Foster v. Sutton - Real Property Dispute / Unjust Enrichment Award

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April 8, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Terry Foster v. Stephanie Sutton and Sutton Ltd., LLC

Court of Appeals of Arkansas

• Citations: 2026 Ark. App. 224

• Docket Number: Unknown

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (5.3K)

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Combined Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 224
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CV-25-236

TERRY FOSTER Opinion Delivered April 8, 2026

APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE RANDOLPH
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 61CV-24-26]

STEPHANIE SUTTON AND SUTTON HONORABLE ADAM G. WEEKS,
LTD., LLC JUDGE
APPELLEES
AFFIRMED

CINDY GRACE THYER, Judge

Terry Foster brings this appeal from an order of the Randolph County Circuit Court

finding that he failed to prove the existence of a contract for the purchase of real property

but awarding him $18,300 on a theory of unjust enrichment. On appeal, Foster argues that

the circuit court’s decision denied him his due-process and equal-protection rights. In

addition, he raises claims of fraud and argues that the circuit court’s finding that no contract

existed was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.

The parties to this case are appellant Terry Foster (“Terry”) and appellees Stephanie

Sutton (“Stephanie”) and Sutton LTD., LLC (“the LLC”). When the LLC was formed in

2017, the only two members were Stephanie and her husband, Keith Sutton (“Keith”).

According to the LLC’s operating agreement, any action to sell any company property

required the unanimous consent of all members.
In November 2018, the LLC purchased the parcel of property at issue in this case

from Charlotte and Ralph Baltz for $80,000. Keith used the property for an auto body shop.

In January 2022, Terry contacted Keith about buying the property to use as his own shop,

and Keith agreed to sell it to him for $80,000. Although Terry began making payments for

the property, there was apparently never a written contract memorializing the sale. A

“mortgage deed” reflected the sale price of $80,000, but this document was not signed by

either Keith or Terry or executed by the LLC.

Keith passed away in December 2023. At that time, Stephanie knew that Terry had

been working in the shop on the property, but she assumed he was renting it since she and

Keith owned it. She was unaware of the purported mortgage deed until she was going

through some documents after Keith died and found the deed and an amortization schedule

in an envelope among his things. The amortization schedule showed that Terry had been

making payments on the property from May 2022 through December 2023.

In February 2024, Stephanie and the LLC filed a complaint against Terry. They

asserted that Keith and Terry had only an oral agreement to sell the property, and the alleged

mortgage deed was neither executed by any named party to the instrument nor executed by

the true owner of the property, the LLC. The complaint asked the circuit court to determine

that the purported contract was ineffective. Alternatively, in the event the court found that

a contract existed, the complaint alleged that Terry was in breach of the contract because he

had failed to pay taxes and insurance on the property and had paid two months’ rent

payments with a check written on insufficient funds. If the court found no breach of

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contract, the complaint asked the court to determine the amount of principal that remained

due on the indebtedness.

The matter proceeded to trial in October 2024. Terry testified that he and Keith were

half brothers. Terry first contacted Keith about purchasing the property in January 2022. He

said that they had been talking about it for a couple of years, but the property had previously

been rented by someone else. The agreed-upon purchase price was $80,000, which is the

amount Keith had paid for it in 2018. Terry explained that the amortization schedule showed

payments that he had made from May 2022 through December 2023. He claimed that those

payments were in addition to $40,000 in cash that Terry delivered to Keith in March 2022.

Terry knew that Stephanie did not want him to have the property, acknowledging

that she had sent him an email after Keith died expressly informing him of her disapproval.

He denied there was ever any discussion about the LLC owning the property, saying “it was

mixed up. Some of it had her name on it, some of it didn’t.” He said the deal was between

him and Keith individually because Stephanie did not want to sell the property to him.

Regarding the mortgage deed, Terry said that he obtained the deed from Keith at the

same time he got the amortization schedule. He conceded that he never signed the deed,

which he got months after he started making payments. He also agreed that the deed

provided that he would pay taxes and insurance on the property, but he never did. Terry said

he and Keith “worked on” getting the mortgage deed signed but never got it done. Asked if

part of the reason was because Stephanie was not going to agree to the sale, Terry replied, “It

wasn’t her building. It wasn’t her––wasn’t her deal.” He initially claimed the title was solely

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in Keith’s name and that Stephanie “didn’t have nothing more to do with it.” But when

asked if the title was in Keith’s name and not Keith’s and Stephanie’s names, he replied, “I

understand it was both ways. Sometime it was, sometime it wasn’t.” He added that he did

not think she had to sign off on the contract because Keith “was the one I dealt with. He’s

the one that said it was his building.” At the conclusion of his direct testimony, Terry agreed

that he and Keith never got everything in writing because “she didn’t want me to have it.”

Terry asked that the contract for the sale of the property be honored and that he take title

to and possession of the property.

Stephanie also testified at trial, asserting that before her husband’s death, she knew

that Terry was renting the building that she and Keith owned, but she had no information

or details about “the land deal.” Stephanie said she didn’t take care of any of the business

and did not see the mortgage deed between Keith and Terry until after Keith died. She said

that she neither individually nor as a member of the LLC ever agreed to the sale of the

property. Stephanie testified that she would not have approved the sale of the property for

$80,000 to Terry or to anyone else. She noted that other people had expressed an interest in

buying the property and that she had an offer of $132,000 for it, with the contingency that

Terry not be on the property. Stephanie agreed that, despite some bounced checks, Terry

was current on payments according to the amortization schedule through October 2024,

such that the remaining balance on the purported loan was $69,282; however, she had never

found any receipts of any kind between Keith and Terry. On cross-examination, Stephanie

acknowledged that Terry had been making payments to Keith; however, she said she had no

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idea that Keith was trying to sell the property, and she thought the money being paid was

rent.

After the trial, the circuit court issued a letter opinion on November 1, 2024, in which

it found that no enforceable contract existed between the parties:

The majority of the essential elements necessary for a contract are there. It is
clear to me that Mr. Sutton and Mr. Foster intended to enter into a sale for the subject
property. The amortization schedule found by Ms. Sutton following her husband’s
death evidenced an agreed upon monthly payment and interest rate. The evidence
points to the $80,000 amount amortized was not a sale price but a remaining balance.
The Mortgage Deed found in Mr. Sutton’s working papers provides some evidence
of intent. Unfortunately, the terms laid out therein do not reflect what was happening
in real life.

All of that being said: a contract requires an agreement by and between two or
more parties, bound by consideration. We do not have that here. The subject property
is owned by Sutton Ltd., LLC. The Operating Agreement entered into evidence states
that this is a member managed corporation. What’s more, there is a prohibition
against selling the majority of the assets of the corporation without unanimous
consent from its members. Furthermore, were Mr. Sutton to wish to sell his
ownership interest in the LLC, Ms. Sutton would have had a right to purchase his
interest first.

It is clear from the evidence that Mr. Foster believes to this day that Ms. Sutton
does not hold any ownership interest in the subject property. His testimony was such
at trial. He clearly does not believe that his deal was with her. Nor did he believe that
his deal was with Sutton Ltd., LLC. Thus it is clear that Sutton Ltd., LLC––the owner
of the property––did not enter into an enforceable contract for the sale of the subject
property.

The court also noted that “the fallout from this decision requires further argument” and

directed the parties to file posttrial briefs “as to what the result of this decision should be.”

An order reflecting the court’s findings was entered on November 14.

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Terry submitted a brief in which he argued that Stephanie had been unjustly enriched

by the payments he made to her for a property that he never received. Stephanie and the

LLC responded that, among other things, Terry failed to satisfactorily prove a specific dollar

amount by which they had been unjustly enriched.

The circuit court entered a judgment on January 22, 2025. In it, the court found that

Foster had made cash payments of $40,000 to Keith on behalf of the LLC, thereby unjustly

enriching Stephanie and the LLC. The court also found that a fair rental value on the

property would have been $700 a month beginning in May 2022, and it offset $21,700 in

fair rental from the $40,000 payments. The court therefore entered a judgment in Terry’s

favor for $18,300, which would be a lien on the property and would be satisfied at the closing

of the sale of the property to a third party. Terry filed a timely pro se notice of appeal on

January 29.

In appeals from bench trials, we will reverse only if the circuit court’s findings are

clearly erroneous. Jones v. MNLRN, LLC, 2025 Ark. App. 537, 725 S.W.3d 790; Glenn v.

Bubbus, 2018 Ark. App. 252, 548 S.W.3d 857. Whether a binding contract exists is a

question of law. Smith v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 340 Ark. 335, 10 S.W.3d 846 (2000).

Terry’s argument on appeal is somewhat difficult to follow. 1 His point heading states

that he is arguing whether he was “denied due process and equal protection guaranteed by

1
We also point out that Terry’s statement of the case is woefully deficient. Arkansas
Supreme Court Rule 4-2(a)(6) requires an appellant’s brief to contain a statement of the case
and facts that “shall identify and discuss all material factual and procedural information
contained in the record on appeal. . . . All material information must be supported by

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the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution when the Randolph County Circuit

Court held Appellant’s cash payments of $78,000 toward purchase price of real property,

consideration, as rent and ordered Appellant off the property; further, whether Appellee

treated Appellant’s contract as a Ponzi scheme.” In addition to his due-process and equal-

protection arguments, he also asserts both that the circuit court “ruled the contract

unenforceable” and that it “found no contract exists because of lack of consideration.”

Finally, he urges that Keith and Stephanie Sutton committed fraud. 2

Terry’s due-process, equal-protection, and fraud arguments were neither presented to

nor ruled on by the circuit court. We acknowledge that he did mention due process and

equal protection in his notice of appeal, and he asserted that the Suttons had engaged in

fraud or a Ponzi scheme in a response to the LLC’s request for notice in the event that he

sought an appeal bond. The circuit court, however, was never given an opportunity to rule

on these issues and arguments. We therefore conclude that they are not preserved for

appellate review. See Chastain v. Chastain, 2012 Ark. App. 73, 388 S.W.3d 495 (stating the

well-settled rule that in order to preserve an argument for appeal, the issue must first be

raised at the circuit court level).

citations to the pages of the appellate record where the information can be found.” Terry’s
statement of the case does none of these things. We do not order rebriefing, however,
because the appellees’ brief supplies the missing information in an appropriate format.
2
Terry’s appeal does not challenge the specific dollar amount of the judgment
awarded to him.

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The sole argument preserved for appeal is that the circuit court erred in finding that

no contract existed, although Terry mistakenly asserts that the court found that no contract

existed for lack of consideration. In actuality, the circuit court found that there was no

contract because the true owner of the property––the LLC––was not a party to the

agreement.

We find no error in this decision. In a factually analogous case, this court affirmed a

grant of summary judgment finding that no contract existed. Stewart v. Copeland Holdings,

LLC, 2009 Ark. App. 145, involved a suit to recover earnest money in a real-estate-contract

dispute. The real estate at issue was owned by Henley Properties, LLC; the sole members of

the LLC were Rebecca and Waylan Henley. Appellee Copeland Holdings, LLC, paid

$20,000 earnest money to purchase that real estate; the offer was accepted by the Henleys’

personal attorney-in-fact. The terms of the contract were never performed, however, and

Copeland sued for the return of its earnest money, arguing, among other things, that no

contract had ever been formed. Copeland eventually moved for summary judgment,

asserting that the Henleys, individually, had no ownership interest in the property. The

circuit court granted Copeland’s motion, reasoning that the Henleys’ attorney-in-fact signed

the contract on behalf of Rebecca and Waylan Henley individually and not as their agent or

in the capacity of their LLC. This court affirmed, writing as follows:

The trial court did not err in its application of the law based on a finding of
fact that neither the owner of the property nor its agent signed the contract nor was
ever identified as a party to the contract. The facts regarding whether a contract was
formed are not in dispute. The sellers in the contract are listed as Tony Stewart,
Waylan Henley and Rebecca Henley. However, the Henleys owned no interest in this

8
property because they had conveyed by way of warranty deed recorded April 18, 2006,
their right, title, and interest to the land at issue. Eric Bray [the attorney-in-fact] signed
the contract as attorney-in-fact for Waylan Henley and Rebecca Henley. Again, the
Henleys had no ownership interest in the property.

An essential element of a contract is “competent parties.” See Youree v.
Eshaghoff, 99 Ark. App. 4, 256 S.W.3d 551 (2007). Because the LLC was never a party
to the contract, it cannot be argued that an enforceable contract was ever formed. Accordingly,
we hold that the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment was not clearly
erroneous.

Stewart, 2009 Ark. App. 145, at 2–3 (emphasis added).

Here, as in Stewart, the LLC was never a party to the contract. The circuit court thus

did not err in determining that no valid contract was ever formed, and we therefore affirm.

Affirmed.

VIRDEN and GLADWIN, JJ., agree.

Larry J. Steele, PLC, by: Larry J. Steele, for appellant.

Brett D. Watson, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by: Brett D. Watson; and Broadaway Law Firm,

by: Brad Broadaway, for appellees.

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