Droz Conviction Affirmed, Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim Fails

Jump To

Top Caption Lead Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

April 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State Of Washington V. Peter J. Droz

Court of Appeals of Washington

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 86912-4

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (26)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (16.2K)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,
No. 86912-4-I
Respondent,
DIVISION ONE
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PETER J. DROZ,

Appellant.

HAZELRIGG, C.J. — Peter Droz appeals from his conviction for attempting to

elude a pursuing police vehicle after a jury trial. Droz avers that certain of the

prosecutor’s statements during closing argument constituted misconduct that

deprived him of a fair trial such that reversal is required. We disagree and affirm.

FACTS

Droz was driving in Gold Bar on May 20, 2019, when he was pulled over by

Snohomish County Sheriff’s Office Deputy Chad Daugherty. While both Droz and

Daugherty agreed that the stop occurred sometime between 9:30 and 10:00 p.m.

and the night was dark and rainy, they offered diverging accounts of the incident

when they eventually testified at the resulting trial.

Daugherty observed a van drive through two consecutive stop signs without

halting. He then activated his emergency lights to effect a traffic stop and the

vehicle complied. Daugherty approached the vehicle on the driver’s side.

Daugherty spoke to Droz, identified himself as a deputy and explained why he had
No. 86912-4-I/2

stopped the van. Daugherty later described Droz’s answers to his questions as

“loud” and that eventually Droz “refused to speak” to him. Daugherty then

requested Droz’s identification. Daugherty testified that Droz then turned the

steering wheel to the left, directing the van towards where Daugherty was standing,

and drove the vehicle away. Daugherty stated that “the rear tires nearly ran over”

his feet and passed “maybe a quarter inch from the fronts of” his boots. Daugherty

returned to his vehicle and began a pursuit, following Droz onto Highway 2.

Daugherty’s emergency lights and siren remained activated throughout the pursuit.

Daugherty testified that the top speed reached by both vehicles was 100 miles per

hour and several cars had to yield and pull off the road. Daugherty performed a

“PIT maneuver” 1 to stop the van and, as a result, the van spun, travelled into a

ditch, and rolled. Daugherty and his sergeant placed Droz under arrest at the

scene.

Droz also testified at trial and asserted he had complied with both stop

signs. Droz stated that a black truck then pulled behind him, but he had difficulty

observing any of the vehicle’s details because of its bright lights. Droz could not

discern the color of the lights beyond “kind of a yellow tint” and was unable to tell

who was driving the truck. Droz described the driver who he said approached him

as “mad” and “[s]creaming [‘]get out of the car.[’]” Droz denied being asked to

provide identification or other documentation by this person and testified that he

was “scared” because people had been robbed in that neighborhood and he did

1 Daugherty stated that a “PIT maneuver” is a “pursuit immobilization technique” where the

front bumper of the law enforcement vehicle makes contact with the back corner of the pursued
vehicle causing it to spin and stop.

-2-
No. 86912-4-I/3

not “want to get car jacked or anything like that.” Droz explained he suspected he

was about to be the victim of a robbery, so he drove away; he navigated the

residential area and made his way back to Highway 2. Once he reached Highway

2, Droz stated his rate of travel was “60, maybe 65” miles per hour and that he did

not see any other vehicles besides the pursuing truck.

On May 19, 2022, the State charged Droz with attempting to elude a

pursuing police vehicle. The trial was delayed several times and eventually

commenced on January 16, 2024. The State introduced testimony from Daugherty

and another SCSO deputy who was present when Droz was arrested, and Droz

testified on his own behalf. The jury was given instruction no. 1 which, in relevant

part, directed the jurors to consider witness testimony and credibility in the

following manner:

You are the sole judges of the credibility of each witness. You
are also the sole judges of the value or weight to be given to the
testimony of each witness. In assessing credibility, you must avoid
bias, conscious or unconscious, including bias based on religion,
ethnicity, race, sexual orientation, gender or disability.
In considering a witness’s testimony, you may consider these
things: the opportunity of the witness to observe or know the things
[they] testif[y] about; the ability of the witness to observe accurately;
the quality of a witness’s memory while testifying; the manner of the
witness while testifying; any personal interest that the witness might
have in the outcome or the issues; any bias or prejudice that the
witness may have shown; the reasonableness of the witness’s
statements in the context of all of the other evidence; and any other
factors that affect your evaluation or belief of a witness or your
evaluation of [their] testimony. 2

The jury was also instructed as follows on Droz’s defense theory of the case:

It is a defense to a charge of [a]ttempting to [e]lude a [p]olice
[v]ehicle that a reasonable person would not have believed that the

2 This mirrors the language contained 11 Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury

Instructions: Criminal 1.02, at 26 (5th ed. 2024).

-3-
No. 86912-4-I/4

signal to stop was given by a police officer and that the Defendant’s
driving after the signal to stop was reasonable under the
circumstances.

The jury found Droz guilty as charged and the trial judge sentenced him to 22

months in prison.

Droz timely appealed.

ANALYSIS

I. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Droz’s sole assignment of error on appeal is a claim of prosecutorial

misconduct. Specifically, he avers that statements made by the State during

closing argument amounted to prosecutorial misconduct that prejudiced him such

that he was denied his right to a fair trial. He contends “the prosecutor used closing

argument to impermissibly disparage Mr. Droz’s exercise of his constitutional right

to testify while urging the jury to adopt a presumption of Mr. Droz’s guilt based on

his status as a criminal defendant.” The State’s response brief counters that Droz

“cannot show the trial court abused its discretion in overruling the objections” he

made in response to the statements now challenged on appeal.

“We review allegations of prosecutorial misconduct under an abuse of

discretion standard.” State v. Azevedo, 31 Wn. App. 2d 70, 78, 547 P.3d 287

(2024). “To prevail on a prosecutorial misconduct claim, a defendant who timely

objects to a prosecutor’s conduct at trial must prove that the ‘conduct was both

improper and prejudicial in the context of the entire trial.’” State v. Loughbom, 196

Wn.2d 64, 70, 470 P.3d 499 (2020) (quoting State v. Walker, 182 Wn.2d 463, 477,

341 P.3d 976 (2015)). If there was a timely objection, to “establish prejudice, the

-4-
No. 86912-4-I/5

defendant must show a substantial likelihood that the error affected the jury

verdict.” State v. Molina, 16 Wn. App. 2d 908, 918, 485 P.3d 963 (2021). We

consider the challenged “statements in the context of the entire case.” State v.

Thorgerson, 172 Wn.2d 438, 443, 258 P.3d 43 (2011). This includes “the

prosecutor’s entire argument, the issues in the case, the evidence discussed in the

argument, and the jury instructions.” State v. Dhaliwal, 150 Wn.2d 559, 578, 79

P.3d 432 (2003). A prosecutor “functions as the representative of the people in a

quasijudicial capacity in a search for justice,” including the accused, thus, the

States owes them a duty to “to see that their rights to a constitutionally fair trial are

not violated.” State v. Monday, 171 Wn.2d 667, 676, 257 P.3d 551 (2011).

“Prosecutorial misconduct may deprive a defendant of their constitutional right to

a fair trial.” State v. Markovich, 19 Wn. App. 2d 157, 169, 492 P.3d 206 (2021).

Droz’s challenge is centered on the following statement by the prosecutor:

[THE STATE:] Now, you heard from Mr. Droz himself about
this, about what he said happened that day. You were given a[n]
instruction about credibility. And that’s part of what being a juror is
and part of what we talked about in the jury selection, that being a
juror, you weigh the credibility of different witnesses.
You have Deputy Daugherty. He does training for anyone
who does driving training for the county sheriff’s department, law
enforcement for 20 years, has training and experience with
accurately measuring speeds, estimations and pacing, out there
doing his job, talking about how, like he does in every case, identified
himself as an officer when he pulls someone over, asks for license
and registration, and that the defendant just took off and drove in this
manner.
Then you have Mr. Droz. Now, you don’t have to imagine why
Mr. Droz would get on the stand and have a reason to say things
differently. You don’t have to imagine what his motivation could be
in this situation where he is on trial for a crime.

[DROZ]: Objection. Improper.

-5-
No. 86912-4-I/6

THE COURT: Overruled. Do you want to be heard?
....
[THE STATE:] I’d ask that after looking at all of the elements
in this case, looking fairly at the testimony, weighing it and looking at
the people that are—that are giving this testimony and the reasons
for why they’re giving this testimony—because that is the important
thing here, and that is something you can’t hide your heads in the
sand about.

[DROZ]: Objection. Improper.

THE COURT: Overruled.

Droz offers several related grounds on which he contends we should conclude the

prosecutor’s statements were improper: the State undermined the presumption of

innocence and improperly shifted the burdened of proof and further set up an

“improper comparison of the honesty of a defendant with law enforcement.” He

also contends that because he exercised his right to testify in his own defense, “it

was impermissible misconduct for the prosecutor to argue adverse inferences from

the exercise of that right.”

A. Presumption of Innocence and Burden of Proof

First, as to the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof, Droz

asserts that when the prosecutor’s statement, “You don’t have to imagine what his

motivation would be in this situation where he is on trial for a crime,” was coupled

with their admonition that the jurors could not “hide [their] heads in the sand” about

the reasons a witness might give certain testimony, such argument was

“inconsistent with the presumption of innocence” and, as a result, “the prosecution

diluted its burden of proof.” We disagree.

-6-
No. 86912-4-I/7

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution requires “the State to prove ‘beyond a reasonable doubt . . . every fact

necessary to constitute the crime with which [a defendant] is charged.’” State v.

W.R., 181 Wn.2d 757, 762, 336 P.3d 1134 (2014) (alterations in original) (quoting

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. A

prosecutor engages in misconduct if they misstate the law regarding the

presumption of innocence or otherwise undermine it. See State v. Johnson, 158

Wn. App. 677, 685-86, 243 P.3d 936 (2010) (“[A] misstatement about the law and

the presumption of innocence due a defendant, the ‘bedrock upon which [our]

criminal justice system stands,’ constitutes great prejudice because it reduces the

State’s burden and undermines a defendant’s due process rights.” (some alteration

in original) (quoting State v. Bennett, 161 Wn.2d 303, 315, 165 P.3d 1241 (2007)).

“A prosecutor may not argue that to acquit a defendant, the jury must find that the

State’s witnesses are either lying or mistaken. Such arguments may undermine

the presumption of innocence, shift the burden of proof, and mislead the jury.”

State v. Rafay, 168 Wn. App. 734, 836, 285 P.3d 83 (2012). “In general, a

prosecutor’s argument that shifts the burden to the defense is improper.” State v.

Cardenas-Flores, 194 Wn. App. 496, 515, 374 P.3d 1217 (2016), aff’d, 189 Wn.2d

243, 401 P.3d 19 (2017).

In briefing, Droz relies on State v. Lindsay to support his position. 180

Wn.2d 423, 326 P.3d 125 (2014). In Lindsay, our state Supreme Court held that

several arguments made by the prosecutor were improper, including comparing

reasonable doubt to completing a jigsaw puzzle and crossing the road at a

-7-
No. 86912-4-I/8

crosswalk. Id. at 434-36. The court quoted favorably from State v. Johnson, a

Division Two case that had also concluded that a jigsaw puzzle analogy was

improper and held it “‘trivialized the State’s burden, focused on the degree of

certainty the jurors needed to act, and implied that the jury had a duty to convict

without a reason not to do so.’” Lindsay, 180 Wn.2d at 435 (quoting Johnson, 158

Wn. App. at 682).

However, the statements of the prosecutor at issue here are distinct from

those held to be improper in Lindsay. In Lindsay, the State discussed reasonable

doubt directly and inappropriately quantified and trivialized it by use of an analogy

to a recreational pastime. 180 Wn.2d at 436. Here, the prosecutor did not mention

the burden of proof, even indirectly. Instead, the statement was intended to urge

the jurors to fully engage with its credibility analysis and direct them to consider

why Droz had given his testimony in reaching their determination as to his

credibility. This is further demonstrated by the surrounding context; the prosecutor

explained the evidence from which the jury could find Daugherty more credible

than Droz. The State emphasized the content of Daugherty’s testimony along with

Droz’s possible motivations for his own as a means to cast doubt on the latter.

This comparison was then followed by a summation of Droz’s testimony. Droz fails

to articulate why the prosecutor’s statements diluted or even implicated the burden

of proof such that the trial court abused its discretion when it overruled his

objections.

Our appellate courts have held that a prosecutor’s statements are improper

when they have misstated the law or otherwise undermined the presumption of

-8-
No. 86912-4-I/9

innocence. See, e.g., State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741, 759-60, 278 P.3d 653

(2012); State v. Evans, 163 Wn. App. 635, 643, 260 P.3d 934 (2011); State v.

Venegas, 155 Wn. App. 507, 523-24, 228 P.3d 813 (2010). In Emery, the

prosecutor made an impermissible argument that implied the jury needed to

provide a reason to find the defendant not guilty. 174 Wn.2d at 759. Our Supreme

Court held this was improper “because a jury need do nothing to find the defendant

not guilty.” Id. at 759-60. This is the essence of the presumption of innocence.

The prosecutor in Evans misstated the law when they had said that “presumptive

innocence ‘kind of stops once you start deliberating.’” 163 Wn. App. at 643. In

Venegas, the prosecutor made a similarly improper mischaracterization and said

that the “‘presumption of innocence . . . erodes each and every time you hear

evidence that the defendant is guilty’” until “‘that presumption no longer exists.’”

155 Wn. App. at 524.

The challenged statement here simply does not implicate Droz’s

constitutionally protected presumption of innocence in the same way as in these

cases. The State’s argument went only to Droz’s credibility as a witness, which is

a determination that the jury must make in its role as the finder of fact. The

comment here does not undermine the presumption; the jury could find some

aspects of Droz’s testimony not credible but still conclude that the State had not

overcome the presumption of innocence because it had failed to prove all elements

of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Droz claims that the statement

“was untethered to any evidence presented at trial and instead invited the jury to

assess Mr. Droz’s credibility solely based on his status as a criminal defendant,

-9-
No. 86912-4-I/10

with the presumption of guilt as a starting point.” However, this is directly

contradicted by the record; the challenged statement was made after the

prosecutor referred back to Droz’s testimony by stating, “Now you heard from Mr.

Droz about this, about what he said happened that day” and before they offered a

summary of his testimony. These comments are not improper; they do not

contradict the presumption of innocence as in Emery and do not misstate the law

as in Evans and Venegas. The prosecutor may not have explicitly recounted the

content of Droz’s testimony in great detail, but the argument offered after their

summary is clearly grounded in what Droz said on the stand, and the prosecutor

merely urged the jury to interpret that testimony in a manner that favored its

position at trial.

Finally, Droz claims that the State created a “false dichotomy: if the jury

believes a testifying officer is truthful, they must convict; but to acquit they must

decide the officer has lied.” However, when the jury is presented with different

versions of the facts, credibility becomes “a central issue” and “there is nothing

misleading or unfair in stating the obvious: that if the jury accepts one version of

the facts, it must necessarily reject the other.” State v. White, 76 Wn. App. 811,

825, 888 P.2d 1214 (1995). Further, “[w]e have stated before that, in closing

argument, a prosecutor may comment on a witness’s veracity as long as a

personal opinion is not expressed and as long as the comments are not intended

to incite the passion of the jury.” State v. Stith, 71 Wn. App. 14, 21, 856 P.3d 415

(1993).

• 10 - No. 86912-4-I/11

Crucial here is the nature of Droz’s defense; he contended that he believed

he was being robbed and fled from the traffic stop due to that fear. This defense

rested on Droz’s own perception of the situation, which the jury necessarily had to

assess in order to reach its verdict. Thus, even where Daugherty and Droz offered

conflicting accounts of events, the jury could have found aspects of both credible

and could have acquitted Droz by finding his testimony about his fear reasonable

under the circumstances and, therefore, justifying his flight from the scene. This

undercuts Droz’s claim of a dichotomy, and even if the jury had to choose one set

of facts over the other, basing that choice, at least in part, on witness motivation is

not improper. Further, the prosecutor did not offer their personal opinion on Droz’s

credibility but only invited the jury to consider the motivation behind his testimony

in reaching its own conclusion on credibility.

Because Droz has not shown that the State misstated or shifted the burden

of proof or undermined the presumption of innocence, he has failed to establish

that the challenged statements were improper. The disputed comments do not

constitute prosecutorial misconduct on these bases, and we need not consider

prejudice.

B. Right To Testify

The other aspect of Droz’s prosecutorial misconduct claim is his contention

that the State’s closing argument was separately improper because it was an

“impermissible insinuation that Mr. Droz, like other criminal defendants who

choose to testify” do so to “mislead the jury with self-serving testimony.”

• 11 - No. 86912-4-I/12

“In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and

defend in person.” WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 22. The State cannot draw “adverse

inferences” from the accused person’s exercise of a right protected by the

constitution. State v. Rupe, 101 Wn.2d 664, 705, 638 P.2d 751 (1984). Thus, “it

is improper for the State to speculate as to why a defendant testified to infer guilt.”

State v. Teas, 10 Wn. App. 2d 111, 123, 447 P.3d 606 (2019). However,

“prosecutors may argue inferences from the evidence, including inferences as to

why the jury would want to believe one witness over another. The same rule has

been applied as to credibility of a defendant.” State v. Copeland, 130 Wn.2d 244,

290-91, 922 P.2d 1304 (1996) (citation omitted).

Droz’s briefing on this portion of his challenge relies heavily on Teas. There,

the prosecutor’s statement was essentially that Teas was aware of the breadth and

strength of the evidence against him, and he testified to create his own narrative

to “explain away what happened.” Teas, 10 Wn. App. 2d at 123. The prosecutor

explicitly commented on why Teas chose to testify and provided a narrative

regarding his purported motivation, which also implied that he knew he was guilty

but had nonetheless taken the stand for the express purpose of lying to the jurors.

This led Division Two of this court to hold it was “improper for the State to speculate

as to why a defendant testified [in order] to infer guilt.” Id. However, Teas is easily

distinguishable. Here, the prosecutor did not speculate as to any particular reason

why Droz chose to testify; any inference in that regard was drawn from the State’s

invitation for the jury to consider the conflicting testimony in making its

determination regarding Droz’s credibility. While the State approached the line

• 12 - No. 86912-4-I/13

drawn in Teas by urging the jury to consider Droz’s reasons for testifying, this

statement was presented in the context of the prosecutor telling the jury why it

should find that Droz’s testimony was not credible, not to infer guilt. As explained,

supra, the prosecution is permitted to make arguments as to why the jury should

reach a specific credibility determination, so long as they draw on the evidence to

do so. After the first challenged statement, the prosecution reviewed the contents

of the testimonial evidence that Droz introduced in order to explain to the jury why

it should make the credibility determination advocated by the State. Such

argument does not constitute prosecutorial misconduct.

Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

• 13 -