Rifahi v Secretary, Department of Social Services – Extension of Time Refused, Judicial Review Dismissed

Original Word Document (106.8 KB) Federal Court of Australia

Rifahi v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2026] FCA 487

| File number(s): | NSD 1667 of 2025 |

| Judgment of: | BROMWICH J |

| Date of judgment: | 12 February 2026 |

| Date of publication of reasons | 22 April 2026 |

| Catchwords: | SOCIAL SECURITY – application for an extension of time to bring application for judicial review of Social Security Appeals Tribunal (SSAT) decision – where SSAT upheld decision that applicant owed debt arising from payment of disability support pension when he was not entitled to payment by virtue of his absence from Australia – where applicant sought to bring judicial review application 14 years after SSAT decision – where proposed grounds of review without merit – HELD: application for extension of time refused; application for judicial review dismissed |

| Legislation: | Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5(1)(a), 5(2)(g), 11(1)(c), 11(3)

Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) ss 1213(a), 1213A(1), 1215(1)(a), 1217, 1218, 1218(2), 1218AA(1), 1218A, 1218B, 1223(1), 1237A(1), 1237AAD, Sch 1A cl 128, Sch 1A cl 135, Sch 1A cl 135(1)(a)

Social Security and Veterans' Entitlements Legislation Amendment (Miscellaneous Matters) Act 2000 (Cth) Sch 1 item 110, Sch 1 item 113.

Family and Community Services and Veterans’ Affairs Legislation Amendment (2003 Budget and Other Measures) Act 2003 (Cth) s 2, Sch 6 item 18, Sch 6 item 19 |

| Cases cited: | Rajcinoski v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2006] FCA 1396

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; 214 CLR 1 |

| Division: | General Division |

| Registry: | New South Wales |

| National Practice Area: | Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights |

| Number of paragraphs: | 54 |

| Date of last submission/s: | 22 January 2026 |

| Date of hearing: | 12 February 2026 |

| Counsel for the Applicant: | The Applicant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter |

| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr N Swan |

| Solicitor for the Respondents: | Hicksons | Hunt & Hunt |
ORDERS

| NSD 1667 of 2025 |

| BETWEEN: | JOE RIFAHI

Applicant | |
| AND: | SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

First Respondent

SERVICES AUSTRALIA (CENTRELINK)

Second Respondent | |

| order made by: | BROMWICH J |
| DATE OF ORDER: | 12 February 2026 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The applicant be refused an extension of time within which to bring an application for review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth).

2. The originating application for judicial review dated 3 December 2025 and filed 4 December 2025 be dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent as assessed or agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BROMWICH J:

1 These are my reasons for refusing an extension of time within which to bring an application for review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act) and dismissing that application on the day of the hearing on 12 February 2026.

2 The applicant sought to challenge decisions by which he was found not to be entitled to the payment of disability support pension (DSP), by reason of being absent from Australia for lengthy periods of time in excess of those for which he was entitled to continue to receive such payments. He was therefore required to repay those sums.

3 The respondents are:

(a) the Secretary of the Department of Social Services; and

(b) Services Australia, which operates as Centrelink.

4 As detailed below, I concluded that there was no merit in the judicial review challenge that the applicant wished to bring in this Court, which left me with no real alternative but to refuse the extension of time sought, as being futile.

Chronology of key events

5 The applicant was granted a DSP with effect from July 1991. Between July 1995 and July 2009, he was outside Australia for substantial periods of time, returning periodically. Legislative provisions were in place (and still are in place) which limit the entitlement of persons not in Australia to payments of social security benefits, at least after a period of time overseas. However, it was only in August 2009 that Centrelink became aware of all but the first of the applicant’s departures from Australia during this period. Because of that lack of knowledge, his absence from Australia did not affect the continued payment of all of his DSP. However, his absence from Australia did affect his entitlement to receive a significant amount of those payments.

6 Centrelink wrote to the applicant on 22 March 2011 asking him to repay the portion of DSP payments which he had received over certain periods during which he had not been eligible for those payments as a result of some of the periods of his absence from Australia. The decision to seek recovery of that debt was upheld by a Centrelink authorised review officer (ARO) on 16 May 2011. The ARO found that the payments made to which the applicant was not entitled as a result of his absence from Australia, and which were therefore debts owed to the Commonwealth, totalled $54,673.51, and also decided that the debt should not be written off or waived under the relevant legislation.

7 The applicant sought merits review of the ARO decision by the then Social Security Appeals Tribunal (SSAT). On 6 September 2011, the SSAT affirmed the ARO’s decision as to the existence of the debt, and the ARO’s finding that there was no basis for it to be written off, or waived due to administrative error or special circumstances. The reasons for decision were finalised on 20 September 2011 and apparently sent to the applicant that day.

8 Six years later, on 5 September 2017, the applicant applied to the then Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) for review of the decision of the ARO, and for an extension of time in which to make that application. The AAT treated the application as relating to the decision of the SSAT, rather than the ARO, that being the operative decision at the time. On 9 October 2017, the AAT refused an extension of time to lodge an application to review the SSAT decision.

9 About eight years later, on 9 September 2025, the applicant filed the present originating application for judicial review, under the ADJR Act. An amended version of that document was filed on 4 December 2025, which is the originating application on which the hearing of the application for an extension of time proceeded.

10 While the originating application on its terms sought review of the decisions of the officers of Centrelink (as the delegates of the Secretary), the ARO and the AAT, I have treated that application in the most beneficial way possible by treating it as an application for judicial review of the SSAT decision, given that was the operative decision relating to the applicant’s debt. The AAT’s decision to refuse an extension of time was also operative in a more narrow sense, in that it denied the applicant a further opportunity for merits review. Insofar as the applicant included grounds of appeal and made submissions directed specifically at the AAT’s refusal to provide an extension of time, I have dealt with those matters at the conclusion of my reasons.

11 An application for review under the ADJR Act must be commenced within 28 days of the decision sought to be reviewed: s 11(1)(c), (3). As a result, the applicant requires an extension of time to bring this proceeding. The Secretary objects to any extension of time, relying upon:

(a) the unexplained and unacceptable delay of approximately 14 years since the SSAT decision and 8 years since the AAT decision;

(b) the prejudice to the administration of the social security system as a whole caused by the delay; and

(c) the lack of merit in the challenge which the applicant seeks to bring.

12 At the hearing of the application, I was satisfied that the delay in seeking to bring this judicial review challenge was extraordinary and there was no reasonable, let alone sufficient, explanation for it on the face of the documentary material before me. That consideration alone would ordinarily provide ample reason to refuse the necessary extension of time. However, the applicant was not legally represented, and required the assistance of an interpreter. There were at least hints of reasons for that delay in the material which would take some time and effort to consider amongst the detail of the material before me. Doubtless also the applicant would have wished to explain further the reasons for the delay. Although unlikely, he might have provided a sufficient explanation. In those circumstances, it was more convenient, efficient and certain to decide whether or not to grant the necessary extension of time upon the basis of the merits of the underlying judicial review application. That approach does not entail condoning the delay, but rather deciding it is not necessary to take it into account in light of the conclusion reached about the merits.

13 After the hearing of the application, I was comfortably satisfied that the proposed challenge was wholly devoid of merit. Accordingly, I ordered that an extension of time be refused, the originating application therefore be dismissed and the applicant pay the Secretary’s costs. My reasons for those orders follow.

Consideration

14 The entitlement to be paid a DSP, in keeping with other benefits of this kind, is governed by legislation, here the Socia l Security Act 1991 (Cth), as amended, and aided by any applicable regulation. Unless otherwise specified, references to legislation in the remainder of these reasons are to that Act. An entitlement to a benefit such as the DSP is not governed by policy, guidance, or what is entered into government records. While such documents ought to follow and be consistent with the Act, if there is any conflict between the two, the Act usually prevails. It does so in this case, such that any conflicts in the materials between administrative records or decisions and the legal position established by the Act must be resolved in favour of the Act. The Act determines the correct legal position and any departure from that position in any executive action taken cannot be used to support the applicant’s stance as to what he was entitled to if it is contrary to the Act.

15 A person who is paid the DSP despite their lack of entitlement thereby incurs a debt to the Commonwealth under s 1223(1), irrespective of whether or not the overpayment was caused by their own actions. However, the Secretary can, in certain circumstances, write off or waive the debt: ss 1236, 1237A, 1237AAD.

16 During the time the applicant was being paid the DSP, he left Australia on numerous occasions, for periods of varying duration, and did not notify Centrelink of his travel. It is the fact that the applicant did not notify Centrelink of certain returns and departures that matters in this case, not any reason that non-notification occurred. The periods of absence which have been found to have resulted in overpayments were conveniently set out at page 8 of the decision of the ARO in a table which also identified the resultant period during which the ARO found the applicant was not entitled to the DSP, and the amount paid to him in each of those periods (Overpayments Table). I reproduce the information in the Overpayments Table below, with numbering for each row added for ease of reference. As set out above, the SSAT affirmed the decision of the ARO, including those findings, except in certain immaterial respects. The applicant did not dispute the dates of departure and return in relation to each period as set out in the first two columns.

| Ref | Departure Date | Return Date | Period not entitled to DSP payments | Amount overpaid |
| 1. | 18 March 1997 | 25 August 1999 | 18 September 1997 to 24 August 1999 | $15,379.80 |
| 2. | 3 October 1999 | 1 October 2000 | 3 April 2000 to 30 September 20 00 | $4,100.53 |
| 3. | 22 July 2004 | 31 October 2004 | 21 October 2004 to 30 October 2004 | $280.71 |
| 4. | 17 April 2005 | 3 October 2005 | 17 July 2005 to 2 October 2005 | $2,225.50 |
| 5. | 10 January 2006 | 10 September 200 6 | 11 April 2006 to 9 September 2006 | $4,529.60 |
| 6. | 18 November 2006 | 2 July 2009 | 17 February 2007 to 1 July 2009 | $28.157.37 |
| Total | $54,673.51 |
Correctness of the SSAT’s decision

17 The bulk of the applicant’s submissions essentially contended that the SSAT should have reached a different conclusion as to the existence of the debt in relation to each of the identified periods. As a result, I first consider whether the SSAT’s conclusion as to the amount overpaid was correct.

Periods 1 and 2 from the Overpayments Table

18 Between 1 July 1995 and 20 September 2000, s 1218(2) of the Act provided that, in relation to social security payments including the DSP (s 1218(1)(b)):

Subject to sections 1218A and 1218B, a person who is absent from Australia for more than 6 months ceases to be qualified for a social security payment 6 months after the person’s departure from Australia, unless the person has been given a departure certificate under section 1219 relating to the departure.

19 The applicant did not dispute before the SSAT that rows 1 and 2 in the Overpayments Table reflected the periods he was absent from Australia, and that he did not have a departure certificate in relation to each of those departures (unlike previous departures, for which he did obtain such a certificate), reflecting the fact that he did not notify Centrelink of this travel.

20 The operation of s 1218(2) was subject to ss 1218A and 1218B, neither of which apply to the applicant because:

(a) the first and second periods were not specified in writing by the Secretary under s 1218A(1), and could not have been, given the Secretary was not aware of the applicant’s departure on each occasion until well after two years later (s 1218A(2)(b)); and

(b) the applicant did not return a recipient statement notice in relation to each period (ss 1218(2), 1218C(1)), and could not have done so given such a notice could not have been issued because the Secretary was not aware of the applicant’s departure within 12 months (s 1218B(1)(a)).

21 As a result, the applicant ceased to be entitled to the DSP six months after his departure from Australia. Accordingly, he was not entitled to the DSP during the period identified in the second-to-last column of the Overpayments Table for Periods 1 and 2 from the Overpayments Table, as found by the SSAT when it upheld the ARO’s decision.

22 The applicant appeared to contend that the SSAT was incorrect to reach this conclusion because he had been granted indefinite portability (in the sense that his DSP entitlement would continue indefinitely while absent from Australia) when he departed Australia on 19 July 1995. It is true that indefinite portability applied to the absence which followed that departure because, at the time of that departure, he was assessed as meeting the requirements in the legislation for indefinite portability (as were set out in s 1213A), and had obtained a departure certificate as required under s 1218(2). However, the applicant then returned to Australia on 10 February 1997 before departing again on 18 March 1997 (the start of the first period of absence identified in the Overpayments Table) without a departure certificate. Whatever the position in relation to his departure on 19 July 1995, s 1218(2) thereafter applied in relation to the 18 March 1997 departure such that he would cease to be entitled to DSP payments six months later. As a result, the applicant’s indefinite portability relating to the departure on 19 July 1995 became irrelevant. The effect of his return to Australia, however brief, is presumably why the departure certificate the applicant obtained in relation to the July 1995 departure provided the following guidance:

• When you return to Australia you must contact your local Social Security office immediately.

• If you return to Australia, you will need to apply for a new certificate should you again wish to leave Australia.

The period between the Period 2 and Period 3 from the Overpayments Table

23 Both the ARO and the SSAT found that, although the applicant departed Australia for extended periods numerous times between the departures in rows 2 and 3 of the Overpayments Table above, those absences from Australia did not result in any overpayments, on the basis that he had “ unlimited portability ” between 20 September 2000 and 1 July 2004. It is necessary to explain how that finding is consistent with the SSAT’s conclusion that the applicant was not entitled to the DSP during Period 2 from the Overpayments Table, given that period runs until 30 September 2000.

24 Prior to 20 September 2000, s 1213A(1) of the Act provided that:

a person’s right to continue to be paid disability support pension is not affected by the person’s leaving Australia.

However, the right to continue to be paid DSP under s 1213A(1) was subject to the requirement to obtain a departure certificate contained in s 1218(2), extracted at ] above: s 1213A(4).

25 From 20 September 2000, the Act was amended by the Social Security and Veterans' Entitlements Legislation Amendment (Miscellaneous Matters) Act 2000 (Cth) (First Amending Act) to repeal the “ indefinite portability ” provision in s 1213A(1), and the departure certificate requirement in s 1218(2). However, the following savings provision was also introduced to the Act at Sch 1A cl 128 (First Savings Provision):

Despite the amendments of sections 1213A, 1215, 1216, 1220A, 1220B and 1221 of this Act made by the Social Security and Veterans’ Entitlements Legislation Amendment (Miscellaneous Matters) Act 2000, if:

(a)     a person was absent from Australia immediately before 20 September 2000; and

(b)     at a time (the post-start time) after 20 September 2000, the person had not returned to Australia for a continuous period of 26 weeks or more since 20 September 2000;

those provisions continue to apply to the person at the post-start time as if those amendments had not been made.

26 At no time between 20 September 2000 and 1 July 2004 did the applicant return to Australia for a continuous period of 26 weeks or more. As a result, the effect of the First Savings Provision was that, during that period, s 1213A(1) continued to confer upon the applicant indefinite portability, which was not subject to the requirement to obtain a departure certificate (given s 1218 fell outside the scope of the First Savings Provision).

27 However, I am satisfied that that position does not render incorrect the SSAT’s finding that the applicant was not entitled to the DSP for the full duration of Period 2 from the Overpayments Table, including the part which fell after the 20 September 2000 amendments. That is so because s 1218(2) took effect prior to its repeal to end the applicant’s entitlement to DSP on and from 3 April 2000, by virtue of his departure from Australia on 3 October 1999. At that time, insofar as s 1213A applied to his departure, it continued to be subject to the requirement to obtain a departure certificate s 1218(2). That finding sits comfortably alongside the SSAT’s finding that he had unlimited portability in relation to his departures after 20 September 2000, which were not subject to that requirement. In any event, even if that conclusion was incorrect, the difference relates to a limited period of entitlement to the DSP between 20 September 2000 and 30 September 2000, which would not warrant the grant of the very lengthy extension of time sought by the applicant.

28 It is important also to record that the unlimited portability afforded to the applicant by the First Amending Act and the application of s 1213A(1) ceased from 1 July 2004 as a result of further amendments which took effect from that date under the Family and Community Services and Veterans’ Affairs Legislation Amendment (2003 Budget and Other Measures) Act 2003 (Cth) (Second Amending Act). Other aspects of those amendments are discussed in more detail in the following section, but the relevant change for present purposes was that the First Savings Provision at Sch 1A cl 128 of the Act was amended to specify that s 1213A no longer applied to a person from the first time they were in Australia after the 1 July 2004 amendments commenced: Second Amending Act s 2, Sch 6 item 18. As discussed in the following section, the applicant was in Australia on 1 July 2004, so any indefinite portability he had under the First Savings Provision ended at that time: Act Sch 1A, cl 128(2)(a).

Periods 3, 4, 5 and 6 from the Overpayments Table

29 From 1 July 2004 the Act was amended by the Second Amending Act. Following those amendments, and at the time of the applicant’s departure as recorded in the Overpayments Table in relation to Periods 3, 4, 5 and 6, it relevantly provided that:

(a) a person who was receiving certain social security payments when they departed Australia would only continue to be paid those payments for the duration of their absence which was within their defined maximum portability period: ss 1213(a), 1215(1)(a), 1217; and

(b) for persons receiving the DSP, the maximum portability period was 13 weeks, unless the Secretary determined that it was unlimited under s 1218AA(1): s 1217 item 3.

30 The SSAT found that there was no evidence to suggest that the Secretary had made any determination under s 1218AA(1) relating to the applicant. The applicant did not dispute that finding before me, and indeed it seems unlikely that any such determination could have been made, given the statutory conditions which were required to be met, including that the person is terminally ill: s 1218AA(1)(c).

31 The 13-week maximum portability period was also subject to a Second S avings P rovision (distinct from the First Savings Provision discussed above) which permitted the Secretary to determine that a person receiving the DSP had unlimited portability if various conditions were satisfied: Act Sch 1A cl 135. Those conditions included that the person was absent from Australia as at 1 July 2004: Act Sch 1A cl 135(1)(a); Second Amending Act s 2, Sch 6 item 19.

32 The applicant did not dispute his dates of travel between Australia and Lebanon as set out by the SSAT, which record that he returned to Australia on 10 June 2004 and departed on 22 July 2004, such that he was in Australia on 1 July 2004. That accords with his stance before me. The applicant submitted that he was properly covered by the Second Savings Provision because his presence in Australia on 1 July 2004 was only temporary, and he was still living overseas. He also relied upon various internal records obtained from Centrelink which were said to reflect that position, in that they referred to the applicant as, for example, “ saved under pre-2000 rules and payable indefinitely ”.

33 However, the Second Savings Provision only applied to those who were absent from Australia on 1 July 2004: Act Sch 1A cl 135(1)(a). The ordinary meaning of those words excludes the applicant by virtue of his physical presence in Australia, whether or not that was a temporary state of affairs as he contends. Where he lived at that time was not the relevant consideration. There is nothing in the provision’s context or purpose which affects that interpretation: Rajcinoski v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2006] FCA 1396 at [19]-20. As the applicant was in Australia on 1 July 2004, the Second Savings Provision could not have applied to him. The fact that Centrelink’s internal records were inconsistent with that result does not affect the conclusion mandated by the legislation and the correct factual position of being in Australia on 1 July 2004. In any event, that inconsistency is likely a result of the applicant’s failure to inform Centrelink of his travel.

34 In attempting to maintain that it was relevant that he did not live in Australia on 1 July 2004, the applicant referred to information apparently provided to him by Centrelink which, he contended, indicated that DSP payments would continue if:

you left Australia before 1 July 2004 and were told at the time you could be paid indefinitely, and you have not returned to Australia to live since that time.

35 In such a case (which was not the applicant’s position because he did not relevantly leave Australia before 1 July 2004 so as not to be in Australia on that date), that guidance indicated that:

[i]f, however, you return to Australia to live, you will be subject to the new rules upon any subsequent departure.

36 I do not consider it necessary to interrogate what is meant by that guidance, the nature of its purpose and context (which was unclear from the manner in which it was provided to the Court), and whether it is inconsistent with the conclusion reached by the SSAT in the manner contended by the applicant, on the basis that it cannot affect the outcome in any case. The conclusion that the Second Savings Provision did not apply to the applicant by virtue of his presence in Australia on 1 July 2004 is mandated by the Act, and cannot be affected by any other information provided to the applicant, even if it was wrong or misleading. For that reason, it is also unnecessary to consider in any detail the “ Portability Policy ” which was broadly relied upon by the applicant.

37 In the absence of the Second Savings Provision applying as I have concluded, the SSAT was correct to find that, in relation to each of the applicant’s absences from Australia after 1 July 2004, he was no longer entitled to DSP once he had been away for thirteen weeks from the date of departure. Consequently, he was not entitled to the DSP during the period identified in the second-to-last column of the Overpayments Table, as found by the SSAT when it upheld the ARO’s decision.

Debt and recovery

38 By virtue of the findings outlined above, the SSAT found that the applicant received $54,673.51 in DSP periods to which he was not entitled. As a result, the SSAT found that the applicant owed a debt to the Commonwealth of $54,673.51, pursuant to s 1223(1).

39 The SSAT finally found that the debt should not or could not be written off (under s 1236) or waived (under s 1237A(1) or s 1237AAD).

Grounds of review and submissions

40 Having found that the conclusion of the SSAT was consistent with the provisions of the Act, I now turn to the specific grounds of review which the applicant sought to advance.

41 By proposed ground 1, the applicant alleged that the SSAT had applied the wrong DSP portability framework given is contention that he was a “ saved pre-2004 indefinite portability case ” (which he was not) and his assertion that “ [s] hort visits did not cancel portability ” (which they did in circumstances in which such a visit by the applicant straddled 1 July 2004). The applicant relied upon various Centrelink records and guidance as consistent with that conclusion, as outlined above. For the reasons given above, the SSAT did not make such an error. The creation of the debt is the result mandated by the terms of the Act, whether or not the applicant’s lack of entitlement was accurately captured in Centrelink’s internal records at the time or reflected in guidance and public policy documents. As a result, the first proposed ground of review would inevitably have failed.

42 By proposed ground 2, the applicant relied upon the fact that he was not notified of the change to the portability rules in July 2004, and submitted that this amounted to a failure to provide procedural fairness. That submission also had to be rejected. Lack of notice of the fact that the law had changed does not have any bearing on the procedural fairness of the decision of the SSAT in 2011 applying the law, as required. It followed that proposed ground 2 had to fail.

43 By proposed ground 3, the applicant alleged that the Centrelink records showed that the overpayments found by the SSAT resulted from a system malfunction, not the applicant’s conduct. That is a reference to an entry in the Centrelink records dated 31 August 2009 which reads:

advised he will be restored but I could not due to system problem.

44 In its terms, that entry appears to indicate that a system problem prevented the payment of the DSP from being restored, rather than causing the overpayments which have led to the debt. It is unclear how the existence of such an error would have any relevance to the correctness of the SSAT’s decision. The debt arises directly from the fact that he received the DSP in circumstances where he was not entitled to. The third proposed ground of review would therefore have failed.

45 By proposed ground 4, the applicant submitted that he was denied procedural fairness because various decisions were made without effective Arabic interpreter assistance being obtained by Centrelink, relying upon the ARO’s decision on 16 May 2011 in relation to the applicant’s debt as an example. It is not a denial of procedural fairness if any loss of an opportunity to be heard could not possibly have made a difference because of the clear operation of legislation. As Gleeson CJ pointed out in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; 214 CLR 1 at [37]:

Whether one talks in terms of procedural fairness or natural justice, the concern of the law is to avoid practical injustice.

46 There is no practical injustice if nothing the applicant could have said or done could have made any difference, as is the case in relation to the existence of the debt. The same reasoning applies to natural justice under s 5(1)(a) of the ADJR Act. In any event, the operative decision was that of the SSAT, and the applicant had the assistance of an Arabic interpreter at that stage.

47 By proposed ground 5, the applicant asserted legal unreasonableness. That ground must also be rejected. Much of the basis for that conclusion is dealt with elsewhere in these reasons, but I address the following directly. The applicant relied upon the fact that he was not notified of the changes to the portability rules on 1 July 2004 as amounting to legal unreasonableness (in addition to the submission as to procedural unfairness canvassed above). For legal unreasonableness to be made out, the relevant decision must be so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have reached it: see s 5(2)(g) ADJR Act. Given the SSAT’s decision to uphold the debt was mandated by the Act, it cannot have been unreasonable in the relevant sense.

48 The only instance where the failure to notify the applicant of the rule changes could have been considered by the SSAT was in relation to its conclusion that the debt could or should not be written off or waived. I do not consider the applicant’s proposed ground of review to show any error in that regard. In effect, it goes no further than inviting impermissible merits review. In any event, as set out above, it appears that the applicant was informed by Centrelink (at least in writing) at the time he was given his departure certificate for his initial departure in 1995 that he needed to inform the government if he returned to Australia, and did not do so. Had he complied with this obligation, it is likely that he would have been informed of the changes to the DSP, or otherwise become aware of them. The government had no obligation to advise the applicant of changes in the law.

49 The applicant further submitted that the lack of notification of the rule change was not properly considered in the SSAT decision. I am not satisfied that is the case. The lack of notice could only have been relevant to whether the decision could be waived under s 1237A(1) or s 1237AAD, and I see no reason to conclude that the SSAT failed to consider that matter based on its reasons in that regard.

50 The applicant argued in written submissions that the recovery of the debt by the deduction of $30 per fortnight from his ongoing pension payments and related reporting requirements are legally unreasonable, due to the financial hardship they have caused, and the applicant’s anxiety relating to his reporting obligations and threats of escalation if those are not met, in circumstances where his financial situation is unlikely to materially change. The SSAT decision did not relate to the repayment conditions, which are also not addressed by the applicant’s proposed grounds of review. That is consistent with the applicant’s indication at a case management hearing before me on 31 October 2025 that he did not dispute the rate of repayment. In those circumstances, I do not consider it necessary to address those submissions.

51 By proposed ground 6, the applicant submitted that the SSAT had incorrectly assumed that the applicant had returned to Australia in a way that cancelled portability. For the reasons I have given above, the SSAT made no such incorrect assumption.

The AAT’s decision to refuse an extension of time

52 The applicant filed with the Court an affidavit in which he deposed that he was only ever notified of the AAT’s refusal to grant an extension of time for a review of the SSAT’s decision over the phone, rather than by written correspondence. The applicant contended that he should have been provided with written reasons or a written notification of its decision, and relied upon this alleged failure as showing legal unreasonableness (at proposed ground 5, otherwise dealt with above) and generally preventing him from challenging the AAT’s decision (at proposed ground 7). However, there is no evidence that the applicant ever requested written reasons or a written confirmation of the decision. As a result, I do not consider that any error is made out in relation to those grounds.

53 The applicant’s submissions also sought to impugn the AAT’s decision on various other bases, which drew upon those levelled against the SSAT (and to that extent are dealt with above), and otherwise sought to explain the applicant’s delay in applying to the AAT. None of those submissions amounted to a credible case for reviewable error.

Conclusion

54 For the reasons above, the application for an extension of time was refused and the origination application was therefore dismissed with costs.

| I certify that the preceding fifty-four (54) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Bromwich. |
Associate:

Dated: 22 April 2026