contends that the BOP’s interpretation of “successful participation” is

inconsistent with the FSA and is therefore not entitled to deference under Chevron, which

the Supreme Court overturned in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369

(2024). We vacate and remand for the district court to decide in the first instance whether

the BOP’s interpretation survives scrutiny under Loper Bright.

As a threshold issue, the Government attempts an end-run around the Chevron issue,

arguing that this Court may affirm the dismissal of Benson’s petition because he failed to

adequately plead participation in FSA programs before he arrived at FCI Edgefield. But

“[p]ro se filings are to be construed liberally.” Sanford v. Clarke, 52 F.4th 582, 587 (4th

Cir. 2022). And in his pro se habeas petition, Benson alleged that he “availed himself

admirably of the [PAs] which were made available to him” during his time at Wyatt. J.A.

10–11. We also note that, after the magistrate judge recommended dismissing his petition

based on his failure to allege adequate participation, Benson objected. He explained that,

“[w]hen he was transferred between facilities he had property go missing, including his

completion certificates for rehabilitation programs he completed.” J.A. 33. Further, Benson

explained that “there is testimony in his court transcripts that he ‘had at least 20

completions of different programs that he’s engaged in on his own,’” and he asked the

district court to “request his educational transcripts from his federal holding facility to

determine how many additional days he may be entitled to.” Id. He noted that he had made

such a request, “but ha[d] not yet received a response.” Id.

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A review of the district court’s opinion reveals that it did not engage with—let alone

rely on—this argument. It dismissed Benson’s petition because he did not successfully

participate in FSA programs as defined in the BOP’s regulations—not that he failed to

plead participation altogether. And notably, it did so without permitting any discovery or

requiring a response from the Government. The record is thus critically under-developed

on the issue of whether Benson actually participated in FSA programs prior to arriving at

FCI Edgefield.

Given our liberal construction of pro se pleadings and the district court’s failure to

develop the record or address this argument, we decline to affirm on this ground. See

McNair v. McCune, 527 F.2d 874, 875 (4th Cir. 1975) (“Because the facts have not been

ascertained, we are compelled to assume the truth of the complaint, and because it was

prepared pro se, to construe it liberally.”).

Having dispensed with the Government’s pleading deficiency argument, we are left

with the district court’s conclusion that, applying Chevron deference, the BOP’s

implementation of its “successful participation” regulation was a valid exercise of

delegated authority. The trouble, of course, is that Chevron was overturned in Loper Bright,

603 U.S. 369. In the wake of Loper Bright, federal courts “may not defer to an agency

interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.” Id. at 413. Instead,

“[c]ourts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has

acted within its statutory authority, as the APA requires.” Id. “Courts ‘fulfill[] that role by

recognizing constitutional delegations, fixing the boundaries of the delegated authority,

and ensuring the agency has engaged in reasoned decisionmaking within those

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boundaries.” United States v. Kokinda, 146 F.4th 405, 417 (4th Cir. 2025) (quoting Loper

Bright, 603 U.S. at 395). The goal of this inquiry is to ensure that agencies are adhering to

the “single, best meaning” of a statute. Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 400.

While we recognize the district court did not have the benefit of Loper Bright at the

time of its decision, it must be applied now. Accordingly, we remand for the district court

to address the Loper Bright issue in the first instance. We briefly discuss some guiding

principles for purposes of remand.

Turning to the text, the FSA provides: “A prisoner may not earn time credits under

this paragraph for an [EBRR] program that the prisoner successfully completed . . . prior

to the date of enactment of this subchapter; or . . . during official detention prior to the date

that the prisoner’s sentence commences under section 3585(a).” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3632 (d)(4)(B). Section 3585(a), in turn, explains that a sentence “commences on the date

the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to

commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to

be served.” Id. § 3585(a) (emphasis added).

The FSA also provides that a prisoner “who successfully completes [EBRR]

programming or [PAs] . . . shall earn 10 days or time credits for every 30 days of successful

participation.” Id. § 3632(d)(4)(A). What the FSA does not provide, however, is a

definition of “successful participation.” The BOP stepped into that void, defining

“successful participation” as “requir[ing] a determination by [BOP] staff that an eligible

inmate has participated in the EBRR programs or PAs that the [BOP] has recommended

based on the inmate’s individualized risk and needs assessment, and has complied with the

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requirements of each particular EBRR Program or PA.” 28 C.F.R. § 523.41 (c)(2)

(emphasis added). The BOP has, in practice, interpreted that definition as requiring that

prisoners complete a risk and needs assessment before being eligible to earn FSA credits.

In line with the FSA’s definition of “commence,” we conclude that the district court

correctly found Benson’s sentence commenced when he was taken into custody of the U.S.

Marshals Service on December 15, 2020. J.A. 37–38. Critically, the FSA does not hinge

the commencement of a prisoner’s sentence on his arrival to his BOP-designated facility.

Therefore, Benson’s ability to “earn time credits” is not tied to his arrival at FCI Edgefield.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3632 (d)(4)(B)(ii). As a result, the fact that Benson did not arrive at his

designated facility, FCI Edgefield, until March 2022 is irrelevant to the commencement of

his sentence for FSA purposes. So under the FSA, Benson was eligible to participate in

FSA programs as of December 2020, and he alleges he did exactly that. Yet the BOP

declined to recognize any credits Benson allegedly earned before his arrival at FCI

Edgefield because the BOP’s definition of “successful participation” requires an

individualized risk and needs assessment as a condition precedent to any participation.

While that regulation may make some practical sense, the statutory requirement as to when

a sentence “commences” is mandatory.

In short, Congress decided that a prisoner is eligible to earn credits when his

sentence commences. 18 U.S.C. § 3632 (d)(4)(B). Despite that clear commend, it appears

that the BOP’s interpretation of “successful participation” permits it to ignore FSA time

credits earned after a prisoner’s sentence commences but before the BOP’s own

administration of an assessment. Insomuch as that interpretation is not due the now-

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discarded Chevron deference, we leave it to the district court to flesh out in the first instance

whether it is the “single, best meaning” of the FSA. Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 400. 4

We now briefly address the Government’s additional argument that White v.

Warden of Federal Correctional Institution – Cumberland, 164 F.4th 326 (4th Cir. 2025),

resolved this issue. In White, the plaintiff, a federal prisoner, sought FSA credits based on

the BOP’s failure to provide him with programming during a three-day period while he

was housed in a federal transfer center. Id. at 328. But the Court’s resolution of that issue

does not resolve the issue presented in this appeal.

In White, the Court conducted a Loper Bright analysis and concluded that “under

the best reading of the FSA, the district court correctly ruled that White is not entitled to

FSA time credits for his three-day transitory stay in the [federal transfer center], where no

FSA programming was offered and where there is no evidence that White even requested

such programming while there.” Id. at 330. We emphasized that “[i]n this case, the record

does not demonstrate, nor does it at all suggest, that White participated in or completed any

programming to earn credits during his three days in [the federal facility] while transferring

from FCI Terre Haute to FCI Cumberland.” Id. at 331. That was fatal to White’s claim

because “[t]he statute is plain; it requires participation for credits.” Id. “For White, it [was]

4
On remand, the Government requested that the Court instruct the district court to
consider whether it retains jurisdiction given that Benson has allegedly been transferred to
a federal detention facility outside of the District of South Carolina. We decline to do so.
“When the ‘Government moves a habeas petitioner after [he] properly files a petition
naming [his] immediate custodian, the District Court [where the petitioner filed a petition]
retains jurisdiction.’” Lennear v. Wilson, 937 F.3d 257, 263 n.1 (4th Cir. 2019) (alteration
in original) (quoting Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 441 (2004)).
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not a question of whether he successfully participated; it [was] a question of whether he

participated at all, and the record show[ed] that he did not.” Id. at 333.

By contrast, Benson’s successful participation for FSA purposes is the issue here

and that has yet to be resolved. As explained above, the factual record is in far too nascent

a stage to dismiss on the ground that Benson did not, in fact, participate in FSA programs

during his time at Wyatt. Thus, the Court’s holding that White’s failure to actually

participate in FSA programs meant he was not entitled to FSA credits does not control this

appeal. 5

For all the reasons set forth above, we vacate and remand this case for the district

court to address in the first instance whether the BOP’s interpretation of “successful

participation” reflects the “single, best meaning” of the FSA. 6, 7 Loper Bright, 603 U.S.

400.

5
In White, the Court also held that federal prisoners do not have a liberty interest in
FSA time credits. 164 F.4th at 333–35. That holding similarly has no bearing on the issue
of whether Benson successfully participated in programming, as required by the FSA.
6
If the district court concludes that the BOP’s interpretation is inconsistent with the
FSA, this case raises a panoply of other questions. For instance, additional factfinding
would be necessary to determine how many credits Benson actually earned during his time
at Wyatt. In addition, the district court would need to determine whether Benson is entitled
to all of his FSA time credits earned during his time at Wyatt, or if he is only entitled to
credits that comport with his risk assessment at the time of his arrival at FCI Edgefield.
These are important, fact-intensive questions. That said, Benson is scheduled to be
released in November 2027 and, if he receives a favorable decision, could be eligible for
pre-release custody and supervised release earlier than that. Therefore, to the extent
practicable, we encourage the district court to act with the utmost expediency.
7
Because we vacate and remand for the district court to consider this issue in light
of Loper Bright, we do not address Benson’s argument that the delay in his transfer to FCI
Edgefield independently warrants receipt of any additional FSA credits.
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III.

The judgment of the district court is therefore vacated and remanded for additional

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

VACATED AND REMANDED

17