Drake v. UC Health - Summary Judgment Affirmed

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April 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Drake v. UC Health, L.L.C.

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 1483
• Docket Number: C-250581

• Judges: Kinsley

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (32.5K)

• PDF

Syllabus

SUMMARY JUDGMENT — WRONGFUL TERMINATION — PUBLIC POLICY — OVERRIDING JUSTIFICATION: The trial court properly awarded summary judgment to the defendant-employer hospital on the plaintiff-employee's claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy where the employer demonstrated that it terminated the plaintiff for her unauthorized access of a patient's private health information and the plaintiff failed to present evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to the employer's overriding business justification for the termination.

Combined Opinion

[Cite as Drake v. UC Health, L.L.C., 2026-Ohio-1483.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

DANIELLE DRAKE, : APPEAL NO. C-250581
TRIAL NO. A-2403093
Plaintiff-Appellant, :

vs. :

UC HEALTH, LLC, : JUDGMENT ENTRY

Defendant-Appellee. :

This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs.
For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal,
allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24.
The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the
Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial
court for execution under App.R. 27.

To the clerk:
Enter upon the journal of the court on 4/24/2026 per order of the court.

By:_______________________
Administrative Judge
[Cite as Drake v. UC Health, L.L.C., 2026-Ohio-1483.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

DANIELLE DRAKE, : APPEAL NO. C-250581
TRIAL NO. A-2403093
Plaintiff-Appellant, :

vs. :

UC HEALTH, LLC, : OPINION

Defendant-Appellee. :

Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: April 24, 2026

Tobias & Torchia and David Torchia, for Plaintiff-Appellant,

Jackson Lewis, P.C., Patricia Anderson Pryor and Patricia K. Gavigan for Defendant-
Appellee.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

KINSLEY, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Danielle Drake was terminated from her job as a

social worker at a facility operated by defendant-appellee UC Health, LLC (“UC”). She

sued UC, alleging that she was dismissed in violation of public policy because she

accessed a patient’s private health information (“PHI”) for the purpose of reporting a

coworker’s violation of federal law. But UC contends it terminated Drake, an at-will

employee, based on its clear workplace policy that PHI is off-limits for all but patient

care, billing, and department management, none of which justified Drake’s access.

{¶2} The trial court awarded summary judgment to UC. Because we agree

that, on this record, there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to the overriding

business justification for Drake’s termination, we affirm the judgment of trial court.

Background

{¶3} Drake began working as a social worker in UC’s emergency department

in 2014. As part of her employment, she regularly accessed patients’ PHI. Two rules

limited the circumstances under which she could do so. First, as with all health care

workers, Drake’s access to PHI was governed by a federal statute: the Health Insurance

Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”). Drake was also required to

follow UC’s policies related to patient PHI. As a standard workplace rule, UC restricted

its employees’ access to PHI to “legitimate business reason[s].” A “legitimate business

reason” occurred when an employee had direct involvement in the treatment of the

patient, the billing or collecting of payment for services, or the management of a

department.

{¶4} UC became aware that Drake accessed patient PHI without a legitimate

business reason in the course of investigating a complaint Drake initiated against a

coworker. Drake does not dispute that she accessed the patient’s PHI, but she argues

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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

that her complaint justified the violation.

{¶5} Drake’s complaint stemmed from a phone call she overhead between

the coworker and the patient’s family member on December 8, 2023. Drake believed

the coworker provided the patient’s PHI to the family member in violation of HIPAA.

UC directed its employees to report suspected HIPAA violations through a phone

hotline, an email address, by completing a Medical Information Data Analysis System

(“MIDAS”) form, or directly reporting the violation to a manager. Drake alleged she

could not complete a MIDAS form because she did not know the patient’s name. So,

on December 11, 2023, Drake reported the alleged violation to her social work

supervisor.

{¶6} When Drake did not hear back about the complaint, she followed up

with a different supervisor on January 12, 2024. In the days that followed, UC

conducted an investigation of Drake’s coworker. The investigation included speaking

to a member of the patient’s direct care team, who did not recall much. But the

conversation with the provider revealed that Drake knew much more about the patient

than the care team. This led Drake’s supervisor to be concerned that Drake herself

had accessed the patient’s PHI in an unauthorized way.

{¶7} Drake’s supervisor then contacted UC’s compliance department to

determine whether Drake had in fact accessed the patient’s PHI. The compliance

department confirmed that Drake accessed the patient’s identity report on December

8, 2023, the day of the coworker’s alleged HIPAA violation. Compliance records

reflected that Drake viewed a patient floor list for a floor of the hospital she was not

working on in order to connect to the patient’s record. Drake’s view of the document

was brief—a mere 18 seconds.

{¶8} After learning this information, Drake’s supervisor emailed her to

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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

inquire whether she had a “work-related” reason for accessing the patient’s PHI.

Drake did not recall accessing the record.

{¶9} The compliance department, Drake’s supervisor, and UC’s Human

Resources Department (“HR”) then conferred about Drake’s conduct. Drake’s

supervisor concluded that, according to UC policy, her access to patient PHI was

unauthorized because she was not a part of the patient’s care team. The team then

discussed the appropriate response for Drake’s misconduct, as UC’s written policy

permitted discipline up to and including termination for violations of the PHI rule.

HR advised that UC’s strict practice is to terminate employees who access patient PHI

in an unauthorized manner.

{¶10} After learning termination was required, Drake’s supervisor asked

about lesser sanctions, given that Drake acted in good faith and only briefly viewed the

record. He also expressed concern about “the implications a termination could have

on future good faith reporting.” In response, HR repeated that termination was the

standard remedy for Drake’s conduct.

{¶11} On February 7, 2024, Drake attended a meeting with HR and her

supervisors. Although she still did not recall accessing the patient’s PHI, she admitted

at the meeting that she must have done so. She indicated that her purpose in reviewing

the patient’s record was to learn the patient’s name so she could complete a MIDAS

form to report the coworker’s alleged HIPAA violation. Drake was then terminated for

“[u]nauthorized or otherwise inappropriate access, use, handling, or disclosure of

confidential patient health information (PHI), or inappropriate discussion of PHI in

public areas.”

{¶12} On July 10, 2024, Drake filed a complaint against UC in the Hamilton

County Court of Common Pleas, alleging that UC wrongfully terminated her in

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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

violation of public policy. At the close of discovery, UC moved for summary judgment,

which the trial court granted. In its written order, the trial court focused on two

questions: (1) whether Drake accessed a patient’s PHI without appropriate

authorization, and (2) if Drake did, whether her termination was wrongful. In

answering the first question, the trial court highlighted the undisputed facts that

indicated that Drake had in fact accessed the patient’s PHI without authorization.

Drake herself admitted that she accessed a system list involving the patient, and UC’s

compliance officer also testified that Drake viewed the patient’s PHI. As to the second

question, the trial court found no authority for the proposition that terminating an

employee for unauthorized access of a patient’s PHI was against public policy. It

accordingly concluded that UC was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

{¶13} This appeal followed.

Analysis

{¶14} Drake raises one assignment of error on appeal. She argues that the

trial court erred in granting UC’s motion for summary judgment because there are

disputed issues of material fact regarding the elements of her claim for wrongful

discharge in violation of Ohio’s public policy. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

{¶15} “The granting of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.” Rogers v.

Sears, Roebuck and Co., 2002-Ohio-3304, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.).

Summary judgment is appropriate when (1) there is no genuine issue of

material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law, and (3) the evidence, when viewed in favor of the nonmoving party,

permits only one reasonable conclusion and that conclusion is adverse

to the nonmoving party.

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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Heiert v. Crossroads Community Church, Inc., 2021-Ohio-1649, ¶ 37 (1st Dist.), citing

Evans v. Thrasher, 2013-Ohio-4776, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.).

{¶16} In resolving a summary judgment motion, a court may consider “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits,

transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact.” Civ.R. 56(C). “When a

motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported,” the burden shifts to

the nonmoving party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue

for trial.” Todd Dev. Co. v. Morgan, 2008-Ohio-87, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.), citing Civ.R. 56(E).

When the nonmoving party is the plaintiff, if the plaintiff fails to set forth evidence

showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to each element of its claim, then

“the defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.” Heiert at ¶ 40,

citing Williams v. 312 Walnut Ltd. Partnership, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 5887 *2 (1st

Dist. May 12, 2021).

B. Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy

{¶17} Employment relationships in Ohio are governed by “the common-law

doctrine of employment at will.” Dohme v. Eurand Am. Inc., 2011-Ohio-4609, ¶ 11.

However, Ohio recognizes a public policy exception to this doctrine “when an

employee is discharged or disciplined for a reason which is prohibited by statute.”

Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contrs., 49 Ohio St.3d 228, 234 (1990). The

elements of a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy are

(1) That clear public policy existed and was manifested in a state or

federal constitution, statute or administrative regulation, or in the

common law (the clarity element).

(2) That dismissing employees under circumstances like those involved

in the plaintiff’s dismissal would jeopardize the public policy (the

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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

jeopardy element).

(3) The plaintiff's dismissal was motivated by conduct related to the

public policy (the causation element).

(4) The employer lacked overriding legitimate business justification for

the dismissal (the overriding justification element).

Dohme at ¶ 12-16, citing Painter v. Graley, 70 Ohio St.3d 377, 384, fn. 8 (1994). The

clarity and jeopardy elements present questions of law, while the causation and

overriding justification elements present questions of fact. Collins v. Rizkana, 73 Ohio

St.3d 65, 70 (1995). A plaintiff must prove each element to satisfy the public policy

exception. See Wissler v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2010-Ohio-3432, ¶ 18

(10th Dist.).

C. Overriding Justification

{¶18} We begin with the final element of the public policy test—the overriding

justification element—because it is dispositive of Drake’s appeal.

{¶19} Courts have established a burden-shifting framework in analyzing the

overriding justification element of a wrongful termination claim that relies on the

public policy exception. Nance v. Auto Mall, Inc., 2020-Ohio-3419, ¶ 48 (3d Dist.).

Under this framework, if the plaintiff presents some evidence that the termination was

motivated by conduct related to the public policy, the burden shifts to the employer to

show that an overriding business justification supported the termination. Id. at ¶ 49.

If the employer meets that burden, then the plaintiff may demonstrate a genuine issue

of material fact exists as to this element by identifying evidence that the purported

justification was pretextual. Id. at ¶ 51.

{¶20} As a general rule, absent a genuine dispute of material fact, courts do

not second-guess the business judgment of employers in determining personnel

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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

decisions. Wissler, 2010-Ohio-3432, at ¶ 37 (10th Dist.). Courts therefore routinely

grant motions for summary judgment in public policy exception cases where the

plaintiff fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to the employer’s

overriding business justification. Nance at ¶ 52, citing Sells v. Holiday Mgmt., Ltd.,

2011-Ohio-5974, ¶ 39 (10th Dist.).

{¶21} Here, UC presented an overriding business justification for its decision

to terminate Drake: that she violated its workplace policy prohibiting the unauthorized

access of patient PHI. The fact that Drake accessed the patient’s private health record

was undisputed; in fact, Drake herself admitted as much. This accordingly shifted the

burden to Drake to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact that her

termination was pretextual. See Nance, 2020-Ohio-3419, at ¶ 48 (3d Dist.).

{¶22} To establish pretext, Drake first argues that her conduct fell within the

scope of UC’s “legitimate business purpose” policy, as her access to the patient’s record

was brief, unintentional, and focused solely on obtaining the information necessary to

report the coworker’s alleged HIPAA violation. But Drake’s argument goes against the

plain terms of UC’s PHI policy. Under that policy, employees were only permitted to

access PHI in the treatment of a patient, for billing purposes, or to manage a

department. Drake’s access did not fall within any of these categories.

{¶23} Drake next points to UC’s progressive discipline policy in an effort to

establish pretext. It is true that UC’s written policy does not mandate automatic

termination for improper PHI access. But Drake offers no proof that it requires

corrective discipline before termination. To the contrary, UC’s chief compliance

officer testified that its strict practice is to automatically terminate employees who

inappropriately access PHI, and UC’s senior HR partner and Drake’s supervisor both

attested that they were unaware of any circumstance in which an employee was not

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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

terminated after UC discovered improper access of PHI. Absent any evidence that

UC’s policies require progressive discipline or that UC deviated from its standard

practices, we see no evidence of pretext in its decision to terminate Drake as a first

response.

{¶24} Drake next points to text messages she entered into the record between

herself and another UC employee, R.W., as potential evidence of pretext. Drake claims

that R.W. confirmed in texts that she had not been fired after her supervisor

determined that she improperly accessed PHI. But this alleged fact is not competently

demonstrated by the record. R.W. never testified or provided evidence, and R.W.’s

alleged statements to Drake in text messages about how she was treated at work are

hearsay. See, e.g., State v. Roseberry, 2011-Ohio-5921, ¶ 74 (holding that text

messages admitted for the truth of the matter asserted are inadmissible hearsay).

“Absent an exception, hearsay may not be considered in a motion for summary

judgment.” Pearl v. City of Wyoming, 2013-Ohio-2723, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.), citing Johnson

v. Southview Hosp., 2012-Ohio-4974, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.). As Drake has not identified any

applicable hearsay exception, we must therefore discount any statements attributed to

R.W. And absent R.W.’s texts, nothing in the record supports Drake’s argument that

other employees have engaged in the unauthorized access of PHI without being fired.

{¶25} We resolve two other points about pretext. Drake contends that her

supervisor and the senior HR partner provided conflicting testimony as to who made

the determination that Drake’s PHI access was inappropriate. We disagree with

Drake’s interpretation of the record, as both witnesses seemed clear that the

supervisor labeled Drake’s conduct in violation. But even if Drake is correct, and the

supervisor and the HR partner disagreed as to who made the decision, the evidence

still does not conflict on the ultimate question of material fact under the overriding

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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

justification element—why Drake was terminated. All UC witnesses agreed that Drake

was fired because she violated UC’s policy against the unauthorized access of patient

PHI. Drake therefore fails to point to a genuine issue of material fact between the

supervisor’s and the HR partner’s testimony.

{¶26} Lastly, Drake argues that HIPAA itself insulates her conduct. In doing

so, she relies in part on 45 C.F.R. 164.501, a federal regulation which defines the term

“health care operations” to include “management activities.” But UC’s overriding

justification for terminating Drake was not that she violated HIPAA; it was that she

violated UC’s policy against the unauthorized access of patient PHI. Thus, we do not

determine whether federal law permitted Drake to access the patient’s hospital

records, as that point is immaterial. It is clear that UC’s policy did not and that UC

fired Drake for this reason.

{¶27} Drake therefore failed to meet her burden of establishing a genuine

issue of material fact as to the overriding justification for her termination. As a result,

and based on the record before the court, reasonable fact finders could come to only

one conclusion on this element of the public policy test—that it was against UC policy

for any employee to access patient PHI without a legitimate business reason, that

Drake lacked such a reason, and that UC followed its strict practice of termination for

these violations. Drake’s claim therefore fails the fourth prong of the public policy

exception to at-will employment.

Conclusion

{¶28} Because Drake has not set forth evidence showing that a genuine issue

of material fact exists as to the overriding justification element of her claim, the trial

court did not err in granting summary judgment in UC’s favor. We accordingly

overrule Drake’s sole assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Judgment affirmed.

ZAYAS and MOORE, JJ., concur.

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