Domestic Violence Conviction Affirmed, Jail Credit Issue Remanded

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April 15, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Snow

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 1364
• Docket Number: C-250335

• Judges: Nestor

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (31.1K)

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Syllabus

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE — REASONABLE PARENTAL DISCIPLINE — R.C. 1.51 — JAIL TIME CREDIT: Defendant's conviction for domestic violence was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where there was video evidence showing the defendant punching her daughter and the court determined that that act was not reasonable parental discipline. The State could choose to prosecute the defendant for domestic violence and assault rather than endangering children pursuant to R.C. 1.51 because the child endangering statute contains different elements. The trial court erred by failing to award jail time credit where defendant spent one day in jail and the cause must be remanded for the trial court to award defendant proper jail time credit.

Combined Opinion

[Cite as State v. Snow, 2026-Ohio-1364.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-250335
TRIAL NOS. C/25/CRB/6690/A
Plaintiff-Appellee, : C/25/CRB/6690/C

vs. :

CIERRA SNOW, :

Defendant-Appellant. : JUDGMENT ENTRY

This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, the briefs, and arguments.
For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, the cause is remanded, and the appeal is
dismissed in part.
Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal,
allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed 50% to appellant and 50% to appellee.
The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the
Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial
court for execution under App.R. 27.

To the clerk:
Enter upon the journal of the court on 4/15/2026 per order of the court.

By:_______________________
Administrative Judge
[Cite as State v. Snow, 2026-Ohio-1364.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-250335
TRIAL NOS. C/25/CRB/6690/A
Plaintiff-Appellee, : C/25/CRB/6690/C

vs. :

CIERRA SNOW, :
OPINION
Defendant-Appellant. :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Cause
Remanded; Appeal Dismissed in Part

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: April 15, 2026

Connie M. Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Verjine V. Adanalian,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Christine Y. Jones,
Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

NESTOR, Judge.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Cierra Snow appeals her domestic violence

conviction. She argues that a punch to her ten-year-old daughter’s stomach was

reasonable parental discipline, that the State charged her under the wrong statute, and

that the trial court failed to credit her jail time. Because Snow’s chosen form of

discipline was not reasonable and because the State can choose which statute to

prosecute under, we affirm Snow’s conviction. However, the trial court erred when it

failed to credit Snow one day of jail time. Accordingly, we remand the cause only for

the trial court to correct Snow’s sentence.

I. Factual and Procedural History

{¶2} In April of 2025, Snow and her daughter, N.S., got into an argument.

Snow told her daughter to wait outside on the front porch. While outside, N.S. decided

to leave and walk to her grandmother’s house. When Snow went outside and N.S. was

gone, Snow got into her car and searched the neighborhood for N.S.

{¶3} While walking, N.S. saw her mother in the car. Snow told N.S. to “come

here.” N.S. continued to walk away and entered a neighbor’s yard. When asked why

she went into the yard, N.S. said she “went to the people’s house” even though she did

not know them “[b]ecause they were the only people outside.”

{¶4} N.S. walked into the yard of off-duty police Detective Derek Noland.

Detective Noland watched as N.S. walked up and Snow got out of the car. Detective

Noland testified that N.S. walked to the back of his truck in what seemed like an

attempt to put him between her and her mother. Snow walked over to Detective

Noland’s truck while N.S. had her back to the truck. Detective Noland realized this

was a family situation and initially did not want to intervene. Detective Noland

testified he heard Snow say, “[Y]ou’re getting your ass beat either way.” He thought

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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

that the situation was escalating, so he turned back and he saw Snow punch N.S. When

Snow punched N.S., N.S. doubled over and held her stomach for ten seconds.1

{¶5} Detective Noland immediately intervened. He told Snow that he was an

off-duty police officer and that he was calling for the police to come. Detective

Noland’s wife came and took N.S. away to sit on the porch. Detective Noland stayed

with Snow. Detective Noland testified that Snow “denied immediately [that it was a

punch] and [said] . . . it was an open-handed slap.” Officer Faehr arrived shortly and

talked with Detective Noland and Snow. Snow invoked her Miranda rights, and

Officer Faehr ended the questioning. Detective Noland showed Officer Faehr the

footage captured on his home security system that clearly showed the punch. Officer

Faehr then arrested Snow and took N.S. to Children’s hospital.

{¶6} This matter proceeded to a bench trial where Detective Noland, Officer

Faehr, and N.S. testified on behalf of the State. Snow did not introduce any evidence

to assert her defense that this was reasonable parental discipline but argued in a

Crim.R. 29 motion that the punch was reasonable parental discipline. The court found

Snow guilty of assault and domestic violence. The trial court sentenced her on June

4, 2025, and merged the assault charge with the domestic violence charge for

sentencing. Snow received a suspended sentence of 180 days on the domestic violence

charge. She was placed on probation for a year and was required to complete anger

management classes. Additionally, the court imposed a $500 fine and required Snow

to pay court costs, with the option of completing community service hours instead of

paying the fine. She now appeals asserting three assignments of error. Her appeal as

to the assault charge is dismissed as that charge was merged with the domestic

1 Detective Noland has a home security system that captured the incident. The recording was
introduced at trial by the State.

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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

violence charge.

II. Analysis

{¶7} Snow argues that her punch was reasonable parental discipline because

N.S. was not following her direction to stay on the porch. She argues she met her

burden to prove her actions were reasonable. She also argues that the State charged

her under the wrong statute. The State charged Snow with domestic violence and

assault, but Snow asserts that R.C. 1.51 required the State to charge her under the child

endangering statute. Lastly, Snow argues that the trial court erred by failing to award

jail-time credit.

A. First Assignment of Error

{¶8} In her first assignment of error, Snow argues her contact with her

daughter was reasonable parental discipline and did not meet the legal standard for

domestic violence. She argues that it was an open-handed slap, not a punch, that N.S.

is physically mature for her age so she was not vulnerable, that N.S. had no bruising,

and that Snow’s response was reasonable following unsuccessful attempts to discipline

her child. Ultimately, she argues her conviction was against the manifest weight of the

evidence.

1. Reasonable Parental Discipline

{¶9} “When evaluating a parent’s claim that a domestic-violence conviction

is against the weight of the evidence, we must consider whether the defendant

sustained her burden to affirmatively prove that she used only proper and reasonable

parental discipline.” State v. Thornton, 2022-Ohio-3452, ¶ 34 (1st Dist.), citing State

v. Ford, 2020-Ohio-4298, ¶ 27 (8th Dist.). Snow had the burden to show that her use

of discipline was reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at ¶ 31, citing State v. Faggs,

2020-Ohio-523, ¶ 20-24. The trial court considers the reasonableness of corporal

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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

punishment by evaluating all relevant facts and circumstances such as “‘the child’s age,

the child’s behavior that led to the parent’s action, the child’s response to noncorporal

punishment, and the location and severity of the punishment,’ as well as ‘the parent's

state of mind while administering the discipline.’” Id. at ¶ 35, quoting Ford at ¶ 28.

“While generally, a parent may determine how to discipline her child, parents may not

cause ‘physical harm,’ which is defined by R.C. 2901.01(A)(3) as ‘any injury . . .

regardless of its gravity or duration.’” Id. at ¶ 32, quoting State v. Suchomski, 58 Ohio

St.3d 74, 75 (1991).

{¶10} On review, “this court must review ‘the entire record, weigh the evidence

and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses and determine

whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and

a new trial ordered.’” Id. at ¶ 36, quoting State v. Bailey, 2015-Ohio-2997, ¶ 59 (1st

Dist.). “The weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily

for the trier of fact.” Id. at ¶ 37, citing Bailey at ¶ 63. “In reviewing a challenge to the

weight of the evidence, this court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror.’” Id., quoting State v.

Curry, 2020 Ohio App. LEXIS 1184 (1st Dist. Mar. 31, 2020). “This court will not

substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on the issue of witness credibility

unless it is patently apparent that the trier of fact lost its way in arriving at its verdict.”

Id., citing Bailey at ¶ 63.

{¶11} By arguing that her actions were reasonable parental discipline, Snow

admits that the offense occurred. Reasonable parental discipline is an affirmative

defense that Snow had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence. Faggs at ¶ 28.

{¶12} “R.C. 2919.25(A) provides that ‘[n]o person shall knowingly cause or

attempt to cause physical harm to a family or household member.’” Faggs, 2020-Ohio-

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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

523, at ¶ 14. “R.C. 2901.01(A)(3) defines the term ‘physical harm,’ as it relates to

people, broadly to mean ‘any injury, illness, or other physiological impairment,

regardless of its gravity or duration.’” Id. By punching her daughter in the stomach,

Snow knowingly caused physical harm to her daughter by causing an injury, regardless

of that injury’s gravity or duration. For Snow’s acts to be reasonable parental

discipline and not domestic violence, the acts must be reasonable and proper.

Thornton, 2022-Ohio-3452, at ¶ 34 (1st Dist.).

{¶13} At trial, Snow did not introduce any evidence to show that her actions

were proper or reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Instead, Snow

relied on the testimony of the State’s witness to argue her defense.

{¶14} Snow asserts that when considering the totality of the circumstances,

N.S. is physically mature, so this was a suitable punishment. Snow also argues that

N.S. was defiant and that the location of the punishment (outside, at a neighbor’s

house) is irrelevant. She additionally states that there is no testimony showing she

was angry. Snow argues other points that exceed the scope of the record and therefore

cannot be considered by this court. See State v. Gray, 2025-Ohio-4607, ¶ 35 (1st Dist.)

(a party may not raise an issue on appeal that it has failed to raise in the trial court).

{¶15} Contrary to Snow’s assertions, the trial court found N.S. to be physically

vulnerable. N.S. is ten years old and appears to be that age in the video. The court

found N.S.’s behavior to be improper but stated there is “nothing in the evidence that

justifies the conduct that [Snow] took.” The court did not have much evidence of N.S.’s

response to noncorporal punishment but found that “[t]here is very little, if any,

attempt to obtain compliance other than the physical assaultive behavior.” The court

found it concerning that Snow would hit her child so severely in public and in “broad

daylight.” Additionally, between the language Snow used and Snow’s actions, the trial

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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

court relied on circumstantial evidence to determine that she was angry and she was

not “engaged in an intentional, thoughtful attempt at imposing discipline.”

{¶16} Snow had the burden of proof for her affirmative defense. She did not

put on any witnesses nor provide any additional proof to persuade the trier of fact.

Snow failed to persuade the trial court to accept her version of events. See Faggs,

2020-Ohio-523, at ¶ 23 (“it is fair to ask the accused to introduce evidence in the form

of expert-witness testimony, lay-witness testimony, or his or her own testimony

regarding the factors and surrounding circumstances [as to] why the level of discipline

imposed was justified.”). Because this is a factual issue, we decline to disturb the trial

court’s judgment on appeal.

1. Observable Injury

{¶17} At trial and on appeal, Snow cited to the Adaranijo case from this court

to support her argument that her acts were reasonable. See State v. Adaranijo, 2003-

Ohio-3822 (1st Dist.). In Adaranijo, this court held, “without observable injury, or

without risk of serious physical harm, there can be no domestic-violence conviction

for a parent as a result of striking a child.” Id. at ¶ 13. In Adaranijo, a father was

charged with, and found guilty of, domestic violence. Id. at ¶ 2. This court reversed

the conviction because it found that Adaranijo successfully raised the affirmative

defense of reasonable parental discipline. Id. at ¶ 13.

{¶18} The lack of observable injury or risk of serious physical harm may have

guided this court in Adaranijo, but neither observable injury nor risk of serious harm

are elements of Ohio’s domestic violence statute. See Faggs at ¶ 14 (“R.C. 2919.25(A)

provides that ‘[n]o person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to

a family or household member.’ R.C. 2901.01(A)(3) defines the term ‘physical harm,’

as it relates to people, broadly to mean ‘any injury, illness, or other physiological

8
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

impairment, regardless of its gravity or duration.’”).

{¶19} This court recently discussed observable injuries again in State v.

Kyambadde, 2026-Ohio-24, ¶ 34 (1st Dist.). In Kyambadde, the defendant’s

testimony contradicted that of his children’s. Kyambadde at ¶ 6, 10, 12. During the

trial, Kyambadde sought to impeach his children as biased witnesses, but the trial

court did not allow him to do so. Id. at ¶ 2. On appeal, we held that this was an error

but that it was harmless because there was observable injury to the children. Id. The

photographic evidence of the injuries was enough to prove domestic violence even

though the children may have been biased. Id. Kyambadde demonstrates that

observable injury, while sufficient to support a conviction, is not required under the

statute.

{¶20} Here, unlike in Adaranijo, there is an observable injury. The video

evidence introduced at trial demonstrated Snow causing injury to N.S. The video alone

established the evidence needed for a domestic violence conviction. While Snow

argued this was reasonable parental discipline, she offered no evidence in support or

to challenge the State’s evidence. Domestic violence and the defense of reasonable

parental discipline present very fact specific questions. The case before us today falls

closer to Kyambadde with an observable injury establishing domestic violence.2

{¶21} Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s first assignment of error.

B. Second Assignment of Error

{¶22} In her second assignment of error, Snow argues that the State charged

her under the wrong statute. She argues that R.C. 1.51 required that she be charged

2 Showing an observable injury is not required by Ohio’s domestic violence statute. Ohio courts
have upheld domestic violence convictions without an observable injury. See State v. Behlke, 2017-
Ohio-7910, ¶ 10, 19 (9th Dist.); State v. Enoch, 2020-Ohio-3406, ¶ 23, 26 (11th Dist.). This court
has upheld a domestic violence conviction without observable injury. See State v. Cook, 2021-Ohio-
3841, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.).

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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

under R.C. 2919.22(B)(3), the more specific child endangering statute, instead of the

general domestic violence and assault statutes. Snow did not move to dismiss these

charges below, so she has waived that argument on appellate review. See State v.

Infante, 2020-Ohio-992, ¶ 11 (11th Dist.).

{¶23} Regardless, Snow’s argument fails because the endangering children

statute (R.C. 2919.22(B)(3)) contains different elements than the domestic violence

(R.C. 2919.25(A)) and assault statutes (R.C. 2903.13(A)). See State v. Edmiston, 2010-

Ohio-3413, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.) (“Because the crimes of public indecency and pandering

obscenity have different elements and proscribe different conduct under different

circumstances, a conviction for public indecency would not necessarily result in a

conviction for pandering obscenity.”). R.C. 1.51 only applies if there is a more specific

statute that punishes the same conduct as a more general statute but there are

different penalties under each statute. R.C. 1.51. When both elements are met, then

there is an irreconcilable difference, and the defendant must be charged under the

more specific statute. Id.

{¶24} To prove Snow guilty of endangering children under R.C. 2919.22(B)(3),

the State would have had to prove that Snow “[administered] corporal punishment or

other physical disciplinary measure[s] . . . [that were] excessive under the

circumstances and create[d] a substantial risk of serious physical harm to the child.”

Domestic violence and assault only required the State to prove Snow “knowingly

cause[d] or attempt[ed] to cause physical harm” to a family member for domestic

violence, or any person for assault. R.C. 2903.13(A); R.C. 2919.25(A). A conviction

for domestic violence does not require the same elements as a conviction for

endangering children. Because the statutes punish different conduct, they are not

irreconcilable and R.C. 1.51 does not apply. See Edmiston at ¶ 10.

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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

{¶25} We overrule appellant’s second assignment of error.

C. Third Assignment of Error

{¶26} In her third assignment of error, Snow argues she was not credited for

her one day in jail. The State concedes this point and acknowledges the proper course

is to remand. “‘When a trial court fails to include the appropriate amount of jail-time

credit in the sentencing entry, it commits plain error.’” State v. Lee, 2024-Ohio-3080,

¶ 19 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Bowden, 2015-Ohio-3740, ¶ 18 (1st Dist.). Snow had

a right to one day of jail-time credit that the court below overlooked. “[A]s the State

concedes, the trial court plainly erred by failing to include [Snow’s] jail-time credit

when it imposed the sentence[.]” Id. at ¶ 20.

{¶27} We sustain appellant’s third assignment of error and remand the cause

to the trial court so Snow may be credited for her one day served.

III. Conclusion

{¶28} Having sustained the third assignment of error, we remand the matter

for the limited purpose of awarding the appropriate amount of jail-time credit. See id.

at ¶ 22. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. The appeal is

dismissed as to the assault charge.

Judgment accordingly.

ZAYAS, P.J., and MOORE, J., concur.

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