Doyle v. Aube - Ky. Appeal Reversed and Remanded

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April 10, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Elizabeth K. Doyle v. Alexander N. Aube

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2025-CA-1041
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
• Judges: Thompson

• Disposition: OPINION REVERSING AND REMANDING

• Opinion

• Authorities (2)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (4K)

• PDF

Disposition

OPINION REVERSING AND REMANDING

Combined Opinion

                        by [Kelly Thompson](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/7345/kelly-thompson/)

RENDERED: APRIL 10, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-1041-MR

ELIZABETH K. DOYLE APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM BOURBON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JEREMY MICHAEL MATTOX, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 25-CI-00120

ALEXANDER N. AUBE APPELLEE

OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING

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BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; CETRULO AND KAREM, JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Elizabeth K. Doyle (Appellant) appeals from an

order of the Bourbon Circuit Court dismissing her claims of breach of contract and

unjust enrichment against Alexander N. Aube (Appellee). That order granted

Appellee’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

Appellant, pro se, argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by dismissing

her complaint without findings of fact or conclusions of law; that the dismissal of
her action was inconsistent with the court’s prior order placing disputed funds in

escrow; and, that reversal and remand are required. After careful review, we

conclude that the Bourbon Circuit Court erred in ruling that Appellant’s complaint

failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Accordingly, we reverse

the order on appeal and remand the matter to the Bourbon Circuit Court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 1, 2025, Appellant, pro se, filed a complaint in Bourbon

Circuit Court against Appellee alleging that in September 2020, the parties entered

into a written agreement concerning a jointly-owned parcel of real property

situated at 2144 Violet Road, Lexington, Kentucky. The complaint alleged that the

agreement provided that profit from the sale of the parcel would be divided equally

and reinvested in the purchase of a new property.

According to the complaint, the Violet Road property sold for a profit

of approximately $84,000, with Appellant contributing her half of the profit toward

the purchase of a new home with Appellee in Bourbon County, Kentucky. She

stated that the new home was purchased for $275,000, and was listed for sale at the

time of the complaint at $329,000.

Appellant alleged that her $42,000 contribution represented an

approximately 15.27% ownership interest in the new property. She maintained

that Appellee failed to honor the written agreement by refusing to recognize her

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equity ownership or to pay her share of the anticipated profit in the sale of the new

residence.

The complaint set out three causes of action: 1) breach of contract; 2)

unjust enrichment; and, 3) constructive trust. It sought a judgment in favor of

Appellant in the amount of $60,935, and a declaration of Appellant’s equity

interest. Appellant also sought a constructive trust or lis pendens to preserve her

claim during the sale of the new parcel.

On May 23, 2025, Appellee filed a motion to dismiss Appellant’s

complaint, and motion to allow the sale of the Bourbon County property with the

funds held in escrow. In support of the motion, Appellee argued that the complaint

failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Specifically, Appellee

stated that,

Plaintiff [Appellant] has failed to properly allege the
existence of any breach or damages. She asserts the legal
conclusion that Defendant “materially breached the
[A]greement,” however she does not specify the
covenant that Defendant allegedly breached, nor does she
provide any factual allegation that Defendant was
required to perform any particular action. Moreover,
Plaintiff states that Defendant “fail[ed] to deliver
Plaintiff’s share of the proceeds,” however, Plaintiff does
not allege the existence of a sale of the property, or any
other action resulting in proceeds. Without a sale, the
proceeds upon which Plaintiff’s claim relies do not exist.
Put differently, Plaintiff has not alleged the existence of
any certain damages; instead, she has presented a
theoretical scenario as grounds for her breach of contract
claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to plead a

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necessary element of a claim for breach of contract, and
her claim should therefore be dismissed.

Appellee tendered to the court a proposed order dismissing

Appellant’s complaint.1 The circuit court entered the order on July 22, 2025, and

this appeal followed.2

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Since a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted is a pure question of law, . . . an appellate court reviews the

issue de novo.” Tucker v. Tucker, 623 S.W.3d 142, 145 (Ky. App. 2021) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS

Appellant argues that the Bourbon Circuit Court committed reversible

error in dismissing her claims with prejudice, and without findings of fact or

conclusions of law. She argues that dismissal with prejudice is an extraordinary

sanction that should be imposed only in the most compelling circumstances, and

only after careful consideration of the totality of the facts. She asserts that when

dismissal with prejudice is entered without findings of fact or conclusions of law,

1
On July 20, 2025, the circuit court entered a hand-written docket order allowing the sale, and
placing the funds in escrow. Thereafter, the parties entered into an agreed order memorializing
the July 20, 2025 hand-written order.
2
Appellee argues that Appellant’s brief should be stricken for failure to comply with Kentucky
Rules of Appellate Procedure (RAP) 32(A). We have chosen to ignore the deficiency and
proceed with the review. See Hallis v. Hallis, 328 S.W.3d 694, 695-97 (Ky. App. 2010).

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meaningful appellate review is frustrated and reversal is required. Appellant

argues that she asserted a facially valid breach of contract claim based on a written,

notarized agreement. As such, she maintains that dismissal of her complaint for

failure to state a claim was unwarranted and the underlying order should be

reversed.

The failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is a

defense which may be raised by a pleading or motion in response to a complaint.

Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 12.02(f).

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted admits as true the
material facts of the complaint. So a court should not
grant such a motion unless it appears the pleading party
would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts
which could be proved. . . . Accordingly, the pleadings
should be liberally construed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, all allegations being taken as true. This
exacting standard of review eliminates any need by the
trial court to make findings of fact; rather, the question is
purely a matter of law. Stated another way, the court
must ask if the facts alleged in the complaint can be
proved, would the plaintiff be entitled to relief? Since a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted is a pure question of law, a
reviewing court owes no deference to a trial court’s
determination; instead, an appellate court reviews the
issue de novo.

Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010) (internal quotation marks, footnotes,

and citations omitted). Thus, per Fox and Tucker, we owe no deference to the

Bourbon Circuit Court’s disposition of Appellee’s motion, and will examine the

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issues presented de novo. In so doing, we must liberally construe the pleadings in

a light most favorable to Appellant, characterizing all of her allegations as true. Id.

Appellant’s primary cause of action in the complaint is breach of

contract. In order to prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must prove 1) the existence

of a contract; 2) a breach of that contract; and, 3) that the breach resulted in

damages. EQT Production Company v. Big Sandy Company, L.P., 590 S.W.3d

275, 293 (Ky. App. 2019). As the matter is before us on the circuit court dismissal

of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, our role on review is merely

to determine whether the elements were alleged, not proven. Fox, 317 S.W.3d at

7.

Here, Appellant alleged in her complaint that she entered into a

written agreement with Appellee regarding the Violet Road property. She

maintained that the agreement stated that profits from the sale of the property

would be divided equally and reinvested in a new property, with both parties

benefitting equally irrespective of whose name appeared on the title. The

complaint further alleged that the Violet Road property was sold for a profit of

$84,000. Half of that sum represented Appellant’s share and was then reinvested

in the purchase of the new property with Appellee in Bourbon County, Kentucky.

More specifically, under the complaint’s heading styled “CAUSES

OF ACTION”, Appellant asserted that, 1) she entered into a valid, enforceable

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contract with Appellee; 2) she performed her obligations under the contract; 3) that

Appellee materially breached the agreement by failing to deliver Appellant’s share

of the proceeds and excluded her equitable ownership; and, 4) as a result,

Appellant suffered direct, financial harm. Appellant’s complaint sets out a claim

of breach of contract, and alleged that each element was satisfied. This constitutes

a claim upon which relief may be granted for purposes of CR 12.02(f). This is

especially true when we liberally construe the complaint in a light most favorable

to Appellant, and characterize all of her allegations as true. Fox, 317 S.W.3d at 7.

It is on this basis that we reverse and remand the order dismissing Appellant’s

complaint.

Appellant also argues that the dismissal was improper because it was

inconsistent with the circuit court’s prior order placing the disputed funds in

escrow, and that she was improperly denied due process. These arguments are

moot in light of our disposition of Appellant’s breach of contract claim.

Additionally, Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in failing to make

findings of fact in support of its order dismissing her complaint. No findings were

necessary, as the circuit court was required to characterize all of Appellant’s

factual allegations as true. Fox, 317 S.W.3d at 7.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the Bourbon Circuit

Court, and remand the matter for further proceedings.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Elizabeth K. Doyle, pro se Elias M. Little
Lexington, Kentucky Cynthiana, Kentucky

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